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WAR DIARY
German Naval Staff
ODerations Division
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Part A
Vol. 50
OCTOBER 1943
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CONFIDENTIAL
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WAR DIARY OF THE GERMAN NAVAL STAFF
(Operations Division)
PART A
October 19^3
Chief, Naval Staff: Grand Admiral Doenitz
Chief of Staff, Naval Staff Vice Admiral Melsel
Chief, Operations Division, Naval Staff Rear Admiral Wagner
A Volume: 50
Begun: 1 Oct. 194;?
Closed: 51 Oct. 1943
CONFIDENTIAL
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
Washington, D. C.
Foreword
1. The Office of Naval Intelligence has undertaken to
translate important parts of the War Diary of the German
Naval Staff. The present volume, entitled War Diary of
th e German Naval Staffm Operations Divis i on, Part A,
Volume 50 is the twenty-sixth one of 'the series to appear.
Other volumes will follow shortly.
2. The War Diaries, Part A, are important because they
contain a day by day summary of the information available
to the German Naval Staff and the decisions reached on the
basis thereof. Together with the Fuehrer Conferences on
M atters Dealing with the German Navy, 1939-1945 , which have
been published by this office, the War Diaries should provide
valuable material for the study of naval problems arising
from total war. The War Diary, Part A, is also a useful
index to the German Naval Archives of World War II;
references may be found in the microfilm library of Naval .
Records and History.
3. Due to the cost of publication, only a limited number of
copies could be made; it is therefore desirable that the
copies which may have been distributed are available to
other offices which may be interested.
Washington, D. C.
1949
CONFIDENTIAL
1 Oct.. 19*0 CONFIDENTIAL
Items of Politics 1 Importance ■ ■■'<
According to British and Airier i'cair^press' reports ,-•• the. U. .3.;..., ."'
Senate has postponed the debate on the Fulbright resolution
suggestion U. S. participation in maintaining peace after
the "war. It is- apparent that- a crisis will arise regarding
the conference. The U. S. Government has expressed the
•wish, to meet in London instead of going to Moscow as arrang-
ed/ apparently to make it possible for 72 year- old Secretary
of State Hull to attend- Evidently. the Russians have not yet'
agreed. As regards the agenda of the conference, British and
American opinions -are divergent. ."The Times" writes appre-
hensively that an alliance between the Americans and British
alone Is one Ideology and that the world security can only
be built up on a foundation of British, American' and Russian'
unity. It is evident that U. S. policy does not follow the
Russian trendto the extent still regarded necessary in London
at present. The differences which are usual and natural in
such a war coalition are anyway quite evident at the moment'
and require most careful observation. These differences will,
however, still not be great enough to warrant any hope .of .a. ...
spontaneous relaxation of enemy pressure on us - either'
politically or strategically. It remains to be seen to. what;"-
extent any clear picture of the actual diplomatic and polit-
ical game can be- gained from press reports and other sources
of information, diplomatic included, even with a greater -in-
sight into these than Naval Staff has. The degree to which
the Foreign office and Priced Forces High Command are success-
ful in this is not known, since the supreme, commands are'
given no information or orientation. It' is therefore only '
possible with difficulty to obta in satisfactory recognition
of the special experiences ga ined from the individual sectors,
for example the naval officer's specific outlook, which is de-
tached from matters Continental* By reason of its nature this
cannot be restricted to purely military matters. What lends
special interest for the near future to the factors above •
.indicated within enemy coalition, is the reciprocal effect
of politics and "warfare. The question of the so-called
Second Front in Europe has a political aspect.' which is... : '....'■
just as important as its military one. The same applies to
the enemy's strategic plan in the Mediterranean, particularly
with regard to the Balkans and the Near East In view of
this reciprocal effect In. the. political and military game
.it is understandable If Nava.l. Staff is anxious to concern -
'itself with the problems of warfare as a whole and that
the limited opportunity in this respect is felt to a certain
extent as shortcoming.
According to Reuter, the-Badoglio Government has been re-
formed. General Ambrosio has been' appointed Chief of General
Staff, •'Roatte/ Chief.. of the Army Staff, Admiral De Courten,
Secretary of Navy, Genera l,Sandelli Secretary for Air.
According to "Exchange", Italy will' soon be regarded 'as- a-
"co-belligerent state".
.'■.•'.•.", :",v, r l r ^ CONFIDENTIAL-
1 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL
Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff
I. Army Situation :
In the southern part of the eastern front a full
defensive success was scored in the Melitopol sector against
a heavy enemy attack. The battles for the Dnieper bridgeheads
continue vith fluctuating success. Positions on the contemplat'
ed "East Wall" line have now been taken up from the s:uth as
far as Gomel. In the Smolensk sector heavy ebemy pressure
inflicted considerable losses on our forces. The Russians are
throwing in their men regardless of the cost. In Italjy and
the Balkans the situation is more or less unchanged.
II. Chief, Naval Staff announces that the Fuehrer-
wishes monitors to be improvised for the defense of the Iron
Gate.
Chief, Operations Division reports that the defense assign-
ment is already being carried out by parts of the Danube
Flotilla. Group South will be requested to investigate the
possible strengthening of defense b;v bringing up naval
landing craft. Chief, Naval Staff orders that Admiral,
Fuehrer Headquarters be advised accordingly for today's
situation report.
III. Chief, Naval Staff enquires regarding the state
of anti-aircraft defenses at Gdynia and the possibilities of
imm.ediate measures to increase them. The present .re infer cement
by 12.8 cm guns will still take many weeks owing to the
constuction of emplacements. Quartermaster General does not
consider the transfer of 8.8 cm. mobile anti-aircraft
batteries from Brest worthwhile, as their caliber is not
effective. This matter will be investigated further.
IV. Chie f, Organizations and Mobilization Branch,"
Quartermaster Division reports that Commanding Admiral, Group
South has again drawn attention to the considerable difficult-
ies in administration resulting from the withdrawal of
Naval Shore Commander, North Adriatic from the sphere of
Admiral, Adriatic. Armed Forces High Command has now withdrawn
its objections to the difference in the area boundaries, as
far as naval control makes it necessary. With the exception of
dockyards, Naval. Staff considers that every advantage lies in
the assignment of the North Adriatic to the area of Admiral,
Adriatic .
Chief, Naval Staff signifies his approval but stresses the
fact that Naval Shore Commander, North Adriatic must still'
%ee two sides" and is on no account to neglect the interests
of German Naval Command, Italy.
V. T he Naval Attache's Section reports that the
crew of submarine U "blY" will be transferred to Cartagena.
On arrival Lieutenant (s.g.) Brandi will "escape".
-2- CONFIDENTIAL
1 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL
Chief, Naval Staff orders that blowing-up of the submarine
must be ensured under all circumstances (on account of the
pis.tols in the bov tubes ). This would best be carried out
under the unobstrctive supervision of one of her officers.
The Naval Attache's Section further reports that Italian
ships -will sail from Las Palmas, i.e. are being handed over
to the enemy. • .
VI • Repo rt by Chief, Naval Intelligence Division
Discussions took place between Eisenhower and Badoglio
aboard the NELSON in La Valetta, probably on the use of
Italian forces .
A report of the German Ambassador in Dublin describes
Britain's inner power' of resistance as far lower than is
apparent from the majority of other reports. One must
take the writer's Irish environment into account.
According to a Portuguese report, the British and Americans
intend to take up the fight against Russia after the defeat
of. Germany; whether before or after the Japanese conflict is
settled is not jta.ted.
A report of the Greek Ambassador in Ankara confirms the ■
current rumor that the Russian Ambassador has requested
from the Turkish Government active participation in the
war on the side of the Allies . Turkey has refused. It is
assumed that Russia's step was instigated by exhaustion
and fear of the Turkish armed fcrce being intact at the
end of the war.
VII. Chief, Operat i ons Division reports on the agree-
ment between Germany "ancT England regarding the exchange of
seriously wounded prisoners, which is to start on 8 Oct.
according to the British proposal and on 12 Oct. . according
to the German proposal, in Gothenburg, Oran/Marseilles and
Smyrna. For details see War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIi:
i
Special item s ■-...:./..'•'.■
I. In order to co-ordinate defense of the Scheldt,
Group West and Naval Command, North have, agreed that as from
20 Oct. the whole artillery group "Zeebrugge" be transferred
to Admiral, Netherlands without any change in the previous
area boundaries .
II. According to the previous arrangement, overlapping
in the Memel sea area between Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic
-3- CONFIDENTIAL
1 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
and Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic is unavoidable.
Naval Command, Baltic proposes therefore that the boundary
be moved to the line Polangen-TJtlaengan. The entire Memel sea
area will thus come completely in the'area of Commanding Admiral,
Defenses, Baltic so that uniform command is guaranteed.
III. Commander in Chief, Navy has put into force for the
Nav^ the directive for the Shipbuilding Commission, issued
with his approval by the Minister of Armament and Ammunition.
The following order is given: "Up to now cooperation between
warship construction and weapons development has been lacking.
In future all efforts must be concentrated to the full on
completion of 1943 Fleet Construction Program."
To attain this objective "Coordination of Ship, Weapons and
Equipment" I order the following:
"All naval research departments will without delay submit to
the Shipbuilding Commission a written survey of the devel-
opments at present in preparation or already in progress. If
the Shipbuilding Commission then wishes to have certain projects
canceled, in order to concentrate forces, and if an agreement
cannot be reached I am to be called on to make a decision.
In future the Shipbuilding Commission is first to be advised
of developments contemplated and its approval obtained before
any orders are given for these'.'
For copy of directive as per l/skl 29919/43 geh. see War
Diary Part B, Vol. V.
Situation 1 Oct.
T~. War in Foreign Waters
Nothing to report.
11. S ituation West Area .
Enemy Situation:
Only four enemy planes were reported over the Bay
of Biscay; this is the lowest number ever reported unless
(and this is unlikely) interception of radio traffic is no-
longer an indication of the actual number of enemy planes
on operation. One British vessel was located in BF 2?o0 at
2319 and another in BF 5120 at 2330. On 30 Sept. fishing
vessels equipped with radar were detected in BF 8356 and 92? 1.
-4- • CONFIDENTIAL
1 Oct'. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL
If postive results are obtained by our air reconnaissance
operating on the afternoon of 1 Oct. it is planned to send out
our destroyer sub-division on 2 Oct. to seize the suspicious
vessels .
Own Situation :
Atlantic Coas t;
Four submarines were escorted out and two in off Lorient,
Brest and La Pa 11 ice. One mine was swept off the Gironde and
another off La Pallice.
In order to seize the fishing vessels, destroyers should, if
necessary, put out on the night of .1 Oct. so as to be in pos-
ition 70 miles southwest of the mouth of. the Gironde at
dawn. . Commander, 8th Destroyer Flotilla with destroyers Z
"24" and Z "32" will be transferred to Royan roads in read-
iness .
Submarine Division requests a decision on the proposal of
Commander., Submarines, West for bringing out the • FLIEDER .
Escort, as. in the case of our submarines, is proposed. If
it Is desirable for reasons of prestige, escort by torpedo
boats may be considered, In agreement with the Commander
of the FLIEDER, Submarine Division recommends a normal
escort, as torpedo boats offer no protection but only
endanger the submarine. Naval Staff decides in accordance
with the proposal. " "_
Channel Coast: ■;
At 1730. an enemy vessel, apparently attempting mine-
sweeping in our barrage, was fired on five miles north of
Calais. At 2320 the target was located hy radar six miles
northwest of Boulogne. From 23^5 onwards, enemy vessels were
detected off Boulogne by radar and searchlights and attacked
by our batteries . One landing boat caught fire and capsized;
the remaining : boats turned away. The capsized boat (200 GRT)
was towed in to Boulogne and beached. The enemy's intentions
are not yet known but minesweeping is possible.
During the night of 1 Oct. the transfer of the LIVADIA with
torpedo boat T "19" from Le Havre to Dieppe will continue. In
addition the 5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla will be transferred from
Cherbourg to Brest. The projected mine laying operation by
the 2nd, 4th., ;• 6th, and ,6th PT Boat Flotillas on theconvoy
route between. Harwich and Great Yarmouth was broken off as
visibility deteriorated.*
III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters
1. North Sea :
-5- CONFIDENTIAL
1 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL • ■
"•'... .<
During the night of 1 Oct. the 7'th Minesweeper
Flotilla and the 9th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla are" to carry
out mine laying operation "Fafnia" west of Terschelling.
Otherwise nothing special to report.
2. Norway/ Northern Waters:
Enemy Situation:
Over the North' Sea 18 planes were' detected on
.operation. Photographic reconnaissance .of 28 Sept. revealed:
At Murmans k: 1 destroyer in dry dock, 1 torpedo boat on
slipway, 13 vessels, apparently minesweepers, some being
fitted out and on slipway, 1 repair ship, 1 special service
vessel, 1 torpedo boat of the "S 11 class, .2 vessels,
apparently PT boats,'! submarine (Presumably of the "E" class)
in floating dock, 1. submarine on slipway and 17 freighters
with a tonnage of 62,000 G.R.T. The total number of, ships ■> ■.?.-.::•.'»■?
in harbor is almost unchanged since August.- .;.;{■.-.
Polyarnoye: 4 submarines, 1 vessel, presumably a submarine
supply- ship, 1 tanker (about 3,000 G.R.T. ), one vessel,. .
apparently a motor minesweeper. The number of submarines
detected in this port has decreased. ^.: —
Our aerial reconnaissance sighted on 1 Oct. at 0925 in.^AM . .
2151 1 cruiser, 2 destroyers, 3 escort vessels and 2 large
merchantmen on course 300 degrees; also south of the Faroes
1 merchantmen and 1 destroyer on course 270 degrees-.' • -•---- -
Reconnaissance with single planes was detected in the Bana.k;
and Petsamo-Vardoe area on 29 and 5*0 Sept. At 0651 the mine-
layer PARIS was unsuccessfully attacked with an aerial torpedo
by a Boston in the .harbor of Honningsvaag. ■ ■
Own Situation:
At I855 on 30 Sept.. the Norwegian steamer ST. . SVITHUN
(1,376 G.R.T. ) was attacked off Stadtlandet by five enemy
planes with bombs and machine-guns and set on fire. She
was beached off Buholmen. Rescue work. Is hampered by a
southwesterly sto-rim. .'.' :,'':*
In the' area of Haval Command, Norway.' 22 ships' were . escorted,
north 'aiid 22 south. In the Arctic. Coast- area 14 ships were
left lying in harbor owing' to la ck /of escorts . The Task ■
Force reports that one of 'the enemy midget submarines was
salvaged and beached. Investigation will commence on 2 Oct.
Submarine Group "Wilking" , ..operating along the West Siberian
route reports sinking altogether 15,000 G.R.T. of merchant
shipping. The Group is now homeward bound.- On© boat is to
bring along the rest of the crew -of the Russian steamer from
Hope Island. •
"^5"= CONFIDENTIAL
1 Oct, 19^3 " CONFIDENTIAL
IV... Skagerra k , Baltic Sea En tr ances , Baltic Sea
1. Enem y S 1 1 ua t i on :.' '
In Kronstadt Bay and airing the. Islands in the
Gulf, of Finland the situation is unchanged.
Admiral, Baltic States reports the appearance of partisans
in the Libau and Windau area. North of Libau a truck carrying
twelve Latvian auciliary police was ambushed and eight men
■were killed; the bandits escaped.
^ • Own Situation;
The five Danish gunboats engaged in patrolling the
Sound were laid up, since the crews had to be returned to
the large minesweeper MRS "11".
The steamer RADBOD (4,354 G.R.T.) ran aground south of Kjelsnor
Salvaging is under way.
Effective 1 Oct. the previous offices of Coast- 1 Defense
Commanders, Western Baltic, Pomeranian Coast and Eastern
Baltic are abolished and Coastal Defense Commanders-, Central
and Western Baltic now established.
The LUETZOW and PRINZ EUGEN put in to Gdynia.
On the afternoon of JO Sept. two mine detonations were observ-
ed east of Tyters. West of Lyserort the steamer NOGAT' was attac-
ked by a twin-engined torpedo bomber.
Two patrol boats are standing by off the Latvian coast as anti-
aircraft defense for steamers expected at d^wn.
V. S ubmarine Warfare '
1. Enemy Situation:
According to/a'n Intelligence, report from Portugal
a convoy will sail from Portland (Maine) during the first '
days of October with approximately: 15,000 U. S. and Canadian
troops as well as war materiel on board ^nd will probably
join up with a .convoy to Boston. Destination - England.
2. Own -Situation: ■ ■-< ■
Evaluations of radio intelligence show that the
two convoys expected in the North Atlantic actually are in
a position further to ' ■■
7- CONFIDENTIAL
i Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL
"Rossbach" has, therefore, been ordered to take up new
disposition AD 8511 to AK jBjk on 2 Oct. at 0800. It is
evident that the enemy is reacting to the serious defeat
of the last convoy battle by resorting to very rapid. and
decided deviations. It is very doubtful whether, in view
of the small number of submarines and the large area to be
covered, the convoy will be intercepted. Without our own
air reconnaissance this is more or less a matter of chance.
Naval Staff informs the Naval Attache in Tokyo that our
submarines have arrived in the operational areas off Mombasa,
in the Gulf of Aden, off the southern point of India and off
Bombay. Another submarine is expected in three days off the
Gulf of Oman. The submarines will remain about four weeks in
their operational areas.
Submarine successes are reported from Northern Waters and the
Mediterranean. =-.
VI. Aerial Warfare
1. British IslesQgjj Vicinity:
The 3rd Air Force had 25 planes out on operation
over England, 27 over the Atlantic and 10 over the Mediterranean.
The attack by 18 planes on the convoy intercepted west of
Cape Finisterre was unsuccessful. It is intended to repeat
this operation with stronger forces.
During the day the enemy attacked airfields and traffic
installations in Belguim and France.
At noon 25 Fortresses from the south flew into the upper
Lake Constance area. Fifteen bombs were -dropped on Feldkirch;
115 of our fighters shot down five Fortresses.
A large formation, also coming from the south, flew in to
Austria and dropped 60 bombs on Wiener-Neustadt . According
to reports so far, 54 of our fighters shot down 10 out of
50 - 60 Liberators, 7 of our planes being lost. The damage
caused at the Messerschmidt plant was less serious than in
the first attack.
During the night of 1 Oct. 300 bombers made a heavy 1 raid
on the Rhine - We stphalian industrial area, concentrating on
Hagen, where considerable damage is reported. Anti-aircraft
batteries shot down one bomber; although 19 of our fighters
went up they scored no successes.
-8- '
CONFIDENTIAL
1 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL
2.. Mediterranean Theater :
The 2nd Air Force reports only slight transport
activity from Corsica because troops are engaged in loading
ships. As soon as this is completed, however, increased air
transports are to be expected. Our planes were out on
reconnaissance flights.
Air Force Command, Southeast made' another attack on shipping
in Leros . One destroyer and one freighter were damaged.
Further attacks were made on Kos to prepare for our landing
operation.
Air reconnaissance of Beirut was not possible. The enemy
air activity over the combat area was normal. The airfield at
Frosinone and the city of Bologna were raided, but damage only
slight.
Six enemy reconnaissance planes were detected over the Aegean
Sea .
3- Eastern Front:
Nothing is reported from the Army front. The 5th
Air Force reports 24 planes out on reconnaissance flights.
VII. Warefare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea
1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:
Two transports escorted- by five destroyers left
Gibraltar presumably for the Atlantic. At noon eight loaded
U. S. tankers, carrying planes as deck cargo- passed Tangier
on easterly course. Two of these, entered Gibraltar, followed
by a cruiser of the DIDO class also from the Atlantic. At
1400 the following were lying in Gibraltar: 3 ILLUSTRIOUS
class, 5 destroyers, 7 corvettes, 3 transports, 56 freighters,
8 tankers, etc.
No reconnaissance reports have been received from the western
and eastern Mediterranea .
Reconnaissance of 'the Italian area brought little result owing
to the small number of planes on operation. Ten ships were
sighted north west of Palermo and 10 also 60 miles north-
northeast of Bizerta. The course and speed of these two
units were not ascertained. In the afternoon 1 light cruiser
and 1 destroyer were, off the west coast of Sardinia- on
westerly course.. In the Gulf of Salerno 70 ships were counted.
Thirty miles south of Salerno there were 7 ships proceeding
south and 90 miles south of Salerno 12 ships proceeding south
and 90 miles south of Salerno 12 ships proceeding West. New.
-9-
CONFIDENTIAL
1 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL
enemy landings -were observed at Caste 11a ma re near '.Naples .
Naples "was occupied by the enemy after our forces had finally
withdrawn. The increased numer of hospital ships between Italy,
Sicily and Tunisia indicates considerable enemj losses.
Submarine activity has increased between Bastia and the'
mainland.. Our convoys were attacked on 29 and 30 Sept. and
on 1 Oct. On 30 Sept.' the leading ship of the lobster boat
flotilla was sunk.
On the afternoon of 30 Sept. a small convoy was sighted 30
miles south of crotone on course .'ribrtheast. The number of
merchantmen in Bar i has increased slightly.- ., •
Naval Staff, Operations Division has drawn' up a preliminary;
survey of the whereabouts of the Italian Fleet. For copy as
per 1/Skl 1 m 29.806/42 gen, see War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.
This statement shows that out of the original 8 battleships
5 are in enemy hands and 2 in ours. The eight battleship was
sunk. The 2 heavy cruisers are in our hands.
Out of the 15 light cruisers , 7 are in enemy hands', 5 in ours
and 1 Is interned in Spain. The thereabouts of the remaining . .•
2 cruisers is not known.
Out of 28 destroyer s 11 are in enemy ha ids, 5 in our hands and
3 are interned in SDain. One was sunk; the hereabouts of 8
destroyers is not kn-'Wh. v-:
Of 66 submarines 13 are in enemy .hands, 7 in our hands and 3
were destroyed; 43 submarines have not been located.
2. Own Situation Mediterranean:
The PT boat operation during the nights of 29 an; n
30 Sept. had to be broken off on account of the weather.
Minelaying operation "Pomme'rn" was also postponed' until ...': •■.
1 Oct. because of the weather. Ferry traffic from Corsica
to Leghorn was carried, out as planned despite air : and submarine
attacks. This will probably be. 'Completed already on 3 Oct;:
T*wo of the seven enemy fighters which attacked three naval-
landing craft off Bastia on 29 Sept. were shot down* On the .-.■
s.ame day four of our transport planes were shot down by enemy
f ighters which flew out from Sardinia .
Naval Staff asks German Naval Command, Italy whether ground
mines were laid in the harbor of Naples. If not, the 2 nd Air
Force should be urged to lay aerial mines.
Submarine U "410" , firing five single torpedoes on a westbound
convoy
-10-
CONFIDSNTIAL
lOct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
sank a steamer of 8,000 GRT in CJ 7718. Since four addition-
al detonations were heard, it is probable that further
steamers were sunk and damaged.
3. Area Naval Group South : /■■.-"-. '•.'■• ■
a . Adriatic Sea :
One small steamer, 7 auxiliary sailing vessels
and 7 auxiliary fishing vessels were captured' at Zara . Che
company of the 1st Motorized Naval Communications Division left
Belgrade for the ' Dalmation coast under.' its. own power.
b. . Aegean Sea :
On 50 Sept. and 1 Oct. MIlos and Candia were
attacked by single enemy planes. .
The disarmament of Italian troops on -Andres has been carried
out. The next action is being prepared against. Paros and
Antiparos. Minesweeping on the "Trikkeri" barrage is. being
continued. North of Skiathos passage another enemy barrage
was detected, from which 18 mines Mark XIV were swept. Three
boats of Minesweeping Group Attica are engaged in clearing a
barrage gap in the entrance to the harbor of Argostoll. •"
For instructions from Group South to Admiral, Aegean regarding
the crew of the Italian Hospital ship GRADISCA see teletype
2040.
c . Black Sea : . .. •
At 2035 an enemy submarine was located .70 miles
west of Sevastopol.
Operations by our PT boats and patrol units off the south and
north coasts of the Tainan Peninsula and east of .Genichesk were
withoot result. Three boats of the 1st PT boat Flotilla were
sent out during the night of 1 Oct. against enemy naval forces
and supplies in the Anapa - Cape Utrish area.
Otherwise nothing to report. :
VIII. Situation East Asia . ■ '"■
ii.— ■ m i , n — — ■ — — 11 — ■ .|| 1 f 1 ,,„ — 1-^ ■— ■!■
Nothing to Report. - ........
■ .< CONFIDENTIAL
2 Oct. 19.53: ... ; CONFIDENTIAL
Items of Political .Importance . . .
Nothing to report. : ... .
Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff
I. Army Situation:
On 1 Oct. no large-scale actions took place on the eastern
front. The inactivity in the southern sector is obviously
caused by the heavy losses suffered by the enemy, especially
in the Zaporozhe area . The battles for the Dnieper bridge- •
heads continue with varying success. Enemy attacks In the :
sector of Army Group Center no longer- shoved the same impetus
as hitherto. The areas of Gomel and Smolensk are the main
points of attack.
In Italy it appears that the forces ve had available were
insufficient to hold the Foggia area. There is increasing
partisan activity, somes times under British leadership, in
Northern Italy. _ :
British and French troops appeared for the first time, on
Corsica. There are still approximately 6 ,000 of . our own
troops' and 1,500 motor vehicles as veil as numerous anti-
aircraft guns on the island. All tanks and assault guns
have been taken off.
The Apennine line In the Florence area is being strenghtene'd.
II. a. Quartermaster General reports that an order has
been received from the Reichsmarschall for concentration in
the production of anti-aircraft guns on heavy ones , chiefly
12.8 cm. caliber. Super -heavy anti-aircraft guns ("15 and 24 cm.
which are being developed) have been dropped. Anti-aircraft
rockets are the only ones In the calibers above. 12.8 cm,, which
are still to be manufactured and their output is expected to
benefit from the above restrictions. This will, however, not
effect the Navy.
b. Group West reports that out of 100 Italian officer
and 1,000 enlisted men, 10 officers and 70 men have declared
their adherence to the cause; 70 officers and 450 men have-
volunteered for labor service. Twenty officers and ] -l^ r ' ren
refused any further cooperation.
III. Chief, Naval_Qrdnance Division reports on a meeting
with the General War Office and Commander, Replacement Arm?,
regarding preparation of the Fuehrer's directive through which
the Ministry of Armament and Ammunition is to be granted the
right to inspect and dispose of all stocks of the Armed Forces.
On 4 Oct. a final discussion on this matter will take place
under the auspices of Chief, Armed Forces High Command. The
-12- CONFIDENTIAL
2 Oct. 19^3 ■— CONFIDENTIAL
point of view of the Navy, as. approved by Commander
in Chief, Navy, is that the Ministry must naturally be
furnished a survey' on all stocks but that. these can only
be surrendered with the consent of the branches of the
Arned Forces concerned. It is pointed out in this connect-
ion that the Navy nowhere has excessive stocks of materials
which are in short supply.
With regard to the armament conference at Gdynia and the
Gauleiter convention at Posen, Commander in Chief, Navy
orders that new weapons and new submarine tactics are not
to be discussed.
IV. C hief, Naval Intelligence Division: The first reports
from abroad on the convoy battle in the North Atlantic are now
to hand. According to Reuter, more than 6 freighters and j - 4
escort vessels were lost, including the Canadian destroyer ST.
CROIX, from which the crew of 14? was lost except for one
survivor. The submarines are said to have attacked two convoys
and it is assumed that new and deadly torpedoes were used.
Reports from the United States mention torpedoes with acoustic
control.
Chief, Naval Intelligence Division also submitted a final
report on enemy merchant shipping losses for the month of
September. (For copy as per l/Skl 30012,A3 geh. see War Diary
Part D, Vol "Enemy Shipping Losses 19*13"). The number of ships
sunk was 59, totalling 202,584,GRT, out of which our sub-
marines accounted for 16 vessels totalling ?6,392 GRT.
V. In a Highly Restricted Circle :
Following a report by Quartermaster General :>n
strengthening the anti-aircraft defense of Gdynia, Chief,
Naval Staff decides that completion of the final emplacements
for 12.8 cm. twin anti-aircraft guns is to be awaited.
Quartermaster Division, Fleet Branch, Air Defense Section
reports on the anti-aircraft defense of Pillau, Memel and
Libau and states that personnel is lacking for the material
which is available for strengthening defense. Chief, Naval
Staff orders that Chief, General Naval Administration Bureau
should assess personnel requirements by the niddle of October.
With regard to smoke-screen defense, Air Defense Section
proposes that no change be made in present arrangements.
Chief, Operations Division urges that the re -formation of
smoke-screen battalions with Italians be investigated and
Naval Command, Baltic be. ordered to investigate the possibilit^
ies of dispersing berths in Gdynia.'
-13-
CONFIDENTIAL
2 Oct. 19^3 . CONFIDENTIAL
VI. Chief, Na,val Staff again discusses the failure
of technical developments, which lest summer -led to the
break-down in submarine -warfare. It is the second time
that technical deficiency has robbed the submarines of
great successes. Even now heavy pressure has been nec-
essary to urge technicians to speed up research work. The
"Zaunkoenig" torpedo was not to be ready for operational
use before 1944.
Special Items
I. Operations Division had expected the eleven boats of
the zero series- of the multi-purpose .boat to be put into '..'.'.
construction Independent of completion of the first boat.
It agrees, however, because of the difficulties reported by
the Shipbuilding' Commission, that construction of the
eleven boats shall not commence until after the first boat;
has been tested, ' if this emergency meesure is offset by
arranging quotas of minesweepers and nor or minesweepers so
that output is possible at least of the number requested.
II. The Swedish Naval Attache In Berlin has reported 1 that,
according to Swedish experiences, the duretionof minefields
in waters where there are currents is relatively short, since
the mines go adrift a fter 8-9 months ; lie has asked for a
report on German experiences in this matter. ''. . '
This is. obviously a ruse in order -to obtain data on the
durability of German mines, e.g. those used in J the "West
Wall". Probably Sweden was astonished at the protracted
efficacy of our Ska gen barrage (loss of the ULVEN)'.
The Naval Attache's Section is given the following guide
for an evasive, reply: ....* " . '
"The Swedish .Navy's unfortunate experiences on the limited
duration of minefields can only be confirmed to a certain ...
extent. Numerous drifting mines with broken goring -rope :"■
are continually discovered. These mines are of German, as .,
well as of British origin; they are mostly obsolete. A proof
of the good durability of the German mooring ropes is the
large barrage east of Ska gen which is- still effective though
laid over three years ago. This is shown by the loss of the'.
Swedish submarine ULVEN." ••
-14- CONFIDENTIAL
a Oct. 1943 ''• CONFIDENTIAL
Situation 2 Oct.
I. War in Foreign Water s
All units operating in foreign waters are advisee.
regarding the enemy situation by Radiogram 0902.
Otherwise nothing to report.
H- Situation West Area ■'.
1. E nemy Situation: .-'.-',; '.'. \
Over the Bay of Biscay 20 planes were detected on
operation. The following were located: one British vessel at
1905 in BP-4548 and one at 20^3 in BF 4518; 1 U. S. vessel at
2100 in CG 4720.
Our aerial reconnaissance reported:
at 1320 1 light cruiser on course 270 degrees in BE 6772; :
at 1340 32 merchantmen, 8 guardboats and 1 cruiser on course'
360 degrees in BE 5986;
at 1840 a convoy consisting og 17-19 merchantmen with 5
guardboats 2-3 destroyers and 1 vessel, presumably a
cruiser, on course 360 degrees in ..BE 9719*
As regards the vessels successfully attacked during the night
of 1 Oct. off Boulogne, of which one landing boat was brought
in, Group West no longer adheres to its previous assumption of
a minesqeeping operation. It seems most likely that- the enemy's
aim was to land sabotage detachments between the. harbor and
batteru at Mont de Couple or between this battery and Cape
D'Alprech or, if more vessels were taking part, to seize
radar sets located there,- The enemy plan was successfully
frustrated by prompt detection and accurate hits on the
leading boat.
2. Own Situation: '
Atlantic Coast:
One ELM/A mine was swept off Brest and one off lie
de Re. Altogehter 7 submarines were escorted in to Brest, St.
Na zaire, La Pa 11 ice and the Gironde.
-15-
CONFIDENTIAL
2 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIA
Torpedo boats T "22". "23". "24" and "25" ^ero transferred
from Concarne.au .to Brest. The operation by a destroyer sub-
division against steam trailers was postponed for 24 hours,.-....'.
C hannel Coast :
Three ELM/A mines were swept off Nieuport. The : LIVADIA
■was escorted from Le Havre to Dieppe by 13 escort vessels.
Further passage to Boulogne is postponed for 24 hours.
Four boats of the 6th Minesweeper Flotilla and torpedo boat
T "19", vhile being transferred, became involved in an
engagement "With seven vessels of the 2nd Motor Minesweeper
Flotilla towards 0300 off Cayeux between Boulogne and Dieppe.-
Both Flotillas fired at each other with all calibers for
approximately ten minutes. The command, boa ts of the Flotillas
were quite unable to stop the engagement although they were
aware of the true situation. The incident, which entailed
casualties amounting to 4 dead and 14 seriously wounded as I
well as some damage to the boats, was ceused by the blowing-up :
of star shells which were intended for the detection of an
unknown target located by radar, but which misfired.
Considering the facts available, this must be regarded as one
of those unfortunate incidents which in wartime can never be
entirely avoided. .>'; '■'.•'■
For detailed report by Group West see teletype 1437.
A minelaying operation on the convoy. route Harwich - Great
Yarmouth by the 2nd, 4th, 6th and 8th PT Boat Flotilla and
a torpedo operation by the 5th PT Boat Flotilla against a
convoy off the southeast coast are scheduled for the night
of 2 Oct.
III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters
1. North Sea:
North of Terschelling and Ameland altogether 8
ELM mines were swept. Emden was heavily raided from 1450 -
1710 by a U. S. bomber formation with fighter escort.
For details see "Aerial Warfare".
Commanding Admiral, Defenses., North, reports . that a deep-
water route for special purposes has been prepared by a
double sweep and requests permission to search and sweep
the remainder of barrage "3". For sailing directions see
teletype 1845.
Naval Staff has approved as requested.
. : ... •■..■ ■■'■' CONFIDENTIAL
-16- '
2 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL
2. Norway; Northern Waters :
' i' * i i
Enemy Situation:
Eighteen planes were detected on operation; over
the North Sea. Slight gunfire was observed in the Petsamo
area and slight aerial reconnaissance in the Yard ow area.
Our air reconnaissance of Longyearbyen on 1 Oct. estab-
lished that the coal dumps there /were still smouldering
Own Situation :
In the area of Naval Command, Norway Ik vessels and
1 submarine were escorted north and 11 vessels south. In
the Arctic coast area 15 ships qere delayed owing to lack of
escorts.
Chief, Naval Staff has decided that twelve submarines are to
remain in the northern area. Order to this effect from
Naval Staff has been sent to Group North/Fleet, Admiral,
Northern Waters, Commander,. Submarines, Norway and Submarine
Division.
Submarine Division has arranged withdrawal of the. submarines
so as to leave Commander, Submarines, .Norway s:ix boats
which are at present at sea, also five which will be ready
for operations in October and a twelfth, the date of .operation-
al readiness of which is not yet certain. "Nine submarines
will be withdrawn for operations in the Atlantic.
IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea : '■■'■
1 . ' Enemy Situation:
Only slight gunfire is reported from Kronstadt
Bay. The steamer NORDSTRUM was unsuccessfully attacked by
a torpedo bomber which was again observed southwest of Windau
and off Sworbe.
2 . Own Situation: •,
A mine was swept off schulzgrund by mine-
exploding vessel "13", which was slightly damaged.
Naval Command, Baltic transmitted a report from Admiral,
Denmark according to which the police raid on Jews carried
out in Denmark during the night of 1 Oct. was a failure,
since most of the Jews, warned by rumors, had hidden. A
mass flight of Jews -to Sweden has- also started. Admiral,
-17- CONFIDENTIAL
2 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
Denmark further reports that according to telephonic
advice from Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff,
demobilization of the Danish Armed Forces -will probably
commence next -week. Admiral, Denmark interprets this to
mean that obviously there will be no. recruiting of SS
volunteers ..
Convoy and transport traffic in the entire Baltic Sea
area vas carried out according to plan. Nothing special
is reported from the area of Commander, Minesweepers,
Baltic and Admiral, Baltic States.
Armed Forces High Command, Supply and Transportation Office
of the Armed Forces Overseas advises that, in view of the
enemy aerial torpedo attacks on hospital ships and. leave
ships as well as on merchantmen proceeding to and from the
Baltic States, this traffic must cease as long as escort
and air Cover are not provided. (See teletype 2224).
Naval Command, Baltic advises Operations Division for
information of instructions issued to offices concerned
dealing with the situation and plans for escort of .vessels
to and from the Baltic States. For copy as per l/Skl 2?644/43
Gkdos. See War Diary, Part C, Vol. III.
It is of primary importance to equip all ships proceeding to
and from the Baltic States with 2 cm. anti-aircraft guns,
to establish an anti-aircraft relay escort from Kolkas to
Backofen by four heavy gun carriers of the 24th Landing
Flotilla, to have the 3rd Patrol Boat Flotilla, which
will be withdrawn from the Gulf of Finland, carry out anti-
aircraft escort of specially valuable ships and tankers and,
finally, to establish air patrol by the 102nd Bomber Wing.
Moreover, merchantmen have been advised to keep a sharp
lookout and to avoid the run from Demesnes to Libau at dawn.
Attempts should be made, until all .merchantmen are equipped
with anti-aircraft guns, to have unarmed ships proceed to-
gether with one that is armed. As -regards armament of merchant
men in the Baltic, Operations Division has issued revelant
instructions to Quartermaster Division and requested re-
armament of all merchantmen passing north of the line Memel -
southern point of Oeland. If possible Finnish merchantmen too
s ho old be armed. The first request; in this connection was
already made on 2.5 Sept.. to Quartermaster Division.
V. Submarine Warfare
On the basis of .evaluations of radio intelligence,
the patrol 1 ne of Group "Rossbach" was once again mov:
50 miles further north into the line AD 8133 - AK 392;
Otherwise nothing special to report from the Atlantic.
-18- CONFIDENTIAL
2 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
VI. Aerial Warfare.
1 . British Isles and Vicinity:
The 3rd Air Force reports the number of planes out
on operation as 60 over England, 15 over the Atlantic and 3
over the Mediterranean. A mine laying operation was carried out
over the Humber area by 56 planes, of -which 4 did not return.
Einden was raided between 1640 and l r ,<40 by/200 - 250 enemy
planes .mostly 4-engined ones, which came in over the Heligoland
Bight. Our fighters, numbering 244, went up in defense and
brought down 3 enemy planes but themselves lost- 10. Consider-
able damage was caused at Emden. Amongst other things, a slip-
way and a submarine were badly damaged at the Nordseewerke.
The Schulte & Bruns Dockyard was hit by 30 high explosive
bombs, causing a. 95$ deficit in production; a floating deck
with crane sank. At Cassens dockyard all machines in the
workshop and forge were destroyed. A floating dock with a
patrol boat sank and a patrol boat was heavily damaged.
Production deficit is 75^. At the State Dockyard the pro-
duction deficit is 60fb. One steamer, two tugs and two barges
sank and further vessels were damaged. Traffic on the Ems-
Jade Canal will be interrupted for 8 to 10 days owing to
hits on the locks. Furthermore, naval barracks and labor
camps were badly damaged.
The enemy obviously still regards Emden as a center of
submarine production, possibly remembering the first "World
War. Actually submarine construction at Emden is extremely
small.
During the night of 2 Oct. about 70-80 planes carried out
mine laying (probably heavy) in the Heligoland Bight and
the western part of the Baltic Sea.
Approximately 300 planes flew into southern Germany via
Belgium and carried out a heavy raid on Munich where exten-
sive damage was caused to residential districts as well as
to industrial installations .-
Twenty further planes carried out nuisance raids over
Duisburg, Dortmund and Remscheld, causing only slight damage.
With reference to the attack of 1 Oct. on Wiener-Neustadt,
it is now reported that this was carried out by 8l enemy
planes of which 6 were brought down by anti-aircraft guns and
19 by our fighters, of which 47 were sent out. Of the 25
Fortresses which raided Feldkirch, presumably as an alter-
native target to Augsburg, 2 were shot down by fighters
over northern Italy and 6 over home territory. In addition
it is reported that 8 Fortresses made forced landings in
Switzerland.
-19- CONFIDENTIAL
2 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
According to Swiss press reports, Swiss anti-aircraft
guns opened fire on several of the U.S. planes flying
over and actually shot -down at least one. '.
2. Mediterranean Theater ;
The 2nd Air Force reports reconnaissance activity
over the area of Corsica - Salerno - Palermo. Following the
loss of four Arado 196' s on transport operations from Corsica,
these planes will be withdrawn. Air Force Command, Southeast
reports a successful attack on Leros end the airfield of Kos .
Over Crete our fighters brought down two enemy planes.
In Italy the enemy carried out continuous fighter-bomber
and machine-gun attacks over the Army Front'. Two planes were
over Rome.
Over the Aegean Sea 14 reconnaissance planes were observed.
An unsuccessful attack by 6-- 8 enemy planes was carried out
on Rhodes . • .
3. Eastern Front: -
On 1 Oct. the 4th Air Force carried out photographic
reconnaissance of Black Sea ports. For evaluations see Enemy
Situation, Black Sea. ; A:-
Ten planes of the 5th Air Force carried out reconnaissance.
West of Ireland 4 merchantmen with 3 destroyers and 2 escort
vessels were sighted on course 210 degrees.
VII . Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea
lv Enemy Situation Mediterranean;
At 0815 (obviously 1815, Tr.N.) a. cruiser of
the DIDO class which put in to Gibraltar in the morning
put out for the Atlantic. A convoy' of 22 loaded freighters
left Gibraltar in the evening for the' Mediterranean.
report from Cape Spartel, a convoy of 5^
•tankers and 10 destroyers passed the line
Cape Trafalgar between 1700 and 1800 on
and passed through the Straits of Gibraltar
No reports on air reconnaissance have been received from the
western and eastern Mediterranean.
According to a
freighters , 10 •
Cape Spartel -
easterly course
at 2000.
-20-
CONFIDENTIAL
2 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL
In the Tyrrhenian" Sea. rough interpretation of photographic
reconnaissance over the Salerno beachhead shows en increase
in the numbers of cruisers and large landing boats. No
convoys were sighted between Salerno and Sicily.
At 0930 there was a cruiser with two destroyers on south-
easterly course 60 miles Least of Cagliari. No further land-
ings at Caste llama re were observed.
2. Own Situation Mediterranean: ■-
During the night of 1 -Oct. the minelayer POMMERN
broke off her operation after laying three barrage sections,
but will resume it during the night of 2 Oct. Ferry traffic
from Corsica by large vessels and barges continues according
to plan.
Submarine chaser "2210" was unsuccessfully attacked by an ■;■■
enemy submarine off Porto Ferraio.
On 30 Sept. the auxiliary minelayer LAURANA was commissioned
in Venice end on 2 Oct. the minelayer CROTONE was commissioned
in Spezia .
At 0102 30 miles northeast of C^pe Tones submarine U-"223"
heard two hits on a steamer of 10,000 GRT and observed a
hit each on a destroyer and a steamer 8,000 GRT. Commander.,
Submarines, Mediterranean assumes that all three vessels -
were sunk. According to a report from submarine U "81",
there was an enemy destroyer group in the Strait of
Otranto during the night. Submarine U "380" is heading
for Salerno Bay.
German Naval Command, Italy has requested immediate shipment.
of 450 EMC mines to Toulon for mine laying operations north
of Corsica and off the Ligurian coast by the minelayers
POMMERN and AQUI . Naval Staff has arranged for shipment of
the 431 EMC mines available. The mines, however, only be ....
released after presentation of an exact mine laying plan,
since the shortage, of mines makes it imperative to 'restrict
barrages to areas which can be defended by us. :' .:..-..: .
German Naval Command ? Italy had requested on 4 Sept.. closing"
of the approaches to the central Adriatic in a Tine from
Cape Gargano to the island of Korcula with 520 SMF or 1260 ."
EMC mines, and asked for allocation., of two to four mine-
layers from the area, of Group South. Developments • in the ',
situation in Italy at tiv o t time made it appear 'most urgent
to defend the Aegean Sea and the Dalmatian c oa s t ; further-,
more, enither sufficient mines nor minelayers were avail--,
able. Accordingly Naval Staff on 10 Sept. re jected the
minelaying project and promised available mines and mine-
layers to Group South for defense of the Aegean Sea and
east coast of the Adriatic. On 26 Sept. German
-21 CONFIDENTIAL
2 Oct. 19^3 CO NFIDENTIAL
Command, Italy repeated the request, and proposed that the
Adriatic minefield be laid immediately by Group South . In
addition it requested 72 UMB and 200 EMC mines for oper-
ations by PT boats and naval landing craft off the southern
ports of the east coast of Italy and reported the imminent
commissioning of small Italian minelayers equipped with
Italian mines and of one naval landing craft for German mines.
Operations Division has approved the latter request. Naval
Ordnance Division, .Underwater Obstacles Branch has been order-
ed to supply the mines to the Mining and Barrage Command,
Venice. As regards the Adriatic barrage, Naval Staff deems it
expedient, because of the situation in the southern part
of the Adriatic which is by no means under control and in
view of the short supply of mines, to continue to con-
centrate mine defense on the coastal areas. Group South is
of the same opinion and also reports that the Adriatic barrage
cannot at present be laid by minelayers of Admiral, Aegean
as this might jeopardize the entire mine laying plan in the
Aegean area. On 29 Sept. Operations Division advised Group
South and German Naval Command, Italy as well as Admiral,.
Adriatic for information, of its views and entrusted
Group South with responsibility for the defense of the -
Adriatic Sea area including the southern approaches, with •
orders to investigate the possibilities of a barrage approx-
imately off Ancona. Furthermore, Group South . is. to submit
as soon as possible plans and requirements for mine, defense
of the east coas t of the Adriatic. ■:.
German Naval Command, Italy is also to report the mines and
minelayers available in Trieste to Group South and Admiral,
Adriatic, while Group- South is to .investigate, the possibility
of diverting minelayers from the Aegean for. the tasks in the-
Adriatic Sea area and on the east coast of this. . area .-
On 1 Oct. German Naval Command, Lfcalj submitted the v^ew
that an EMF barrage in the Adriatic off Gargano> combined
with anti-submarine barrages • laid in the direction of the
enemy, even without possibility of patrol, can decidedly •
hinder or check an enemy operation in the Adriatic, par-
ticularly a thrust into the partisan area with landing
craft. German Naval Command, Italy, therefore, asks for
increased shipments (of mines,: Tr.N) to Venice. The Italian
east coast ports will be mined with Italian mines. Oper-
ations Division has ordered Group South to investigate
the suggestion made by German Naval Command, Italy, .
considering, facilities available, and has advised German.
Naval Command, Italy that further shipements of mines are at
present impossible, except 100- cutting floats, and that it .
should resort to Italian mines-.
-22 CONFIDENTIAL
2 0ct : .;i9% -C ONFIDENTIAL
3. Area Navel Group South : . -; . •; , . • .
8 • Adriatic Sea ; •'
Of the steamers proceeding south from, the
northern Adriatic, the motorship POZARICA en route from
Trieste to Cattaro put into Zara, as the route South of .
Sibenik .is not navigable owing to shelling from land.
The steamer. DEA MARCELLA -was probably sunk there, on the
same route. The steamer MERANO has turned back.
b. Aegean Sea : ..■■..'• ■._..-.
. ' On the afternoon of 1 Oct. a strong enemy
formation which flew into the arep of Suda Bay was scatter-
ed by our fighters, which Drought down three enemy plants.
On 1 Oct. the landing operation on Kos , code word "Eisbaer",
commenced. Army troops boarded steamers and na.val vessels
which sail from Piraeus, Suda and Cahdia in three groups and
meet west of Naxos . :. r.,« ..'.■
Operational control rests with Admiral, Aegean and tactical
control at sea with Commander, 21st Submarine Chaser Flotilla
The landing on Kos is set for 3 Oct. at 0^00. So far the
operation is proceeding according to plan.
c. Black Sea :
Enemy Situation:
According to photographic reconnaissance of 1
Oct. the following were lying:
In Poti:
1 battleship, 1 heavy cruiser, 2 destroyers, 1 of
them in dock, 6 submarines, 3 of them in dock, 7 motor
minesweepers, the submarine accomodation ship NEWA, 15
freighters ,etc.
In the Schopi estuary:
The hulls of 1 cruiser and 1 destroyer were made out and
2 submarines, 3 PT boats, 1 tanker, 8 freighters and other
vessels were detected.
In Oshemshiri:
There were 3 submarines, 6 motor minesweepers, k of
them on slipway and also 2 submarine escort boats.
23-
CONFIDENTIAL
2 Oct. 1945 CONFIDENTIAL
Own Situation:
The enemy carried out air attacks on Feodosiya,
■where two motor minesweepers were heavily damaged and
casualties sustained, on Senna^a and on a convoy from
Kerch to Feodosiya. Our fighters reported that one enemy
plane was shot down...
During the night of 1 Oct. our motor minesweepers were in
position off the southern outlet to the Strait of Kerch
without sighting the enemy. When putting in to Feodosiya
they were bombed by enemy planes without success.
Repeated enemy air attacks were also made by day on the
naval landing craft and naval artillery lighters in patrol
lines north and south of the Taman Coast.
Two naval landing craft returning from the south Taman coast
struck mines and became total losses.
Submarine U "9" -put out from Constanta into the operational
area .
Otherwise nothing to report.
VIII. Situation East Asia.
Nothing to report.
* * * ■* * * ■* * * ■* * * * ■* -X- * *
-24-
: CONFIDENTIAL
5 Oct. 19^3 ■:.;., .., CONFI DENTIAL
Items of Political Importance .
According to British press reports , Spain, Switzerland,'
Sweden and Portugal have decided for the time being not to
recognize the new; Facist-Republican Government ■ of Italy.
However, the Badoglio Government also is'not yet recognized;
by these countries. According to Swedish reports from London,
Russo-Polish tension has increased to such an extent that an
inter-Allied crisis is feared. Churchill's diplomacy will be
put to its hardest test yet in order to prevent a conflict..
According to a Reuter report from Washington, emanating from
apparently the best informed source, the opening of the
second European front will be advanced bj more than a month
compared to the Quebec plan, because of the speedy development
in the situation in Russia and in Italy. General Marshall is
said to be making preparations to leave Europe. The British,
U. S. and Russian Supreme Commands regard Europe now as the
only theater of war. All preparations are said to be uncer-
way. Practical execution will be the main topic at the Allied
Staff discussions soon to commence.
According to the "International News Service", the U/'S.
State Department has dr.^wn up a : pl°n for post-war cooperation
with Russia, in preparation for the Three Power Conference
in London or Moscow, which plan is s^id toprovidea system.
for maintenance of lasting peace. The United States have,
according to Reuter, dropped the plan to hold the conference
in London instead of in Moscow, in view of Russian objections.
British newspapers are again discussing the possibility of a
Portuguese declaration of w^r on Japan.
The strikes for wage increases continue in the British Arma-
ment industry.
Confe rence on the Situation wi t h Chief, Naw 1 Staff
I. Army Situat ion; ■ '••
The situation on the whole is satisfactory- on the eastern
front. There were no large-scale actions on 2 Oct.'..
I taly;
The withdrawal from Corsica should be completed by 3
Oct. The Fuehrer has ordered that the line Gaeta - Ortona
is definitely to be held. Two divisions will be moved up
from Northern Italy. If this is successful, the surrender
of Rome will thus be avoided.
-25-
CONTINENTIAL
3 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTI AL
Mopping -up operations in the Goerz area are completed and
will be followed 03 similar operations in the Pola, Trieste
and Flume areas. .■ .
II. According to advice from -Admiral, Fuehrer Headquarters,
the Fuehrer has expressed concern regarding a possible
enemy landing In the Crimea and considers the concentration
of all naval forces for defense to be imperative.
Chief, Operations Divisi on reports in this connection that
the following are available for defense of the Crimea:
6 submarines, 3 of them in operational .readiness : 10 PT
boats, k of them in operational readiness; 17 motor mine-
sweepers, 12 of them in operational readiness; 7 naval
artillery lighters, 6 of them in operational readiness
(4 in sea of Azov, the remained in the southern Crimea);
5 Italian CB boats (midget submarines, Tr.N.) all of
them in operational readiness; 9& naval landing crafty
70 of them in operational readiness (35 of these are re-
quired for increasing escort duties in the western part'
of the Black Sea ),
Rumanian naval forces cannot be used for defense of the
Crimea. No additional German forces from home "waters can be:
allocated in view of the exceedingly, tense situation In
all areas. No reserves are '. available. ... •
Chief, Naval Staff orders that Admiral, Fuehrer Headquarters
be informed' at once and his attention drawn to the Fleet v.:
Construction Program for 19^3, which should ensure the
most urgent naval requirements. , ■•>■•.. • ■■' =
For teletype l/Skl 2772O/ 2 Gkdos. see War Diary., Part C,
Vol. XIV a.
III. On the evening of 2 Oct. Operations Division received
telephonic advice from Armed Forces High Command, Operations
Staff through competent authorities that, as regards demob-
ilization of members of the Danish Armed Forces, plans,- have .
been revised. It is intended to carry out demobilization '-'.
also of regular soilders within the. next few days.
Instructions to this effect from Armed Forces High Command,
Operations Staff were received on the evening of 3 Oct. For
copy as per l/skl 27736/43 Gkdos .. see War .Diary, Part C,
Vol. III. According to these- instructions , recruitment for
the Schalburg Corps and River Ra ilway Police is to commence
after non-commissioned 'officers and enlisted men are demob-
ilized. ; :
It remains to be seen whether recruiting will still be very
promising after what has happened meanwhile. Further, Chief
26 "~ CONFIDENTIAL
§
3 Oct. 19^5 CONFIDENTIAL
Operations Division reports on difficulties "which have
arisen as regards the exchange of seriously wounded between
Germany and Britain because the Foreign Minister refuses to
report to the Fuehrer the result of negotiations so for, so
that adherence to the date fixed (12 Oct.) is questionable.
It will be impossible to adhere to the date if the Fuehrer's
final instructions are not issued today. For details see
War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII.
Chief, Naval Staff orders that Chief of Staff, Army Group B
be advised of the negative decision regarding the appointment
of the negative decision regarding the appointment of Vice
Admiral Ruge, with special reference to the fact that the
latter is not an expert on coastal defense. •
S pecial Items
I. • The Shipbuilding Commission - Sub-Commission /Lane ing
Craft - reported on 28 Sept. that the immediate setting-up
of a construction site for nav^l landing cr°ft and n^val-
artillery lighters in Salonika, as requested by Naval Staff ,
cannot be carried out. ..'. ■>.■ , : -...i"-
Naval Staff must nevertheless insist most emphatically, on
its demand; naval landing craft cannot be dispensed' with in
the Aegean Sea for the extensive tasks of minelaying, escort
submarine chase, etc. and -also as freight-carriers.
Siebel ferries can only -be used to a certain extent in these
operations. Quartermaster Division therefore requests the ■■'*'■
Shipbuilding Commission to take the necessary steps without
further delay so as to make up for lost time.
II. Operations Division, Special Weapons Division (Vice
Admiral Weichold) has ascertained from Prince Borghese the
present situation regarding material and personnel of the
Italian special weapons available, with a view to quick
establishment of fighting power and operational readiness..
Naval Staff contemplates setting up the 10th Italian PT.
Boat Flotilla as a volunteer corps with Italian personnel
under the command of Prince Borghese, since there are no^
forces available for the establishment of a German unit
and new training would take too long. The- Borghese unit
would be put under Admiral Legnani. German Naval Command,
Italy would submit operations requirements to Legnani,
would supervise, through the liaison officer to the 10th
Italian PT Boat Flotilla, Its training, activity and
-27- CONFIDENTIAL
3 Oct. 19^3 ■ CONFIDENTIA L
conduct and would expedite, through the Cocrr-anding .Generals-
Armed Forces, establishment of /war readiness., as well- as .
current material requirements, by means of Italian dockyard '
and industrial facilities. ';;
Naval Staff advises German Naval Command, Italy of these
plans and of' the fact that Prince Borghese will leave foK. .
Rome on 3 Oct., in order to contact Admiral Le.gnani, The'
position of the former German Liaison Officer of Armed
Forces High Command, Intelligence Division to the 10th
Italian. PT Boat Flotilla remains unchanged for the time.
being.
III. With regard to the considerations put forward by k:
Operations Division on the enemy mine offensive against
our submarine bases in the Biscay area (see War Diary
5 Aug.), the views of Group West and Commanding Admiral,
Defenses, West, as requested, have in the meantime been
received. Both Commands fully agree with the basic state-
ments of Operations Division and their reports, especially
the one of Commanding Admiral, Defenses , West, contain
various requests and recommendations which have been follow
ed up in detail or are still under consideration by Naval. '
Staff. •• •<
The following are dealt with: All anti-mine measures and
defense against mines, including navigational aids of a . '?:'
technical as well as of a tactical nature. For further ■: :■■•'■
details see order l/Skl IE 26140/43 Gkdos. and l/Skl,
IE 27542/43 Gkdos. in files IE 15, Vol.: 3- ';•::/ -
IV. In brief Report No. 4/43 regarding the situation:
on the eastern front, Naval •Intelligence Division 'reports ■
on the following, among.- other- things : . .;■
Re-occupation of Novorossiisk by the Russians on 10 Sept.;
armored boat flotilla in the Sea of Azov; ships sunk In the.
Arctic by submarines and awards conferred. For copy as for
l/Skl 30186/43 geh. see War Dipry,- P^rt D, "Data on the ■•■
Enemy Situation 1943". . ..-..• ...'.'■
Situation 3 Oct. . j : \
I. War in Foreign Wa ters
Nothing to report, ;■
~ 28 " CONFIDENTIAL
3 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
II. Situation West Area'
1. Enemy Situation:
Over the Bay of Biscay 42 planes were detected on
operation. Between 1918 and 2140 one British vessel each
was located in BE 9890, AL 68lQ s BE 9440 and AM 44?0.
Our air reconnaissance reported at 0951 ^ freighters
tanker and 6 destroyers on course 250 degrees in BE J>1q2
5 —
From 2115* vessels were located in the Channel west of
Boulogne, northwest of Calais and in Les Sept lies area.
2 . Own Situation :
Atlantic Coast:
Seven submarines were escorted out of Brest, St.
Na zaire and La Pall ice. The tanker NORDVAARD left Brest at
I65O with escort Lezardrieux. Air Commander, Atlantic Coast
plans to guide the destroyer sub-division to steam trawlers
with radar on 4 Oct. So far this operation had to.be post-
poned owing to fog.
Channel Coast:
Torpedo boat T "19" put in to Flushing in the
morning,. Torpedo boats T "22", "23". "25" and "27" left
Brest at 1900 for transfer to St. Malo; The convoy of the
steamer LIVADIA from Dieppe to Boulogne was carried, out
with 14 escort vessels and is- scheduled to continue- t: Ostend
at 2400. At 2331 British long-r*nge batteries fired on one
of our westbound ©envoys between Blanc-Nez ' and Gris Nez with-
out effect; our batteries returned fire.
Two ELM/ J mines were swept west of Zeebruegge and 14 ELM/A
mines between Nieup-ort and Ostend.
The PT boat mine laying operation during the night of 2
Oct. was canceled on account of bad visibility. The Torpedo
operation by the 5th PT boat Flotilla was not carrier; ; o'ut
owing to negative air reconnaissance. •
Group West transmits a report of Commander, 2nd Coast patrol
Force on the brief reports of the 6th minesweeper Flotilla and
the 2nd Motor Minesweeper Flotilla on the. exchange of gun-
fire during the night of 1 Oct.
For copy see teletype 1610.
•29-
CONFIDENTIAL
3 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
111 • North ■■' Sea / Norws y , Northern Wa ters
1. North Sen:
Patrol operations were to some extent hampered by
unfavorable weather. . Three ground mines were swept west of
Scheveningen. In the Dutch coastal area s, few bombs were .s
dropped by enemy planes. No casualties or damage sustained .
Patrol boat "2009" was set on fire off Vere by eight enemy
planes and capsized, casualties being sustained. Minesweeper
M "438" was' damaged in an air attack of Wemeldingen. •
For report of Naval Command, North on the heavy enemy attack
on 2 Oct. on Emden see teletype 0801.- ■ The damage caused was
already reported on 2 Oct. Under "Aerial Warfare".
2 . Norway, Northern Waters :
Enemy Situation:
Over the North Sea 23 planes were detected on
operation. On 1 Oct. and 2 Oct. single reconnaissance planes
were reported in the areas of Banak and Nordkyn.
Own Sit uation:
On 2 Oct. the steamer ROTENFELS (8,000 GRT) carry-
ing a cargo of ore went aground while lying anchored off
Roervik. The ship was damaged and towed off.
Seventeen vessels were escorted, north and .18 south. The
Task Force reports that during the night prior to the
midget-submarine attack and on the morning itself the
barrage gap to the TIRPITZ net enclosure was open owing -
to continuous boat traffic with teletype station "Dosskopf".
During darkness the gap was patrolled by a sailing smack
manned by TIRPITZ personnel. Furthermore, the hydrophone
station aboard the TIRPITZ was manned until broad daylight
at 0700. .••..;•-. ' ;
This report gives decisive, .information on the submarine's
penetration into the net enclosure.
Meteorological operation "Kreuzritter". began from Hammer f est
on the evening of 2 Oct. and operation "Schatzgrae'ber 11 was
commenced on 3 Oct. 0310. • • .■
Group North/Fleet has transmitted to the 5th Air Force
30- ' CONFIDENTIAL
3 Oct. 19^3 ■ CONFIDENTIAL
agreement of Chief, Naval Meteorological Service to the
installation of a meteorological station on Hope Island
for the Air Forces; a naval station will not be set up-.
Admiral, Northern Waters has orders to communicate direct
with the 5th Air Force regarding prepart ions for this
project as well as transport and instant ion of the station.
IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entranc e s, Baltic S ea
1 . Ene my S i t ua t ion : ■
Minor gunfire and slight patrol bo^t traffic
were observed in Kronstadt Bay. Eighty planes flew in over-
Denmark, the Baltic Sea entrances, Fehmarn Belt, Luebeck
Bay and the central part of ' the Baltic, apparently on
mining operations. A returning Liberator was shot down by
naval anti-aircraft guns in the outer Kiel estuary.
2. Own Situation:
Three ELM/A mines were swept in the Fehmarn area
and five in the central part of the Baltic.
Group North/Fleet' submits a brief report of the ? LUETZOW on
her transfer from 23 Sept. to 30 Sept. For copy see teletype
1232. In the whole Baltic Sea area convoy and transport
traffic was carried out as ■ planned and. without^ incident.
The Finns swept four Russian ground mines in the P or ka 11a - :
Helsinki channel on 2 Oct. •
The heavy gun carriers of the 24th Landing" Flotilla 'on
barrage patrol in the "Seeigol" area were relieved by the
2^th Minesweeper Flotilla and will transfer to the Irbcn
Straits as anti-aircraft defense for merchant shipping.
V. Submarine Warfare
From the patrol line of Group "Rossbach": "'two submarines
report an attack by enemy planes which, however, caused no
damage. Three submarines of the patrol' line were probably
sighted by planes, according' to" radio' intelligence. These •'■ >
planes are possibly the advance reconnaissance- of the await-
ed convoy. It is possible that the convoy has already passed
31 CONFIDENTIAL
3 Oct. 19^3 confidential
the patrol line, and, If so, it -will no longer be possible
to intercept it.
No further important reports have been received from the
Atlantic.
VI . Ae rial W arfare
1. British Isle s pnd Vicinity :
The 3rd Air "Force had 15 heavy fighters out :n
free lance opera t ions over the Atlantic. Two enemy planes
are reported shot down. Nine bombers attacked airfields ■
in the Bedford area and 16 heavy fighters attacked airfields
in the Cambridge area .
During the day the enemy attacked airfields and patrol
vessels in Holland. Four airfields and several boats were
damaged. Two enemy planes were brought down.. In Belgium
the airfield at Beauvais Tille was badly damaged. In
Western France, Le Havre and Fecamp were raided as well
as the electric power plants at Mur de Bretagne, Le
Treport and Orleans. Three enemy planes were shot down.
Over Germany there was lively reconnaissance activity by
single planes in the northwest and in the Baltic Sea area.
During the night Cassel was heavily raided by about '• 3Q0 '....;
enemy planes. Our fighters, numbering 26l, went up in defense
and shot down 15 planes, theselves losing 8. The damage to
industrial and traffic installations in Cassel is serious.
For particulars see "Daily Situation".
2. Mediterranean Theater:
The 2nd Air Force reports an attack by five
fighter-bombers on LST r s off Termoli. One LST was damaged.
Air reconnaissance was also- carried out. The enemy carried.'
out reconnaissance in the Bologna - Padua area and raided
Civitavecchia. In addition, continuous attacks are reported
from the front.
3. Eastern Front:
Fifty two enemy planes were shot down over the:' ■:,
Army front on 2 Oct. We- lost one plane. Nothing special is
reported by the 4th and 5th Air Forces .
~32-
CONFIDENTIAJ
3 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
VI I . Warfare in the Med 1 ter ra ne an a nd Bis ck Sea
~L • Enemy Situation :
On the evening of 2 Oct. 3 tankers, 1 freighter,
2 escort vessels end 16 vessels, presumably minesweepers ,
put in to Gibraltar from the Atlantic. On 3 Oct. 7 destroyers,
and, at 1415,. the VALIANT put in from the Mediterranean.
One DIDO class put out on the evening destination unknown.
The large eastbound convoy -which entered the Mediterranean
on the evening of 2 Oct. was not detected again.
Our own air reconnaissance in the Corsica - Sardinia area
was incJr.plete because- of unfavorable weather. Only a few
reports Were received ^Iso from the Tyrrhenian Sea. At
O85O.4 torpedo boats and 3 landing boats on course west
northwest were sighted 10 miles east of Cagliari.
The hunt carried out for the submarine which attacked
submarine chaser "2210" seems to have been successful;
according to a report from German Naya.l Command, Italy,
Submarine chaser "2208" reports having out-maneuvered a
spread of three torpedoes southeast of Rapallo, Submarine
chase was taken up by her and later on continued by a- ■
motor minesweeper. • .••:
Motor minesweeper R "212" was unsuccessfully attacked by
an enemy submarine off Bastia.
According to photographic reconnaissance the following were
lying in Taranto at 1025: ':
3 light cruisers, including an Italian one, 3 destroyers:,
2 torpedo boats,. 6 vessels, apparently torpedo boats, 6-
submarines, 3 of them in dock, 53 small vessels (naval),
10 LST's. 1 large passenger steamer. 3 tankers, 19 freighters.
Only a few light naval forces were detected in Brindisi but'
the number of freighters ■■ had increased. In the harbor of
Termoli 4 ships were observed, apparently for the first time
enemy vessels. : v
^ • Own Situa tion:
On 2 Oct. 2300 PT boats unexpectedly sighted a
receding convoy 40 miles northeast of Ustica. Fuller reports
have not yet been received. This confirms that conveys are
out at sea at night.
Commander, Supply and Transport, Corsica reports at 2300
33- CONFIDENTIAL
■j. Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL
■2
the completion of evacuation. From 1? 15 Bastia was under
enemy fire. PT boats were disposed erst of Corsica as flanking
defense for ferry traffic.
The minelayer POMMERN has completed her operation according
to plan. The escort boats LIDO and SCARP ANTO. were commissioned
in Venice. In the area of Naval Shore Command, West Adriatic
an escprt group of five vessels and a H°rbor Defense Group a
Venice are being formed. Preparations are being made for the
formation of a submarine Chaser group, The manning of three
coastal batteries in the Venice area has started.
Submarine U "6l6" left Toulon for Salerno Ba\. Submarine U
"410" has now reported on arrival, in connection with her
successes of 1 Oct., that the sinking of the steamer of
8,000 GRT was observed and sinking of the other four
steamers totaling 31,000 GRT is to be assumed on the basis
of dept setting (torpedo pistol Pi 2 - 7 meters)
3 • Area Naval Group South:
a . Adriat ic Sea:
Radio communication has been established
between the naval liaison officer to Army Group F and Durazzo,
Cattaro, Ragusa and Zara, according to a report from Group
South. According to' a decision by Air Force Command,
Southeast; convoy escort in the Adriatic will at present
be provided by Air Commander, Albania, since Air Commander,
Croatia has not sufficient forces available.
The loss of the steamer DEA MARC ELLA south of Sibenik
was due to stranding and fire caused by coastal battery
gunfire. Her German crew was rescued.
Group South has again stressed its request for allocation
of vessels for the Adriatic, reporting the following as
minimum requirements :
a. for offensive operations:
2 PT boat flotillas, 1 midget submarine flotilla •
b. for minesweeping end escort operations:
3 motor minesweeper flotillas and as many torpedo boats
as possible.
c. for local patrol and minesweeping:
3 coast patrol flotillas
d. for submarine chase:
3 submarine chaser groups
3^ CONFIDENTIAL
4
5 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
e . for mining opera 1 1 ons :
1 minelayer unit and 1 net barrage unit
f. for anti-aircraft defense of ports
Siebel anti-aircraft ferries
g. for supply traffic:
naval landing craft , as man^ ?s possible, pIso barges,
lighters and tugs
h. for local defense:
naval artillery lighters.
Group South also reports that an increase in the number of
vessels in the Aegean is imperative and that submarine chasers.
motor minesweepers, PT boats and submarines are primarily
needed. For- copy of report see teletype 13^5-
b. Aegean Sea :
■11 ^"^ . r
On 2 Oct. the airfield of Gadura on Rhodes
was attacked by six to eight enemy planes without any
particular damage. Over the central and southern parts of
the Aegean several enemy reconnaissance planes were detected
throughout the day of 2 Oct. . ■
Naval Staff has advised Armed Forces High Command, Oper-
ations Staff, Navy and the.. Naval. Lia is on Officers to
High Command Army, Army Gernal Staff and Commander In
Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff regarding naval par-
ticipation in the landing operation on Kos, based on the
report by Group South. (See War Diary 2 Oct.) For copy
of teletype as per l/Ski I op 2?6?V i O Gkdos see War Diary,
Part C, Vol. XIV.
Group South reports that the landing on Kos beg^n at 0-400
as planned. Commander, 21st Submarine Chaser Flotilla, re-
ported at 0922 that the landing was almost completed and
that it had been successful. Casualties are slight in
spite of strong resistance. Our radio intelligence inter
cepted at 0653 an enemy order for air attacks on our
invasion forces. Our landing vessels, with the exception
of two naval landing craft, are on return passage.
After completion of the mopping-up of Andros the bulk of
the Army Group was transported back to Syra .
Sweeping of mines from the barrage north of Skiathos and
in the harbor of Argo-stoli was continued.
35
CONFIDENTIAL
3 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
c . Black Sea :
Enemy S 1 1 up 1 1 on : ■.■;:'"
At 1600 Feodosiya was attacked by eleven planes .
Twenty-five high-explosive bombs fell in the harbor . basin
and on the mole, causing only slight damage.
Own Situation:
Nothing to report from any of the patrol lines
during the night of 2 Oct. The patrol line, north . of the .,
Taman coast was repeatedly attacked from the air; .two, enemy
planes were shot down.
The last transports out of Senna ya arrived at Kerch. . :
Installations in Taman and Sennsy* were blown up. Ferry :
traffic over the Strait of Kerch, between Kossa Shushka.
and Yenikale as well as convoys between Kerch and Sevastopol
were carried out as. planned and without incident.
VIII. Situation East Asia
Nothing to report.
*********#-;*****#-**-*
- 36 . . • ■ ,.
CONFIDENTIAL
4 Oct. 19^3 ';■■ CONFIDENTIAL
Items of Politica l Import ance
"DNB" transrits a Spanish, press rep ;rt 'from London,
according to which Allied discussions are taking place
at Brindisi regarding Italy's admission to the Allied
Nations . ,•-.■■■'.
Conference on the S it uation with C hief,: N- r val S taff
I . Army Situation:
Evacuation of the Tainan penisula is' being continued a $
planned. On the eastern front the areas of Me 1 it op o l/Zap or ozhe
and of Smolensk are the two enemy points of concentration.
The Dnieper line is firmly in our hands. On the Volchov front
the enemy has again taken up the offensive. Army General Staff,
calculates that approximately 50 divisions pre being assembled
for the Russian winter offensive (80 according to Japanese
Statements ) .
Italy :
The ferry operation between Corsica and the mainland. is
completed. The enemy is pursuing hotly in the Foggia area.;'
in the Naples area he is only following up our movements
with hesitation.
Ba lkans :
Partisan activity has Increased in the Agram area , The
partisan leader Tito is trying to recapture, the coastal'
area of Split. The. operation against Kos is proceeding
according to plan.
II. The steamer LIVAPIA was sunk in the Channel by enemy
long-range batteries during' the night of . 3 Oct. Thus the first
attempt to withdraw large vessels from' the- west area to the.
east has failed, but the operation will be continued when
conditions ^re more favorable. > '
III. For report by Operations Division, Fleet Operations
Section on revised instruction of Armed Forces High Command,
Operations Staff regarding Denmark, see statements in War-
Diary under 2 Oct. and j5 Oct.
IV. Chief, Naval Communications Division, Rear Admiral
Stummel, will be" unable to attend to his duties for
several weeks because of injuries sustained while picking
fruit.
37-
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
4 Oct. 19^5
V. Chief, Naval Intelli gence Divisi on reports that out of
175 senior officers at the Italian officers' prison, camp in
posen only four have declared allegiance to Mussolini.
It seems that the Spanish Government is making preparations ■-
for the -withdrawal of the "Blue" Division from the fighting
line on the eastern front.
Reuter reports press statements by the U. S. Secretary of
the N-vy, Knox, at Algiers, after visiting Eisenhower, Alex-
ander and Cunningham. According to these statements the
Allied attack on Europe has not yet begun and the most
difficult part of the war is yet to come. The battle has so
far only been for outposts. At present the submarine menace is
not so serious, through there was a time '■when everything hung
in balance. Knox warned against underestimating with German
submarine. The Germans would reappear on the scene with newly
equipped submarines,, Their submarines had again appeared in
the Atlantic in full strength. Submarine warefare is a serious
threat as long as the war lasts.
Special Items
I. According to telephonic advice from Armed Forces High
Command, Operations Staff, Navy, the -Fuehrer will address
a letter to the Duce regarding the const tut ion' of the future
Italian Armed Forces. Branches of the Armed Forces are to
submit suggestions for this at once, According. to a report
of Cdr. Meier, the Army will suggest the formation of four
Italian Divisions, to be trained in France and the Air Force
the formation of several groups.
Chief/ Organization and Mobilization Branch, Quartermaster
Division is of opinion that it will be impossible ti) lay c own
such specific requirements as to number and type regarding
the Italian Navy. After having obtained the approval of
Commander in Chief, Navy by telephone, Chief, Organization
and Mobilization Branch submitted the following suggestions
to the Fuehrer Headquarters by telephone on the afteroon of
3 Oct. As regards Commander In Chief's approval is to be
noted that he personally included "submarine warfare" in
Section 3 ss he had in view possibly using the "Gross i"
Unit again for submarine operations when conditions in
Italy became more settled.
1. Formation of commends and offices for Coastal
tasks of .the German Navy in the Italian area, such as commands
for coastal defense as well as offices for harbor traffic.
The type, .number, strength and operational areas of these
-38- CONFIDENTIAL
4 Oct. 1943 ■. ■,■'.'• CONFI DENTIA L
commands and offices, which : - are to.be under German oper-
ational control, are to be determined in direct discussions
between the two High Comma nds ... .
2. Formation of further, end/or retention of' already
existing smoke- laying units, construction parties, and
similar units to be used also outside the Italian area for
tasks of the German Navy. Here too the number and strength
should be decided in separate discussions. ■■-.
3. In special exceptions to be determined by Naval
Staff, formation of Italian units for patrol of coastal
waters, commando operations and submarine warfare under
German opera ti ona 1 c ontr ol .
II. Instructions of Chief, Naval Staff, regarding advice .
to Admiral Inspector of the Navy on the war situation are..-
contained in order l/Skl 50094/43 geh. "For copy, see War
Diary, Part B, Vol. V.
III. Submarine Division advises Operations Division for
inf orma t i on of ins tr uc t i ons 1 C omma nder s , S ubina r ine s ,
West and Mediterranean regarding the transfer of five
submarines to the Mediterranean during the next new moon
period. For teletype in question as per l/Skl 3000/43 Gkdos
Chefs, see War Diary, Part C, Vol IV.
IV. According to advice from Quartermaster Division,
Fleet Branch, the PRINZ EUGEN will h^ve to undergo a six to
eight weeks' engine overhaul, and subsequently tw.o months' .
training before she will be ready for operations. Complete
operational readiness is, therefore, not to be expected
before the beginning of February .1944 at the earliest ,
Situation 4 Oct.
I. War in Foreign Waters ■;. .
All vessels in foregin waters were advised of enemy
shipping movements by Radiogram 2103 .
Otherwise nothing to report.
39 CONFIDENTIAL
4 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL
II . Situation West Area
'"'■*■• Enemy Situation:
Forty -four planes "were observed on operation over
the Biscay area. One British vessel was located at QjOo in
BE 2990, one at 0^40 in BE 6110 and one at 1155 in AM 4l40.
Radar locations in the areas of Boulogne and Calais -continued
until 0224. Further locations were made from 0102 to 0156
in the area of Les Sept lies.
2 . Own Situation :
Atlantic Coast:
One ELM/ J mine was swept by a plane off Lorient.
The LONDOR put in to La Pallice a% 1600. The FALKE and
torpedo boat T "14" were transferred from Bordeaux to
Royan Roads .
Off Brest, Lorient, St. Naeaire and La Pallice four sub-
marines were escorted out and four in.
Channel Coast:
Torpedo boats T "22"./ "25", "25" and "27" had an
engagement with enemy destroyers at 0202 four miles- west'
of Les Sept lies. Commander, 4th Torpedo Boat Flotilla
first reported two and later four modern destroyers , one
possibly being a small cruiser. Both sides brought their
guns and torpedoes into full action; a torpedo hit on a
destroyer and a large number of gun hits were observed.
Actual sinking of enemy vessels was not ascertained.
Torpedo boat T "27" received a hit from from 15 cm. shell
in her boiler room and sustained casualties - two seriously (
wounded and two slightly wounded. For brief action report
of Commander. 4th torpedo boat Flotilla see teletype 1415.
Repairs to torpedo boat T "27" will require one to two
days. The Flotilla put in to St. Malo in the morning. When
entering port torpedo boat T "22" had a minor collision
with patrol boat "7 07" and sustained, slight damage; repairs
will require two to three weeks.
The convoy of the tanker NORVAARD left- Lezardrieux at lbOO
for Cherbourg. Three boats of the 4th torpedo Boat Flotilla
provided close escort from St. Malo and then put in to
harbor again. Seven boats of the 5th PT Boat Flotilla in
two groups were in defensive patrol line from 2200 north-
west of Peterport. Mine -exploding vessel "180" sustained
slight damage from splinters when one of our westbound
convoys was shelled by long-range batteries during the
CONFIDENTIAL
-40- :
] 4 Oct. 19^3 ■ CONFIDENTIAL
night of 3 Oct. -All vessels put in to Boulogne.
The convoy of steamer LIVADIA started on passage from
Boulogne to Ostend at midnight and -was shelled from 0115
to 0157 by long-range batteries from Dover. At 0150 the
steamer sprang a leak forward folio-wing s close hit, but
■was unable to continue. Foliwing a second hit close to . ■;.
her side damage was caused to the engine. An attempt to •
tow the ship in to Calais was unsuccessful and she sank
at 0226. Her entire crew was rescued. The escort vessels .:
sustained no damage or casualties. For brief action report
see teletype 0630.
The naval supply depot near Rouen was damaged during an-
enemy air attack by 12 planes with fighter escort on 3
Oct. at 19^5. Traffic was also interrupted through one ferry
being put out of action.
III. North Sea, No rway, Northern Waters :
1. North Sea : • ' ■
Torpedo boat T "19" was transferred from Flushing
to Rotterdam. Petrol positions were not taken up ow xng to
the weather. An enemy air attack on convoy traffic between
Zijpe and Wemeldingen on the afternoon of 3 Oct. caused
damage to one heavy gun carrier and two' naval landing craft. , ;
On the morning of 4 Oct. the ferrv at Zi^pe was again
attacked. One enemy plane was shot down and one set on. fire •
by boats of the Maas Flotilla. A tug of a convoy off Wemeld-
ingen was beached. A further plane was shot down. From 09^2
an enemy formation flew into the Heligoland Bight in three
waves but was forced by a large number of our fighters to
turn away to the west. Three planes are reported shot down
by gighters . ....
2 . Norway, Norther n Waters:
Enemy Situation:
Over the North Sea 8 planes were observed- in the
morning and 27 in the afternoon on operations in the direction
of the Norwegian coast, the northern .area and Iceland. In
the morning Ik planes were detected on air-sea rescue operat-
ions northeast of Cromer and In the southern' part of the •■■
North Sea. In the area of Vardoe slight air reconnaissance
was reported on 3 Oct.
-41-
CONFIDENTIAL
4 Oct. 1945 CONFIDENTIAL
On 4 Oct., . between 0755 and 0835 about 44 British and U. S.
carrierborne planes of the Martlet, Skua, Martin and
Thunderbolt types carried out surprise attacks in the
Bodoe area on two of our convoys, one northbound and
the other southbound, as veil as on ships in Bodoe harbor.
At 16^5 Admiral, North Norwegian Coast reported an air for-
mation in AF 6429 on course south.
At 1300 a Ju 88 sighted in AF 26?1 17- warships, including
a carrier, on course 90 degrees. This, report did not reach the
naval operations office until a second plane had landed, .
as the shadowing plane did not return and the radio message
sent was only picked up at sea.
Consequently the first reports as to the extent and the nature
of the operation were at first only transmitted through Air
Force stations. Naval Staff was also unable to gain a clear
picuture of events from individual radio messages inter-
cepted from escort vessels regarding, air attacks and hits on
ships in the convoy which messages came in late in the 'morning,
quite apart from the fact that the above mentioned reports
were not submitted unfoil the afternoon, entailing a regrett-
able delay.
Own Situation:
The enemy raid, which was apparently carried out
by strong British and American fleet units and which came
as a complete surprise owing to absence of bur own re-
connaissance, has caused us appreciable losses. Altogether
6 steamers totaling approximately 22,300 'GRT were lost and
4 further steamers totaling 18,000 GRT more or less badly
damaged. The latter include the . tanker SCHLESWIG (10/762
GRT) with a cargo of fuel oil and the troop transport
SKRAMSTAD (4,300 : GRT) with several hundred troops aboard.
Difficult communications hampered, exact determination of
the losses sustained, which are now known to be as follows:
The Norwegian steamer TOPEKA (4,991 GRT) burned' out; 6 of
the ship's anti-aircraft crew dead, 4 seriously wounded.
The Norwegian steamer VAGAN (687 GRT) sank following a bomb
hit.
Naval landing craft MFP "231" was beached after a bomb
hit forward; 2 of her crew were wounded.
The tanker SCHLESWIG (10,762 GRT) received 3 bomb hits.
The vessel Is out of control and has anchored. 1
The steamer KERKPLEIN: 2 bomb hits , steering out of order,
-42- CONFIDENTIAL
4 Oct. 19*13 CONFIDENTIAL
stern on fire; 13 dead and 17 seriously wounded. The
steamer was towed to Bodoe roads.
The steamer La Plata (8,056 GRT) was beached after a bpirb
hit.
The troop transport SKRAMSTAD (4,3.00 GRT) was hit by a
bomb; probably cannot be kept afloat. About 40 men' seriously
wounded.
The steamer IBIS (1,367 GRT) sustained slight damage from
ma chine -gunfire. „.,
The steamer MALAGA (2, 7 11 GRT) sustained minor damage from
an unexpeploded bomb.
During the attack on Bodoe harbor and roads the steamer
RABAT (2,719 GRT) sank following a bomb hit. The steamer
KAGUIR (1,536 GRT) was beached in the inner harbor following
a bomb hit.
Only 2 of the attacking planes were shot down, according'' '
to reports received so far.
Two U. S. Pilots were taken prisoner.
Our own countermeasures : At 1940 Admiral, North Norwegian
Coast ordered coast alarm third degree and at 1139 second
degree .
From 1045 - 1119 Air Commander, Lofoten sent out two Ju
88 ' s and one He 115 on reconnaissance for the assumed
carrier.
Admiral, Northern Waters has ordered the Task Force to
maintain three hours' readiness from 1900. For 5 Oct, one
submarine is disposed in AF 37^0 and two' submarines in AF
3750.
Admiral, Northern Waters reported at 1942 that the enemy's
final plans could not be recognized and that further air
attacks were to be expected. At 1900 Group/North Fleet gave
its views on the situation as follows: The carrier sent out
against our shipping, which was escorted by forces presumably
superior to our Task Force, will turn away again after the
attack. An air formation in AF 6429 is combing the coast for
further convoys. Reappearance on 5th Oct. is unlikely.
Group North/Fleet is obviously correct in its opinion that
the enemy has no aims other than air attack on our own
shipping. The 5th Air Forceplans further reconnaissance at
dawn on 5 Oct. ' " ;
Naval Staff is of opinion that ' following our operation on
Spitsbergen some kind of enemy activity in Northern Waters
was to be expected.
-43- CONFIDENTIAL
4 Oct. 1945. ;;>■•:, CONFIDENTIAL
Our convoy traffic has become obvious target of attack
since the cessation of Swedish transit traffic. By its
operation "Zitronella" (attack on British base at Spits-
bergen, Tr. N) the Task Force has 'drawn great attention
to itself. This enemy operation, as well as the midget
submarine attack in Alta must, therefore, be regarded as
the beginning of systematic provocation of our heavy
vessels, aiming at elimination of our battleships in
order to obviate the undesirable tying down of heavy
enemy vessels in favor of concentration against the
Japanese Fleet.
Further, it is reported:
At 0507 submarine chaser "1214" sank, probably through .. ; .r
striking a mine, in the outlet of the Bussesund while
escorting a westbound convoy. .■■•'■■;■.
Fifteen ships were escorted north and 24 south.-
In connection with the proposal of Group North/Fleet (see
War Diar 30 Sept) to assign additional armed fishing
vessels to Naval Command, Norway in order to strengthen
defense in Alta Fjord, Operations Division decides as
follows :
"1. Out of the first 300 armed fishing vessels, 66 were
assigned to Naval Command, Norway (more than to any other-;
theater of war). Naval Command, Norway will also in future
receive preference in assignments.
2. If armed fishing vessels are. considered suitable for
strengthening defense Of the : Alta' Fjord anchorages , Naval
Command, Norway must provide some for this purpose from- its
own numbers . ■■' .-.-
With regard to the plan to transfer the HUASCARAN tp Alta
for repairs to TIRPITZ, Commander, Submarines, Norway-
requests that he and Commanding Admiral , Submarines be
consulted in this matter and points out that this repair
ship is indispensable for- submarine repairs at Trondheim.
and Bergen. For copy of report see teletype 1425.
The following details are reported regarding the successes of
submarine Group "Wilking" in the North Siberian area from
30 Sept. to 2 Oct.' against a southwest convoy.
Submarine U r, 601" sank .1 steamer '-■($, 100 GRT), U "703" 1
steamer (4,200 GRT), U "96O" 2 steamers (8,900 GRT) and 1
escort vessel. An ice-breaker, and. 2 escort vessels have
escaped. --• ; • " '---"
•• •'.•• ' - ♦■-■ •» —..'■ - ' . ■•" :
U "387" and ^,"255" nave put out from Narvik into the
operational. areas Off the . Lofoten Islands (AF 3750 and AF
3730). ..';.: ;'.-. ' .
44 CONFIDENTIAL
f
4 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL
Weather ship KOBURG has reported that staying in her
present position for the winter is considered possible.
Group North/Fleet reports in this connection that rapid
deterioration In ice conditions renders release of the
ship by icebreakers Impossible and that there is no
possibility of seaplanes or land based planes making a
landing, according to pir reconnaissance. Ice conditions
also prevent the use of submarines. It is therefore intended
to leave the ship in the Ice and to have the transmission
of -weather reports commence from the end of October, since
the enemy Air Force will no longer be able to re^ch the ship
owing to darkness. As soon as the days begin to lengthen
the weather reports by r^dio will be discontinued and the
ship's crew will be fetched later on. Naval Staff agrees with
this solution.
I V . Skagerrak, Balt ic S ea Entr ances, Ba ltic Se a
1. Enemy Situation:
At 0150 a large fire was observed on Seiskar
and at 10^5 dense smoke.
2. Own Situation:
Nothing to -report from the area of Commanding
Admiral, Defenses, Baltic.
Convoy and transport operations In the Baltic Sea were
carried out as planned and without incident.
Two boats of the 3rd Patrol Boat Flotilla are in position
in the Irben Strait for relay escort. Heavy, gun carriers
are still under way.
Battery "Prlnz Heinrich" shelled the Sudomech Dockyard
from 0930 - 0955 and Kanoerski Dockyard and Petropalovsk
from 1028 - 1200. Hits causing heavy fires were observed.
Counter-fire was feeble and targets were heavily smoke
screened.
The Reich- Commissioner of Maritime Shipping does not
regard the air patrol off the Baltic coast provided by the
Air Force as sufficient and has requested Commander in Chief,
Air Force to transfer two fighter flights to Libau. The
Commissioner requests Naval Staff to investigate whether, and
to what extent, escort forces can be used to protect ship -
mg in this «rea , and, further, to see to it that vessels on
the run to the Baltic States are equipped with anti aircraft
guns as quickly as possible.
^5- CONFIDENTIAL
4 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
Operations Division replies as follows.:
"Escorts for merchant shipping in the northern part of
the Baltic for defense against air attack cannot he provid-
ed at present owing to shortage of suitable navel vessels.
Moreover, such escort operations, .which would also have
to extend to the Aaland Sea area considering the present sir
situation, would necessarily involve considerable delays for
shipping. Local anti-aircraft relay escorts are, however,
already provided. A basic order for equipment with anti-
aircraft guns of all merchantmen passing north of the line
Memel - southern point of . Oe land has already been issued
and will be carried out according to thearms available. ■
The Air Force has promised fighter defense at local points
of concentration, as far as forces are available."
V. Submarine Warfare
I. Enemy Situation:
The following is an extract from brief Report.
No. lg/43 of Naval Intelligence Division.
According to an official statement in Washington, three
German submarines were sunk and a fourth damaged recently
in the Atlantic by a Grumman-Avenger bomber which took off
from an escort aircraft carrier. Sixty-five survivors were
picked up by a destroyer. .■;..-
Chief, Ant i- Submarine Division on the Staff of the U. S.
Fleet Admiral stated on 28 Sept. that more than 4,000
Allied vessels had been convoyed across the Atlantic from
May to the end of August this year, without a single: ship
having been lost by submarine attack.
Naval Intelligence Division remarks in this connection:
According to data available, the figure mentioned of oyer
4,000 ships convoyed across the Atlantic without loss from
May to the end of August may be correct.
Naval Intelligence Division, Enemy Situation Branch estim-
ates trans-atlantic traffic as follows:
-46- CONFIDENTIAL
May
about
June
I!
July
1!
Augus t
1!
4 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL
1,200 ships
1,190 ships
1,0§2 ships
■ 1 ,107 ships
Total about ~T, 579 ships
Chief, Ant i- Submarine Division on the' Staff 1 of the TJ. 8.
Fleet Admiral also announced the formation of the 10th Fleet,
Incorporating all naval vessels for operations against Axis
submarines .
Further statements regarding anti-submarine measures of
the U. S. Navy deal with new types of escort vessels,
destroyer construction and improvements in location gear.
2 . • Own Situatio n :
Reports of two submarines of Group "Rossbach" show
that the expected convoy evidently passed our patrol line
on 3 Oct. at 2100. At this time destroyers, apparently
of the remote escort, were sighted and from dawn on 4 Oct.
enemy planes also.
Unfortunately the sighting of these destroyers was not
reported promptly enough for an order to be given to pursue
and search. The operation was therefore unsuccessful, although
radio intelligence provided some data.
Submarine Division in this connection points out the
difficulties of intercepting the enemy without air reconnaiss-
ance and complete radio intelligence. Reconnaissance reports
from planes, for which the operational area was within
range from Norway, could have influenced the present oper-
ation decidedly.
Group "Rossbach" will proceed from 5 Oct. at 0800 on course
195 degrees in order to intercept an eastbound convoy m
AK 80 and AK 90 on 7 Oct. Data' on this is, however, based sole
ly on an estimate of convoy schedules. U "455" reported bj
short signal from the supply rendezvous as attack by carrier
borne planes necessitating transfer to BD 8l.
VI. Aerial Warfare
1 . British Ilsles and Vicinity:
The 3rd Air Force reports 25 planes out on operation
47 CONFIDENTIAL
4 Oct. 1943 C ONFIDENTIAL
over England end 13 over Biscay area. One Liberator was shot
down.
In the morning the enemy raided Frankfurt on Main with 300
Fortresses in six waves. On the run-in a heavy escort off
fighters accompanied them as far as Holland and met them
again on the return flight. Our fighters numbering 302,
went up In defense. For flight of a further formation of
about 100 Liberators into "the Heligoland Bight see !, 3i.t
uation North See". Altogether 18 enemy planes were shot
down.
During the night of 4 Oct. Frankfurt on Main was again
heavily raided by about ^00 bombers, of which 10 were
shot down by our fighters. For particulars of the appreciable
damage caused In the Frankfurt area see "Daily Situation".
Further attacks were; carried out during the night on
Mannheim, Ludwigshafen and Worms, also causing serious
damage to industrial installations.
In Belgium and France airfields were attacked by smaller
formations. Fifteen planes were on a mine laying operation
over the mouth of the Gironde.
^ • Mediterra nean Thea ter :
Formations of the 3rd Air Force carried outt re
connaissance flights as far as the Western Mediterranean* At
1800 a large convoy of 80 vessels was detected off Cape
Tenes and this is to be attacked by 80 bombers on 5 Oct.
Air Force Command, Southeast had 21 <Ju 88' s and J>6 Stukas
out on operation against Leros with good results.
The enemy attacked the 'station and town of Bolzano, w.ith
44 Fortresses and the station and town of Pisa with 28
Fortresses. Here two of our ammunition tram's were destroyed
and a goods train damaged.
In an enemy air attack on the airfields of Athens - Tetoi
and Argos altogether 16 of our planes were destroyed on the
field. Over the Aegean nine reconnaissance planes were
detected during the day and eight during the night.
5 . Eastern Front:
Nothing special is reported from the Army front-i The
5th Air Force reports 17 planes on reconnaissance flights.
For details of evaluations see "Situation Norway, Northern
Waters" .
48- CONFIDENTIAL
4 Oct. 19^5
VI I . Warfare in the Medi t erranean and B lack Sep
1 . Enemy S ituat ion Mediterranean :
Two transports, carrying troops "which had apparent-
ly had been relieved, 12 freighters, 2 destroyers and 2 gun
boats left Gibraltar; 6 freighters and 2 corvettes put out
direct from the Mediterranean into the Atlantic. The. cruiser
UGANDA,. 15 freighters and 4 corvettes arrived at Gibraltar
from the Mediterranean. At 1400 the VALIANT, 3 ILLUSTRIOUS
class, 15 destroyers, 2 transports, 30 freighters, 13 tankers
etc. "were lying in port.
The large convoy which put into the Mediterranean on 2 Oct.
■was detected on 3 Oct. at l83Q north of Alboran consisting
of 69 ships and on 4 Oct. at 6845 north of Oran consisting
of 40 ships and 8 escort vessels.. . .-• .
Our air reconnaissance also sighted: at 0824 1 transport on
course west 60 miles north of Trapani; at 1930 3 small -warships
30 miles southeast of Cagliari; at 2140 a merchantmen south of
Punta Stilo on course northeast.
PT boats and landing boats -were sighted off Olbia for the
first time. Continuous freight traffic -was observed off the
beachhead at Termoli
No evaluations of air reconnaissance have been received from
the eastern Mediterranean.
2 . Own Situation Mediterranean :
Our PT boat operation during the night of > Oct,
led to an unsuccessful attack on a convoy escorted by destroy-
ers 70 miles north northeast of Palermo.
PT boats S "30" and S "33" were placed at the disposal of
Naval Shore Commander, - North Adriatic by German Naval Command,
Italy. The minelayer POMMERN left Toulon a.t 2000 on a new
mine laying operation off the west coast of Italy.
It is probable that the enemy submarine attacked southeast
of Rapallo was destroyed.
Chief, Supply and Transport, Leghorn reported at 0704 that
the withdrawal from Corsica w^s carried out according to
plans .
The Fuehrer has addressed the following message to Commanding
General, Armed Forces, South with copy to Commander in Chief,
Air Force, Operations Staff and High Command Navy,- Naval Staff
49
CONFIDENTIAL
4 Oct 1943 -.; ■::; • :■..;-:- ■■ CONFIDENTIAL
"The withdrawal of troops, Including their heavy -
arms and equipment, from Sardinia and Corsica to the main-
land was an exceptional feat. It was- hardly to be hoped
that this evacuation from one Island to the other and thence
by sea to the mainland would be completed so successfully.
The German forces, pushing though the treacherous Badoglio
troops, shelled from the sea and attacked from the air by
by strong enemy formations, made their way to Bastia,
recaptured it and there held out against the attack of
regular de Gaulle troops until evacuation to the main-
land was completed in spite of numerous enemy submarines.
I express my fullest appreciation. to the Commander on . ;
Corsica, General Von Senger und Etterlin, to the troops
under his command as well as to the Naval and Air Force
escort and transport units and to their Commanders."
Commanding General, Armed Forces, South advises Naval
Staff for information hf his request to Armed Forces High
Command, Operations Staff for allocation of two further
21 cm. guns for defense of the Piombino Strait (See '..,
teletype 1925) . •.
3 • Aree Naval Group So uth;
a . Adriatic Sea :
The steamers BOCCACIA and LEOPARDI and the
tanker JOHN KNUDSEN arrived at Cattaro from Trieste on
3 Oct. "• ■ ■ : . -. '.
Naval Shore Commander reports that the coastal battery at
Cattaro is, as an emergency measure, manned by Army troops.
Naval Shore Commander, North Adriatic reports plans to send
1,500 coastal gunners during the night of k Oct. aboard five
steamers to Dubrovnik and Durazzo end requests air escort and
reconnaissance from. Air Commander, Dalmatia since naval
escort cannot be provided.
Army Group F advises in this connection that air escort can
only be provided from Korcula southward.
It is of importance for Adriatic shipping to note that an
1700 an enemy submarine was sighted for the first time again;
she was on course 6:0 degrees , kO miles north-northeast
of Ancoria. Radiogram 1855 on this was transmitted from the
submarine base at Pola to Commander Submarines, Italy and'
German Naval Command, Italy.
50 CONFIDENTIAL
4 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
In accordance with Instructions from Operations Division
dated 29 Sept. (see War Diary 2' Oct .) .regarding mine
defense of the Adriatic Group South reports thaty.iri its
view a barrage off Ancona is impracticable because data on
navigation is lacking; it also, reports pl^ns. to effect
transfers for mine defense of the e^st co^st of the Adriatic.,
beginning from Valona to the north, i.e. V. n lon~, Durczzo,
Drin Gulf.
This report by Group South obviously crossed with the last
instructions from Operations Division of 7 Oct. (see War
Diary 2 Oct.) regarding a barrage in s line from Garga.no
to Korcula . A reply to this enquiry is, therefore, to be
awaited.
b ' Aeg ean Sea ;
Enemy air attacks in the C^ndir rver on the evening,
of 3 Oct. and during th?t night caused only slight damage.
For particulars of the attacks on the airfields of Tatol and
Argos see "Aerial Warfare".
The operation on Kos proceeded recording to pl- n n against
slight enemy resistance. On the evening of 3 Oct. our
forces were outside the city of Kos and the island airfields
from which no enemy planes came out on operation. Operations
from Cyprus rnd North Africa were ineffectual, whereas our
Air Force in considerable strength ver^ effectively covered
the advance of our troops. On 3 Oct. at 1400 1 cruiser and
2 destroyers were reported appoaching northwest of Cyprus.
Twelve Ju 88 ' s were sent out a gins t this unit. Other planes
carried out fighter escort of our escort of our convoys,
reconnaissance, air~ser rescue operations nnd dropping of
a para troop company. On 4 Oct. at 0?00 the Commander of
the landing troops reported that the airfield and harbor were
in our hands and that 800 men, including 200 British, had
been taken prisoner.
A brief report by Commander, 21st Submarine Chaser Flotilla'
(Lt. Car. Brand) liad been received on the prrt played by
Naval Forces in this operation. For copy see teletype 1725.
According to this report, several landing groups were ass-
embled in the Naxos area on 2 Oct. On 3 Oct. between
0400 and 0430 the first wave was landed by surprise at
three points of the Island of Kos with naval 'landing craft.
Two landings were made on the south coast by 0700. -These
were attacked by enemy planes, of which two were shot down.
The four steamers of the northern : group were unloaded to
some extent under mortar fire rn£ shelling. This group also
was attacked by planes, of which three were shot down. The
51 CONFIDENTIAL
4 Oct. 1943 CONFI DENT IAL
passage of the small vessels and naval landing craft was
also subjected to continuous mortar fire and, at times, to
shelling. Our losses were insignigicant . Unloading was
assisted by two armed fishing vessels, several motor boats
and cutters. Four submarine chasers and two unloaded steam-
ers received orders to depart at 1500. This convoy was
shelled while passing the island of Callno. On receipt of the
report that enemy naval forces had been sighted north-
west of Cyprus, which by dead reckoning could reach the west-
ern point of Kos at 2100, Commander, 21st Submarine Chaser
Flotilla decided to discontinue operations immediately
and to start back in several groups, avoiding direct courses
and leaving behind the last four naval landing craft which
were still loaded. All vessels participating have meanwhile
reached harbor. The steamer CIT.TA DI SAVONA and submarine
chaser "2102" were bombed and machine-gunned by seven low-
flying enemy planes; only minor casualties were caused and
one enemy plane was shot down.
The prudent decisions taken by Commander, 21st Submarine
Chaser Flotilla fully met the situation and were instrumental
in reducing to the minimum the danger to our vessels from
enemy naval forces, which was considerable when the situation
as a whole is taken into account.
c . Black Sea:
Ene my Si t ua t i on :
According to air reconnaissance three destroyers were
lying in Tuapse.
• Own SI tuation: .
Nothing is reported from the patrol lines during the
night of 3 Oct. The naval landing craft on the north coast
of the Tainan Peninsula were repeatedly attacked by enemy
planes during the day; two planes were shot down. Naval
landing craft F "125, while returning from the inner
part of Tainan. Bay, struck a mine at 0555 seven miles east-
southeast of Kerch and was later shelled from the coast.
The boat received three direct hits. Five men including the
Commander of the group are" missing.
Feodosiya was attacked 1?" times during the night of 3 Oct. .--;-
and again four times during the -day. One lighter and one tug
were damaged. The anti-aircraft defense of Feodosiya has been
strengthened by two heavy batteries and one, light battery.
Barrage "X" was laid in the Strait of Kerch as planned.
52 CONFIDENTIAL
4 Oct. 1943 ... CONFIDENTIAL
Three boats of the 1st PT Boat Flotilla served as escorts for
convoys from Feodosiya to Sevastopol during the night of 4
Oct.
In carrying out evacuation of the Gotenkopf bridgehead the
following "were transferred from 28 Sept. to 3 Oct. inclusive:
21,314 tons of -war supplies
45,620 men
1,857 "wounded
5»2§? motor vehicles
6,003 horse -dra-wn vehicles
4,092 guns
23 tanks
15*845 horses and
800 civilians
of which 16,824 tons of war supplies
1,923 men
812 wounded
89 motor vehicles and
11 guns
fell to the share of the Navy.
VIII. Situation East Asia
Nothing to report.
* Mr * *■*■* -*■*■* -X- -X- *- -X- -X- * •* * ■* -X- -X- # #•** -X- *-#-*-* -X- -X- -X- -X--X- #
53 :. CONFIDENTIAL
5 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
Items o f Political Impor tance
The United States have appointed a new Ambassador for Moscow.
At the same time the new Russian Ambassador in Washington has
presented his credentials. These facts pre worthwhile mention-
ing since a 'certain political significance had withdrawn from
previous conditions.
Moscow has now definitely been fixed as the location for
the Allied Foreign Ministers' Conference. The forthcoming
Conference will be the most critical diplomatic undertaking
of the war, according to a statement by Hoare Belisha. Only
if it leads to a closer relationship between the Three Big
Powers can speedy victory and a world order ensuring lasting
peace be hoped for.
Admiral Cunningham has been appointed successor to the F~rst
Sea Lord, Dudley Pound, who is retiring for reasons of health.
Confe rence on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff
*■■ Army Situation: , • '
No large scale actions took place on the eastern front.
According to a new directive from the Fuehrer on future
operations in Italy, Commanding General, Armed Forces., South
is to continue delaying defense only as far as the l^ne Gaeta-
Ortona . This line is to be held and two divisions from
northern Italy brought up for this purpose. If the enemy
does not press on more strongly to the north but plans to 1
invade the Balkans from southern Italy, Commanding General,
Armed Forces, South is to work out plans for an attack on
Apulia .
Elba is to be kept occupied by one fortress regiment. The
duties of Army Group B pre: to pacify its territory and
suppress the uprising in Slovenia and Iatria with strong
forces; to protect rear communications and the coastal flank
of the Commanding General, Armed Forces, South, concentratingo
on the Ligurian Sea; to organize defense in northern Italy;
to build up a defense position on the Apennines and the
adjoining coasts, concentrating on the Ligurian coast.
Since major enemy operations agpinst the coastal sectors of
Army Group B are not expected within the near future, coastal
defenses shou]d be reduced, with concentration on the most
important sectors and ports, m favor of operations by strong
forces in Istria and Slovenia.
54 CONFIDENTIAL
5 Oct. 19^3 — - . • • CQNFIDEM^k.
II. Admiral, Ge r ma n ' Na v a l C oggna nd , . 1 1 p 1 5 ' reported to Chief,
Naval Staff on^f Oct. that the transfer from Cor sice to the
mainland of all German troops. Including vehicles and most
important sipplies, have been completed and added in his
report that this was achieved thanks to the untiring effort
and devotion of all naval offices and units concerned. Chief,
Naval Staff replied as follows:
"The task of withdrawing German troops from Sardinia and
Corsica has been carried out remarkably well and I commend
German Naval Command, Italy and all naval units and offices
concerned. "
III. Chief, Operations Division reports on the inefficiency
in transmitting reports during the air attack on our convoy
traffic in Norway on 4 Oct. Naval Staff should in any event
have received a report from Naval Command, Norway at latest
during the morning. Chief, Naval Staff orders that the follow-
ing personal teletype be dispatched to Naval Command/
Norway with cpp.3 to Group North Fleet; "The successful air
attack by British and American carreer borne planes on
our convo\ traffic m skerries off Bodoe on the morning
of 4 Oct. "was not reported to Navel Staff by Naval Command,
Norway until the evening* I must insist that Naval Staff be
advised at all times without delay of all special events".
IV. Chief, Naval Ordnance Division reports on the meeting on
^ Oct. with Chief, Armed Forces High Command..
Within the armament organization of the Ministry of Armament
and Ammunition all interests of the Armed Forces are taken
care of in Office "Kehrl". Armed Forces High Command will be
represented by a General in this Office. No extension of this
representation to branches of the Armed Forces is intended.
As regards the right to seize Armed Forces reserve stocks,
Chief, Armed Forces High Command will in specific cases cons-
ult branches of the Armed Forces. The final decision, how-
ever, will rest soley with Armed Forces High Commando
V. Chief, Operations Division reports that transports of
prisoners of war through the Dardanelles are at present out
of question and that the Foreign Office is of the same opinion,
In a Highly Restricted Circle:
VI. The Fuehrer's directive regarding future operations in
Italy outlines the Navy;s tasks as follows:
"The Navy will assist the Army in every way possible,
especially in: coastal defense against enemy landings at the
55 CONFIDENTIAL
5 Oct. 1943 C ONFIDENTIAL
rear of our front; maintenance of coastal traffic, "which
may be of vital importance in case the enemy succeeds in
effectively disrupting railroad traffic along the east apt
vest coasts of Italy; offensive naval operations against
enemy shipping." The -main task of the Air Force will still
be attacks on enemy shipping; in addition, support of the
Army and defense for large-scale, troop' movements and vital
lines of communication.
German Naval Command, Italy and Group South, for information,
have been sent an extract of the above by Operations Division,
For teletype l/Skl I op 3001/43 Gkdos . Chefs, see War Diary,
Part C, Vol. XIV.
VII « Chief of St aff, N aval Staff states:
It is necessary to adjust our plans to the fact that, in
spite of all previous assurances, the raw materials required
for the 1943 Fleet Construction Program -will in fact not be
available. Naval Staff must point out that the 1943 Program
already represents minimum requirements so that any cuts will
unquestionably mean that tasks of naval warfare can no longer
be fulfilled. There are now already gaps caused by mountain
losses and increasing damage through natural wear and tear,
which can hardly be filled even if the 1943 Program
is carried out- in full. Moreover, the Program is drawn up,
as regards the various types of vessels, on the basis that
one type is absolutely dependent on the other. This means that,
if cuts should actually become unavoidable, these can
only be made, in the entire- Program according to the various
Recording to the various types required and not solely in this
or that category. In ahj case, operational considerations only,
and not practical wishes for reasons of construction,
may be the basis for effecting cuts. In view of recent
experiences, a curtailment of the definite minesweepers
and motor minesweeper Construction Program will cert-
ainly not be justified. Events have already proved that
the 1943 Program also is very moderate ^nd represents a
minimum which was perhaps 1 adjusted all too much to meet-
emergency conditions and leaves no margin for cuts.
Investigations should be made as. to whether the Italian
dockyards really did not give us raw materials which render
a certain alleviation of the raw material situation possible.
Chief, Naval Staff agrees and points out that, if necessary,
a reduction in submarine construction in favor of mines-
weepers and motor minesweepers might have to be accepted.
56 CONFIDENTIAL
5 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL
Special Items
I. The transfer of Naval Shore Command, North Adriatic
to Group South, as approved by Commander in Chief, Navy
on 1 Oct. was ordered by Quartermaster Division, Organi-
zation And Mobilization Branch - n s follows:
1. Effective immediately Naval Shore Commander,
North Adriatic will.be under Admiral, Adriatic. The boundary
between Admiral, Adriatic and German Naval Command, Italy
■will be the Isonzo River. Further details will be worked
out between Admiral, Adriatic and German Navai Command,
Italy.
2. The Dockyard Control Staff of German Naval Com-
mand, Italy will provide Working Group "Trieste" as long
as control of dockyards from the Italian area is necessary.
Ensure cooperation with Admiral, Adriatic and N-°val Shore
Commander, North Adriatic.
3- Cooperation between Naval Shore Commander , North
Adriatic and local operational headquarters of Army Group B
regarding Fuehrer Directive No. 40 •
4. If alteration of the boundary between Naval Shore
Commander, North Adriatic and Naval Shore 'Commander, Dalmatia
Is intended, submit proposal.
II. Operations Division has settled the request of Group
South for allocation of forces in the Adriatic" area (see
War Diary '3 Oct.) as follows:
A. Since Naval Shore Commander, North Adriatic is now under
Admiral, Adriatic, Naval Staff plans the following distribution
of forces in the Adriatic:
German Naval Command, Italy (Naval Shore Commander, West
Adriatic will receive: 10 Siebel ferries, one third of the
naval landing craft becoming available, in the Adriatic up
to a maximum of 10, as well as the necessary Harbor Defense
Flotillas.
Group South will receive all other warships and auxiliary
warships of every description, naval landing craft and
Siebel ferries becoming available in the Adriatic.
B. The following remarks are made on the particular
requests submitted by Group South:
1 and 2 are acknowledged.
.. >■* ; : 57 CONFIDENTIAL
5 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
3. Anti-aircraft defense rests -with the Air Force.
4. Submarines will not be assigned. Operations
by submarines also midget submarines, in the
Adriatic -will be ordered when the occasion
arises .
5. Will be decided on separately.
6. Request is acknowledged in principle and will be
complied with as far as possible (with the
exception of a midget submarine flotilla, see
under 4. ) .
The composition of naval forces of Admiral, Adriatic
will probably differ substantially from that request-
ed by Group South. Naval Artillery lighters will not
beaava liable at present for the Adriatic. Instruct-
ions with regard to organization of naval forces in
the Adriatic will be issued separately.
7. All forces becoming available in the Adriatic
will be assigned to Group South. It is left
to the discretion of Group South to transfer
part of these forces to the Aegean Sea,
according to the situation.
III. Naval Intelligence Division issued Enemy Situation
report No. 19. 43 on 2 Oct. For copy as per l/skl 27972 A 43
Gkdos . see War Diary, File "Enemy Situation Reports of
Naval Intelligence Division".
With reference to the general situation this report states:
"inadequate air reconnaissance in the Mediterranean makes
an insight into the present disposition of enemy landing
craft and merchant shipping difficult. It is assumed that
approximately 30% of special landing craft available and
approximately 20^ of merchant shipping in the Mediterranean
is still engaged in traffic between North /frica/Sicily
and the Italian operational areas.
It is expected that the focal point -of future operations
in the Central Mediterranean outside the Italian mainland
will be the east Adriatic area ( Albania /Da lma tia ) , while
in the Eastern Mediterranean a further operation against
the Aegean islands is likely."
With regard to enemy merchant ' tonnage, Naval. Staff has
reached the following conclusion:
"The to. total tonnage of vessels over 1,000 GRT each avail-
able to the enemy at the beginning of October 1943 is
estimated to be approximately 35,000,000 G.R.T. without
taking the lately acquired Italian tonnage into account.
58 CONFIDENTIAL
•
5 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
The surplus ' in. .new constructions reached a maximum level
of approximately 1,000,000 - GRT during the month of September.
Freighters which -'can he' used for supplying home countries
and troops overseas-, for operational purposes and other tasks
must be estimated as exceeding 20,000,000 GRT.
At present a rise in enemy -tankers is to be expected, since
in the USA alone approximately 20 tankers are to be commiss-
ioned every month. The tanker construction program of the
United States may be connected with enemy operational, con-
siderations .
It is intended to build 200 tankers during 194^ in the
United States, while for 1944 only 89 tankers sfe planned.
This leads to the assumption that the tanker fleet avail
able is considered sufficient as from 1944 for the demands
to be made on it .
Accurate figures of serviceable Italian merchant shipping
which fell into enemy's hands cannot yet be ascertained.
About 500,000 GRT of Italian end former French merchant
shipping are in enemy territory; a substantial part,
however, may have been sunk or damaged.
■In addition there are approximately 100,000 GRT of Italian
merchant shipping at present in Spanish ports."
Situation 5 Oct.
-*-• War in Foreign Waters
Nothing to report.
II. Situation West Area
1. Enemy Situation: .
Twenty- seven planes were detected on operation over
the Bay of Biscay. One British vessel was located at I538
in BE 5350 and one around midnight on 5 Oct. in BE 6220.
An Intelligence report states that there . is a marked decline
in the assembly of invasion troops for northern France in
England. ...-■"-'•.
:, 59'. . -.■■ CONFIDENTIAL
5 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
and traffic restrictions as "well as closed areas have
been abolished Shipping concentrations in southern ports
no longer indicate an imminent operation against northern
France. Troop movements from these ports during September
were destined solely for the Mediterranean and India.
For particulars see teletype 1830.
2. Own Situati on:
Atlantic Coast:
One ELM/J mine -was swept by a plane off St. Jean
de Luz .
Three submarines were escorted out of Brest and La -Pal lice.
The FLIEDER (Japanese submarine, Tr. N. ) left Brest at 1600.
The FALKE and torpedo boat T "14" anchored in Royan roads
on the evening of 4 Oct. T "23" ~nd T "27" left St. Ma 1-6
for Brest at 1845.
With reference to the inquiry by the 3rd Air Force as
to the use of BV 222' s in the Atlantic, Naval Staff is
of the following opinion:
"in order to augment reconnaissance, it seems advisable to
leave the BV 222' s there even ^fter allocation of JU 290 's.
The view that the BV 222 is inadequately armed has up to
now net been borne out by any air combat. It is not
considered importa*nb to retain the BV 138' s in the Atlantic
area .
Since, at the order of Commander in Chief, Air Force,
Operations Staff, the further production of large flying
boats has been discontinued, a maximum of seven flying
boats only be reckoned with, of which never more th^n three
to four boats can be in operation simultaneously. Expansion
of the ground organization at Biscarosse need, therefore,
provide only three to four berths with provisional camouf-
lage, of which two are already completed according to inform-
ation available."
Naval Staff, therefore, requests Commander in Chief, Air
Force, Operations Staff to keep the operational BV 222' s
still in use, even after introduction of the 5th long-
range Reconnaissance Group.
Channel Coast:
'
Five ELM/j mines were swept northnorthwest of
Dunkirk. The convoy of the NORDVAARD put in to Cherbourg
at at 0330 and at 2000 continued its passage to Le Havre;
however, on account of ships located and presumed to be
in a lurking position, it was first insturcted to proceed
close to shore and, later, to turn back to Cherbourg.
60 CONFIDENTIAL
5 Oct. 1943 CO NFIDENTIAL
Torpedo boats T "23" and T "27" left St. Ma 16 for Brest
at 1845-
The first batch of 1,000 surface mines (types OMA I, II and
IV) developed in. accordance with the earlier request of
Group West' has been delivered to this Group in exchange for
the remaining UMA/K mines. Instructions have been given
to make a study, in close cooperation with the Mlnelaying
Experimental Command and by participating in the trials
being conducted In the Channel, of the efficiency of
the OMA mines and to try out the first OMA/l. mines delivered
in operation. The extent of further production of OMA I, II
and IV mines will depend on the practical results..
III. North Sea , Norway, Nor the rn Waters :
1. Nort h Sea :
Nothing to report.
2. Norway, Northern' Waters :
Enemy Situation:
Twenty-one planes were detected on operation over
the North Sea. Single reconnaissance flights were observed
in the Petsam® - V^rdoe - Alta areas. On 4 Oct. five planes
were reported south of Stadtlandet and one. plane each off
Ytteroe and Bergen.
Our air reconnaissance sighted at 0945 in AE 9630 1 aircraft
carrier, 1 battleship, 2 cruisers and 4 destroyers on course
200 degrees and at 0925 in AF ?4l0 1 aircraft carrier, 1
cruiser and 5 destroyers on course 14.0 degrees.. Admiral,
Northern Waters and Group North/Fleet assume that the war-
ship unit detected on 4 Oct consisting of 1?' ships is on
return passage In two groups.
Own S it uation :
In view of the enemy situation the' three hours'
readiness of the Task Force is canceled* The submarines will
be withdrawn to West Fjord. Skj omen Fjord, rema ins the sub-
marine base for the present. Admiral, Northern Waters
expects a repetition of similar surprise attacks at any
time until the days become very short, since there is no
reconnaissance of coastal waters. He considers that submar-
ine bases and vessels carrying ' supplies, ore and men on
leave are still in danger considering the small number
of our escort, forces rnd inadequate anti-aircraft defense.
Eight steamers damaged and one naval landing cr^ft sunk
justify a further request for permanent transfer.
61 CONFIDENTIAL
5 Oct. 19^3 '• C ONFIDENTIAL
of fighter planes to the northern pre?, -where they are
just as badly needed as in southern Norway (See teletype
1524).
Naval Command, Norway reports casualties sustained yesterday
evening as follows:
200 believed, to be dead and 15 seriously "wounded on the
troop transport SKRAMSTAD, which had 8^4 soldiers aboard.
On the steamer KERKPLEIN, which hcd 1,551 prisoners on board,
14 are reported dead, 9 missing and 29 seriously wounded.
For further particulars see teletype 1320.
From investigation of the salvaged British midget submarine
the Task Force deduces that these submarines avoid any known
nets and also anti-submarine bottom nets, so that our net
defense is still of utmost importance. (See teletype 09^0).
In the area of Naval Command, Norway 11 ships were escorted
north and 28 south. In the Arctic co^st- ares 9 ships were
held up owing to shortage of escorts.
IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances , Baltic Sea
1. E nemy Situation:
In Kronstadt Bay there was heavy gunfire- from the
Oranienbaum pocket on our positions from. 1000. At 0200 about
25 Russians landed near Strelna Mole and west thereof; they
blew up two Army assault boats and fired on a pillbox. As
soon as our Armj defense went into action they withdrew
to Leningrad Mole, leaving a rubber dinghy behind. •
In the afternoon the presumed positions of Army Battery 688
and Army Coastal Battery 509 vere bombed without result bv two
enemy planes after Army Battery 688 had shelled Lavansaari.
There was only minor air activity -over Tyters . Mine laying is
suspected in the Irben Strait.
2. Own Situation:
Four ground mines were' swept in the Baltic Sea
entrances and' one off Gdynia. The Danish steamer HANNE
struck a mine and .was damaged near Drogden lighthouse.
Convoy and transport, operations in the whole Baltic Sea
area were carried out according to plan.
62 CONFIDENTIAL
5 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIA L
Operations Division points out to Naval Command, Baltic,
as regards control of merchant shipping, that some ships
come from the North Sea and, from Hiltenau, pass through into
the northern part of the Baltic Sea without calling at-
an intermediate port. It is therefore the distribution
of military instructions. This should rather be done direct
by Naval Command, Baltic in order to avoid misunderstand-
ings . ' . ,
Special It ems
Naval Command, Baltic submitted on 29 Sept. plans for
Naval Warfare and coastal defense in the Gulf of Finland
and Eastern part of the Baltic Sea during the coming year
after commencement of Operation "Blau" (withdrawal to
"East Wall" position).
Naval Command, Baltic specifies the Navy's tasks in this
operation as follows:
"a. To' continue blockade of the Russian Fleet in the
Gulf of Finland so as to exclude a threat to the
Baltic Sea. This is to be done in spite of the
deterioration in our positions in the Gulf of
Finland and the activitiy to be expected from
the Russian Fleet.
b. To protect the coasts of the Gulf of Finland and of
the Baltic States in such a way that- a- threat to the
left wing of the eastern front from the sea is'
impossible .
c. To ensure sea communications from the Baltic States
to Germany and vice versa, as well as to and from
Finland, in spite of increased threat."
Commanding Admiral, Naval Command, Baltic is of the opinion
that this can be done if a certain concentration - in men' .
and material - is effected and if the Navy is given adequate
support by the Air Force. The requirements set forth in the ■
following plans have been weighed up in view of the threat
to the Baltic Sea and also have in mind, retaining Finland's
faith and trust in our strength and thus keeping her still as
our Ally.
The plans provide for:
1. Strengthening of the "Nashorn" barrages.
2. A new defended barrage system to be known as "Krebs"
63 CONFIDENTIAL
5 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
for the defense of Tallinn and Helsinki and for control
of the sea area between "Seelgel" and "Nashorn" oarrages.
3. Coastal defense barrages and flanking barrages and expan-
sion of "Seeigel" barrages.
For defense by naval forces, Naval Command, B-ltic is of
opinion that the Dutch gunboats, artillery motor minesweepers
and coastal minelayers would be suitable as torpedo carriers.
In view of the requirements of other theaters of war certain
requests are not being made at present.
A total of 16,400 mines and 13,000 anti sweeping devices
will be required. ,.
The 1st Motor Minesweeper Flotilla, the 24th Landing Flotilla,
the 31st Minesweeper Flotilla and at least two minelayers will
be required to carry mines. It is considered necessary to
assign twelve further armed fishing vessels to the ,31st-
Minesweeper Flotilla for anti-submarine patrol.
Two additional minesweeper flotillas would h?ve to be
assigned to Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic for defense
of the routes in the eastern pert of the Baltic Sea which
are outside the area of Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic.
Furthermore, as a precaution, a request is made for two
submarine chaser flotillas for the Baltic Sea aaea. The
old vessels of the .-.Coastal Defense Flotilla, Baltic States
would have to be replaced by armed fishing vessels.
The tasks of coastal defense will be:
a. defense of the Estonian coast so as to prevent
landings aimed at occupation of the oil shale area;
b. on connection with this, patrol of the defensive
barrages laid for the same purpose;
c. defense of the "Nashorn" and "Krebs" barrages.
The disposition of batteries has been planned In accordance
with these tasks.. In addition it, is 'intended to expand
the radar network,. Preparations for withdrawal of batteries
from the Leningrad sector are being made at the instigation
of the 18th Army. Command. The batteries concerned are:
Battery "Prlnz Heinrich"; two 13 cm and two 10. 5 cm batteries;
Battery "Bluecher" and one 8.8 cm anti-aircraft battery.
64 CONFIDENTIAL
Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL
Preparations are being made for demolition of the ports
of Peipia and Rutschi. The defense of Tyters is being
Strengthened. With regard to mine laying operations ,
Operations Division issued the following order to Naval
Command, Baltic on 2 Oct.
"1. "Na s horn ":
a. The proposed reinforcement is approved in
principle. Economical use of mines will, however,
suffice since only a slight deterioration is to
be assumed in deep barrages lying outside the enemy's
sphere of minesweeping activities.
b. The use of EMP mines is advisable on account of
their all-round effect against submerged submarines.
UMA mines should also be provided in deep rows.
2. "Krebs":
a. This barrage system is onlv to be provided in case
Tyters and/or Hogland are evacuated, so that "Seeigel"
position cannot be held. ..
b. The barrage should (according to the "Juminda"
system) be laid over as wide an area as possible and
lie shallow (against surface faces only). An average
distance between mines of 15-20 m. is sufficient. The
number of anti sweeping devices (average distance apart
5 m. ) applied for is far too large, since these are
less efective against narrow shipping targets than
against minesweeping gear of 100 150 m. cutting width
and frequently remain effective still for the next
minesweeping run.
c. Report whether sufficient Finnish mines are available
for the barrage section north of Kalbada.
d. The shallow mines of the old Juminda barrage have,
after three winters, certainly been rendered in-
effective by ice, but the deep mines are probably
still effective. They would, however, become useless
if a searching sweep of the whole area were carried
out. It therefore appears possible to lay mines next ,
spring by. motor mieesweepers and naval landing craft
without a previous searching sweep by minelayers with
advance motor minesweeper gear.
65 CONFIDENTIAL
—
5 Oct. 1945 CONFIDENTIAL
3. "Seeigel":
a. Attempts are to be made to retain, and reingorce
the northern part of this barrage system up to Neu-
grund and to extend it from Neugrund in approx
imately a ■ southerly direction as far as the coast.
b. Here too the mines should be laid over as wide an
area as possible and lie shallow. The average
distance apart of mines in the new sector should be
about 15 meters.
c. Plans to extend this barrage in the direction of
Hungerburg are inadvisable. This extension could not
be defended, since it would be within range of Russian
batteries assumed to be on Kurgala Peninsula .
do If it is impossible to hold the islands, extensive
mine laying should only be carried out in the area
between the islands and in the eastern part of Narva
Bay; for this purpose extension of "Krebs".
4. Make preparations for coastal defense barrages, if
necessary also system "Krebs", as alarm barrages, ±r±
accordance with developments in the situation.
5. If operation "Blau" does not arise, repeat in general
the mine laying operations carried out this spring.
6. Mines:
Present stocks and probably supplies permit allocation
of at most 50$ of the numbers requested; EMF and DMA
mines will also have to be used.
7. Mine carriers:
At least two minelayers as well as motor minesweepers,
naval landing craft and coastal minelayers in the numbers
available this year can be relied on.
8. In view of the above points, revise plans and submit again
in compliance with the necessary material restrictions."
Further plans as regards coastal batteries will be drawn up
by Quartermaster Division and when completed will be decided
on finally by Naval Staff,-.
66 CONFIDENTIAL
5 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
Naval Ordnance Division, Underwater Obstacles Branch
received the folio-wing order on 5 Oct.:
"In order to create mine reserves for the large
numbers needed in spring 1944 in the Gulf of Finland , from
November on the following numbers monthly are to be set
aside, with designation "Otto 29"°.
400 EMC
400 UMB
200 EMF and
200 UMA
Lengths of mooring rope 100 m.
Irrespective of this provision, the special production
program of the Minister of Armament and Ammunition should
be speeded up in every way possible and current Production
brought to its highest level. The total requirements applied
for by Naval Command, Baltic for the Gulf of FinLiM next
spring are 1.6,400 mines and 13,000 anti-sweeping devices . It
is therefore imperative to increase monthly output of anti-
sweeping devices to at least 500 in spite of ample supplies.
V. Submarine Warfare
Four submarines of Group "Rossbach" are returning owing
to damage and casualties. A supply group of four submarines
was attacked by several enemy carrier-borne planes on .4 Oct
in BD 9750. One submarine was damaged and also had to start
on return passage.
No successes have been reported from the Atlantic or the
Indian Ocean. ■ •
VI. Aerial Warfare ■ . .
1. British Isles and Vicinity:
During the : day minor enemy forces attacked traffic '
installations and planes on the ground in Belgium and France.'
Three planes are reported shot down and two crashed. No enemy
planes flew in during the night of 5 Oct. During the night
of 4 Oct. 16 planes were shot down and on 5 Oct. 18 were
definitely shot down and 15 probably "' shot down. ■
67 CONFIDENTIAL
5 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIA L
2. Mediterranean Theater :
The 3rd Air Force sent out 57 planes against a convoy
off Cape Tenes . Of these, 46 reached the target and sank
or damaged 15 ships totaling 150,000 GRT. Four of our planes
•were lost through strong fighter escort and very severe light
anti-aircraft gunfire.
The 2nd Air Force sank two landing boats and damaged a third
one during an attack by 24 fighter-bombers on the port of
Termoli. Air Force Command, Southeast had 67 planes out on
operation against Leros, concentrating their attack on
Port: Lagc, and reports accurate hits on land and on small
vessels .
3. Eastern Front;
The 5th Air Force reports 23 planes out on re-
connaissance .
VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea;
1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean;
Three u\ S. tankers, 1 U. S. Coastguard cruiser
and two U. S. gunboats left Gibraltar in the afternoon
for the 'Atlantic and 13 auxiliary minesweepers left for the
Mediterranean. The VALIANT, FORMIDABLE, INDOMITABLE and one
ILLUSTRIOUS class left port in the evening, probably
■westbound.
A damaged Norwegian tanker sank during an attempt to tow
her into port.
At 1800 on 4 Oct. the large eastbound convoy was detected
again 20 miles west of Tenes, consisting of 80 ships and
7 escort vessels; on 5 Oct. it was successfully attacked
by forces of the 3rd Air Force.
At 0350 there were 5 ships on northerly course 55 miles south
of Salerno, at 1355 7 ships on southwesterly course 12 miles
south of Salerno, at 0335 5 ships on northerly course east- '
northeast of Crotona and at 0650 4 ships on northeasterly
course 15 miles east -northeast of Punta Stilo. There were
no ships in Termili harbor. The coast 13 miles northwest
of Termoli was subjected to heavy gunfire, probably from
destroyers.
No reconnaissance reports have been received from the
eastern Mediterranean.
68 CONFIDENTIAL
5 Oct. 1943 - C ONFIDENTIAL
The Naval Attache In Madrid transmits a report from
the Italian Embassy, according to which Italian warships
and merchantmen v ill leave the Balearic Islands, presum-
ably for the British area (Gibraltar). (See teletype 1750).
According to a 'later report, the Spanish Foreign Minister
assured the German Ambassador today that Italian warships
in the Balearic Islands are definitely interned. For details
see War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII.
2. Own Situation Mediterranean:
At 08^5 the minelayer POMMERN sank, presumably
as a result of striking a mine, lj miles south of San Remo
while on her way to a new mine laying operation. Naval landing
craft rescued the Commander and 189 of the cratf . These
survivors are to man the minelayer AGNI and a mine ferry.
A nsval landing craft was sent out on a minelaying operat-
ion in the Nettunia area .
Submarine U "380" probably sank a tanker of 8,000 GRT 60
miles south of Salerno, U "593" after return from the
operational area in Salerno Bay reported:
"No location from the air, no night activity, strong naval
patrol. Heavy traffic on courses north and south over CJ 6797
and 6798. Good result with "Aphrodite" (submarine decoy, Tr.N)."
Commanding General, Armed Forces, South reports on the
completion of the withdrawal from Corsica as follows:
"it. was possible to conclude withdrawal of troops,
all assault guns and special motor vehicles to the mainland
as planned, in spite of a marked Increase in the enemy's
pressure during the last stages of withdrawal from the
island.
During embarkation of the last bridgehead garrison in Bastia
the new harbor was continuously under heavy gunfire from
1715 until nightfall, so that some of the vessels hod to
be loaded under considerable diff i-culties outside the harbor
on the open coast. Embarkation of the troops was completed
towards 2300. Demolition companies destroyed the harbor and
sank the steamer SASSARI as a block ship/ Only after the
last rear guards and demolition parties had embarked die
the Commander of the German Armed Forces on. Corsica, General
Von Senger und Etterlin, leave the island with his staff. Two
69 CONFIDENTIAL
5 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL
motor minesweepers stood by.. off Bastla. until around 0^00
to pick up any stagglers. There was no enemy interference
on the return passage and all the vessels taking part ■
have put- in."
German Naval Command, Italy reports that 2,282 men,, 222
prisoners, 328 motor vehicles, 51 guns and 77 tons of material
were transferred on 3 Oct, the last day.
Transports and escort units will at once be transferred
to coastal traffic, especially for intensified evacuation
of return cargo from the front-line area on west and east
coasts. From the Gaeta ,-*■ Ostia area alone 25,000 tons
are to be transported.
The interruption of traffic across the Brenner by enemy air
attacks proves the vulnerability of land traffic .routes and
the importance of coastal traffic from southern France to
the west coast of Italy.
5 • A rea Nav al Group South;
a . A driatic S ea :
Na^val Shore . Commander, North. Adriatic reports
plans to send the 62j5rd Naval Artillery Battalion aboard the
steamers ARGENTINA And ITALIA from Trieste outside the Islands
to Durazzo on the evening of 5 Oct. and to send two detach-
ments -of the 6 12th Naval Artillery Battalion aboard the steam-
er FIS3ER from Pola to Zata and from there aboard' the steam-
er CAGLIARI to Durzzzo on the morning of 6 Oct. Air escort
especially of tje ARGENTINA and ITALIA, is necessary. (See
teletype 1758).
Group South, as instructed, commented on 4 Oct. on the
suggestion of German Naval Command, Italy with regard to a
barrage defense of the entracne to the Adriatic Sea ' In a
line Lagosta - Pelagosa - Tremiti and urged that enemy-
occupied ports on the east coast of Italy be mined by.
planes .
Operations Division then issued the following instructions
to Group South, with copy to German. Naval Command, Ital
l
y°
1. a. Mine barrages for defense of the entrance. to
the Adriatic Sea in a line Lagosta - Pelagosa - Tremiti
are too late. .Since enemy forces have already been estab-
lished in Termoli and withdrawal of our land front as' far
as Ortona has been ordered, the laying of mines in the
western part, as planned, is questionable; barrages in
the eastern part only would be a half measure, especially
as enemy supplies will stay close to the Italian coast
occupied by him.
70 CONFIDENTIAL
5 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
b. It is left to your discretion to l ay mines .,
vest of Pelagosa and in our coastal waters between Lagosta
and Lissa merely in order to harass enemy thrusts to the
north; due regard must, however, be given to passage
facilities for the submarines of Commander, Submarines,
Mediterranean. ■ ■-
2. Offensive operations against enemy supplies off the
ports on the east coast of Italy are desirable. Close con-,
tact should be maintained with Commander, Submarines,
Mediterranean owing to operations by our submarines in this
area (submarine mining operation off Brindis.i).
J> . The suggestion made regarding mining of enemy-.' ...
occupied ports by planes will be passed on to Air Force
Operations Staff.
4. On the Adriatic coast the mine defense of Cattaro ..
appears to be urgent. .'
5. The following mines will be allocated under
designation "Ad 2":
a. for mine laying as per 1 b:
300 EMF's and 200 m. mooring rope,
100 EMR's and 200 m. mooring rope.
b. for offensive operations as per 2:
36 EMF's and 200 m. mooring rope,
lkk EMF's and 100 m. mooring rope,
100 LMB's. , ; \
*■ •■ ''■ i
In addition, 100 UMB's and 150 m. mooring rope, since the ■..••.
laying of EMF mines by PT boats is dependent on calm weather.-.
Details and place of delivery are to be arranged direct
with .the Mining and Barrage Inspectorate.
Commander, Submarines, Mediterranean has been advised at
the same time as follows:
Group South has received, instructions, When laying mines
in the Adriatic - ....
a. between Lagosta and Lissa
b. between Pelagosa and Tremiti
c. off enemy- occupied ports on the east coast of
Italy, _ •. '■.
to take into consideration passage and operational facilities
for our submarines and, therefore, to keep in close touch
with Commander, Submarines, Mediterranean.
71 CONFIDENTIAL
5 Oct. 19^5 CONFIDENTIAL
j.j
b. Aegean Sea :
On 4 Oct. at O805 our air reconnaissance sighted
a surfaced enemy submarine on southeasterly course 24 miles
east of Naxos .
All naval forces and steamers which participated in the
operation against Kos, except for two neval landing craft,
have returned to Piraeus. Our losses amount to 15 dead and 70
wounded. The number of prisoners taken on Kos has increased
to 600 British and 2,5.00 Italians. Among other things 1
ferry barge, 1 fishing smack, 1 luxury yacht and 11 planes,
as well as ho guns, are also reported to have been captured.
The operation to disarm Naxos, Paros and Antiparos by Army
groups, which are to be transported from Syra on boats of
Coast Patrol Flotilla "Attica" and one naval landing craft,
was scheduled for 5 Oct. No reports have yet been received.
According to radio intelligence, enemy air activity over the
Agean was less than usual on 5 Oct.
c. Black Sea:
Enemy Situation:
During the evening two submarine locations were
reported southwest and northwest of Sevastopol. The destroy-
ers reported In Tuapse have apparently put out. Our air
reconnaissance sighted shortly, after midnight on 5 Oct. two
destroyers proceeding at high speed on westerly course
58 miles southeast of Feodosiya. One destroyer shelled Yalta
without particular effect. Coastal batteries returned fire %
without the result being observed.
O wn Situation:
Naval artillery lighters and naval landing
craft had an encounter from 0200 to 0230 at the northern
outlet of the Strait of Kerch with several enemy gunboats
which were proceeding towards the Taman coast. The enemy
attack was repulsed. There were no casualties or damage.
During the day the patrol line off the north Taman coast
was bombed and machine-gunned by 50 enemy planes without
substantial damage. No enemy planes were brought down.
On 4 Oct. three enemy planes were shot down at this point,
and not too as previously reported.
72 CONFIDENTIAL.
5 Oct. 19"43 .. • CONFIDENTIAL
During the enemy sir attack on Geniche-sk on 3 Oct. a tank..
containing 13 corn, of gasoline -was destroyed.- The battery
position on Biryushi partly collasped. Enemy planes attacked
Feodosiya three times during the day of 3 Oct. Two lighters
were damaged. .
Crimean convoys were carried out according to plan.
Three boats of the 1st PT Boat Flotilla, as expected, sighted
an enemy destroyer while escorting the Kerch-Feodosiya
convoy during the night of 5 Oct. The destroyer, however,
outmaneuvered attack.
Two Italian midget submarines are proceeding from Sevastopol
to Constanta via Odessa for repairs. PT boats S "51" and
"52" left Constanta for Ivanbabe and S "49" left Ivanbaba
for Constanta.
VIII. Situation East Asia
Nothing to report.
73 CONFIDENTIAL
6 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL
Items of Politics! Importance
According to"DNB" the U. S. press reports, in view of
Franco's latest speech,; that Spain has changed her foreign
policy from' a non-belligerent status to one of watchful
neutrality. ■ ."
According to Reuter, disappointment is becoming increasingly
evident in Moscow over£the failure to open a second front,
now, during the height of the Russian offensive, since
progress is necessarily becoming slower. The Allied advance
in Italy is regarded by Russia as too slow and unimportant.
Very little Is expected of the Balkan operation. It is held
that the Balkan problem would be automatically solved by a
German defeat on the western front.
Finland's attitude seems to have become more settled lately.
The new Parliamentary elections for summer 19^ snd this
year's municipal elections have wisely been postponed. A
capitulation is unanimously rejected.
The "Daily Mail" writes as follows in connection with the
appointment of Cunningham:
"Now that the Atlantic is under British control and
the Mediterranean as good as cleared, the Pacific
looms on the horizon. In the days to come the biggest
naval war in world history will be fought in the
East. Preparation for this war will be Cunningham's
task".
Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff
I. A rmy Situation:
On 5 Oct. no major operations took place on the
eastern front. The enemy's anticipated large-scale offen-
sive in the Melitopol - Zaporozhe area has not yet commenced.
Minor penetrations into the "East Wall" position prove the
weakness of this line, where our own divisions, most of them
exhausted, have to defend sectors of 20 - 25 km. each.
Fighting in the Leningrad area shows an increase.
Our forces were sent in against the enemy landing near
Termoli behind our Italian front but they were not able to
break through.
74 CONFIDENTIAL
6 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
II. The departure of the three aircraft carriers from the
Mediterranean may indicate, that no operation against the
Balkans in the near future is contemplated. Aircraft carriers
are no longer needed in the Italian area since the occupation
of the Tyrrhenian islands.
Chief, Naval Staff expresses his great appreciation of the
able command of naval forces during the operation on Kbs
by Commander, 21st Submarine Chaser Flotilla.
No other special conferences or decisions.
Commander in Chief, Navy attended the Gauleiter Convention
at Posen, in the course of -which he spoke on questions of
naval warfare. The Fuehrer also attended this Convention,
Special Items
I. On 6 and 7 Oct. there will be discussions at Naval
Staff headquarters between the Chiefs of Staff of the Groups,
Naval Commands and the other high Command headquarters.
For itinerary and list of reports and conferences as per
1 Ski I op 29 2 H5A3 gen. see War Diary, Part B, Vol. V.
This meeting has been called with the intention of acquain-
ting all those concerned, in personal discussions, with the
general situation and requirements in the various theaters
of war.
Chief of Staff, Naval Staff will take the opportunity to
impress on all the Chiefs of Staff the necessity of quicker
and more effective advice to Naval Staff regarding special
events .
II. The Shipbuilding Commission has requested Naval Staff
to decide as to whether a number, which is lower by at
least 50$, of larg e mine -exploding vessels (3,000 tons,
14-16 knots) should be constructed or whether the number,
as provided in the 19^3 Construction Program, should be
constructed of wartime mine -exploding vessels of the present
type.
Operations Division gives the following views on this to
Quartermaster Division:
75 CONFIDENTIAL
6 Oct. 19^ CONFIDENTIAL
If it is possible to build the wartime mine -exploding'
vessel with the additional fittings and reinforcements,
without thereby lowering the speed to less than 12
knots, Operations Division 'agrees to construction of the
wartime mine -exploding vessel of the present design and
abandonment for the time being of the 3,000 ton type.
It is, however, requested that the plan of the letter
type nevertheless be taken in hand and completed, so that
construction can be' started without delay if the situation
should demand it. •"
Situation 6 Oct,
I. War in Foreign Waters
■'■ h i !■■ n ii i ip n !■ i ■■ i ■■■■■■■■ i m i . ■ i.
1. Enemy Situation :
Nothing to report.
2.. Own Situation:
The naval Attache in Tokyo reports that the 0S0RN0
has orders to leave Jokjokarta on 26 Oct. In his report he
also gives details as' regards route, equipment and intended
camouflage.'
According to a further report of the Naval Attache, the
Japanese Navy will probably agree to the request to hand
over all three AQUILA submarines.
All vessels in foreign waters were advised of the enemy
situationjsee Radiogram 1651.
II. Situation West Area
1. Enemy Situation:
Only five planes were detedced on operation over
the Biscay area. One British vessel was located in BF 1810 at
2013 Channel: Up to 0245 enemy targets, probably larger
than PT boats', were located in Seine Bay, also at 014^
9 miles west of Boulogne and 0242 North" of Point D'Ailly.
2. Own Situation
Atlantic Coast;
CONFIDENTIAL
76
6 Oct. 1943 , CONFIDENTIAL
One ELM/J mine was swept on 4 Oct. off St. Jean de
Luz and one on 5 Oct. off Lorient and La Pallice.
Three submarines were escorted out of the submarine bases
and one was escorted in.
Destroyer Z "37" was transferred in the morning from
Bordeaux and the KONDOR in the evening from La Pallice
to Royan Roads .
Torpedo boat T "27" ran on to the net barrage while
entering Brest, but sustained no damage.
Tactical exercises in the Bay of Biscay by the 8th Destroyer
Flotilla and the 5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla rre planned for
7 and 8 Oct.
Channel Coast:
A ground mine was swept north of Gr-^ve lilies on 3 Oct.
Patrol positions in the Channel were not taken up on
account of weather conditions.
The convoy of the NORDVAARD put in to Le H^vre again at
0600.
III. North Sea, Norway,- Northern Waters
1. North Sea :
Patrol positions were not taken up and minesweeping
operations had to be canceled owing to weather conditions.
The Hook - Elbe and FUE.SILIER convoys were postponed for
24 hours .
Patrol duty in the inner part of the Heligoland Bight
was carried' out according to plan.
2 . Norway, Northern Waters:
Enemy S i t ua 1 3. on :
Twenty- one planes were detected on operation over the
North Sea, A reconnaissance plane was reported in the Alta area
77 CONFIDENTIAL
6 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
Own Situation:
At 04.00 the steamer ANTJE FRIT ZEN was damaged at the
waterline by an adhesive (sabotage) mine in Aelesund
harbor, but remained afloat.
Seventeen ships were escorted north and 17 south.
In the Arctic coast area 13 ships were delayed owing to
lack of escorts .
Naval Command, Norway reports that it, as well as Admiral,
North Norwegian Coast, and the Naval Shore Commanders were
quite inadequately informed on events regarding the con-
voys and the actual situation during the enemy air attack
in the Bodoe area, owing to inefficiency in the trans-
mission of messages by our escorts - the cause of which
has not yet been ascertained. It took some time to obtain
accurate information on the situation. The message of
l^OO reporting the sighting of the enemy carrier unit was
not received by the 5"th Air Force until 1739. Messages
received up to then by the 5th Air Force were such that
even its Commanding Gereral was not sure until 1730 that
the planes concerned were carrier-borne. (See teletype
1930.)
Naval Command, Norway further submits a survey dated 4
Oct. of casualties and damage so far ascertained.
(For copy see teletype 23 15.)
Submarine U "733" will relieve U "277" off Ice Fjord. .
U H 36" will take up position AB 3568.
IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea. Entrances, Baltic Sea
• 1. Enemy Situation :
Gunfire in Kronstadt Bay vas very lively. In
our lines 450 impacts were counted, Including 85" heavy ones
near Battery "Prinz Heinrich", but no damage caused. Battery
"Prinz Heinrich" shelled the large floating dock and Kan-
onerski Dockyard from 100 to 1200. One hit was observed
in the dock and three in the dockyard area, causing a fire.
Tho enemy planes which droppped numerous bombs were
reported in the coastal area. At 1105 there were 26
motor minesweepers northeast of Labansaari on westerly
course. This unit put in to Lavansaari at 1315.
-78- CONFIDENTIAL
6 Oct. 19^3
CONFIDENTIAL
A submarine was located between the net barrage and the
line Hogland-Tyters . ._ :,.-l.;
The Finns have captured a Russian with radio set and
provisions, who had been landed oh Hamen-Holmarne from.
a submarine. On the southern part of Hogland a radio set
and a store of provisions were found. A further search has so
far been fruitless. ...
2. Own Situation:
Two ELM/J mines were swept east of Halsbarre. . ■- i.
Mine exploding vessel "18" is transferring from Gdynia %6.:;.r
Copenhagen for operations in the Danish p.tbp .
Convoy and transport traffic in the entire Baltic. Sea area
was carried out according to plan and without incident.
Nd other reports of special note have been received from
the areas of Commander, Minesweeper, Baltic and Admiral,
Baltic States.
V. Subma r ine Wa r f a r e
1 . ■ Enemy : S i tua t i on : ...
Nothing to report.
2. Own Situation:
U "539" shot down one enemy plane on 4 Oct. in AD
8190 (south of Newfoundland) and warded off a further one.
The s ubma r ine s us ta ine d minor da ma ge .
Group "Rossbach", consisting of 16 submarines, is to be
in reconnaissance patrol line from AK 3970 to AK 9290
at midnight on 7 Oct. and will proceed at 5 knots on course
2 20 degrees.
On 8 Oct. an eastbound HX- convoy is expected. There is,
however, no Information on its position.
Four submarines are proceeding to BD 37 for refuelling.
79 CONFIDENTIAL
6 Oct. 19^43 CONFIDENTIAL
VI. Aerial Warfare
1. British Isle.s and .Vicinity :
The 3rd Air Force reports kk planes out on
operation over England, 16 .over the Atlantic and 3 over
the Mediterranean.
Nine planes carried out nuisance raids on London, dropping
1-4.2 tons of high explosives.
Five FW 200 's have been sent out on armed reconnaissance -west
of Portugal.
During the day and the night enemy air activity over the
vest area and Germany was only slight.
'2. Mediterranean Theater:
Planes of the 2nd Air Force were on : reconnaissance
operations over the Italian area.
Air Force Command, Southeast reports that 20 Ju 88 ' s , 4
He Ill's and 25 Stukas carried out operations against
land targets on Leros with good effect.
All available planes of Air Force Command, Southeast
were sent out against the enemy force of two cruisers and
two destroyers which attacked our conVoy west of. Leros.
3 . Eastern Front :
The 4th Air Force had 67 Stukas out on operations
against three destroyers south of Yalta. For- particulars of
this successful operation see "Black Sea:". Reconnaissance
of Poti was also carried out. . .
On 5 Oct. W49 enemy planes were shot down over the Army
•front. Our losses amounted to two planes.
VII. Warfare in the' Mediterranean and Black Sea
lo Enemy Situation "Mediterranean: . ' ■
Four freighters and 2 destroyers put in to Gibraltar
80 CONFIDENTIAL
6 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
from the Atlantic and 2 battleships of the KING GEORGE V
class -with 5 destroyers and 1 cruiser of the CARDIFF class
put in from the Mediterranean.
Tres Forcas reported at O83O 13 escort vessels on course
east, presumably the auxiliary minesweepers which left
Gibraltar on the evening of 5 Oct.
Two floating docks in tow and k escort vessels proceeding
towards the Mediterranean were also reported.
The large eastbound convo^y, which was off Cape Tenes on
4 Oct. 5 was not detected again owing to lack of reconnaissance
German Naval Command, Italy is of opinion that the convoy
probably- entered Algiers or Bone. Photographic reconnaissance
of Bizerta and Bone was broken off owing to unfavorable
weather. ""...
The number of ships, in Sardinian and Corsiean ports was
found to be unchanged. In the Salerno-Sicilian area-
single ships were sighted.
Merchantmen, tankers and landing boats were lying in
Naples on the afternoon of 5 Oct. according to photo-
graphic reconnaissance.
Considerable shipping movements, consisting of small
convoys or single vessels, were observed near Crotone,
off Brindisi and Manfredonia by our reconnaissance planes.
No reports have been received from the eastern Mediterranean.
2 . Own Situation Mediterranean:
Submarine U "380" fired a T5 torpedo on a destroyer
off Salerno Bay without, however, observing the result.
In CO 5721 (60 miles west of Derna ) U "596" fired a spread
of four torpedoes on four steamers; three hits were heard.
The submarine was heavily dept charged and is not returning
to Pola. .
Mine laying oprations during the night of 5 Oct. were
carried out by PT boats, minelayer F "8" and one 'naval-
landing craft according to plen, Two motor minesweepers ■ ',.
searched the area off San Remo without result.
Out PT. boats were sent out on operation in the Salern
Ustica area during the night of 6 Oct.
n-
81 CONFIDENTIAL
6 Oct; 1943
The torpedo- boat ARTURE "was commissioned in Genoa on 5 Oct.
The torpedo boat MISSOURI, manned by an Italian crew,
is. at present supporting Army operations in the Flume area.
German Naval Command, Italy reports in teletype 1920 complete
figures on ferry operations from Sardinia to Corsica and
from Corsica to the mainland. Our vessels lost in these
operations -were: 1 infantry landing boat, 7 naval landing
craft, 2 submarine chasers, 1 tug, 3 Siebel ferries, 1
barge and 3 steamers each of 16,943 G..R.T. In 40- enemy
air attacks 15 planes were shot down and in 8' submarine
attacks 1 submarine was destroyed. Our total casualties
amount to 31 dead and 101 wounded.
Commanding General, Armed Forces, South in his report to
Armed Forces High Command, makes mention of the operational
achievements of German Naval Command and Chief, Supply and
Transport, Italy. He expresses highest praise for the crews
of the naval landing craft, Siebel ferries, combined
operations boats and the transport planes on their excellent
achievement during the last few weeks, their daring having
been decisive for the success of the whole operation.
3. Area Naval Group South
a . Adriatic Sea :
It is intended to use the Cruiser CATTARO as
a floating anti-aircraft battery for Trieste.
After the occupation of Split by German troops it was
found that the mole. was only slightly damaged and for the
most part can be used, whereas the dockyard and the large
dock are out of action. It will be possible to repair the
small, floating dock-.'' Three ships were sunk in the harbor,
but they can be made serviceable again in six to eight
weeks . ■"'■"..
In the Adriatic the steamer SIBENICO avoided a submarine
torpedo on 4 Oct. 38 miles southeast of Pola .
The steamer SIGLlANO reports on the same day a mine deton-
ation ten miles south of Pola . A subsequent report states
that the tanker KNUDSEN' was damaged by a torpedo or mine
hit two miles off Dubrovnik' on 29 Sept. She was, however,
able to reach Cattaro.
The steamer E. H FISSER left Trieste' for Sibenik on 5
Oct. according to plan.
82 CONFIDENTIAL
u kj^ u . j-y~r j
In connection with the intended mine offensive and
operations by naval forces along the southeast coast
of Italy, Group South assumes that Commander, Submarines,
Mediterranean will coordinate plans with Group South or
keep the Group promptly and continually informed in order
to avoid complications.
Gri'Up South further proposes that the Naval Liaison Staff'/.
Croatia be put under Admiral, Adriatic, as it is in this
area of command and many points for discussion arise in
connection with the training :f and operations by 'Croat-
ians. Quartermaster Division, Organization and Mobilization
Branch will go into this matter further.
b. Aegean Sea :
At 0050 20 low-flying enemy planes machine-gunned
the airfield at Araxos , One plane was destroyed by fire.
Two naval landing craft arrived at Piraeus from Kos with
500 Italian prisoners. The operation against Pares' and
Antiparos has been postponed since all naval landing craft
are reserved for a special operation. Details of ..-tnls are
not yet known to Naval Staff.
The steamer OLYMPOS and six naval landing craft are trans-
ferring one battalion from Piraeus to Kos.
c . Black Sea :
During the night . of 5 Oct. two enemy destroyers
attacked. the Crimean coast off Feodosiya -Ivanbaba ,. while
the destroyer CHARKOW with two further destroyers attacked
Yalta and Alusta. The destroyer group off Feodosiya was
attacked and driven off by the 1st PT boat Flotilla,
acting as flank escort for the Kerch-Feodosiya convoy,
in cooperation with our night reconnaissance planes. In
this way the enemy operation planned against the coast .
and our convoy was frustrated in cooperation with ' the
Air Force. At 0^00 enemy planes attacked Ivanbaba, using
numerous flares to illuminate the target for shelling
from the sea „
At ^0350. the CHARKOW group shelled the roads ,. harbor
and town of Yalta .at -long, range. No 'militarv damage
is reported. Our coastal battery immediately returned
fire. -t
The enemy withdrew to -the east under heavy smoke and
shelled Alusta. At 0503 submarine U "9" unsuccess-
fully attacked the enemy destroyer formations which
had joined up at a position about 30 miles south-
southwest.
8 3 CONFIDENTIAL
6 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
Towards 0?00 the returning enemy unit Was attacked by
one of our- Stuka .formations. One enemy vessel, possibly
a minelayer, was sunk and a destroyer was put out of control
and had to be' taken in tow by the CEARKOW. In a second
air attack at 0950 another destroyer received two direct
hits. At 1253 the sinking of one, and at 1326 of two destroy-
ers 'W£3 observed. The remaining j5 destroyers withdrew at high
speed. . • ■;
At 1625 U ,l 9" observed the explosion of a destroyer when
closing in for an attack.
The destruction of three destroyer can, therefore, be
considered certain.
Four boats of the 1st PT Boat Flotilla left Ivanbaba at
1800 for a further operation against enemy destroyers and
at 1950 had an engagement with three Russian gunboats'.
In addition to U "9"* U "20" also was ordered to operate
against enemy naval forces end to bring in prisoners if
possible. •'.•"•"• - ■••;•
During the night of 5 Oct. Naval landing craft in patrol
line off the north Taman coast had an engagement with
enemy naval forces. Hits on one enemy vessel were observed.
During the day the naval landing craft were repeatedly
bombed and machine-gunned. One naval landing craft was
slightly damaged. Kossa Tussla was occupied by the enemy
during the night of 5 Oct. : '."■.".-':•. ..':'".'..':
At 0750. before entering Feodosiya one of our convoys
was unsuccessfully attacked by twelve enemy planes which
dived on it. r. ■ • -.!.. : "•' ■'
Nothing else to report. v
VI 1 1 . Situation East Asi a . ■•
The Naval Attache- in Tokyo reports :
1. The Japanese Naval Representative in Batavia,
Captain Maeda, was in Tokyo for two weeks, in order to
draw attention of headquarters to the inadequate defense
of Sumatra and Java . ■Should the enemy Attack" Burma, it
will, in the opinion of naval offices In the southern area,
only be a deceptive operation. The enemy's main thrust
must naturally be- expected on southern Java or Sumatra,
aiming at Palembang and later at Balikpapan. Should these
-84- CONFIDENTIAL
6 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL
oil supply centers be -wrested from Japan, her situation
would become very serious. The present defense of the
islands is far too weak and above all cound not -withstand
any surprise attack from the Indian Ocean, which must
soon be expected.
2. Admiral Nomura has, since his return, given more
than 50 lectures on Germany, several of them .before highest
Government and Armed Forces offices. He is said to have
expressed himself on Germany in a very definite manner, with-
out glamorizing, and in view of this General Banzai was
very "soon no longer taken seriously. Admiral Nomura has
played an important part in recent Government measures
for total mobilization.
*•* * #*■*■* -* •** ■* **■ •* •*■* * * * * *
-85- : u CONFIDENTIAL
7 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL
Items- of Political Importance , ....
Reuter transmits from Washington- the report of the Senate's
Sub-Comittee for Mobilization, according to which the Allies
now have sufficient shipping available to carry out a
devisive blow against Europe this year. It Is planned
to transport a U. S. Army of 5 million men overseas,. of
which 2| .million will be shipped by this Christmas. It
was. possible to advance the original d^tes planned by
six months as, through .the lull in submarine warfare,^
the increase in tonnage has exceeded its quota by 3 million
tons' .'.'•'
The British Home Secretary stated in one of his speeches
that Great Britain's objective in this war was the annih- .
ilation of Japan just as much as that of Germany.
The military state of emergency"' in Denmark was canceled on
6 Oct.
According to an intelligence report of 16 Sept. the
expected declaration by Salazar and the Portuguese National
Assembly has been postponed until completion of large-
scale maneuvers now commencing. Portugal Is to be
declared a non-belligerent with close leanings to Great
Britain.
Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff
I. Army Situation:
No large-scale actions took place on the eastern front.
In Italy our attack on Termoli was broken off. The enemy
landed new forces and assisted the fighting on land with
gunfire from cruisers and destroyers. Strong enemy forces
broke through 10 km. southwest of Termoli. Enemy supplies
are continuously moving in via Brindisi, Taranto and
Termoli. The marked increase in freighters at Salerno
indicates preparations for a new landing operation. Enemy
advance battalions have reached the Volturno southeast of
Capua .
II. Operations Division, Fleet Operations Section submits
a report fr-om Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff,
Naval Liaison that the convoy of the steamer OLYMPOS con-
sisting of six naval landing craft led by submarine chaser
"2111" was attacked by an enemy submarine at 0400 and later
by surface forces in the Amorgos-Levitha area, while en route
from Piraeus to Kos in connection with the operation against
Leros . All our vessels, with exception of one naval landing
86 CONFIDENTIAL
T Oct, 19^3 , ' CONFIDENTIAL
cra£t- s; -w ere ;sunk-i 'according ; to. air reconnaissance. Naval
Staff , mere ly;. knows ' tha t tfe is . c envoy : wa s intended- . for the
transfer of one battalion of German troops ' from Piraeus
to Kos . It is to be assumed that the destroyers detected
by our air reconnaissance southeast of Rhodes on the
afternoon, of 6 Oct. carried out this attack. So far
Naval Staff has not been advised of any operations planned
following that against Kos. It is only known that the
operation against Paros and Antiparos was postponed in
favor of s special operation and it seems that this was
the operation against Leros. Chief of Staff/ Group South,
who was present at the Chiefs of Staff Conference was
questioned, and states that he too was not informed.
Chief of Staff, Naval Staff has therefore ordered. the
following teletype to be sent to Group South: -
''Commander in Chief, Navy and Naval Staff were not
advised regarding plans for and commencement of the oper-
ation against Leros, otherwise approval to carry it out
would not have been given.
After the successful attack on Kos, Naval Staff expect-
ed enemy measures to prevent a similar German success
against Leros . The Fuehrer has ordered an investigation
as to why the Operations Divisions concerned were not
advised beforehand of this plan, of the preparations
and of the actual commencement of the ' operation against
Leros. Commander in Chief, Navy and Naval Staff have,
.even up to the time of dispatch of this teletype, only
had information from messages transmitted from the Air
Force Operations Staff; nothing has so far come in
from Group South. • , . .•
I have to request a brief report by KR (most immediate)
telttype without delay, enabling me to inform the Fuehrer
at this evening's conference on the situation. A detailed
report on the preparations for and course of the operation
is subsequently to be submitted to me.
A basic order to 'this effect is being sent separately to
all Groups and Naval Commands." .
III. Prompted by the action off Bodoe, Operations Div-
ision has written to Commander in. Chief, Air Force,
Operations Staff as follows: - :'•
On k Oct. 19^3 an enemy naval force, which presum-
ably included two aircraft carriers, succeeded in approach-
ing the north coast of Norway unobserved. Carrier-borne
planes carried out the surprise and successful attack
on our convoy south of Bodoe and on ships in Bodoe harbor
on the morning of h Oct. The losses sustained are very heavy,
87 CONFIDENTIAL
7 Oct. 19^ CONFIDENTIAL
Naval Staff is of opinion that a repetition of such attacks
is certainly to be reckoned -with and that our traffic in the
Norwegian skerries may be seriously affected by this.
Since, following the notice given to terminate transit of
Armed Forces transports through Sweden, supplies by sea
for our forces in northern Finland and Norway now assume still
greater importance than hitherto:, every .precaution should be
taken to pre cent the enemy -a gain achieving such successes
in similar attacks to those on 4 Oct.
Naval Sta.ff will do everything possible to increase convoy
escort and to reinforce anti-aircraft guns on bo-°rd and ships
being convoyed. These, measures a. lone will, however, not
suffice to protect our convoys adequately.
In this respect it is of primary importance to have/an
adequate air reconnaissance off the entire Norwegian coast,
which establishes the approach of enemy aircraft carriers
early enough to enable our forces to operate against the
enemy unit. In addition, it will be necessary to transfer
sufficient fighter planes also to northern Norway so :as
at least to provide the convoys with .fighter cover in case
the approach of an aircraft carrier is not prevented.
It is therefore requested that investigation be made as
to how the forces necessary to fulfill these duties and
the necessary fuel can be allotted to the 5th Air Force-
Quartermaster Division will make further arrangements
regarding reinforcement of anti-aircraft guns aboard ships.
Chief, Naval Staff agrees, -... . ■■■■ .
For copy of order l/skl I op 28009/43 GKdo3 . see War Diary,
Part C. Vol. Ha .
Special Items
I. Quartermaster Division has issued the following order
1. In the area of Admiral, Adriatic a new escort
flotilla will be formed consisting of the escort vessels
GRADO, NAZARIO SAURO and JADDERA at Trieste, the SAN.
GIORGIO, SALVORE and F "149" at Venice and the torpedo
boats MISSOURI at Trieste, AUDACE at Venice and INSIDIOSO
at Pola. Crews for the torpedo boats are to be drawn from
-88- CONFIDENTIAL
7 Oct. 1945 CONFIDENTIAL
reserves for the CALATAFIMI and from reserves on PT boat
depot ships .
2. The following new constructions, -which will be completed
by the end of 19^3 , are to be given priority:
At Ansaldo Dockyard:
In Genoa -Sestri:
3 torpedo boats, 1 corvette, 2 vedette boats.
In Geno-Voltri
1 war transport
In Genoa -Sampler d 1 Arena:
3 naval landing craft.
At Cantieri Baglietto, Varazze:
2 minesweepers, 1 sea -rescue boat and 1 motorboat.
At Cantieri del Tirreno, Riva Trigoso:
10 naval landing craft and 1 war transport.
At Odero Terni Orlando in Muggiano:
3 transport submarines (top priority)
(two of these not until 1944).
At Odero Terni Orlando in Leghorn:
1 destroyer and 2 corvettes.
3. At Cantieri Navale Riuniti del Adriatico in Monfalcone:
2 coastal submarines and 3 transport submarines
(not until 1944).
At San Marco and Rocco (Trieste):
2 corvettes, 1 PT boat (vedette boat),
2 torpedo boats and 5 tugs.
At Cantieri Navale del Quarnaro:
In Fiume:
2 torpedo boats.
In Breda :
1 corvette.
4. A decision as to the new constructions which will
be completed in 1944 will be made later.
II. Re: River Mine -ex ploding Vessels
' ' " - ' ■ ' . I w. M 1. 1 . . .
In view of the favorable experiences of Naval Ordnance
89 CONFIDENTIAL
7 Oct. 19k
CONFIDENTIAL
Division, Underwater Obstacles Branch, and owing to the
urgent need to supply as many small mine-exploding vessels
as possible to the front in the shortest possible time,
Operations Division request Quartermaster Division immed-
iately to convert a series of naval landing craft into
river mine -exploding vessels or to fit up new naval land-
ing craft for this purpose.
The following are to be provided:
for the
for the
for the
for the
West Area
Baltic Se;
North Sea
Da nube
as reserve
6 river mine-exploding vessels
£ it it ~ a
g ii it . ii
•2 II II It
-Z M II II
24 river mine-exploding vesseTs
This new use of necessity requires the construction of 24
more naval landing craft. The introduction of the river
mine -exploding vessel will entail an appreciable relief
it can free them of duties
and river mouths* This will
for the seagoing ones, since
in the shallow coastal areas
sdon' enable n general improvement in the present very
strained situation as regards these vessels.
III. German Naval Command, Italy proposes the introduct-
ion of a special award for crews of sm-°ll ships, in view
of the outstanding achievements by crews of naval landing
craft, Siebel ferries, barges, etc.
IV. Personnel requirements, which are becoming more
urgent every day in connection with the increase in
small naval vessels and escorts, are also being felt
in Royal Navy. Naval Intelligence Division reports
that the Admiralty is taking measures to appoint officers
of the Royal Marines as Commanders of landing craft and to
man certain types of boat with Royal Marines exclusively.
For details' see copy as per 1/Skl 30641/43 geh. in War Diary,
Vol "Evaluation of Intelligence on Foreign Navies."
V. For summary of intelligence on the enemy obtained by
radio decoding and radio intelligence from 27 Sept. to
3 Oct. see Radio Monitoring Report No. 40/43.
Situation ,7 Oct .
I. War In Foreign Waters
1 . E nemy Situation': , i
•Nothing to- report
rix\ ?rV
90
CONFIDENTIAL
7 Oct. 19^3 ■ .,, CONFIDENTIAL
2 . Own Situation:
The Navel Attache in Tokyo reports an order for the
RIO GRANDE to leave Jokhokarta on 29 Oct., with statements
as regards route, equipment, camouflage, etc.
Naval Staff 'advises the Naval Attache in Tokyo that the
FLIKDER left Brest on 5 Oct. at l600.
II. Situation West Area;
1 . Enemy Situation:
Forty-five enemy planes were observed on operation
over the Bay of Biscay; there -was much r^dio traffic of an
urgent nature between them.
One British vessel was located in BE 989O at 2029 ^nd one
in BF i860 at 20^4.
Nine British freighters arrived at Lisbon from the southwest
according to an intelligence report. An escort, consisting
of one destroyer and h corvettes, is waiting off the Tagus
for 8 outgoing steamers.
2. Own Situation:
Atlantic Coast:
Three submarines were escorted out and che in. The
steamer MUENSTERLAND is being transferred from Royan to
Brest. The exercises of the 8th Destroyer Flotilla have
been postponed.
Channel Coast:
Patrol positions were not taken up during the
day because of stormy weather.
The steamer NORDVAARD moved from Cherbourg to Le H^vre
during the night of 6 Oct.
The 2nd, 4th, 6th .and 8th PT Boat Flotillas were out
laulng mines on the Harwich - Great Yarmouth convoy
route during the night of 7 Oct. Targets located by
radar in the Channel, off Boulogne, Dieppe and in
the western part of Seine Bay were in no case confirmed
by searchlights and star shells.
91 CONFIDENTIAL
7 Oct.. 1943 :. CONFIDENTIAL . .
III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters
■:, North Sea :- .■•■■;■... :•,>.. ••.- ..-.
Three ground mines- were swept north of Terschelling.
Three PT boats were transferred from Wilheirns haven to the
Hook. Hook - Elbe. convoy "1179" started out at 1900; torpedo
boat T "19" joined this convoy. It is intended to transfer
the steamer FUESILIER from Helder to Ijmuiden during the
night of 7 Oct.
Emden was attacked by twelve enemy planes at £000. No
damage is reported from the harbor and dockyards. Towards
mignight planes were detected on mine laying operations
in the Borkum - Elbe mouth area . In the morning two
unescorted Dutch freight barges were sunk by eight Typhoons
in the East Scheldt.
In connection with air attack on Emden on 2 Oct., it is.
now reported that despite good smoke screens and an over-
cast sky numerous bombs hit the town and its northern,
suburbs.
Norway, Northern Waters: , .
1. Enemy Situation:
Twenty-seven planes were detected on operation
over the North Sea. Minor reconnaissance activity was
reported over the Vardoe/Nordkyn area and near Stavanger
on 6 Oct. A merchantmen lying, at Toross landing pier, .
at the outlet of Kola Bay, was attacked and damaged
by our planes on 6 Oct. The ship has apparently run
aground.
2. Own Situation:
Fifteen ships were escorted north and lk south.
Nine ships were left lying in harbor in the Arctic coast
area owing to shortage .of escorts.
Naval Command, Norway submits a report of Admiral, North
Norwegian Coast. from Bodoe stating that exact figures of
the casualties sustained on k Oct. cannot yet be .given,
since the local hospitals were temporarily cleared during
the full alarm and the seriously wounded were evacuated,
some to Germany and some to Fauske.
Group North/Fleet reports that the submarine operation
against the radio and signal station and the coal mines
at^Syea (Spitsbergen) will be canceled because of the
slight chances of success and view of the number of
submarines and, their state of readiness.
92 CONFIDENTIAL
7 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea
1 . Enemy Situation:
Over the mouth of the Luga and Lippovo slight
air activity was reported during the day. On 5,6 Q-nd 7
Oct. our vessels -were unsuccessfully attacked by a tor-
pedo bomber off Duenamuende, off Demesnes, -west of Back-
of en and off Porkalla,.
2. Own Situation.:
Two mine detonations "were reported off the Shulz-
grund. In the exercise area of the Torpedo Experimental
Station off Gdynia altogether five ground mines were swept.
Three heavy gun carriers on the 24th Landing Flotilla
anchored north of Moon on the evening of 6 Oct. because
of weather conditions.
The activity of vessels of Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic
was also hampered very much by weather conditions.
Naval Command, Baltic reports:
"1. For operation in the Skagerrak, Commanding
Admiral, Defenses, Baltic has at his disposal:
The 16 th Batrol Boat Flotilla with 6 boats,
The 17th Patrol Boat Flotilla with 9 boats
and 4 detached minesweepers of Commanding
Admiral, Defenses, North - in all 19 vessels.
2. On continuous operations: for Oslo convoys 8
boats, for convoys to Kristiansand South 2 boats
for boiler cleaning and relief purposes 5 boats
in all 15 boats .
3. This leaves only 4 boats available for the
patrol line Arendal-Hirtshals for inter-'
ception of blockade runners. As these boats
have to relieve each other, the patrol line
can only be taken up by 2 or at the most 3
patrol boats .
4. The number of boats in the patrol line is
too small and they are too slow. A break-
through by blockade runners can, therefore
not be prevented effectively.
5. It is deemed necessary to allocate to
Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic another 6
fast boats from another area, since only then
will there be a chance of intercepting
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7 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
of intercepting the blockade runners. No such boats
can be released from the area of Naval Command,
Baltic. . tXyi /;.;-; . . . '
6. From 15 Oct. the 5th Air Force intends to carry
out regular evening reconnaissance in the inner
part of the Sk.agerrak and morning reconnaissance
in the outer part of the Ska-gerrak to detect
blockade runners. This promise was only given with .
reservation. Reconnaissance will only- be carried out
when formations' are available and if they are not
needed for more urgent operations.
7. Nothing was said about plans to provide bombers
and torpedo bombers to operate against the block-
ade runners" . .'.-.-
With regard to the anti-aircraft defense of Peenemuende,
Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, ifc'vy reports:
"An assignment of heavy batteries does not promise
any appreciable improvement in anti-aircraft defense, since
the location of the objective on a peninsula offers few
good facilities for emplacements and during day attacks
does not permit fire to be opened before bombs are released.
An investigation is requested as to whether High Command,
Navy can provide an anti-aircraft cruiser for improvement
of defense. "
Quartermaster Division will make this investigation.
Naval Command, Baltic informs. Naval Staff of instructions
to Baltic Sea Offices that the 102nd Bomber Ving cannot
provide continuous fighter and convoy escort' for merchant
shipping and that, therefore, reports Of departure, as
ordered up to now, are superfluous. The 102nd Bomber Wing
is still willing,- by means of single planes, occasionally
to harass activity by Russian torpedo bombers.
V. Submarine Warfare :
1, gnemy Situatio n:
According to an Intelligence report, 10 tankers,
including 3 of the latest type, left Baltimore on 2. Oct.
at 0200. During September, 62 ...freighters carrying war material
left Baltimore for Ireland, Gibraltar and Siberian ports.
On 29 Sept. a convoy of 11 freighters left Philadelphia, .-
destination unknown.
9^ CONFIDENTIAL
7 Oct. 1943 C ONFIDENTIAL . . ■ ;;
2, ■ O wn Situation :
From the Gulf of Oman U "188" reports the
sinking of a U. S. Steamer type "C 3" (8,000 GRT) in MZ
8916 on 21 Sept. end: of the tanker BRITANNIA (9-970 GRT)
in MF 2640 on 5 Oct. From MF 8630 to 8860 and subsequently
30 miles away from the 200 m line the submarine observed
convoy traffic with light escort on course 35 degrees and
215 degrees; also in the inner part of the Gulf occasional
single vessels. During the day planes made straight for
the submarine, apparently by location* Wo night air- activity
was observed. Probably due to diminished acid content
in electric torpedoes, the submarine had 10 misses (end of
run detonators ). which cannot be accounted for otherwise,
and thus lost the chance of any great success.
Investigations are being made as to whether tropical
influences on the electric torpedoes could be the cause.
The loss of transport submarine UT "460" and of U "422"
is to be assumed. Anit-a ircraf t submarine U "27l n bss
been sent to BD 30 as defense for UT "488",
In the North Atlantic single submarines in the later
afternoon contacted in AK 6l and 62 what was obviously the
destroyer escort Qf an eastbound SC convoy. Group "Rossbach"
was sent in. During the night of 6 Oct. altogether 8 sub-
marines reported destroyers, some .'of which were proceed-
ing in sub-divisions. One destroyer was sunk. Our BV 222 ' s
are carrying out reconnaissance of the convoy area.
VI. Aerial Warfare
British lies and Vicinity:
The 3rd Air Force reports 36 of our planes out on
operation against London and 39 against Norwich. Four bom-
bers and two fighters are overdue. Ten JU 88' s were on
free-lance operations over the Atlantic without success.
The enmy- f lew reconnaissance with altogether seven planes
during the day over Germany and carried out machine-gun
attacks in Holland, Belgium and France on railway install-
ations and on airfield, as well as on vessels off the coast.
On the east coast of Walcheren the motor ship KAMPERLAND
and a fishing smack were sunk.
95 CONFIDENTIAL
7 Oct. 1943 C ONFIDENTIAL
During the night of 7 Oct. the Baltic Sea entrances and
the Heligoland Bight -were mined by strong enemy formations.
A large-scale attack -was carried out on Stuttgart. Further
bombs -were dropped on Munich, Boeblingen, Friedrichshafen
and Strassburg. Substantial damage was done in Stutggart.
For particulars see " Daily Situation". Our fighter defense
in northern' Germany, consisting of 56 planes, shot down 4
enemy planes; in southern Germany our fighters could not
go up owing to fog.
. Mediterranean Theater:
the 2nd Air Force carried out reconnaissance
flights . .
Strong formations of Air Force Command, Southeast carried
out continuous attacks on an enemy warship unit off Scarp-
anto, which was defended by 18-20 fighters and accurate anti-
aircraft fire. Hits were scored on two cruisers.
Our planes rescued 219 of the survivors of the OLYMPOS
convoy. Reconnaissance reported at 1550 near Castelli Rosso
two destroyers on course 280 degrees. The enemy's air activity
over the Italian front was only slight. In the Aegean the
airfields -of Castelli on Crete and Maritza on Rhodes were
attacked. In addition two Ju 88 ! s were damaged during an
attack on the airfield .of Candia .
Eastern Front.: ? .. ,,
The 5th Air Force reports 32 planes out on
operation without special event.
VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and B lac k Sea
1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:
Cape Spartel reported at 1000 sighting
convoy of about A3 ships with 6' escort vessels making
for the Mediterranean. Seven of these ships put in to
Gibraltar in the afternoon. Four destroyers put in to
Gibraltar from the Mediterranean, and the FORMIDABLE,
and the INDOMITABLE and 4 destroyers left Gibraltar
for the Mediterranean and one- CARDIFF class left for
the Atlantic .
No reconnaissance reports have been received from the
western and eastern Mediterranean.
-96- CONFIDENTIAL
7 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL
At Naples many lighters were observed, so that It can
be assumed that the blasting of the berths was effective
Strong enemy fighter defense makes reconnaissance over
Naples and Salerno impossible.
According to Italian reports , a British cruiser sank on
9 Sept. as a result of a mine detonation, when entering
Taranto. This was probably due to the mines laid by our
PT boats and naval landing craft. Off Rapallo one of our
motor minesweepers was unsuccessfully attacked by an
enemy s ubma r ine .
2. Own Situation Mediterranean:
The PT boat operation during the night of 6 Oct.
was discontinued owing to unfavorable weather conditions.
As regards the loss of the POMMERN, it is reported that this
minelayer was chased by two submarines into the Bay of San
Remo. Whether she was sunk by a submarine or a mine is
still being investigated, Our own minesweeping operations
off San Remo were hampered by weather conditons.
On 8 Oct. four naval landing craft are to leave Marseilles
for Genoa; they will be joined from Toulon by three further
naval landing craft.
Submarine U "8l" reports from ON 3256 six misses on a
freighter of 1,800 GRT; U "3&0" reports from CJ 6794 a
miss with a T 5 torpedo on landing boats and from CJ 9128
a miss by a spread of four torpedoes on two overlapping
freighters, firing data being certain. The Commander pre-
sumes pistol failures.
Naval Shore Commander, North Adriatic reports that dockyards
have received orders from the Italian Secretary of the Navy
which do not conform with the instructions issued by Naval
Staff.
Quartermaster Division has ordered that dockyard interests
of the Navy in the north Adriatic area be looked after by
the Dockyard Control Staff of German Naval Command, Italy
as long as matters relating to dockyards in this area are
controlled by Organization Speer from the Italian area.
Naval interests at the yards are to be looked after by-
Working Group Trieste from the Dockyard Control Staff of
Serman Naval Command, Italy, with cooperation between
German Naval Command, Italy and Admiral, Adriatic.
Regarding the Army Situation, Commanding General, Armed
Forces, South reports regrouping for continuation of the
Attack near Termoli; however, he considers it doubtful
whether a decisive success can still be gained.
97 CONFIDENTIAL
7 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
3s. Area Naval Group Sout h: '
a. Adriatic Sea:
The steamer ERIDANIA en route from Pola to
Flume was sunk by an enemy submarine at 0740 off Cape Pro-
montore. The stea-mer SANSEGO en route from Zara to Pola -was
unsuccessfully attacked by an enemy submarine at" 1445 at the
same point as the ERIDANIA. The steamer UGLIANO was fired on
by enemy submarine between Zara and Pola . She returned the
fire and observed several machine-gun hits on the bridge of
the s ubma r ine .
•In the Valona area Italian coastal batteries were taken
over, namely six 15 cm guns at Saseno, three 15 cm guns
at Cape Linguette, one 15 cm and 7-5 cm battery, .at Cape
Treporti. In Venice PT boats S "30" and S "32&" - n re lying
in restricted operational readiness and S "34" and 3 "61"
out of operational readiness. .. •■
Report on departure of the st.ea.ner ROSSELLI from Dura z 20
to Patras has not yet been received.
b. Agean Sea :
Our air reconnaissance sighted: at 1240 on 6
Oct. four miles south of Leros one destroyer or torpedo
boat on south-easterly course; at 1500 east of Leros a
small naval vessel on easterly course; at 1540, as already
reported by the Air Force, six miles south of Castell Rosso
2 destroyers on' westerly course. These reports were contain-
ed in the morning situation report of Group South, which
did not reach Berlin until 153'8. At 0400 on 7 Oct. an enemy
force of 2 cruisers, and 4 destroyers with a few escort
vessels was reported. off Leros; this attacked our convoy
OLYMFOS. The same force consisting of 2 cruisers, 2
destroyers and 2 corvettes was sighted at 1000 between
Rhodes and Scarpanto on southeasterly course end was
successfully attacked by our Air Force.
As already reported only one "naval landing craft remains
out of the convoy of the steamer QLYMPOS. . So far 490 men
have been rescued in operat. ions started at once by naval
and air forces. These operations are continuing.
Naval Staff advises Admiral, Fuehrer Headquarters, with
copy to Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy
as f ollpws :
"Submarine chaser "2111", the steamer OLYMPOS and 7 naval
landing craft left Piraeus for Kos with one battalion of
German troops aboard at 0715 on 6 Oct. At 1.150 on 6 Oct. the
98 CONFIDENTIAL
7 Oct. 1945 CONFIDENTIA L
convoy was first detected by the enemy Air Force southwest
of Kos. At 1640 the convoy •was' west of Serif os according
to plan. At 0400 on 7 Oct. the convoy leader reported
sighting a submarine and subsequently sent a distress
report on a submarine attack east of Amorgos, to the north-
west of Stampalia. At 0-426 submarine chaser "2111" reported
heavy gunfire from the direction of Levitha and requested
Air Force assistance. At 0458 the steamer OLYMPOS and one
naval landing craft were lost. At 0515 distress report was
sent by torpedo boats. At 0510 our air reconnaissance detect-
ed 2 cruisers and 2 destroyers on course 250 degrees immediat-
ly south of Levitha. At 0525 our air reconnaissance reported
enemy naval forces and submarines attacking our convoy. Our
air reconnaissance also sighted at 0550 2 cruisers approach-
ing west of Patrnos and at 0605 east of Stampalia 2 destroy-
ers on course east. Between 0500 and 0550 the convoy was
scattered by enemy surgace forces about halfway between
Levitha and Stampalia. At 0624 3 of our motor minesweepers
were about 1J> miles west of the scene of the engagement;
they requested air cover and at 0720 reported having rescued
survivors. According to air reconnaissance, the entire
convoy was sunk, except for one naval landing craft which
proceeded ti Stampalia. Other convoys en route to Kos
were diverted. Two naval landing craft are on their way
to Kos for rescue operations.
An enemy force consisting of 6 vessels which were with-
drawing to the southeast was attacked at 1000 by our Air
Force between Scarpanto and Rhodes .
Naval Staff was not advised by Group South or Admiral,
Aegean either about further operational plans following the
operation against Kos or about the departure of the convoys
on 6 Oct. Subject to further investigations, Naval Staff is
of opinion that convoys should have been recalled following
the report of two destroyers on westerly course by our
air reconnaissance at 1540 on 6 Oct. 80 miles southeast
of Rhodes. Necessary steps for further investigations have
been taken. "
Group South has replied to the teletype from Chief of Staff,
Naval Staff as follows:
"1. Group South assumes that Naval Staff was informed
through the Fuehrer directive and the situation reports
of the Group regarding the plan to push the British out
of Dodecanese, especially as the first part of the oper-
ations had already been carried out with the occupation of
Kos. The date for the attack on Leros had to be adjusted
according to the outcome of the operation against Kos
(in view of cooperation of the Air Forces) and' according
to the enemy situation.
99 CONFIDENTIAL
7 Oct. 1943 C ONFIDENTIAL
2. Reaction by the British to the operation
against Kos 'was expected by all Commands in the Aegean,
namely reinforcement of defense on the islands and pre-
vention of further offensive operations by us. Our
limited resources for operations at sea and on land
■would not have permitted any later operations, since we
•would not have had sufficient forces after the enemy
had strengthened his positions. British intervention
at sea could not be expected at any time and for long
periods, so that plans for this operation could not
be made dependent on a •waiting policy. Only the following
counte.rmeasures on our part -were possible:
a. immediate continuation of the operation and
b. very strong cooperation by the Air Force through
suitably heavy and extensive reconnaissance and
systematic attacks on the enemy.
3. The transfer of one battalion to Kos as relief
and as the island garrison, reported in the evening sit-
uation report of 6 Oct., meant practically the start of
operation- "Leros". Group South has, however, not yet
received any detailed- orders end instructions for this
because of delay of the air courier. The causes are
under investigation.
4. Advice to Naval Staff about Leros operation
•was held. back until the date and codeword were stated
by Army Group E. and until receipt of data at least for
the naval operation.
5. Sinking of the convoy of the steamer OLYMPOS
was reported by Group South in the morning situation report
of 7 Oct. and in most immediate teletype 5920 Gkdos, of 7
Oct. No reply to further inquiries of Group South to
Admiral, Aegean regarding the operational control of this
convoy has been received here yet."
Group South has also submitted the context of the following
order issued by Army Group E regarding the occupation of
Leros :
"1. In the unanimous opinion of Army Group E, Naval
Group South and Air Force Command, Southeast, the immediate
occupation of the island of Leros is decisive for main-
taining the Aegean stronghold.'
2.- I therefore order that::
a. The island of Leros is to be attacked and
occupied at latest on 9 Oct., if possible
on 8 Oct., by forces under the command of
Lt. General Mueller in accordance with basic
operational plan discussed and agreed on 5 Oct.
It is necessary to act with extreme daring and
•100- CONFIDENTIAL
7 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL
to accept all risk before the British transfer further
reinforcements to the island.
b. It is the task of Admiral, Aegean to carry out the
naval part of this operation at once, setting aside
all- objections and avoiding all runs not essential
for the success of the operation. Plans for carrying
it out are to be reported to me at once. The date for
attack - 9 -Oct. --.is definite unless developments., in . .
the situation make a change necessary, in -which case
I will personally make the decision.
5. The 10th Air Corps "will continue support -of .the
operation -with combined forces.
4. Lt. General Mueller has been advised by radiogram
accordingly, " .
Naval Staff then asked Group South and Admiral, Aegean to "Whom
this order -of Army Group E "was addressed, "when it was received
by Admiral, Aegean and "when by Group South. Information has ' =
also been requested as to who gave the order for departure of
the convoys on 6 Oct. and when the reconnaissance report of
1540 on 6 Oct. was received by Admiral, Aegean and how this
report was evaluated.
Mopping-up operations on Kos are continuing. The number of
prisoners taken has increased to 886 British and 3,000
Italians. A reinforced platoon of Assault Division Rhodes
landed on Symi, where Italians ' offered resistance before
the town. According to unconfirmed reports-, the islands of
Calino, Stampalia and Nicaria are occupied by British forces.
c. Black Sea : •'.
Enemy Situation;
According to radio intelligence there was a submarine
90 miles south-southwest of Feodosiya ,. one 35 miles west-
northwest of Sevastopol and one 40 miles east of Constanta. A
destroyer of the FRUNSE class was seen coming from the south-
east at 1145 in the area of the central Caucasian coast. The
three destroyers sunk on 6 Oct. were the CHARKOW and the des-
troyers "D" and "E", according to radio intelligence.
Own Situation:
Three of our boats sustained slight damage in the
engagement between the 1st PT Boat Flotilla and several
enemy gunboats south of the Strait of Kerch. Definite hits
were observed on two enemy boats. Our boats carried on their
operation after the enemy had withdrawn
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7 Oct. 1943 • • CONFIDENTIAL '
and rothing was sighted at the point where the destroyer
went down except a large oil patch.
The operation was then broken off since the weather- ,
deteriorated.
Submarine U "24" unsuccessfully attacked a coastal .,
vessel with two torpedoes 18 miles southeast of Tuapse.
Further continuous air attacks were carried out on naval
landing craft in patrol line off the north Taman coast,
but no appreciable damage was caused. At 10^0 the convoy .
PR0D0M0S en route from Sevastopol to Constanta was unsuccess-
fully attacked by five enemy planes with three aerial
torpedoes and two aerial mines east of Capt St. George.
At 0850 four enemy planes attacked Yalta, where a small
fire was started aboard the tug BAIKAL.
<
VIII. Situation East Asia
According to Reuter, a strong U. S. Force bombed and.
shelled the Japanese garrison on Wake Island on 5 Oct.
An aircraft carrier took, part in this operation. According
to an "Exchange" report from McArthur ' s Headquarters,
the Allies have gained complete control of the Gulf of
Huron through capture of Finschh^fen. They now surround
all Japanese bases still left on the Solomons, New
Guinea and New Britain, and are attacking these : constantly
from the air.
**■* **■**■*■***■#•■* -a-***.*
102 CONFIDENTIAL
8 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
I tems of Political Importance
According to Swedish press reports, Hull's trip to
Moscow is significant in that he wishes to prevent
territorial concessions by Eden which have come to Wash-
ington's knowledge. Hull will submit for debate, a peace
plan consisting of three points. He is also said to have
been charged by Roosevelt with making endeavors for a
separate peace for Finland. The .Anglo-American divergen-
cies are quite obvious in regard to territorial concess-
ions. Whereas it is sa^d to be Churchill's intention to
re-establish the Baltic States between Russia find Central
Europe, Hull is of opinion that Russia does not need the
protection of such buffer states, in other words that her
territorial expansion to the west is not necessary. As to
the program of the forthcoming conference, every question
is put forward which might in any way come Into consider-
ation either for the continuation of the war or for the
organization of the post war period. To some extent they
serve to show the difficulties which lie in the Anglo-
American differences of opinion alone.
The success or failure of the conference will undoubtedly
have far-reaching effects for Germany. Its failure could
entail the most favorable conditions for political measures
Our prospects will be. decidedly prejudiced if the three
Allies should reach complete unanimity. As there is
obviously no possibility for us to hamper the course
of the negotiations in any way except by unexpected major
strategic successes, for instance in submarine warfare,
the course of events must be watched and the outcome
awaited.
Discussions with Chief, Naval Staff
A. ■ Report of the Shipbuilding Commission on Submarine
Construction Matters:
The Main Committee of the Shipbuiidijng Commission has
requested that construction of the two submarines type
XVIII at the Germania Dockyard in Kiel be canceled, in order
that this dockyard may be commissioned with the construction
of types XIV, XX and XXI, without a delay in the date
fixed for type XX (transport) submarines. The changes
planned could be carried out with a delay of five weeks
only, if the two submarines type XVIII were dropped, ■
whereas otherwise a delay of eight months would have to
be expected. The Shipbuilding Commission is of opinion
that most of the trials planned for the two submarines
type XVIII can be carried out by the first submarines of
-103- CONFIDENTIAL
8 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
types XXI or XVII, -which will be completed earlier.
The question as to "whether the two submarines must be
regarded as type boats for subsequent series is decisive.
As this is unlikely in view of the increased torpedo tube
equipment planned for serial boats, the Shipbuilding
Commission recommends that the two trial boats be dropped
as requested by the Main Commitee, on condition that any
changes for type XVII arising from research while still
under construction be taken into consideration.
Submarine Division is opposed to abandoning type XVIII.
In the entirely new field which will be embarked on with
the new submarines no stages in development should be
omitted. The experiences gained with type XVII are quite
inadequate. This type too will certainly only represent
an experimental stage and will not lead yet to operational
vesselr. .
Operations Division emphasizes the operational importance
of transport submarines. Every effort should be made to
speed up their construction. It points our that the delay
might be avoided if other ways and means are found regard-
ing the contemplated changes in construction work.
Representatives of the Naval (Ship) Construction Division
confirm that the plan of the Main Committee to shift
construction will be responsible for delays. The Naval
(Ship) Construction Division is at present investigating
the whole question of dockyard capacity. Furthermore,
It will shortly be able to submit a plan which will allow
us to forego construction of type XIV.
Chief, Naval Staff decides that the proposals of- the ...
Naval (Ship) Construction -Division should be awaited and
he intends then to discuss the whole matter with Director
Merker personally.
B. Situation;
I. Army Situation :
On the eastern front the enemy has succeeded, apparent-
ly without any special reinforcements, in breaking through
our lines in the area of Veliki Luki on a broad front and
in penetrating beyond Nevel, None of our forces are at
present available in this area to prevent further serious
consequences, but they will be brought up. This situation
is extremely tense, especially in view of the effects
of the break-through on the rest of the northern front.
104 CONFIDENTIAL
8 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
Heavy fighting is reported from the western sector of
the front in Italy. The situation in the area of Terrnoli is
still obscure. Obviously new enemy reinforcements have
been landed. Mopping-up operations Istria are progressing
according to. plan.
Enemy air attacks are being directed systematically
against traffic junctions in northern Italy, so that
bringing, up of our reinforcements to the south is
delayed.
II. Leros Operation:
■}
There is now a clear picture of the operation as such
since meanwhile reports have been received from Group South
and Admiral, Aegean.
According to the report of Group South, this Group received
on the afternoon of 6 Oct. orders from Army Group E. to
continue the operations in the Dodecanese. This was the
first information regarding operation "Leros".' The follow- 1
ing targets were given: first, the occupation of Leros
and subsequently that of Samos after Nicaria h n d been
eliminated. The assault group of Lt. General Mueller was
to carry out these fasks with the cooperation of all
available air and naval forces. Lt. General Mueller was
to arrange details direct with Admiral, Aegean ^nd. the
10th Air Corps. The morning of 9 Oct. was fixed as the
.latest date for landing on Leros.
The code word for the operation against Leros was "Leopard"
and , for that against Samos "Poseidon".
Assault Divison "Rhodes" had orders at the same time to
clear the islands of Symi and Nisiro of agents and to
destroy British radio stations. Before informing Naval
Staff, Group South wished to await the operational order
of Admiral, Aegean stating the times, which was on its
way by air courier and had been reported by telephone.
The report on the departure of the OLYMPOS convoy for Kos
was not taken as an executive signal since the operational
order had not been seen. The operational order of Admiral,
Aegean was received by Group South at 20^0 'on 7 Oct.
and gave only operational instructions, without laying
down any details as to execution. The following was planned:
During 6 Oct.: departure of various groups to Kos according
to instructions of the local Naval Commander.. For 7 Oct.:
occupation of Kalymhos as jump ing- off point for landing
forces. Landing on Leros at 01/50 on 9 Oct. Air escort for
naval forces while on passage from Piraeus to Kos.
Oh' 7 and. -8 Oct. continuous fighter patrol in the operat-
ional area .
-IO5- CONFIDENTIAL
8 Oct. 19-43 •-• CONFIDENTIA L
operational area . In his- report to Group South, Admiral,
Aegean states that he decided to let the OLYMPOS convoy
proceed because of the definite order from Commanding'
General, Army Group E, -which -was described as his final
concession. This order fixed the night of 8 Oct.. as the
latest date for carrying out the operation against Leros .
Admiral, Aegean had rejected the demand that the operation
be carried out during the night of 7 Oct. as impossible.
As pointed out "with special emphasis by Commanding General,
Air Force Command, Southeast, a further delay vould have
meant our air forces becoming -weaker by daily losses
suffered through systematic enemy attacks on our air-
fields .
Definite recall of the convoy -would have entailed a delay,
-with further enemy reinforcement on Leros and -weakening
of our Air Force. Furthermore, only one small patrol vessel
■was sighted in the operational area. The two destroyers
between Cyprus and Rhodes -were only detected once at 1530 «
There -were no enemy locations during the night of 5 Oct., in
contrast to the preceding night. Moreover, intervention
of enemy naval forces -was always to be expected. The
arrival of the convo^ was decisive for the operational
date, as the battalion for the occupation of Kos -was
carried in this convoy. This battalion was to relieve assault
forces for the attack against Leros, Naval Landing craft
were provided for the occupation of Ka lymnos , which had
to be carried out prior to the Leros operation. The fact
that convoys could go through despite the enemy's attention
having been aroused through the "Kos operational is proved
by the simultaneous successful transfer to Kos of two naval
landing craft, one Italian PT boat, and the 12th Motor
Minesweeper Flotilla, Furthermore, the Air Force had
promised to provide strong escort for the convoy from
dawn, which promise was kept.
Admiral, Aegean has fowwarded direct to Naval Staff the
same report as to Group South in reply to the inquiry
of 7 Oct. In this connection he. reports that the . order
of the Commanding General, Army Group E, referred to '
above, was received at 1620 on 7 Oct., and the reconnaiss-
ance report on the destroyers near Rhodes at 1815 on 6
Oct. and that the order for departure of the convoys
was given by Admiral Aegean on 6 Oct.
Group South does not regard the reasons given. by Admiral,"
Aegean for allowing the convoy to proceed as sound. The
group is of opinion that the enemy situation should have
been taken into account by spreading out the formation,
even if this would have delayed the operation by 24-
hours. Furthermore, our incomplete reconnaissance did not
justify the conclusion that the destroyers proceeding
towards Rhodes vould not penetrate into the Aegean.
Group South also states that it was not advised until
the morning of 7 Oct. about sighting of the destroyers
and attacks on the convoy OLYMPOS.
106 CONFIDENTIAL
8 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
Group South comments on the order of Commanding General,
Army Group~-E as follows: ; v . -. •■■:''
"1. Group. South is also of the opinion 'that the oper-
ation, as repeatedly -emphasized, should be carried
■ : .out as soon as- possible 1 and with ..a 11. available
resources. The /Navy will try. to assure this with
all. available mean's. s - .' r '
2. However, it must be stated that the responsibility
for the operations at sea must rest solely with
the Navy, consideration being paid to. the assist-
ance to be expected from the' Air Force as a compen-
sation for the absolutely Inadequate f.ighting
strength of our naval forces."
Chief, Naval Staff ,. as well as Naval Staff, has now gained
the impression that, in view of the clear order Issued by '■
General Loehr, Admiral, Aegean cannot be blamed for his'
decision. The risk was to be approved if the operation was
worthwhile. •■■•.
It is still to be regretted that Naval Staff was not
sufficiently informed by Group South about, the- plans
against Leros' beforehand. The statement by the Group'' re-
garding this Is unsatisfactory and does not obviate the
objections raised. Chief, Naval Staff, .if £ully Informed, ,
would have been in a position at once to give the Fuehrer ; .
his views on this matter. "••'•
Commanding Admiral, Group South in a telephone conversation'
with Chief of Staff, Naval Staff, stated that he could not
regard the reproaches made in the teletype on 7- Oc-t. as
entirely justified and objec ed. especially to the right
claimed by Naval Staff to intervene in. the execution of ;
the operation. .-•'•-■••• '.'.,. ...■'> \ .
Chief, Naval Staff stated that there could.be no doubt on
this point. . :.-''•";•■■■ '".....'
In order to- clear this matter up completely, the following
teletype was dispatched to Commanding Admirals', Group North,
West, South, Naval Commands, Norway^ North, Baltic, and
Admiral, German Naval Command, Italy:. . '
"I am forced to draw attention to the. basic instruct-
ions regarding the system of reports in the Navy.
it is essential that Naval Staff . be advised in the
most direct way possible and kept informed Of' oper-
ational plans, current events, soecial occurrences
measures carried out and future plans. Only in this
way will I be in a position to -intervene if necessary
Mu^ch ^or e 1 VG ?uppeme CoKm ^ 'the required information.
107 CONFIDENTIAL
8 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL
importance must be attached than, hitherto to the immediat<
transmission of important reports to Naval Staff. "When-
ever circumstances permit, preliminary reports should
be made by telephone. Under no circumstances should it
occur that important reports on naval warfare reach
Naval Staff first through one of- the other services
here' or via the Fuehrer Headquarters. I request that
the attention of subordinate offices be drawn repeat-
edly and emphatically to observance • of the above
principles. Everything must be done to see that now at
last the system of reports in the Navy takes all require-
ments Into account in accordance with the conditions in
the new Volume I.b. of the Manual of Naval Warfare."
Admiral, Aegean meanwhile received on the evening of 7 Oct.
a definite order from Army Group E to carry out operation
"Leopard" on 9.. Oct. Admiral, Aegean is to ensure execution
of the naval part of the operation, setting aside all
objections and avoiding all runs not essential for the
success of the operation. The order states that it is
nescessary to act with the greatest daring and to accept
all risks before the British transfer further reinforcements
to the island, Admiral, Aegean has reported that he is now
carrying out this order.
Chief, Naval Staff order that the following be reported to
the Fuehrer at once, by a telephone message to the Naval
Adjutant:
1. Context of the order of Army Group E.
- 2. On the basis of this order Admiral, Aegean has
started the operation despite his objections.
. A report regarding the expediency of its tactical
execution will follow after further investigation.
5. Commander in Chief, Navy reports that owing to the
lack of any naval supremacy, safe transfer of troops
and material in this area cannot be guaranteed. If
the occupation of the island of Leros is regarded
as a strategic necessity, the risk involved must
be taken. Naval Staff is of opinion that the
occupation" of the island of. Leros is necessary,
since it is now certain that Crete and Rhodes
are to be- held for the time being,
4. The operation started again today. Four convoys
put out this morning; the fifth convoy will leave
, . today at noon. • '
Chief, Nav^l Staff also, orders clear instructions to Group
South and , ..■•■;.
108 CONFIDENTIAL
8 Oct. 1945 C ONFIDENT IAL
South and Admiral, Aegean by the folio-wing teletype:
"1. ' Commander in Chief, Navy this morning made a
•preliminary report to the Fuehrer about the
'OLYMPOS convoy, as follows':
Owing to the lack of any naval supremacy, safe
transfer of. troops and material to the Aegean
islands cannot- be guaranteed. The risk must be
accepted if the occupation of Leros and other
islands is nevertheless necessary* for strategic
reasons. Naval Staff is of opinion that occu-
pation of Leros is necessary since it is now
certain that the islands in our possession are
not to be given up.
2. This report of Commander in Chief, Navy to the
Fuehrer is to be regarded as a preliminary
assessment of the measures of Admiral, Aegean
in the case of the OLYMPOS convoy and as a guide
for future plans . A detailed evaluation of the
operation is reserved."
A further, full report to the Fuehrer was made by Chief,
Naval Staff with teletype l/Skl la 3042/43 Gkdos . Chefs.
For copy see War Diary, Part C, Vol.- XIV. After fully
describing the previous events this report concludes as
follows :
"I am of opinion that the tactical and strategic
deliberations of- Admiral, Aegean should not be
contested in view of the strategic situation
and the orders issued by the Commanding General,
Armed Forces. I have also, ■therefore, raised
no objections to the start of the operation
against Leros on 8 Oct. by departure' from
Andros, Syros and Piraeus of the troop convoys,
if the situation is similar to that on 6 and 7
• Oct.
The departure of the OLYMPOS convoy, which was
not directly destined for Leros, but was to carry
troops to Kos for relief was not reported by
Group South to Naval Staff as the start of a new
operation. Furthermore, Naval Staff was not
sufficiently informed of discussions held with
Army Group E on the whole plan. It was therefore
impossible to inform Armed Forces High Command,
as was our duty. In additon, the distress signal
of the convoy leader, which was the only message
intercepted before the sinking of our ships, was
not acted upon by Admiral, Aegean to my satisfaction.
I have taken the necessary steps here."
III. Quartermaster General, Naval Staff :
; 109 CONFIDENTIAL
8 Oct. 19^3 , ... , .... . C ONFIDENTIAL
" All formation for the Mediterranean have now been
recalled. '-'Transport of the Naval Artillery
Battalion destined for the South Adriatic is
'. delayed by the loss of the steamer as reported
. • on 7 Oct. 1 ' •■ ' '. '';
b.' Formation of the 11th Coast Patrol Flotilla
has been ordered.
c. Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff
has appointed a Deputy General For Albania.
For the Navy the office of the Naval Shore
Commander suffices.
d. All PT boats in the "west area have now been
equipped -with cupolas .' Equipment of t£e 1st
-PT Boat Flotilla in the Black Sea is in progress.
e. The Todt Organization has plans for PT boat pens
in Feodosiya and Ivanbaba. In view of the sit-
uation and the extremely large material require-
ments, investigations will be made as to -whether
■ these are still to be constructed.
f. The 40.6 cm. Battery "Engeloe" in the West Fjord
is reported in provisional readiness.
g. Reich Minister Speer has. asked Commander in Chief,
Navy for assistance in the evacuation of captured
r ■:-.. Italian material. A Naval Liaison Officer has been
'■ • appointed- to Staff Leyers, as requested.
In a Highly Restricted Circle ;
TV. " Chief, Operations Branch, Operations Division:
a. According to a report from Naval Attache in Tokoyo
the AQUILA submarines will not be ready to put out
from Japan for about another two months.
b. Transfer of the blockade runners from Japanese
ports to- the southern area has commenced.
c. A Japanese construction engineer -who has been
able to triple the underwater speed of submarines
.• -will proceed to Germany aboard the TANNE- As
.; desired, this matter is to be kept strictly
secret from the Japanese representatives In Berlin.
110 CONFIDENTIAL
8 Oct. 19.43 ' ".'.■■;"' CONFIDENTIAL
Special Items
I. Quartermaster Division, Organization and Mobilizations
Branch has been informed by Armed Forces High Command,
Operations Staff, Navy that Marshal Graziani will arrive
at Fuehrer Headquarters on 9 Oct. The Fuehrer has ordered a
survey to be submitted on 8 Oct. shewing Italy's armed
strength and the requirements of the branches of our'
Armed Forces in connection with the new Italian Armed
Forces to be set up..
The detailed requirements of the Navy have been compiled
accordingly by the Organization and Mobilization Branch
and after approval by Commander in Chief, Navy forwarded
to Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy. For
order on this as per l/Skl 28254/43 Gkdos . see War. Diary,
Part C, Vol. XIV.
II, The following general assessment is taken from the
enemy situation report of Army General Staff, Foreign Armies
West No* 15/43 of 5 Oct.,:
"New developments in the Mediterranean are determined by
the following events:
1. The enemy has succeeded in practically-
e 1 imina t ing I to ly as a p ow er . '
2. The first defense zone of Europe has been
deeply penetrated.
3. The enemy has gained important jumping-off
bases for new operations which endanger
practically the entire Mediterranean defense.
■4-. The elimination of the Italian Battle Fleet
releases strong enemy naval forces. Their use
in the Pacific and Indian area may cause a
decisive change, in the ratio of forces there.
As a result of these events the enemy has achieved, apart
from wider operational, facilities, a considerable gain in '■
self-reliance which may lead to bolder action than up to
now. The gain in general prestige and the actual gain as
regards Russia appear to be at least of equal importance.
The latter is based. first of all on the' fact that the
enemy has achieved his considerable successes with a
relatively small loss of forces, and has thus reached a
more favorable ratio of forces, with Russia in view of her
HI CONFIDENTIAL
8 Oct. 1943 ' CONFIDENTIAL
tremendous "war losses. At the same time Russian dependence
on material supplies from the British and Americans may have
increased.
Moreover, the heavy increase .in naval forces for the
Pacific lessens the importance of Russia in the Anglo-
American battle against Japan.' On the -whole it can therefore
be assumed that the Anglo-American Supreme Command has
become much more independent of its Russian ally in
reaching decisions than up to now. This fact must have
repercussions on the problem of the second front and will
presumably make Anglo-American plans with regard to the
Balkans more independent of Russian opposition.
Tho military developments on the eastern front are obvious-
ly increasing anxiety in Britain and America about an
.early decision in Russia's favor. This concern demands the
establishment of European barriers against the Russian ■
advance as quickly as possible. In this connection the
Balkans primarily will play a part.
This concern and the obviously imminent decision on the
whole eastern front were probably the reasons for the
decision at Quebec, to leave the Anglo-American center of
operations still in Europe and to try and prevent the
bulk of the Continent from being lost to Russia.
Nevertheless, the present Anglo-American increase in
strength in all sectors of the Armed Forces, combined
with the release of strong naval forces in the Mediterran-
ean, will permit the Anglo-American Supreme Command to
divert considerable forces to the .Pacific area and thus
to intensify the war against Japan as demanded by the
American public." , , . .
Th es above considerations make it evident that the enemy's
general aims in Europe will be to force an early decision
in 1944,. .using 'strong forces on all fronts, thus gaining
positions against Russia which are as far east as possible.
Immediate enemy' plans will be to create the necessary
conditions for this by extension of the operational base
in Italy, by establishing a bridgehead in the Balkans and
perhaps also in the Atlantic area (Channel Coast, Noway?)
and by intensification of aerial warfare against Germany
and southeast Europe.".
.Army General Staff has arrived at the following views
regarding the individual theaters of war:
In Norwa y the establishment of a bridgehead, which is
possible with forces available, is regarded as rather
unlikely in view of the advanced season and the develop-
ment in Europe on the whole.
-112- CONFIDENTIAL
c
(
8 Oct. 19^3 C ONFIDENTIAL
Considering the situation in s outhern England the Anglo -
American. readiness for an advance in the Atlantic pre?
is regarded' as- more progressed. This permits the early
start of a large-scale landing at any time. If the
situation remains the same, howeveri, - only minor:
operations' for the purpose of sebotage, testing. German
defensive readiness or establishment of local bridgeheads
are to be expected at present. ■• ...
A general change in the situation can, however, make the
enemy decide at short notice on a large-scale action.
Such a- change in the situation might be brought about,
for instance, by the •withdrawal of Major German forces
from the Atlantic front or by the dreaded use in the
Channel area of a German secret weapon which proves
to be highly effective and impervious to operations
by the Air Force. In both cases a large-scale enemy operation
is possible either to take advantage of or to clear up
the situation on the French and Belgian coasts.
-O '
The present main target in the Western Mediterranean is to
be seen in the occupation of the Italian mainland as a bnse
for "further operations, presumably against the- Balkans,
and as an air base against southeast Germany and southeast-
Europe, The individual targets in Italy aimed at by the
enemy are not yet obvious; it is considered, possible that
they lie already in the line Spezia -Rimini. Operations
so far indicate that the enemy will aim for- his target
through the use of frontal pressure and • outflanking landings
by limited' forces . It is, however, emphasized; that the lack
of German '.air reconnaissance offers the enemy a chance to
assemble large transport and naval forces in the African and
Sicilian areas unobserved and to put them into operation by
syrprise in the Tyrrhenian or Adriatic Seas.
In the Balkan area obvious targets are: our most important
raw material sources, elimination of our allies and block-
ing of Russian advance.
Any operations in the Balkans will undoubtedly meet stiff
Russian opposition. It is , however, believed that the
Anglo -American supreme Command' now feels itself to be
strong enough to pass over this. This is indicated bv a.
remark from Churchill at a public meeting that advantage
will be taken of the situation in the Balkans.. The British
influence on. the insurgent groups in the Balkans, which
is increasingly leaps and bounds, is to be similarly
evaluated. It includes the dispatch of numerous officers,
including recently a General, and the rapid increase in
supplies to the Balkans by sea and air. The fact that
Yugoslavian King has gone to Egypt is
-113- CONFIDENTIAL
8 Oct. 19^3 CON FIDENTIA L
also a proclamation from the King's entourage in
■which his early, return to Yugoslavia together with
the Allies, is announced.
The British control of the Serbo - Croat insurgent
movement is obviously aimed at occupation of the Adriatic
ports and their approaches. It must certainly be assumed
that, at the same time, poslltical alliances according to
the Italian method are being pursued with our allies in
the Balkans . •
In short, various signs indicate enemy plans against
the Balkans. For strategic reasons the coastal sector
Scutari-Split is considered to be particularly endangered.
Concentrations of forces and other indications of an
imminent Anglo-American operation on a large scale are
not yet apparent but it is possible that this is not
planned until 19^4.. Attempts to occupy ports and to
establish bridgeheads must, however, always be expected
and may start soon.
In the Aegean area the enemy will for the time being
presumably try to defend and enlarge his naval and air
bases, in order gradually to attain naval supremacy.
The quick operations by light forces on the Aegean
islands following the Italian betrayal and the strong
British reaction to our operation against Kos emphasize
the greate interest in the Aegean taken by the British
High Command. The early appearance, of enemy naval and air
forces and commandos in order to cut off communication
with the mainland from Crete and Rhodes must be expected.
Finally the" attitude of T urkey will need 'increased observ-
ation and her gradual falling into line with the British
and Americans must be taken into account strategically.
The assessment of the situation by Foreign Armies West
corresponds in general with the opinion of Naval Staff.
(The last sentence added by Chief of Staff, Naval Staff,
Tr. N.)
III. Since 0200 on 8 Oct. Portuguese weather stations have
discontinued the transmission of weather reports... ."
Situation 8 Oct.
I. War in Foreign Waters
Nothing to report.
-114- CONFIDENTIAL
8 Oct. 1943 ••■ - . . CONFIDENTIAL
II. Situation West Area
1. Ene my Situation :
Over the Bay of Biscay 49 planes -were detected on
operation. One British vessel was located at 1850 in AM
1780 and one shortly after midnight in AL f>4 - 55.' ■.-.: .
Our air reconnaissance sighted at 1413 in BF 1936
(100 miles northwest of Brest) two destroyers on
southerly course, presumably in connection with a
rescue operation. Air Commander, Atlantic Coast
reports further:
At 1339 a BV 222 sighted in AL 4138 (600 miles west-north
west of Ireland) a convoy of 2-6 ships on/easterly course,
proceeding 7 knots. (For .further particulars of this long-
range reconnaissance report see Submarine Warfare.)
At 1650 3 FW 200' s detected in CF 9211 a northbound convoy
of 57 ships with 1 cruiser and 6 escort vessels.
In the Channel a tanker (6,000 GRT) was sighted at. .1750
southwest of Plymouth on Westerly course.
2. Own Situation':
Atlantic Coast:
One ELM/J mine was swept off St.- Nazaire on- ■■
7 Oct. Three submarines were escorted out. The outer Gironde
is temporarily closed owing to suspicion of ground mines.
Exercises by the 8th Destroyer Flotilla are planned for
8 and 10 Oct.
Channel Coast: ,-,
Mino laying operations were carried out by the 2nd
4th, 6th and 8th PT Boat Flotillas off the southeast coast
as planned during the night of 7 Oct..,: wind, was north-
northeast 4-5 and seaway 3-4. For brief report see teletype
1825. •
From 0252 to 0301 an- Army Coastal battery shelled targets
located off Pt. d'Ailly with 17 cm. Salvoes.
The harbor defense' barrages at Dieppe and Le Havre were
damaged by our patrol vessels and have been temporarily
taken up. Patrol positions were not taken up because of
weather conditons. Escort operations were carried out as'
planned.
t
-115- CONFIDENTIAL
8 Oct. 1943 CONFIDEN TIAL
III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters
North Sea : ''■■' \ - •
North of Terschelling and in the Heligoland Bight
altogether 17 ground mines were swept. Hook-Elbe convoy
"1179" was carried .out as planned and without incident.
At 1415 a strong enemy formation approached in three waves
via Holland and the Heligoland Bight for an attack on
Bremen from a high altitude. For details see Aerial War-
fare.
Norway, Northern Water s: ■
1. E nemy Situation:
■..'. ;•.•■•'.•; Over the North Sea 14 planes were detected on
operation. On 7 Oct. minor reconna is s-ance- activity was
reported in the area of Petsamo and V^rdoe. Between 0145
and 0255 on 8 Oct. the Air Force radar station on Flekke -
oey located to the southwest what were -apparently various
shipping targets.
2. Own Situation: .-.-.. . ■'; .
The 56th Minesweeper Flotilla discovered a
mine depot northwest of Froeya . The island of Vaa'ges
was occupied. Several Norwegians were arrested. At
1905 on 7 Oct. the troop transport OSTLAND' ran' aground
north of Trondheim and is leaking. All leave personnel
were rescued. The destroyer IHN. put in to Narvik on 8
Oct. for repairs. ■■:•;-;. : ■'-■ :
Twenty-six ships were escorted north and 28 south. In all
19 ships were left lying in harbor owing to shortage of
escorts ,
Group North/Fleet advises Naval Staff of. its request to
the 5"th Air Force to investigate again the question- of sea
reconnaissance- and intensified fighter escort, especially
In the Bodoe area, in view of the events of 4 Oct. Such
surprise attacks and their graVe consequences can only
be prevented if air reconnaissance of the sea area
Spitsbergen/lceland/Faroes is carried out daily, if possible
in the morning and in the evening, so that the approach of
the . enemy is detected early and defense measures can be
taken in time. As the period of darkness becomes longer
the only possible way to obtain information on enemy, aims ■'
will , be by daily photographic reconnaissance of the enemy'
bases. Naval Staff is asked to express its support of this
request to Air Force Operations Staff. (Se'e teletype
1240).
116 CONFIDENTIAL
8 Oct. 19^3
CONFIDENTIAL
IV. Ska gerraX*. Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea :
1. Enemy .•Situation:. • ■. ..
Manual reported at 0350 three- ships, including
one large one, -proceeding at high speed on course west;
a mine laying- operation is possible. :'■'•: ....
In Kronstadt Bay minor air activity and single tugs
and a guardboats are reported.
2. Own Situation ; .-•', • ••■:
.- Mine laying operation "Lithium" was carried out
during, the night of 8 Oct. as planned, despite .two ground
mine detonations on. the course shortly before mine laying
started in.; AN 3923- Four ELM/J mines were also swept off
Anno It and Ska gen. A considerable number of troop transports
and leave ships was escorted according to plan and without
incident. ■ ,
In the area- of. Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic three
heavy gun carriers are standing by. in. the Irben Strait
for relay escort. At 03^7 minesweeper M "19" reported a
brief engagement with two small vessels west of Tyters .
Both vessels turned away when, f ired' on..
Na va 1 C omma nd , Ba .1 tic ha s a ppr o ve.d the pr op os a I of
. Commander > Minesweepers > Baltic to ■ take., up the net
' "Walross " ; bo fore • the ■ ice period begins . For. details
see teletype 1730. . . • :,;,. ,'•,•;
V. Merchant- Shipping:
-1
The Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping has
provided for the following shipping requirements in Oct.:
For Armed ; Forces supplies and supplies to
in Norway. .• .;;. -..-.- :'.; ' - . ;
for . supplies to Finland
for supplies- to the Baltic
for German coastal traffic
for coastal coal traffic
Expected in October from Lulea
and from Oxeloesund •'
States
, except
coal
industry
a ppr ox.
600,000
GRT
11 •
45,000
GRT
: 11 . *
98,000
GRT
11
120,000
GRT
11
176,000
GRT
!!
300,000
GRT
It
200,000
GRT
117
CONFIDENTIAL
8 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
2-. ■ Naval Intelligence Division, Foreign Merchant
Marine Bra nch gives information in Report No. 8/43 on
"Foreign Merchant Shipping" regarding the development in
speed of new enemy merchantmen from 1939 to 1944. According to
to this report out ojt 3.8,9.00,000 GRT of new constructions
17,100,000 GRT. are fast ships with a speed of 14 knots and
more. About 16,000,000 GRT of these have a speed of 14-1?
knots and 1,100,000 GRT a speed of 18 knots and more.
VI. Submarine Warfare
In,. the North Atlantic there- was a west : wind in the
operational area up to l800 with good visibility^ which
then deteriorated considerably. The detection of the
eastbound convoy of 26 ships, reported by a BV 222 in AL
4138, did not lead to any success, by ' our submarines .
The direction-finder signals of theplane we're' not heard
and the convoy was not sighted. The reconnaissance report
was presumably inaccurate- naviga tionaily. .A .'/total of
seven enemy planes was detected by radio intelligence in
the convoy area. ... - ..■',.
Possibly the enemy set our submarine patrol line in motion
through a scattered destroyer group and planes, while the
convoy passed by further to the south-. It is . otherwise in-
explicable that none of the 20 submarines engaged/ was able
to gain any data on the convoy itself -during . the operation,
which lasted. two days. This operation will be broken off
on the morning of 9 Oct.
Only one destroyer was reported' sunk. , ., ..,-. ,-.-,m ; z
From the Indian Ocean Submarine U "183" reports no traffic
for ten days. Off Mombasa only one destroyeivwnd: two' small
patrol vessels were sighted. This ..submarine is operating at
present in LJ 93 against traffic from Aden to Cape.
The Naval Attache, in Tokoyo is' 'advised that one of the MONSUN
submarines is due to call at Penang; in about' two weeks for
overhaul' of torpedoes and for supplies. Transmission of
passage route and approach course is requested. ;
S pecial Items :
According to a report from Submarine Division, 4 12
submarines were in commission on 1 Oct. 1943, including
175 operational submarines.
118 CONFIDENTIAL
8 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
Of these 155 "were in the Atlantic
15 In the Mediterranean
21 in northern waters and
6 in the Black Sea . ;■
In the. Atlantic .curing the September there were 9»5« ••'■
submarines , on a daily avere'ge, in the operational area
ancl 50.5 on outward and return passage at sea. During
September 50 submarines left for the Atlantic. The follow-
ing were lost: in the Atlantic 6, in the Mediterranean
and Northern Waters 1 each,- in home waters 2 submarines.
VII Aerial Warfare
British Isles and Vicinity:
The 5^d Air Force had 54 planes out on operation
against England, 52 over the Atlantic and 5 over the
Redi terra nea n. uulsr«a nee raids against London and Dover were
carried out by minor formations. Our fighters shot. down
7 enemy planes .
Air Commander, Atlantic Coast reports several engagements
with the enemy on 7 Oct. during free-lance fighter oper-
ations over the Bay of Biscay; one Liberator was shot
down and four of our planes were lost.
During the day 400 four-engined planes with fighter escort
attacked Bremen from an altitude of 7,000 - 8,000 m. ;
497 of our fighters went up and reported 56 enemy planes
shot down, 24 of ours being lost. Another 8 planes were
shot down by a nti -aircraft guns. During the night Bremen was
again attacked, this time by 150 planes; 200 planes attacked
Hanover. Single planes flew in as far as Berlin. Our
fighters probably shot down 25 planes, themselves losing
10. The damage sustained in Bremen during the two raids
is considerable. Damage in Hanover is extremely heavy. For
details see Daily Situation.
In western France the airfield at Brest-South was attacked
in the afternoon. Out of 21 enemy planes 4 were shot down.
Mediterranean Theater:
Only reconnaissance reports have been received
trom trie 2nd Air Force and Air Force Command, Southeast.
According to photographic reconnaissance three PT boats
were lying in Castell Rosso at 1600
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CONFIDENTIAL
8 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
in from the -west. The enemy attacked the airfield of
Eleusis near Athens and the airfield of Caste Hi on
Crete. Two of our planes were destroyed. Both airfields
are closed. Twelve enemy planes were shot down while two
of ours were lost.
The enemy carried out continuous fighter -bomber attacks
over the Army front in Italy.
Eastern Front:
The 5th Air Force reports 33 planes out on operation
without special event.
VIII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea
•*• • Enemy Situation Mediterranean :
Out of the convoy of over 40 ships coming from
the Atlantic on the afternoon of 7 Oct. 17 merchantmen
put into Gibraltar. The part-convoy which went on to the
east was joined by 3 tankers and 4 freighters from Gibral-
tar. The convoy consisting of J>k merchantmen and 7 escort
vessels, passed north of Alboran at 0900.
The following were lying in Gibraltar at 1^00: 2 KING
GEORGE V class, the FORMIDABLE, the INDOMITABLE, the
cruiser UGANDA in dock, 13 destroyers, 7 corvettes, 2
transports, 53 freighters, 11 tankers and numerous small
vessels .
At 1705 a submarine was sighted 85 miles southeast of
Majorca .
During the night of 7 Oct. 20 ships were detected in the
Salerno -Sicilian area about 50 miles southeast of Sa lerno
on soutwesterly course. Otherwise only single ships were
sighted. • ; •■*•...
The number of freighters in Maddalena has increased. The
presence of a submarine at Cagliari is noteworthy.
German Naval Command, Italy is of ■' opinion that demolition'
of the harbor of Bastia by blowing up the moles and sinking
ships will be effective for some time. In additon there are
ground mines in the harbor basin and entrance to the harbor
The sinking of a block ship was not entirely successful.
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8 Oct. 19^3 ~ CONFIDENTIAL
In the .area of Tunis -Sicily-Malta concentration of
transport planes. has been detected.. According to the
situation' report of. Commanding General, Armed Forces,
.South, the NELSON -was lying at Malta on 30 Sept, and the.
RODNEY is also presumed to be there. Radio Intelligence
intercepted urgent radio traffic, partly of a tactical
nature, between Alexandria and Tobruk and a British radio
station in the Aegean, srea . . .; ■■ -.•
2. . Own Situation Mediterranean:
Submarines U. "371",; U "223" and U "%31" hs;ve
been assigned new operational areas. Submarine U "73" is
carrying out a special operation for the Intelligence
Service (landing of agents on the African coast).
No PT boats were out on operation owing to weather
conditions. Coastal traffic was carried out as planned..
On 5 Oct. in an enemy commando raid near Rimini the
motor cycle column of the Diplomatic Corp3, consisting
of ten vehicles, was destroyed.
The closed area south of Bastia has been extended to the
east as far as 9 degrees 50' E.
German Naval Command, Italy has advised Naval Shore
Commander, North Adriatic that orders regarding dock-
yards may only be given through German offices. Require-
ments of Italian authorities are to be fulfilled as
allowed by dockyard capacity, but our. orders have absolute
priority. •
5 • A rea Naval Group South :
a. Adriatic Sea :
The 11th Coast. Patrol Flotilla was formed at
Trieste. The six steamers which are to be transferred from
the Adriatic to the Aegean are to be sent off from Dura^zzo
at the. rate' of one every night.
b, ,, Aegean Sea ; ; ■
With regard to the OLYMPOS convoy, Group South
reports that submarine chaser "2111" and the steamer
OLYMPOS were definitely sunk, the latter by a submarine,-
before the attack by the surface forces and that five
naval landing craft were probably sunk.
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8 Oct, "1943 CONFIDENTIAL
Rescue operations are being carried out by planes, one
Italian PT boat and three motor minesweepers. So far about
656 survivors have been picked up, Admiral', Aegean trans-
mits a report of the Commander of s ubma r ine ' cha s er "2111V
The report states that the convoy was first attacked by
two submarines, and later by two cruisers and two destroyers.
All vessels of the convoy had been sunk by 0600. Most of
the crew were in the water, either swimming or in rubber
dinghies, and were fired on with tracer ammunition by
cruisers and destroyrrs which passed them repeatedly
a very short distance away. As the enemy force withdrew,
it fired its guns on the soldiers floundering in the water.
The matter will be pursued. For details see War Diary, Part
C, Vol. VIII.
Admiral, Aegean states, in addition to previous reports:
1. If the convoy, already delayed for three hours, had
been held back until receipt of the morning reconnaissance
report which does not come in until later, it would have
had to pass through the Strait of Kos in darkness and with-
out air escort and naval landing craft, which were already
scheduled to go into operation during 7 Oct. against Kal-
ymnos, would not have been available in time. As a matter of
fact three enemy PT boats appeared In the evening of 7 Oct.
in the Strait of Kos.
2. Up to 7 Oct. the enemy had operated only occasionally
in the eastern Aegean, obviously for fear of our Air Force.
3. The loss of the OLYMPOS, aboard which the greater
part of the battalion was embarked, was due to a submarine
hit. Such a loss could have happened to any other convoy.
4. Our Air Force, apart from achieving no success against
the enemy, attacked our own motor minesweepers during
the rescue operation, despite the fact that it had been
Informed of the presence of three German motor minesweepers.
5. The slow speed of the convoy was decisive. In i s case
the two demands for transfer of troops "ps early and as safely
as possible" could not be fulfilled at the same time if our
own Air Force did not make up for the weakness against super-
ior enemy.
Admiral, Aegean still regards his considerations and measures
regarding the OLYMPOS convoy as justified," even on sub-
sequent review.
According to a report from Group South, the landing operation
against Leros will start at 01^0 on 9 Oct. Five convoys are
en route
-122- CONFIDENTIAL
e
d.
q Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
for this purpose, namely:
a. Three motor minesweepers from Milos .
b. The DRACHE and the BULGARI from Piraeus.
c. Submarine chaser "2101", naval landing craft- :
F "131" 'and armed fishing vessel "2" from Syra .
Coast pa-trol boats GA 'W', "44" and "45" from
Castron and
e. as substitute for the OLYMPOS convoy, one comprising
tfre steamer INGEBORG, 2 naval landing craft and 1
armed fishing vessel, led by submarine chaser "2102".
This convoy left Pireeus at 1100.
The BULGARIA -was sunk by. an enemy submarine at 1523 five
miles south of Amorgos, after two unsuccessful submarine
attacks had already been made on this convoy in the morning
Aboard this vessel were 285 men of the 10th Battalion of
the 999th Regiment, besides the crew of 8l. Rescue operat-
ions are in progress .
At midnight three enemy PT boats machine-gunned a coastal
post on Kos without inflicting any damage. Two enemy
minefields were discovered five miles west of Kos.
The Italian garrison on the island of C^lino has surrended
and was transferred to Kos. The island of Symi was again
evacuated after heavy fighting with superior enemy forces.
The town of Symi was defended by 300 British in dug-out
positions .
The hospital ship GRADISCA was damaged in Patras by two
explosions in the stern on the evening of 7 Oct. The
cause is still unknown. The ship was destined for the
exchange of seriously wounded between Germany and England.
c. Black Sea :
Enemy Situation:
According to photographic reconnaissance the
following were lying on 7 Oct. at Tuapse: 1 destroyer,
1 torpedo boat, 8 PT boats, 2 minesweepers, 4 gunboats
and 8 coastal vessels.
During the night of 7 Oct. a few bombs were dropped on
Genichesk. No military damage was sustained. At 0625
naval landing craft in the patrol line were unsuccess-
fully bombed and machine-gunned in a dive attack. There
were also three unsuccessful air attacks on a. convoy
from Feodosiya to Sevastopol by altogether 15 planes
south of Cape Sarich.
-123- CONFIDENTIAL
8 Oct. 194>, ■ CONFIDENTIAL
Own Situation;
The last day -of the evacuation of the Kuban
bridgehead proceeded as planned. Kossa Tuszla as the
last position, will be probably evacuated at dawn on
9 Oct. The vessels engaged in the evacuation will be
transferred to Sevastopol in three convoys of about
60 vessels each and should pass Cape Takil between
0^00 and 0600 on 9 Oct. Barrages ! 'K 13 n and "K 14"
have been laid according to plan. On 7 Oct. an FZ mine
was swept too miles west of Sevastopol.
IX. Situation East Asia
■ ■ Ml I ■ II. — ■ ll ■ ■ ..■■■■ ^ ■ . I I — ^»— —
Nothing to report.
r
r
-124- CONFIDENTIAL
9 Oct. 19^ CON FIDENTIAL
Items of- Political Importance
Salazar made a statement at a secret session of the
Portuguese Parliament on 8 Oct. It is also announced
that Salazar had a long interview /with the Japanese
envoy. According to "Exchange Telegraph", dramatic
developments are expected. ;-":"/.
According to information from the Japanese Liaison-
Officer to Naval Staff, the Japanese Naval Attache
in Lisbon has reported that cable communications
between Lisbon and Azores are interrupted. Rumors
in Lisbon have it that the Azores have been occupied
by Americans . •' .< •
No confirmation could be furnished by the Foreign Office.
Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff
I. Army Situation:
■ 1 1 1 1 — ^— n ■■!■■■ - — i M—yi ■ i a ■
■The situation on the eastern front must be regarded
on the whole as extremely tense. The strain to which
our exhausted formations are put makes itself felt
in diminishing- powers of attack while the enemy pays
no regard to losses, and shows surprising mobility.
The penetration at Nevel, which on the first day
thrust 40 km. into our lines, is a serious sign.
Attacks against enemy Bridgeheads on the western
Dnieper are also not. very successful.
The evacuation of the Kuban bridgehead, now completed,
was more successful on the whole than expected.
It is estimated that the enemy still has 9,000 -
10,000 armored vehicles of all kinds.
Our losses on the eastern front in August and September
amount to 3^,000 and 20,000 killed, 134,000 and 86,000
wounded and 13,000 and 20,000 missing respectively.
Compared, to these figures our losses in the south
are extremely small,
Armed' Forces High Command, Operations Staff transmitted
a Fuehrer Directive to' Commanding General-, ' Armed Forces,
Southeast on 6 Oct. wiht copy to Group South, regarding
future plans for the entire southeastern' area . This came
to the knowledge of Naval Staff on 9 Oct.
125 CONFIDENTIAL
9 Oct. 1943 ./• . .",.• CONFIDENTIAL
This Fuehrer Directive reads as fallows:,,
"The order for defense of the entire southeastern prea
( including the. Peieponnesos ) remains unchanged, • but
disposition of forces must take the present situation
into account. Major forces should be concentrated
•where the main enemy assault is .to be expected..
The most important islands of the southern Sporades
must remain occupied or be re-occupied, ps they are
essential as a protection of the block Crete-Rhodes."
The Directive then gives the disposition of forces on
the Peleponesos end in the rest of Greece and gives
the following further instruction among other things:
"The following must remain occupied or be occupied,
apart from Crete and Rhodes: at least the Ionian islands
of Corfu, Cepha Ionia, Zante and the Aegean islands of
Scarpanto, Milos, Kos, Leros, Samoa, Chios, Mytilene
and Lemnos .
In case a large-scale enemy landing should be successful
at any point on the extensive coasts', effective demol-
itions must be prepared so as to restrict enemy oper-
ational facilities and gain the necessary time for our
countermen sures .
Preparations for such demolitions are to be made in the .
entire area south of the line Corfu - Metsovon Pass -
Olympos and north thereof on the Adriatic coast at a
depth which will be laid down by Commanding General, Armed
Forces, Southeast and will differ according to geological
conditions-.
Preparations for demolition must include all important
economic installations (Power stations, port installations/
industrial plants, the waterworks at Athens ) and a lso the
traffic network (railroads, highways, constructions -
such as dams, bridges, viaducts, Tr. N. - communications).
It is essential that highways and railroads be rendered
useless to the enemy for months. When demolishing military
installations, the airfields especially pre to be comp-
letely destroyed. Airfields on the Peieponnesos and on the
Aegean islands , which are not needed> are now already. to .
be rendered unserviceable in agreement with the Air Force."
II. Report by Quartermaster General:
a. Group West is making experiments on two trial mine-
fields for use against low-flying planes.
-I26- CONFIDENTIAL
9 Oct. 1945 ' . " ' CONFIDENTIAL.
b Armed Forces High Command has issued instructions
regarding the military oath for members of the
Italian Armed Forces.
c. The following instructions have been received
from Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff:
"1. It' must be expected that the. enemy, just as he did
at Termoli, will continue attempts to surround the
front of Commanding General, Armed Forces South,
by landings in the deep flanks and to bring about
its collapse. Such attempts can only be frustrated
with. the limited forces available if the enemy is
destroyer by our coastal defense already before
or during landing.
2. The. Fuehrer has ordered that Commanding General,
Armed Forces ," South expand coastal defense along the
Tyrrhenian and Adriatic coasts, concentrating at a
\)' depth 'of about 100 km. behind line ''B" and pacing
special attention to artillery defense.
In this connection Commanding General, Armed Forces,
South will report what captured guns suitable for
use against naval targets are available (stating
caliber, range, rate of salvoes and armor-piercing
ammunition) - and what personnel is required for
manning the captured batteries, apart from the
400 coastal gunners already requested, stating
destination.
5. Commander in Chief, Air Force is requested to
transfer to Commanding General, Armed Forces,
South at once ten to twelve batteries comprising-
8.8 cm., If possible 10. .5 cm. anti-aircraft
guns for coastal defense. A decrease in anti-
aircraft defense of industry in northern Italy 5
will be accepted .to* this extent.
4, Commander in Chief, Air Force is requested to
report what facilities or forces he can provide for
this important task",
Naval Staff is investigating all available possibilities.
In order to ensure speedy manning of the batteries
captured In the Italian area, a 20% withdrawal of personnel
from the west area would have to be resorted to. This
was formerly rejected with' the Fuehrer's permission.
Chief of Staff, Naval Staff remarks., that coastal
defense in this case' should definitely be the responsibility
of the Army, especially as ' the Navy does . not have mobile
-127- .. CONFIDENTIAL
9 Oct. 1943" < CONFIDENTIAL
forces a vs liable for this unless weaknesses at other
equally important points are to be accepted.
Chief, Naval Staff stresses that it depends where the
greater danger lies and order that Armed Forces High
Command be informed that naval forces are not avail-
able for the required task, unless permission is given
for withdrawal of the 1st Naval Artillery Battalion
from France. Chief, Naval Staff is of opinion that
withdrawal is justifiable at present.
III. Chief, Operations Division reports on Spanish notes
regarding the submarines BLUM and BRANDI according to copy
in War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII. It is to be hoped thpt
the release of Lt. (s.g.) Brandi through the Nav^l Attache
or the Intelligence Service will not be effected.
In a Highly Restricted Circle:
IV. R eport by Quartermaster General:
The UNDINE might be used as the floating anti-aircraft
battery for Peenemuende requested by Commander in Chief,
Air Force; she has been fitted up as an anti-aircraft
cruiser and is actually scheduled for operation in the
Putziger Wik.
Chief, Naval Staff agrees.
V. Chief, Naval Staff brought up for discussion further
defense measures for the TIRPITZ. Her immobility will
tempt the enemy to further attacks. Considerations by
Naval Staff to have the ship moved by tugs will encounter
great difficulties. Quartermaster Division, Fleet Branch
Is of opinion that the TIRPITZ should remain in Alta
until she is at least ready to proceed again with two
screws. The present condition of the ship still entails
many unknown factors. Defense in Alta /-'gainst attack
by heavy units is still inadequate. No heavy batteries
are available. The question of transferring torpedo
batteries, perhap with FAT torpedoes, to Alta is under
investigation. The ship's own adequate defensive readiness
must, of course, be maintained constantly both materially
and as regards personnel.
VI . Report by Chief, Operations Branch, Operations Division :
a. According to a report by Group South, Admiral, Aegean
already replied on 8 Oct. in accordance with the statements
meanwhile submitted to Naval Staff, to the direct inquiry
from Army Group E of 7 Oct. regarding the Fuehrer's questions
-128- . CONFIDENTIAL
9 Oct. 1943 C ONFIDENT IAL
on the loss of the OLYMPOS convoy. .Admiral, : Agean adds that it
appears advisable for further reports to the Supreme
Command to be made only through Group South, if possible,
in order to avoid reports being submitted to a Supreme
Ccmmand by offices -which are not in a position to judge
questions of naval strategy -with sufficient knowledge.
Group South agreed -with this opinion.
For teletype as per l/Skl JOkj/Uj. Gkdos . Chefs, see Files
1 Ski I op II, 15.
Group South further reports that operation "Leopard"
has been postponed until 0130 on 10 Oct. by order of
Lt. General Mueller. The delay -will be utilized to
increase the number of naval landing craft from five
to seven, to bring up the remainder of the 10th Battalion
of the 999th Regiment, to restore the airfield on Kos,
to check the approach routes, since British mineiaying
has been ascertained, and to bring up reserves of ammunition.
Group South has promised final views on the execution of
operation "Leopard" so far.
Naval Staff agrees in every respect with the view express-
ed by Commanding Admiral, Group South that responsibility
for a combined operation, if it is sea-borne, lies with
the Commander of Naval Forces, This,, however, does^not
exclude the possibility that the strategic situation or
considerations on the operations as a whole may make it
necessary to set aside objections as regards navigation
and naval tactics, and to accept risks.
In the meantime the- basic order of Armed Forces High
Command to Commanding General,- Armed, Forces, Southeast
and to Group South of 6 Oct.. has also been received, hav-
ing, taken three days to arrive. This is the same Fuehrer
Directive which has already been dealt with under "Army
Situation". ..Concerning the Navy it states: ■
"Stocks for and supplies to the numerous islands to be
occupied must be assured by sea in the same way at least
as supplies to the divisions operating in the northern
part of the Dalmatian coast. ■.
Agreement is to be reached with Commanding General, Armed
Forces, Southeast on the erection and taking over of
further coastal batteries on the newly occupied, coastal
sectors.
Laying of mine barrages off the newly acquired ports is
especially important." :
-129- CONFIDENTIAL
9 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
Naval Staff considers it necessary to report to Armed
Forces High Command that carrying out of the tasks demanded
of the Navy cannot be guaranteed should the enemy become
active.
Chief, Naval Staff agreed.
The delay in learning of the Fuehrer Directive has made
.a survey of the situation regarding operation "Leopard"
much more difficult for Naval Staff.
Naval Staff does not support the opinion expressed by
Admiral, Aegean and sponsored by Group South regarding
reports to the Supreme Command. There is no objection to
reports to and from Armed Forces High Command via ^Commanding
Generals, Armed Forces. However, it is necessary tn*t
Naval Staff be informed at the same time.
Here, too, Chief, Naval Staff agreed. Group South and
Admiral, Aegean have been given the following instructions;
1. Commander in Chief, Navy has reported to the Fuehrer
about the OLYMPOS convoy as follows:
"in my opinion the tactical and operational deliberations
of Admiral, Aegean should not be contested in view of the
strategic situation and the orders issued by the Commanding
General, Armed Forces.
2. Presentation of the promised final views of Group South
on the execution of this operation is left to it.
3. Naval Staff confirms that responsibility for carrying
out such a combined operation, if it is sea-borne, lies with
the Commander of Naval Forces. This does not exclude the
possibility that the strategic situation or donsiderations
on the operation as a whole may make it necessary to set
aside objections as regards navigation and naval tactics
and to accept risks. This was the case here.
4. No objections can be raised to the fact that the
Commanding General, Armed Forces, within his responsibility
for the entire execution of a combined operation, also
reports to the Supreme Command on matters of naval tactics
it is the duty of the Commanding Admirals to ensure that-
Naval Staff is advised early enough for the views of the
Navy to be duly received with those of other commands."
b. According to information from Commander in Chief, Air
Force, Operations Staff, Naval Liaison, the Fuehrer has
prohibited long-range night fighter missions.. Our air
activity over England is to concentrate on attacking
cities. This will seriously affect 6ur rir activity
over England is to concentrate on attacking cities.
130 CONFIDENTIAL
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9 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
This will seriously effect our current mine laying
offensive. .. ;
c. The new Italian Naval Liaison Officer in Berlin will
best be attached to the Naval Attaches Section for the
present.
Chief, Naval Staff agreed.
VII. C ommander, Submarines, Medit er ranean has requested
that previous subordination to. German Naval Command, Italy
be canceled, in view of its different location. Chief,
Naval Staff has approved this request, which. was put
forward on 21 Sept. during his visit to Toulon. Naval-
Staff recommends direct operational control of Commander,
Submarines, Mediterranean by Operations Division.
Chief, Naval Staff approved the proposal which was made
in agreement with Submarine Division.
Special Items
I. Foreign Armies West has estimated the situation in
the Mediterranean on 7 Oct. as follows:
"The' course of the. fighting at Termoli again confirms
the previous experience that the Eritish only carry out
such 'operations after thorough preparations and with
ample forces. The developments further indicate that
the enemy attaches much importance to an extension of the
areas gained on the Adriatic coast of Italy. This is also
indicated. by the considerable increase in freighters and
landing craft lately observed at the port of Taranto.
Enemy air attacks, which have been' intensified kince 4
Oct. in the entire Greek area against our a-.irfields,
probably aim, by eliminating German air forces, at
protection of further transports of troops and materiel
to Apulian ports and of naval operations in the Aegean.
The increased use of light naval forces in the Aegean Sea
shows that the enemy is taking advantage of his. naval
supremacy. The future target and result will be progress iv
cutting-off first of the German f orces . in advanced
positions on the Dodecanese islands and then of 'Crete.
In the near future attempts to- recapture the island of
Kos, with its important airfields, and operations against
other Aegean islands must be expected. The fact that the
British troops operating on Kos were transferred from the
Egyptian and Palestinian area is a further indication that
the island of Cyprus does not play any decisive part in
enemy plans in the eastern Mediterranean."
-I3I- CONFIDENTIAL
. a /^TvT-m-r-r\TTiT\Trn-r a t
9 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL
II. Operations Division, in view of information received
from Armed Forces HighvCammand, Operations Staff, Navy
transmitted the following instructions to German Naval
Command, Italy on 5 Oct., -with copy to Army Group B. :
A
A General Staff Officer sent by Armed Forces High Comma nc
Operations Staff Into the area of Army Group B, reports
on his trip from 26 to 30 Sept., as follows:
"The Army Group requests instructions as to what is to
be done with Italian ships lying in ports of northern
Italy, which could be useful to the enemy in case of
landings. There has also been no order as to whether port
entrances are to be closed and, if so, which ones."
2. Instructions on what is to be done with war material
captured from the Italinn Navy and with ships of all
kinds were given l/Skl, 25995 Gkdos. of 16 Sept. (to
German Naval Command, Italy by radiogram).
3. Measures planned and prepared for the closing of port
entrances prre to be reported as soon as possible.
4. Close cooperation with Army Group B. is to be ensured.
The Naval Liaison Officer is to be kept continuously ,
informed of all basic instructions issued by Naval-.
Staff and of plans and measures taken in that area
as far as they may be of interest to Army Group B.
Admiral, German Naval Command, Italy reported in this
connection on 7 Oct.:
"Do not understand .teletype. The Naval Liaison Officer
brought up enquiries regarding ships in ports of northern
Italy with this Command. Transfer to ports in southern
France had already started. Regarding the closing of harbors,
a full report was made by the Sector Commander of the
Deputy Commanding General, Army Group B., which was
approved, and measures were already started by order of
10 Sept. in all harbors. Sinking of blockships, net and
boom barrages and mine laying were prepared. Army Group B.
has been continuously advised of all orders, measures and' .
plans. The General Staff Officer referred to did not
report to Naval Offices. The Naval Liaison Officer was
also not advised of his trip, so that cooperation of
German Naval Command, Italy was impossible. Please ensure
that unfounded reports are not made to Armed Forces High
Command, Operations Staff".
:132 CONFIDENTIAL
9 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIA L
Operations Division has informed Armed Forces High Command,
Operations Staff, Navy of this exchange of teletypes. For
order l/Skl 28095/Gkdos . see War" Diary, Part C, Vol XIV.
III. Foreign Affairs/intelligence Division gives the
following report from a Turkish source at the end of
September: • • .;.,....
"During the next few days an important naval converence
will take place in London, which will be attended by
representatives of the British Admiralty, the U. S.
Fleet Staff and the Navy Department in Washington,
According to well-informed circles, the sole item on the agenda
of the conference will be a certain regrouping of the
British -and American Fleet forces. This regrouping h.°s become
necessary through the changed situation in the Mediterranean
The increase in -power of the Allied Fleets in the . Mediterranean
through the Italian naval forces, makes, it • possible for part
of the U. S. Fleet, which was recently ; ordered to the Med-
iterranean, to be recalled and put into operation elsewhere.
According to information from an agent,, these U. S. Fleet
forces have been ordered to ports in England. " '
IV. Naval Intelligence Divion, Foreign Navies Branch has
drawn up a report on the handling of tank landing craft
(LCT's), during landing operations, on the basis of a
captured British service manual. For copy as per l/Skl
30284/43 geh. see War Diary, Vol. "Evaluation of Intelligence
on Foreign Navies."
S ituation 9 Oc t .
^ • War in Foreign Wate r s :
Obviously on the basis of Information obtained from the
Italians (the EKTREA, the CAG-NI or other sources), the British
have announced the border between the Japanese and German
operational areas in the Indian Ocean as 70 degrees East.
The Japanese Admiralty therefore recommends that point
"Tannewald" be moved to 24 degrees S, 8l degrees East, since
this point has so far lain in the former supply area of the
SCHLIEMANN and on the route of the AQUILA submarines. The
fact that the new point is nearer to the Sunda Strait must
be accepted under present conditions.
Operations Division has confirmed the ne-w position by cable
on 5 Oct. to the Naval Attache in Tokyo.
Otherwise nothing to report.
133 CONFIDENTIAL
9 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
II. Situation West Area:
1. Enemy Situation:
Over the Bay of Biscay 12 planes were detected
on operation. One British vessel was located' at 0519 in
CK 7220, one at 0815 in AL 6130, one at 1521 in AL 5240
and one at 0019 (10 Oct,) in AM 4510.
In the channel targets, presumably PT boats, were
continuously located in lurking position from 0015 to
0445 off Fecamp and Le Havre.
2. Own Situation:
Atlantic Coast:
Mine -exploding vessel "5" vas heavily damaged
through striking a mine on the approach route off La P^llice
but entered port under her own power. Exercises by the
8th Destroyer Flotilla were postponed because of the mine
situation and weather condition.
Channel Coast:
At 0035 Army Batteries fired three salvoes on
targets located off Fecamp. The motor minesweeper depot
ship V.D.LIPPE had engagements with two enemy PT boats
during the night of 8 Oct. off Cape de Heve at 0^12 and
0407. One enemy boat was probably sunk and another damaged
Our damage and casualties were slight. For brief action
report see teletype 0845. PT boats S "142" and S "143"
were transferred from the Hook to Boulogne. Four boats
of the 5th PT Boat Flotilla proceeded in the evening
from Cherbourg to Peterport and started back again at
2400 after taking on torpedoes.
III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters
1. North Sea :
Eight ELM/<J mines were swept northwest of Ijmuiden,
The steamer SUMATRA and ten boats of the 9th Motor Mine-
sweeper Flotilla left Ijmuiden at 1700 for the Elbe river
via the outer route.
2. Norway, Northern Waters:
134 CONFIDENTIAL
9 Oct. I943 CONFIDENTIAL
Enemy Situation:
Over- the North Sea 13 planes were .detected on
operation. Slight gunfire was reported in the Petsamo area.
At 0950 one plane was detected in the Alta area. At 0515
southeast of Sandoey havy. engine noises were heard, presum-
ably from a PT boat. At 1536 on 8 Oct. a northbound convoy
■was unsuccessfully attacked by two planes south of Stad-
tlandet. One plane was reported south of Egersund. Naval
Command, Baltic is of opinion that the locations reported
on 8 Oct.. off Ekkeroey were possibly connected with a
mine laying operation or a channel sweep for blockade runners
from Gothenburg. Naval Command, Norway, however, presumes
a false location due to fog at sea. According to statements
of prisoners, 14 British or American warships participated
in the operation on K Oct.' off Bodoe, including the U. S.
Carrier RANGER with 60 planes . The carrier force left Scapa
at noon on 2 Oct. and was on the morning of 4. Oct. off
Bodoe, including the U. S. carrier RANGER with 60 planes.
The carrier force left Scapa at noon on 2 Oct. and was on
the morning of 4 Oct. about 300 km. west of Bodoe. The
RANGER is said to have been stationed in the Scapa area
for at least six months. For particulars see teletype
1100.
Own Situation:
According to a report from Naval Command, Norway
only 1 man was killed out of the 835 men aboard the
SKRAMSTAD; 27 are missing end 40 wounded. The previous
figure of 200 lost is incorrect.
With reference to the objections of Commander, Minesweepers,
Norway, the Naval (Ship) Construction Division has requested
Quartermaster Division to approve the release of the HILASCARAN
for project "Paul 1 .- 1 (repairs to the TIRPITZ in Alta), .on
condition that short, urgent submarine repairs' have priority.
Otherwise adherence to the repair schedule of the TIRPITZ
is doubtful. (See teletype 1330).
No reports on shipping movements have been received.
Special Items :
Naval Command, Norway has submitted to Naval Staff
and Group North/Fleet considerations and suggestions regard-
ing operations by Fleet forces in case of enemy operations
against Norway. For letter of 6 Oct. as per l/Skl 3041/43 Gkdos
see file l/Skl I op. VIII, 1.
Naval Command, Norway does not consider that the conditions
for previous operational plans still exist:
No more convoy traffic in Northern Waters; intervention in
135 CONFIDENTIAL
9 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL ■
case of enemy lending can only be effective right at the
landing point, in view of our limited forces and the air
situation; a landing with a distant objective will probably
not be made in northern Norway, but further to the South.
The transfer of our Fleet base to the south is therefore
necessary. Operational effectiveness and danger from the
air must be weighed up against one another. If the enemy
operation does not include the Jutland area, operational
command must lie with Naval Command, Norway. Direct defense
operations against landings must be controlled by the command
which has all forces of the entire coastal defense at its
disposal and knows how to cooperate direct with the Army
and Air Force. Furthermore, it Is advisable to increase the
number of submarines by operational ones and by boats of
the Ant i- Submarine School, Finally, the part to be played
by Admiral, Northern Waters should be investigated. In
order to settle views on these matters it might be useful
to carry out a war game based on written plans from a
wide circle.
Naval Staff assumes that Group North/Fleet will first of
all comment on the above.
IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea
1. Enemy Situation:
*
A fire in the Siemens plant at Copenhagen was
presumably caused by sabotage. Between 1026 and 100 a large
U. S. air formation of 400 -450 planes flew into the Baltic
area via Denmark and penetrated as far as Danzig Bay.
Amongst other places Gdynia, Danzig and Elbing were .
attacked. Return flights over the same route began at 1215
and lasted until 1600.'
In Kronstadt Bay minor harassing gunfire and normal tug
traffic were observed. Over Luga Bay there was lively
air activity. In the afternoon a group of 26 small
minesweepers penetrated as far as vest of Vigrund and then
turned away to the North.
2. Own Situation:
In the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic
52" vessels were engaged in check-sweeping. Transports and
convoy traffic went through In the whole Baltic Sea area
without incident. In the area of Naval Command, Baltic
seven enemy planes shot down for certain and four were
probably shot down by fighters, five of which were lost,
in addition five planes were shot down by naval anti-
aircraft guns. With regard to the damage sustained in Gdynia
-I36- CONFIDENTIAL
t
9 Oct', ,194.3... CONFIDENTIAL
sustained in Gdynia, the folio-wing is reported: the
command office was slightly damaged, the local administration
office and the harbor railway-station heavily damaged
and the billeting and stores huts of the Naval Communications
Office totally destroyed. Ship "47" and submarine chaser
"1210" sank. The hospital ship STUTTGART 5?as towed out of
port on fire and can probably -not be saved. The steamer
CUXHAVEN sank after a direct. hit. The tugs SASPE and REVA
and the Finnish Steamer REWJORN sank. The steamer GINHEIM
was damaged. The -2,500 ton 'dock 'carrying the tug ATLANTIK
sustained a direct hit. The Deutsche Werke dockyard was
partly destroyed. Ships of the Training limit, Fleet and
two accommodation ships were undamaged.
No reports about our own defense have yet been recieved.
•Regarding damage, Gdynia itself seems to have come off
comparatively lightly. Above all the submarine base seems
to be almost untouched.
Operations in the area of Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic
.were badly hampered by unfavorable weather..
V. Submarine Warfare
'In an operation against a convoy in AL submarine U
"645" probably sank' a steamer (6,500 G.R.T.) on course
90 degrees at 0627 in the mist. None of the submarines
of Group "Rossbach" sighted, or reported the convoy
itself. The- operation was discontinued in . the morning, as
planned. From altogether five boats which participated
position reports have not been received.
By day on 21 'Sept* submarine U "123" scored two certain >.
▼) and three probably hits on several Liberty ships in convoys
EP 44. This submarine assumes that traffic is moving on the
200 m. line between Trinidad and Freetown in a very large
circle with constant air patrol..-'
A further report of success was received from the Mediterran-
ean. According to the, estimate of Quartermaster Division, Sub-
marine Branch, our submarine losses in September 1943
amount to 9,8$ for the Atlantic, ,9-. 1$ for Northern Waters,
25/6 for the Mediterranean and none for the Black Sea,
calculated on a monthly average of submarines on operation.
The corresponding figure in August .for the Atlantic was 51^.
Losses in relation to the total number of operational sub-
marines (175) amounted in September to 4.9$, on a mean
average since the. beginning of the war 5.9% and since-
January 1943.9.9^.
tjl CONFIDENTIAL
9 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
The corresponding figures for August -were 19.2% 6^ end I&.6$
M> .
VI. Aerial Warfar e,
British Isles and Vicinity:
The 3rd Air Force had 16 planes out on operation over
England, 2 over the Atlantic and 64 over the Mediterranean.
In free-lance fighter operations over the Bay of Biscay on
8 'Oct. 2 Thunderbolts were shot down, 7 BF 110' s being
lost. During defense against an enemy attack on the
airfield at Brest-South 4 Spitfires were shot down, 4
BF 110' s being, lost. The crews of. two of them were saved.
The enemy raided two airfields in the occupied raest area.
Heavy formations flew into the eastern part of northern
Germany in the morning. A formation which approached Berlin
from the north was driven off by our- fighters. Targets
were Anklam, Gdynia, Danzig and Marienburg. At Anklam
and Marienburg the raid centered on the Ar-^do and Focke-
Wulf works. Damage was considerable. For particulars see
"Dally Situation". The attack on Gdynia Is reported under
"Situation Baltic". Single planes flew at the same time
as far as Mannheim and Strassburg/Alsace with out attack-
ing.
During the night of 9 Oct. only minor enemy flights are
reported. Ten fast bombers dropped a few bombs on Berlin
from a great altitude.
Our fighters, numbering 570 shot down during the day 36
four-engined enemy bombers for certain and probably shot
down 37 more. Twelve of our fighters were lost.
M editerranean Theater:
The 2nd Air Force reports attacks on enemy shipping
targets southeast of Plume and off Krk. One freighter was
The 3rd Air Force had 54 bombers out on an unsuccessful
operation against e large convoy which had detected in the
early morning west of Cape Tenes . The operation had to
be broken off because of weather conditions were deter-
iorating.
Thirty-nine planes of the Air Force Command, Southeast
attacked shipping' targets in the harbor of Leros and
sank one steamer of 1,500 G.R.T.
-I38- CONFIDENTIAL
•
9 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENT IAL
RecoimaCssance ; detected at 0515 a force of 1 or 2 cruisers
and 3 or 4 destroyers in the Leros area on easterly course.
During an attack in the afternoon on the force, which was
withdrawing, one destroyer was- sunk and one cruiser heavily
damaged in the Scarpanto' S-trait. Reconnaissance also reported
off Cape Sidero (northeast coast of Crete) a large group
of vessels on easterly course, so far unidentified.
The enemy carried out lively attacks over the front and
against. supply routes in Italy. In the Greek area altogether
seven airfields were attacked. For damage see "Daily
Situation". The enemy also carried out lively reconnaissance
over the Aegean Sea.
East ern Front:
Nothing to report.
VI - • Warfare in the Mediterranean an d Bla c k Sea;
1 .. E nemy Situation Med i terranean :
A convoy of 7 loaded freighters and 1 tanker
in ballast, together with 9 escort vessels, which left
Gibraltar at 15^0 for the Mediterranean put in again
at 1710 for unknown reasons.
At 0645 on 9 Oct. a convoy of 1 tanker, 8 freighters pnd
9 escort vessels put out into the Atlantic and. joined a
convoy of 29 freighters, 3 tankers and 16 escort vessels
passing through from the Mediterranean. Ten friighters
in ballast and k escort vessels put into Gibraltar from
the Mediterranean.
The eastbound convoy reported on the morning of 8 Oct.
off Alboran'was detected by planes of the 3rd Air Force
at 072OIO miles north of Arzeu, consisting of 64 merchantmen
and 4 escort vessels on course eastnortheast, , after it had
been joined by further ships, presumably from Qran. For
report on unsuccessful air attack see "Aerial Warfare".
At 0310 our air reconnaissance sighted 60 miles north-
northwest of Messina 3 vessels, presumably warships,
proceeding a.t high speed on northwesterly course and at
1300 22 miles west-southwest of Salerno 4 transports
with escort vesseal, no course and speed being' stated.
No new reports have been received from Salerno Bay.
Increased unloading from landing craft was observed in
Naples .
139- CONFIDENTIAL
9 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIA L
This part is presumably being used as a submarine base.
German Naval Command, Italy is of opinion that extensive
operations from Naples and Salerno, and also from Termoli,,
must be expected.
Further troops were landed at Termoli.
A small convoy leaving Apulian ports, presumably bound for
Malta, was reported 70 miles east of Catania; no time
was stated.. ; ■
No reconnaissance reports have been received from the
eastern Mediterranean.
Own Situation Mediterranean:
c .
Around midnight on 9 Oct. a steamer of 4,000 GRT
was torpedoed by submarine U "616" in CJ 9443 and left
burning. This submarine also sank a destroyer south of
Salerno.
Four PT boats left Spezia on a minelaying operation.
The monelayer JUMINDA carried out her. minelaying operation
on the east coast of Corsica according to plan. The mine-
layer KEHRWIEDER had to break off her operation because
of engine trouble. Check of the coastal route south of
San Remo was continued without result.
Transport traffic along the west coast of Italy was
carried out as planned and without incident.
3. Area Naval Group South:
a. Adriatic Sea:
The minelayer LAURANA is scheduled for a minelaying
operation from Anc ona, Transfer of the ship- has been post-
poned because of weather conditions. The steamer ROSELLI
left Durazzo for Corfu in the evening. She was shelled
without effect off Valona in spite of the fact that
Army offices had been advised. Group South haa changed its
former views and confirms that the Naval Liaison Staff, •
Croatia is to be put directly under Group South.
b . Aegean Sea :
In the enemy air attacks on our airfields in
Salonika two Ju 88 ' s were destroyed by fire. The landing
strip is out of order. Heavy enemy air attacks on other
airfields caused, however, only relatively slight damage. •
-140- CONFIDENTIAL
♦
9 Oc-t. 1943 •■■••' CONFIDENTIAL
In view of the enemy forces reported by our air 'reconnaissance
in the early morning in the Leros area, the convoy of
submarine chaser "2102" and the INGEBORG was first, ordered
to turn away but later to continue to Kos.
The minelayer DRACHE carried out her mine laying operation
on the evening of 8 Oct. as planned.
Group South transmits a report from Admiral, Aegean on
the intended landing on Leros. The attack is to be
carried out in three assault groups and through landing
of a parachutist company.
In the evening Group South reports that operation "Leopard"
has been postponed for another 24 hours for the following-
reasons; afternoon reconnaissance sighted strong enemy
forces south of Rhodes on northerly course; the airfield
at Kos is not ready' yet; the convoy of the INGEBORG with
the reserve battalion will arrive late; the Air Force has
been put to too much strain by operations during the last
few days. Furthermore, the possibility of an enemy operation
against Kos is foreseen.
Army Group E has ordered, however, that the most favorable
opportunities for attack be utilized if developments in
the situation £ How.
In view of the afternoon reconnaissance which sighted two
cruisers and four destroyers south of Rhodes, proceeding
at high speed on northerly course, the convoy of INGEBORG
was ordered to withdraw to 'the west for the second time.
In addition reconnaissance of the shipping concentrations
have been ordered in Kos .
So far 1,027 men of the OLYMPOS convoy have been rescued and
about 150 are still missing, according to a report from
the Naval Liaison Officer to Army Group F„
Survivors aboard the BULGARIA state that further German
soldiers were taken aboard by four British submarines.
Our motor minesweepers with further survivors aboard are
on their way to Kos. ■ ' •*'■■■'•'
A new operation against Symi starting from Rhodes was
planned for 9 Oct. with a reinforced, assault group.
Armed Forces High Command, Supply and Transportation Office
of the Armed Forces Overseas has ordered that five Siebel
ferries, which were transferred to Trieste overland and
destined for operations in the Aegean Sea, are to remain
141 ■•-■' CONFIDENTIAL
9 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL
at Trieste until further notice. Group South has advised
that it vill raise objection.
c . Black Sea :
E nemy S 1 1 ua 1 1 on :
According to radio intelligence, the destroyers "F"
and "E" probably left Tuapse to the south on the evening
of 8 Oct.
At 1910 on 9 Oct. e submarine south of Sudak. It was
probably this submarine "which vas unsuccessfully attacked
at 2140 by a PT boat 20 miles southwest of Feodosiya.
Another submarine was located in the evening 45 miles .
southwest of Sevastopol on easterly course.
Submarine U "24 " reported in the morning one PT boat
proceeding on easterly course at high speed at the point
where the three Russian destroyers went down.
Own Situation:
Evacuation of Kuban bridgehead has been completed.
The last troops were transferred at 0400. The transport
formations are on the way from Kerch to Sevastopol. The first
unit was attacked at 0700 by seven enemy plane's; one Siebel
ferry was lost and one plane shot down. There was no fighter
cover due to fog at the airfield.
Further air attacks carried out on the convoy unit during
the day caused no damage. The remainder of the convoy con-
sisting of 4 naval landing craft and a tug with naval
artillery lighter "4" and 6 combined operations boats left
Kerch for Feodosiya at 1800.
The 1st PT Boat Flotilla is being sent out from Ivanbabe
as remote escort for the large convoys. Further remote
escort Is being carried out by . three German and three
Italian submarines. '-•.-. , . .■
On the morning of 8 Oct. our convoy from Feodosiya to
Sevastopol was unsuccessfully attacked by 18 enemy planes
off Cape Aitodor. One plane was shot down by ships' anti-
aircraft guns'.
VIII. Situation East Asia
Nothing to report.
-142- CONFIDENTIAL
10 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIA L"
Items of Political Importance ?
According to German agency reports., competent quarters
in Lisbon deny that a secret session of Parliament took
place on 8 Oct. and that Salazar made a statement.
According to Reuter and other sources, however, there
are definite signs that important decisions -were made or
are imminent. Amongst other things, Lisbon will -be blacked
out from 10 Oct. The publication of weather reports has been
discontinued.
The left-wing newspaper "New Leader" writes on 2 Oct.:
"Europe is fast drifting into an Immense political conflag-
ration. The. issues' do not concern so much the military con-
flicts between the Allied Nations and Germany as the
political, conflict between America and England on the one
hand and the' Soviet Union on the other. In all these conflicts,
which concern the treatment of the Baltic States, Eastern
Poland, the Balkans and above all the treatment of Germany
after the war.,. America and Grea.t Britian stand on one side
and Soviet Russia on- the other. The chances of clearing * :
up these differences of opinion at the forthcoming Foreign-- •
Ministers' Conference are small. In the conflict about the
establishment of a "second front" in the Vest', it is less
a matter of helping Russia than of occupying Germany with
British and American' troops before the Red Army comes in.
The "New .Leader" takes the view that all these differences
can only be solved by Establishing United Socialist States
of Europe . "' '
It seems appropriate to note these extreme comments as they
state in plain language what is actually going- on- at
present. ...-.,
According to Reuter, American and British Generals and
Admirals are now gathering in New. Delhi for a large
conference, in .order to assist Lord Mount-batten in
working out details of the Allied- plan for attack
in the Far East. Chunking's Foreign Minister, Soong,
is also participating in these discussions,.
Conference on the Situati on wit h Ch ief, Naval Staff'
I. Army Situation:.
On the eastern front enemy attacks have increased along
the whole line. The enemy is moving new forces into the area
1^3 CONFIDENTIAL
10 Oct, 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL
of his break-through near Nevel, but he -was only successful
in extending it to the north.
The enemy has also started to advance in the sector
of Army Group North, in order to carry out reconnaissance
on our movements .
Fighting in Italy and in the Balkans has not increased
any further.
II. At the recommendation of Operations Division, Chief,
Naval Staff orders the following personal teletype to be
sent to Admiral, Black Sea with copy to Group South:
"The operational control, organization and readiness of the
units and naval forces which participated in the evacuation
of the Kuban bridgehead played an important part in making
this combined operation a complete success. I express my
special appreciation to you, to the Chiefs, Commanders,
Staffs and crews of the units, nrval forces and offices
concerned. "
III . Report of Operations Division, International Law
and Prizes Section on the proposal of Naval Staff for a
reply to Spain regarding the submarines BLUM and BRANDI,
as per notes in War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII .
Chief, Naval Staff agrees, but he thinks it advisable to
proceed in such a manner that the liberation of Lt. (s.g.)
Brand.i Is not interfered with. Moreover, it is best to
make the Spaniards to some extent morally responsible in
order to pave the way for future incidents.
IV. Quartermaster General:
a. The objections raised by Group South against the order
of Armed Forces High Command, Supply and Transportation Office
of the Armed Forces Overseas to leave five of the Siebel
ferries destined for the Aegean at Trieste have now been
received. Group South requests that the neces.snry arrangements
be made for the release of these vessels.
Since the Supply and Transportation Office of the Armed
Forces Overseas usually complies with the requirements
of Naval Staff, it will be possible to support the request
of Group South effectively.
Chief, Naval Staff agreed.
b. The request of Naval Command, Norway for permission to
144 CONFIDENTIAL
10 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
change the destination of the Harbor Defense flotillas -in
its area to' Patrol Boat Flotillas -has been declined by
Quartermaster Division for basic reasons of organization.
V. Chief, Operations Branch,' Operations Division:- 1
II ■ ■ l «H 'I ■■■■ M l ■ I I I ' ll ■■ ■ ■■ — -. ■ ■ 1 i ■■ I ■III -«■■—■ m* I — -II ■ ■■!' W l» » . W W II I ■■! ■— + **m •■■■ ■ — ' ■!■ II .!■■ ■ ■■■■,
a. Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff has sub-
mitted a preliminary report on the discussions -with Marshal
Graziani on 9 Oct.' According to ; this report, the folio-wing
has been agreed on:
1. It is important that Italy contribute as much as
possible to the future of the War effort and it is, there-
fore necessary that:
a. those parts of Italy occupied by us are not treated
as. enemy but as allied territory,
b. the authority and independence of the new Italian
Government is "established and strengthened,
2. With this in mind, the operational area of Command-
ing General, Armed -Forces, South and of Army Croup B will
be limited to a suitable area behind the front lines of
Commanding General, .Armed Forces, South and to certain
areas on the nor theas tern 9 northern and nor thwes tern
boundary of Italy, in order to protect communications to
Germany and France. The whole remaining territory /will be
handed over to the Italian Government for administration.
On the coasts, • operations 1 zones are planned which, however,
will become operational areas only in case of an enemy
landing. Until such- time the coastal areas will also be
under the administration of the Italian Government In
the territory administered by the Italian Government a
Military Commander (General Toussaint) will be appointed,
who will be under Chief, Armed Forces' High Command, His
tasks in General will be:
a: to represent and see to execution of the military
'demands of the German Armed Forces with Italian
•■ ' Government or subordinate Ita lian' authorities, '
b: to assist the Italian Government and its author-
ities, not only with regard to its own Government
measures, as far as this may be required, but also
in dealing with German forces. /•'
3. The intended defense of the line provided for this
purpose is of decisive importance for the common fight.
With the loss of Rome, Italy would actually c&sse to be a
co-belligerent.
145 CONFIDENTIAL
10 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
Therefore, every resource of the country must be mobilized
immediately in order to help defend the deep flunks and
long coastlines and release German forces to a great
extent for operations on the main fronts. For this purpose
the Army Groups, the Navy and the Air Force are to cons-
cript an unlimited number of Italian volunteers, fit for
military service, for the folio-wing categories:
a. Navy and Army coastal gunners
b. Anti-aircraft gunners
c. Construction troops
d. Engineers and railway engineers
e. Air -warning and ground personnel
f. Communications personnel
g. Harbor office personnel and crews for
harbor defense flotillas.
Military Internees do not come into question for these
formations. Should the Italian High Command be unable to
secure volunteers itself, recruiting is to be carried
out by our forces. Each unit of the above -mentionned
categories must establish at least a second unit, part
of the personnel of -which is German. The volunteers will
be treated as regards pay and care in the same way as Ger-
man soldiers. The Italian Government will at the same time
ensure a. favorable provision for the families and depend-
ents of the volunteers .
4. The new formation of large Italian units is
planned at troop training camps outside Italy.
5. Orders for 2) to 4) will follow. For 3), however,
preparatory measures in accordance with this preliminary
advice are to be taken at once.
1) and 2) of this order might seriously hamper our own
freedom of action in the military and especially in the war
economy sphere. However, political reasons may have been
decisive. As regards 3) executive orders must be awaited
in order to see whether and, if at all, to what extent,
formation of actual Italian Armed Forces is still complicated
The matter of a flag is also still to be decided.
b. Quartermaster General recommends that for the time being
Admiral, German Naval Command, Italy be advised ^n6 instruct-
ed to begin preparations, as ordered, together with Admiral
Legnani. If necessary it may be advisable to create a
specific Staff within Naval Staff with the sole task of
dealing with questions of orga inization arising from
cooperation with the Italian Navy.
146 CONFIDENTIAL
10 Oct'.:. 1943. CONFI DENTIAL
Special Item s
I. According to intelligence reports from Portugal, two
islands of the Azores, allegedly Fayal and Flores, -were
occupied by the Americans and British during the night
of 9 Oct. In Lisbon there has been no news at all from
Ponta Delgada since 8 Oct. According to another report
dated 7 Oct., a Brazilian Military Mission has arrived
a.t Ponta Delgada, -which is presumably to make preparations
for a landing. Exceptionally large quantities of -war materiel
are at present being landed on the Azores.
According to a report of our Naval Attache in Lisbon, cable
communication with Azores is normal, as far as he can
ascertain. Current rumors about an occupation of the
Azores are so far not confirmed. He does not regard it,
however, as out of question that the enemy will intensify
diplomatic pressure in order to obtain bases without
resort to force. On Inquiry the Foreign Office states
that it regards also the report concerning the summoning
of the Portuguese National Assembly as piire invention
and that the German envoy in Lisbon has given a very
"Pacifying" tendency to his reports. For details see War
Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII.
II. According to information from Quartermaster Division,
the construction of naval landing craft has lately shown
ever Increasing delays. Compared with, the production schedule
of 109 naval landing craft from April to August 19^3* there
is a deficit of 39 • Delays continue to assume serious
consequences. For instance, not one of the 1? naval landing
craft scheduled for September at dockyards at home and
in occupied areas has been completed. Naval Staff has
drawn the attention of the Main. Committee for Shipbuilding
to the fact that important- war tasks cannot be fulfilled
if these delays continue amd has learned to its regret
that even the allocation of a priority /<rmed Forces number
has shown no result. Naval Staff requests that immediate
steps be taken to change this situation and draws attention
to the fact that the allocation of a priority number was
restricted and expires on 30 Nov. ighj>.
Situation 10 Oct.
I. War in Foreign Water s
The Naval Attache in Tokyo reports that the BRAKE and
the BOGOTA have been supplied with a list of reference
points and waiting areas, as ordered, and that all outgoing
blockade runners and supply ships have been informed of the
new approach points.
1^7 CONFIDENTIAL
10 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDE NTIAL
The No vol Attache enquires whether the waiting areas for
the BRAKE and the BOGOTA are still in force.
II. Situation West Area
1 . Enemy Situat i on:
Over the Bay of Biscay eleven planes were detected
on operation. One British vessel was located at 1222 in AM
4110, one at 1444 in AL 63 and one at 1857 in AM 4640.
Continuous radar locations were reported in the Channel
on the evening of 9 Oct. In the area between Cape de la
Hague and Alderney and from 0500 to 0558 on 10 Oct. in
the area north and west of Point de Barfleur.
2. Own Situation :
Atlan tic Coast :
Five submarines were escorted' out of Brest, Lorient
and St. Na zaire. one ELM/J mine was swept off the Gironde.. .
Damaged mine -exploding vessel "5" put in to La Pallice.
Because of the mine situation and weather conditions no
exercises were carried out by the 8th Destroyer Flotilla.
C hannel Coast :
Nothing to report.
II. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters
North Sea :
It is now reported for 9 Oct. that one boat was
damaged in an enemy air attack on boats of the Rhine
Flotilla on 9 and 10 Oct. 14 ground mines were swept
in the area between Scheveningen and Heligoland.
The convoy of SUMATRA was carried out as planned.
148 CONFIDENTIAL
^
10 Oct. 19^ CONFIDE NTIAL,
near holder the' operational :caDle of the 8o8th Naval
Artillery Battalion was damaged by sabotage. Action
readiness is unimpaired. Twenty-nine Dutch workmen were
arrested,
Noway, Nothern Waters :
^ • E nemy Situ a t 1 on :
Over the central and northern parts of the North
Sea. 23 planes were detected on opera tion. ;
From the Petsamo area slight gunfire and air reconnaissance
are reported. On 9 Oct. off Battery "Hovde", at the entrance
to Trondheim Fjord, a small fast vessel proceeding without
lights was sighted. A search conducted by four harbor
degense vessels has so far proved fruitless. At 0425 on 10
Oct. at the entrance to Nordgulen a loud engine noise wps
heard.. Gulen was searched without result.
2 . Own Situation :
In the area of Naval Command, Norway 12 ships
were escorted north, and one south. In all 22 ships were
left lying In harbor owing to lack of escorts.
Naval Group North/Fleet has 'decided, at the request of the
Task Force, that operation "Paul" be made known to a
larger circle, with corresponding security restrictions.
Arrangements for leave for the crew depend on the question
of transport, which will be settled between Naval "Command,
Norway and Commanding General, Armed Forces, Norway.
Leave Transports by sea from Trondheim to the Skagerrak
are entirely out of question. (See teletype 1252.)
Group North/Fleet also advised Naval Staff for information
that assumption of the, command of Northern Waters by
Rear Admiral Bey must take place during the week of
25-30 Oct. (See teletype 1325.)
I V . Skagerrak, Baltic Sea En t rances, B altic Sea :
1. Enemy Situation:
At 1715 heavy detonations were observed on Lavan-
saari. Southwest of Vaindlo and east of Rotskaer our vessels
had a brief engagement with PT boats which turned away when
fired on.
1^9 CONFIDENTIAL
10 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL
At 0633 on 9 Oct. bombers unsuccessfully attacked the
steamer WINDAU off Lyserort. At 0635 on 10 Oct. probable
mine laying south-west of "Windau was reported by the s termer
HOLLAND. During an air attack on our barrage patrol south
of Porkalla one plane was shot down.
2. Own Situation:
In the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses,
Baltic 26 vessels were engaged in check-sweeping. Two ground
mines were swept ne^r Shulzgrund and one near H^lsb- n rre.
Eight troop transports with 3 defense vessels, 3 steamers and
1 tanker were escorted.
The casualties aboard the hospital ship STUTTGART, which
caught fire after being hit by a bomb at Gdynia on 9 Oct.
and was sunk by our gunfire, amount to: 2 medical officers,
1 medical cadet, 4 enlisted men, 2 Red Cross nurses, 17
civilian members of the crew and about 12 patients killed a
and 29 wounded.
The following were also sunk in the harbor: the 2,500
ton dock with the tug ATLANTIK, Ship "47" (fishing vessel),
the former minesweeper N0RDP0L, the Swedish steamer A. K.
FERNSTROEM (863 GRT) with a cargo of 1,200 tons of coal,
the submarine depot ship EUPEN, submarine chaser "1210",
the Finnish steamer VIPJOERN, the steamer CUXHAVEN (2,500
GRT) and the tugs 3ASPE and REVA .
Operations to salvage submarine chaser "1210", Ship "47",
the NORDPOL, the SASPE and the REVA have been started.
At Neufahrwasser on the same occasion the steamer
NEIDENFELS was damaged by a hit on her forecastle. One
member of the ship's anti-aircraft crew was killed.
The 1st Motor Minesweeper Flotilla made a search sweep
of the area between Tyters and Vikallagrund.
V. Submarine Warfare
The operation of Group "Ross bach" against the
enemy convoy must be considered a failure with the probable
loss of five of our submarines. Three of these were
presumably lost by enemy air attacks near Iceland.
Submarine U "214" carried out a mine laying operation
off Colon (Panama Canal).
150 CONFIDENTIAL
10 Oct..; I943 ; ' CONFIDEN TIAL
VI. Aerial Warfa re ••; .• ;v
British Isles and Vicinity:
No important missions were flown by the J>rd Air Force
Muenster (Westphalia) was raided from 14 10 to 1600 by
200 Fortresses in two waves, with fighter cover up to and
on return from the "Dutch area. Heavy damage was caused.
Further attacks were carried out on Coesfeld, Ha Item -and ■
Emschede. Our fighters numbering 4l6 went up and shot
down 4? Fortresses and 3 Thunderbolts for certain; 22
further planes were probably shot' down. Our losses amount
to 26 fighters and 28 men.
Mediterranean Theater:
The 2nd Air Force reports altogether 136 planes,
including 98 fighters, out on operation.
Air. Force Command, Southeast had 56 bombers, 37 Stukas,
23 fighters, 23 reconnaissance planes and 4 3 transport
planes out on operation, including 33 bombers and 35 Stukas
against Leros. No reports on results have been received.
The enemy attacked the harbor of Cattaro and the airfields
of Tatoi, Candia and Gadura., Heavy damage was caused at some
points. Four Fortresses were shot down.
Eastern Front:
The 5th Air Force had 37 Planes out on close convoy
escort. ..
VII . ' Warfare in" the Mediter ranean and Black Sea :
1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:
On the afternoon of 9 Oct. Ceuta reported a
small convoy of four freighters passing through from
the Atlantic to the Mediterranean, No reconnaissance -reports
have been received from the western and eastern Med-
iterranean.
In the Italian area warships were detected for the first
time on the east coast of Sardinia. Thirty miles east
of Olbia there were four PT boats making for the Straits
of Bonifacio.
!51 CONFIDENTIAL
10 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL
only slight traffic was observed at Naples and in the
Gulf of Salerno. German Naval Command, Italy is of opinion
that the patrol activity of destroyers and the heavy escort
even of snail convoys is due to our PT boat and submarine
attacks .
According to photographic reconnaissance there was a large
number of merchantnent, landing boats and destroyers in
Bari. At Termoli six landing boats were identified, but
no freighters.
2 . Own S ituation Mediterranean :
Submarine U H 8l" fired five misses in CN 33^2
on landing craft and has started on return passage since
all her torpedoes are expended.
The operation which submarine U "73" carried out for the -
Intelligence Service was to land an agent on the Alerian
coast between 1 degree 50' E. and Oran. Commander, Submarines,
Mediterranean has submitted the operational order for this.
For copy as per l/Skl 3054/43 Gkdos. Chefs, see War Diary,
Part C, Vol. XIV.
Commander, Submarines, Mediterranean has also submitted
the operational order for mining by submarines U "453"
of Erindisi roads. For copy as per l/Skl 3055/43 Gkdos.
Chefs, see War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.
The mine laying operation by PT boats on the west coast
of Corsica was carried out during the night of 9 Oct.
was planned, Minesweeping in the area south of San Remo was
still without result. Coastal traffic w^s carried out as
planned. German Naval Command, Italy reports that all
captured Italian vessels are in need of extensive repairs. ^2
Some of these ships were damaged by Italians, To put these
ships into operational readiness at short notice is,
therefore, in most cases impossible. German Naval Command.
Italy has insturcted Submarine Flotilla, Pola at once to
take over the test and laboratory equipment of the Naval
Optical Institute at Pola.
3* Area Naval Gr oup South:
a . A driatic Sea :
On 8 Oct. between 2300 and 24.00 enemy
naval forces shelled the coast twelve miles north of
Durazzo without effect. At 0705 on 10 Oct. enemy planes
unsuccessfully attacked ships in Cattaro Bay. The Anti-
aircraft guns of the tanker KNUDSEN shot down one pl^ne.
The steamer LEOPARDI left Cattaro for Durazzo. Five
special naval commands arrqived on 6 Oct. at Split.
152 CONFIDENTIAL
9
to :■■ <
k
10 Oct. 1943. • ■ : . ;, r ;r; ■ '■ CONFIDENTIAL
A radio station'has been .set ;up.. ; ' Railway communication
to the interior is interrupted. 'The 623rd and 6l2th Naval
Artillery Battalions, except for two batteries, have been
on the -way. from Trieste to Durazzo.by land since 8 Oct.
b • - Aege an Sea :
During the night of 9 Oct. several enemy reconnais-
sance, planes .flew into the southern Aegean- and. the area ,
between the Peieponnesos and the Lonian islands. At noon
on 9 Oct. an enemy reconnaissance plane reported to,.
Alexandeia sighting submarine chaser "2101"' and the
steamer SALVATORE on Kalymnos roads and the minelayer
DRACHE west of Kalymnos. The enemy reconnaissance plane,
while over Kalymnos, probably spotted all the vessels
hidden on the bays. Northing is known of the whereabouts
.of the enemy group reported at 1650 on 9 Oct. off Castell
Rosso.' The enemy force reported at the same time in the
area northwest of Rhodes consisted of 1 light cruiser,
2' destroyers and 2 escort boats, according to a new
report. Following the air attack on the morning' of 9 Oct.
the cruiser was sighted lying stationary with her forecastle
burning heavily. One destroyer was missing.
The DRACHE reported at 0^30 on 10 Oct. off the east coast.
of Kalumnos two destroyers which were searching the coast
with starsheels and searchlights. At 12^9 our air reconn-
aissance definitely sighted two enemy destroyers , of the
ALFRIDI Class putting into the Turkish port of Azuen Kalesi.
This will bo investigated by our Nvval Attache ,in Istanbul.
The destroyers left again a few hours later and were re-
ported at 1920 by the DRACHE once more off Kalymnos. Our
Air Force plane to attack these destrouers with bombers.
The DRACHE has received orders to lay the barrages planned
for the night of 9 Oct., during the night of 10 Oct.
At 0853 the convoy of the -steamer INGEBORG received orders
to enter Mykjonos temporarily, owing to the uncertain enemy
situation and because the' Captain and four of the crew of '■'--.■•■-•
the steamer INGEBORG were wounded in an enemy air attack.
The convoy dropped anchor on the. west coast of Mykunos at 1430.
If it proves impossible to br'Ing this -convoy through to Kos,
motor minesweepers or. even planes, may possibly fetch
particularly valuable' parts of the cargo 'or small groups
of men. Since the weather deteriorated in the course of
the afternoon, the scheduled execution of operation "Leopard"
became doutful. A final decision was postponed until the
evening.
153 CONFIDENTIAL
10 Oct. 19^ ; :;■;-■;.: ■■■■ .,,;,•_. CONFIDENTIAL
The convoy of the steamer INGEBORG, received orders to stand
by in immediate readiness on the lee" side of the island of
Delusa from daybreak on 11 Oct. However, this order could
not be carried oiafe because of weather conditions. In the
evening operation "Leopard" was postponed for another 24
hours .
So far 302 men of the BULGARIA have been reported rescued.
Further figures sre still awaited.
With regard to the Fuehrer Directive of 6 Oct., Naval Staff
has informed Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff,
Navy, Admiral, Fuehrer Headquarters and Group South that
the latter will, in accordance with the Fuehrer's order, use
all facilities for the task ordered.
"It is known that the Navy can occupy and supply the islands
in the. Aegean Sea only as allowed by its small facilities and
at a great risk in view of the enemy naval and air superiority.
Commander in Chief, Navy reported this to the Fuehrer verbally
and by teletype of 8 Oct. This fact must be taken into consid-
eration. "
Naval Staff furthermore points out that a copy of the Fuehrer's
teletype to Commanding General, Armed Dorces, South, with copy
to Group South, was not received by Naval Staff unitl 9 Oct.
Nay£l Staff was therefore advised very late of the measures
ordered bv the Fuehrer. '
c. Black Sea: :
1 • Enemy S i tuation:
No enemy forces were sighted by our air reconnaiss-
ance during the day. No shipping was observed off the Caucasian
coast.
2. Own Situation:
The transport convoys arrived at Sevastopol in
the evening. They were repeatedly attacked by enemy planes
from daylight on, but were well covered by our fighter
escort. One naval landing craft out of the third convoy was
sunk by an enemy submarine at 1325 south of Yalta. In an
air attack on Yalta. at 1^35 one combined operations boat
and the tug BAIKAL were damaged.
Submarine U "23" left Constanta for operations. Submarine
U "20" is on return passage to Constanta.
-15 2 *- CONFIDENTIAL
10 Oct. 19^3 . CONFIDENTIAL,
The 1st PT Boat Flotilla left Ivanbaba in the evening for
convoy escort. : , ;
Barrage "K 15" vas laid according , to plan.
Admiral, Black Sea has submitted a ! brief report about the
Navy's share in the evacuation of the Kuban bridgehead.
Since 7 Sept. the Navy evacuated the following:
97,9^1 tons of war material
12,437 -wounded
6,329 soldiers
12,383 civilians
1,195 horses
2,265 head of livestock
260 motor vehicles . . "' :
770 horse-drawn vehicles
... . ; : 82 guns . ."
Besides this transport task the Navy's main duty was to
protect the sea transports and to prevent enemy landings
behind our front. This entailed numerous engagements with
the enemy. For copy of brief report see teletype 0^00.
VIII. Situation East Asia
• The Naval Attache in Tokyo reports:
"Wake attacked on 6 end 7 Oct. by carrier-borne and shore-
based planes, -which came from Midway. On both days the
attacks were carried out by about 300 planes in four waves.
Most of- the Japanese bombers on the airfield were destroyed
right at the beginning of the attack. The remaining ones did
not succeed in reaching the enemy aircraft carrier. Fighters
and anti-aircraf.t guns, shot down 20 planes on each day.
No attempts at landing were made. Damage was mostly on the
airfield. Forty killed c No ships in port.
During the night of 6 Oct. a destroyer engagement took place
in the waters of the Solomon islands. One Japanese destroyer
was heavily damaged and 'three enemy destroyers probably sunk.
Full particulars are still unknown. Ja-penese troops at
Colombagsrsi and Vella le Vella (northern islands of the
New Georgia Group) were evacuated to Choiseul, except
for rear guards. Heavy fighting In progress near Finschhafen
(New Guinea). Enemy submarine activity in September insign-
ificant. " ,
***#•***■■***#**•*■*■***■**•*■*
-155- CONFIDENTIAL
11 Oct. 1945 CONFIDENTIAL
Items of Political Importance
"DNB" reports in connection -with the situation in Portugal
that, contrary to the sensational reports in the Allied press ,
the situation has not changed. Parliament is not expected
to meet before 2 Nov.
The Intelligence Service reports, on the other hand, that
there has been no communication with Ponta Delgada since
7 Oct. The station has probably been wiped out.
The Intelligence station at Horta reported at 2200:
"All Germans on the island of Faya.l have been arrested and
brought in to Ponta Delgada by the steamer ALF0NZ0 ALBUQUERQUE.
In Horta searches and oonfiscttion of radio sets and trans-
mitters are taking place. All traffic to and communication with
the island of Sao Miguel is interrupted. A convoy of 3
freighters with war materiel and provisions, 4 minesweepers ,
2 tugs and 4 destroyers arrived at Horta on the morning of
8 Oct. (Agent did not give nationality of the ships.
Presumably American vessels.) The destroyers put out again
the same afternoon. The minesweepers remained in harbor,
hoisted the Portuguese flag and took Portuguese crews on
board. Another 6 transports and 100 minesweepers dropped
anchor on the roads. Further ships are expected. An allied
naval base is probably being established."
The Naval Attache in Lisbon refers Naval Staff to report to
the Intelligence Station, with which there is close cooper-
ation on the situation in the Azores.
Following the reference by the Naval Attache to reports
wired by the Ambassador in Lisbon on 6 and 9 Oct.. Naval
Staff tried in vain to gain an insight from the Foreign f
Office into these reports. These are obviously the ones
whoes "pacifying" tendency was referred to already on
10 Oct.
Conference on the Situation with Chief , Nqval Staff
Ao Re: Planning of Schedules for delivery of submarines
ty-qes XVII, XVIII, XIV, and XX. ... '
Chief, Naval (Ship J Construction Division, explained the
"prefabrication" (section construction) process planned
by the Main Committee for Shipbuilding Order Control Office
and referred to the objection that in the case of the two
-156 CONFIDENTIAL
11 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL
.11
western groups five out of ten sections of the entire
monthly output of 25 submarines (the eastern group wi:
take over another 18 "submarines ) will lie at one and the'
same dockyard. However, a still greater objection is
that the' change-over to prefabrication will necessitate. .
the non- completion and breaking-up of altogether 180 sub-
marines under construction.
Naval (Ship) Construction Division proposed that the submarines
under construction be continued until the workers are actually
required for pregabrication and also that the Emden and the
Stuelken dockyards be made use of, bseides the Germania
Dockyard , for the construction of special submarine types
XIV, XVIII o and XX. Director Schuerer doubted whether the
schedules of the Main Committee could be adhered to. The
steel mills, prefabrication dockyards and assembly dock
yard each have only two months for one submarine, including
transport. Although Director Merker has accept sole
responsibility for pregabrication, the Naval (Ship)
Construction Division feels obliged to recommend that
in the case of the first submarines the prefabrication
dockyards be omitted. It fears that the prefabrication
process will undoubtedly lead' to increases in the time
required for final work and trials. As an increased out-
put oo submarines, as planned by the Main Committee, is
to be achieved not by increasing manpower but exclusively
through an improvement in production methods, Naval (Ship)
Construction Division doubts whether the scheduled date of
1 April 19^4 for the first four submarines -can be adhered to
without, however, being able to give proof of this. The
Naval (Ship) Construction Division is in a difficult position
since cancellation of current orders depends on the new
schedules laid down.
Commander in Chief, Navy orders that the above objections
be first discussed throughly by Naval (Ship) Construction
Division and Director Merker. Prom an operational point
of view, it is only important that the planned output be
ma inta ined .
Further to the conference on 8 Oct. the Chairman of the
Shipbuilding Commission reported on the submarine program
for ■ the Germania Docyyard at Kiel. For copy of notes of
the discussion held on 10 Oct. with diagram of the
schedules planned see War Diary, Part B, Vol. V.
B • Situation:
1. Army Situation :
The fact that htere will apparently be no muddy season
on the eastern front this year is being exploited b;y the enemy
157 CONFIDENTIAL
11 Oct. 1943 C ONFIDE NTIAL
for continuation of his attacks. It was possible on the
whole to repulse hi Is large-scale attacks between Melitopol
and Zaporozhe. At Zaporozhe an attack by more than ten
rifle divisions was repelled. Our attacks against the enemy
bridgeheads on the southern Dnieper were discontinued. Heavy
pressure is being brought by the enemy on the area west of
Smolensk. In the area of Nevel we have put the 1st Army
Corps of Army Group North into action.
From Italy tnd Greece only local fighting is reported.
II. The Fuehrer has suggested that the NIELS JUEL be used
as a floating anti-aircraft battery. Admiral, Fuehrer
Headquarters is to be informed that this has already beeni
ordered by Quartermaster Division and -that preparations have
been made accordingly.
III. A compilation of losses and damage to our own ships or
those sailing for us through enemy action in September 1943 fe
is contained in list as per l/Skl IE 28437/43 Gkdos . copy
in War Diary, Part D, File "Own Shipping Losses 1943".
Fifty- three ships totaling 62,644 G R.T. became total losses
and 50 ships totaling 43,357 G.R.T. were damaged, not counting
the losses suffered in ports. Total loss: 103 ships totaling
106,001 G.R.T. About 30fj of the losses were caused by mines,
about 30^ by submarines, about 20^ by planes, 1276 by PT
boats and Qfo by gunfire.
IV. Quartermaster General reports that the request for a
special allocation of one million 2 cm. cartridges monthly,
mostly required for submarines, has been rejected by Armed
Forces High Command, Commander in Chief, Navy orders that the
reasons for this request be submitted once more to Armed
Forces High Command.
Special Items
I. Chief, Foreign Affairs/intelligence Division, Armed Forces
High Command has submitted notes on a discussion with Japanese
officers at the Fuehrer Headquarters on 29 Sept. 1943. Copy
as per l/Skl 28784/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XV.
The Japanese officers were given information on the situation
as a whole and on the individual theaters of war.
II. Since Portuguese weather reports from the Azores area
have ceased since 0200 on 8 Oct., Chief, Meteorological
Branch, Hydrographic and Meteorological Division requests
Chief of Staff, Naval Staff, with copy to Operations
157A - CONFIDENTIAL-
11 Oct. 19^3
■CONFIDENTIAL
Division and Submarine Division to see that other . reports from
this area be passed at. once to the Meteorological Service.
They are of utmost importance for advising Commanding Admiral,
Submarines of the weather in the Atlantic operational areas
as yell as for advising all branches of the Armed Forces
in the Atlantic coastal areas of western and northern Europe.,
Possible measures are under investigation.
Situation 11 Oct.
I . War in ForeJgn W aters
Nothing to report.
II. Situat ion Wes t Area
1. Enemy Situation :
Over the Bay of Biscay 25 planes were detected on oper-
ation. One British vessel was located at OSlO in AM0150 and 1 at
1021 in BF 1873 • Cur air reconnaissance reported at 1010 in BF
1989(120 miles west of -Brest) 2 destroyers and 1 steamer (about
3,000 GRT) on courso 2^0 degrees.
2. Own Situation .- Atlantic Coast:
Five submarines were escorted In and one out.
C hannel Coast:
Mine -exploding vessel "180" was escorted from Cher-
bourg to Lezardrieux. It is planned to transfer the vessel
to Brest during the night of 11 Oct.; escort will be provided
by torpedo- boats T "22" and T "25".
Otherwise nothing to report.
-I58- CONFIDENTIAL
II Oct. 1945 CONFIDENTIAL
III. Nor th Sea, Norway, Northern Waters
North Sea:
Altogether seven ground mines were swept north of
Terschelling.
Convoy "463" Elbe Hook (2 steamers and mine -exploding vessel
"153" with 2 escort vessels and the 1st Minesweeper Flotilla)
left the Elbe at 1000.
In Zeeland waters six convoys with a total tonnage of
29,597 GRT were carried through.
Otherwise nothing to report.
Norway, Northern Waters :
1. Enemy Situation :
Over the North Sea 15 planes were detected on
operation. Minor reconnaissance was reported on 10 Oct.
in the areas of Nordvaranger, Petsnmo, Trondheim and
Lis ter -Egersund .
Reuter reports officially: "British midget submarines damaged
the battleship TIRPITZ in Norwegian waters."
From the time and form of this report is is highly probable
tha t :
B j. Return of the submarines has so far been awaited
in vain.
b) Nothing is known of the course of the operation.
c) The announcement is the first attempt to elicit a
comment from us . To this end all means and tricks
of journalism will be used.
2. Own Situation:
In the area of Naval Command, Norway 2J> ships
were escorted north and 22 south. For altogether 14 ships
there were not sufficient escort vessels.
Otherwise nothing to report.
159 CONFIDENTIAL
11 Oct. 19^3 C ONFIDENT IAL
IV. Ska gerr a k , Br* 1 1 1 c Sea E ntrances, Baltic Sea
1 . E nemy Situation:
Nothing to report. ■ '
There was a minesweeper formation between Great
Tyters and Lavansaari east of the "Seeigel" barrages.
2. Own Situation: • ■••
Mine laying unit "Ostmark" put out for laying of
Sjagerrak barrage "XIX" (Operation "Natrium"). This is to
be carried out during the night of 11 Oct.
The NIELS JUEL has been refloated and it is planned to
tow her to Kiel on 12 Oct.
Otherwise nothing to report. . .
V. Submar ine Warfare
In the North Atlantic an operation is planned with
twelve submarines against the ONS convoy in the area
AK 10, AD 30.
Submarine U "220" carried out a mine laying operation off
St. Johns (Newfoundland).
Submarine U "532", operating in the Indian ocean, reports
lively traffic consisting of- single vessels and vonvoys
with light escort close to the coast at the souUierntip of
India. This submarine sank the steamer PORT LONGWELL
(presumably 7,000 GRT), the steamer DIPLOMAT (8, 000 GET),
one auxiliary warship cf 9,000 GRT, which was equipped with
anti-torpedo nets, and one steamer (6,000 GET) out of a
convoy; in all about 30,000 'GRT.
Further successes have been reported from the Mediterranean.
Naval Staff advised that Naval Attache in Tokyo that the
first MONSUN boat, submatine U "188", is. coming from the
Gulf of Oman and that the second one, submarine U "183",
is proceeding from Mombasa to Penang for repairs and will
arrive on 28 Oct. Route and course of approach are requested
(see teletype 214^).
160- CONFIDENTIAL
11 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL
v ^ • Aerial Warf are
Briti sh Is les and Vic i nity;
No important missions ■ or- events to. report.
In the air attacks of 9 Oct. on Anklam and Gdynia 63 four -
engined enemy planes were shot down. Ten of our planes
were lost.
Mediterranean Theater :
The 2nd Air Force reports 15 planes out on reconnaissance.
Air Force Command, Southeast reports 56 bombers, 42 Stukas,
20 fighters, 27 reconnaissance and 37 transport planes out
on operation. One enemy destroyer or escort boat was driven
ashore by continuous attacks in the south c-nn bay of Levitha
(Aegean). Continuous attacks were also carried out on Leros.
The enemy carried out lively air activity over the Italian
front. In the Greek area 52 enemy planes approached the
area 90 km. vest of Salonika via Valona in the morning, but
were forced to turn back owing to deteriorating weather
conditions. The steamer ROSELLI was heavily damaged in an
attack by nine planes on the port and the airfield of Corfu.
Eight reconnaissance planes were deteceed over the Aegean
Sea and ten planes supplying insurgents over Greece-
Eastern F ront;
The 5th Air Force reported 33 planes out on operation
without soecial event.
VI I . Warfare in the Mediterrane a n and Black Sea
■ 1. Enem y Situation Mediterranean:
The INDOMITABLE with a destroyer escort was out at
sea east of Gibraltar for a few hours during the day. A U. S.
Cruiser of the HONOLULU class and a destroyer put in to
Gibraltar from the Mediterranean.
No reconnaissance reports have been received from the
western and eastern Mediterranean.
One Of cur submarines contacted a westbound convoy at 0109
20 miles north of Bougie.
(
-I6I- CONFIDENTIAL
11 Oct. 1945. .-. .; #: , CONFIDENTIAL
In the Gulf of Naples a further, increase in destroyers and
merchantmen /was observed on the afternoon of 10 Oct. These
had obviously brought up reinforcements for the land front.
This might also veil be an assembly for a new landing oper-
ation in the opinion of German Naval Command, . Italy. The
number of ships in the Gulf of Salerno has decreased-
During 10 Oct. ten small vessels, were sighted on the supply
route from Bari to Termoli. Around 0230 on 10 Oct. the coast
near Pescara was shelved from the sea, apparently by two
destroyers and mo t or ^/gunboats . Rumors of an enemy landing at
this point have not been confirmed. However, the danger to
the open coastal flank is clear.
During the night of 9 Oct. PT boats advanced into the area
of Piombino and north of Elba. There was an engagement with
one of our submarine chasers. Further interference with
convoy traffic in the Ligurian Sea must be expected.
2 . O wn Situation Mediterr anean:
Submarine U "116" registered a hit each on two
LST's (each 3,000 GRT) with "Zaunkoenig" torpedoes at 0530
in CJ. The vessels probably sank. At 0019 submarine U "371"
heard by hydrophone an impact on the leading destroyer of '
a westbound convoy detected north of Bougie. Further
observation was impossible due to ant i -submarine measures.
The minelayers JUMINDA and KEPIRWIEDER left Spezia on a
minelaying operation. •
Mine search off San Remo was broken off without result.
It has not been proved that the POMMERN sank through
striking an enemy mine. A submarine torpedo hit : does not
appear out of question,, It has not been possible to clear this
matter up finally. •
German Naval Command, Italy reports that Chief, Supply and
"Transport, Italy is on his way to Trieste with personnel
for three complete sea transport offices, in order to set
up these offices on the Dalmatian coast in agreement with
Admiral, Adriatic.
After conclusion of the Corsica operation the most important
task on the west coast of Italy is the evacuation by sea of
materiel from the area Ga eta -Leghorn.
In view of strong enemy action by planes, PT boats and
submarines, it is impossible to use large vessesl.
162 CONFIDENTIAL
11 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
Traffic, however, has proceeded smoothly despite great
difficulties encountered in bringing up end loading during
constant air attacks on the ports and approach routes.
Supplies to Elba have also been carried out as planned,
using Siebel ferries and harbor defense vessels, anti-
aircraft protection being afforded by specially armed
Siebel ferries. An intensified submarine chase has been
started in this area. Evacuation of large quantities of
iron from Piombino with large ships is being prepared.
Coastal traffic between Leghorn and Genoa is being
carried out by small vessels. Traffic between Marseilles
and Italy has not been resumed yet. Only naval landing craft
are heing sent to the Italian area. The large ships which are
not required will be distributed among small ports in Italy
and southern France.
Traffic along the east coast of Italy is at present being
carried out by auxiliary sailing vessels. At first 6-8,000
tons monthly will have to be carried by sea for supplies
to our forces, and later on 15,000 tons monthly. The seizure
and fitting-up of escort vessels and submarine chasers is
being pursued as an urgent necessity.
The Office of the Under State Secretary of the new Italian
naval Organization has begun Its funcitons. An Italian Lia-
ison Staff is attacked to German Naval Command, Italy at
Levico.
German Naval Command, Italy request the 2nd Air Force to
lay aerial mines close to shore and in shallow water in
Salerno Bay off Salerno and Pesto and in the Bay of Naples
off Naples, Caste llama re, Torre Annunciate and Pozzuoli-
Niside-Miseno. According to information from Commander
in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff to Naval Staff, the
2nd Air Force will be ordered to mine the occupied
Italian ports from the air. On acconnt of this information
German Naval Command, Italy has requested the 2nd Air Force
also to carry out extensive mine laying of the harbor entrances
and inshore waters of Taranto, Brindisi, Bari, B-rletta,
Manfredonia and Termoli.
3. Area Naval Group South:
a . A driatic Sea :
The minelayer LAURANA is again out of action.
The steamer LE0PARDI arrived at Durazzo and is to proceed
to Corfu during the night of 11 Oct. The tanker KNUDSEN is
to be tdansf erred on the evening of 11 Oct. from Cattaro to
Durazzo; she is to go on from there during the night of
12 Oct. On the morning of 13 Oct. 3 Siebel ferries,
5 infantry landing boats, 1 coastal defense boat and the
steamer H.FISSER are to put out from Pola to Zara with
150 men and the staff company of Naval Shore Commander,
DaLmatia aboard. I63 CONFIDENTIAL
11 Oct. 1943 .. CONFIDEN TIAL,
The steamer ROSELLI is lying damaged at Corfu, the steamer
BOCCACIO in Cattero, and the steamers MERANO and POZA RICA
in Zara .
Group South has ordered that the five Siebel ferries already
assembeed at Trieste are to be assigned to Admiral, Aegean
Sea as soon as possible.
b. Aegean Sea :
Submarine chaser !l 2110" and the steamer SALVATORE
•with 1,200 Italian prisoners aboard left Kos on 10 Oct.
This convoy was seven miles "west of Samos at 0600 on 11
Oct.
During the night of 10 Oct. the DRACHE again sighted east
of Kalynnos the two destroyers reported there on the
evening of 10 Oct. The DRACHE destroyed her secret documents.
Apare. documents- are to be forwarded to her py plane. Coast
patrol boat GA "45" reported at 2209 on 11 Oct.:
"DRACHE is in an engagement with destroyers"
No detailed report has yet been received.
Our air reconnaissance sighted at 0630 on 11 Oct. a
destroyer or escort boat 20 miles northeast' of Levitha
on course 240 degrees. Our planes attached this vessel,
damaged thr and drove her ashore. Air attacks are being
continued.
Isola Vecchia on Kalymnos was shelled by enemy destroyers
around 2250. Submarine chaser "2102" and ;£lthe; steamer INGEBORG
were delayed at Mykonos because of weather conditions.
According to a report from Group South the start of
operation "Leopard" has again been postponed for 24 hours
because of weather conditions, i.e. until 0130 on 13 Oct.
Group South transmits the following views on the situation
from High Command, Army Group E. : ■■•■
"The decision to carry out operation "Leopard" as soon as
possible must be adhered to. The task of Assault Group
"Mueller" is to start off,- disregarding all risks, as
soon as seaway a. Hows and a direct intervention by enemy
warships is not to be expected. It is impossible to await
a favorable phase of the moon. Attacks on enemy warships
by the Air Force has been continued unceasingly. Complete
elimination is, however, impossible.
-164- CONFIDENTIAL
11 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL
Reconnaissance shows that the Aegean se* will probably
be free from surface forces on 11 and 12 Oct. Thus the
necessary tactical conditions for operation "Leopard"
to start on 12 Oct. are favorable. The possibility of
carrying it out from the navigational point of view crn
be decided on the spot".
The comments by Group South state that the deterioration
of the situation regarding operation "Leopard" is due to
loss of tine owing to weather conditions, the full moon,
the bringing up of enemy forces , the weskening of our Air
Force and the losses in our shipping.
The Army also has no new forces available, unless such are
brought up from Crete. The elimination of Leros is, never-
theless, still the most important operational target. The
longer the delay lasts, the more necessary it is to exhaust
all possibilities to maintain the assembly of vessels and to
protect the operational base of Kos by provision of addition-
al Army forces and strengthening and Air Force. The request
for submarines is again urged since other operational vessels
are not available. The suggestion made by Admiral, Aegean
to occupy the islands of Stampalia and Levitha meanwhile
cannot be agreed to. The proposal of Army Group E to allow
General Mueller to issue orders himself, in agreement
wuth the local Naval Commander, when weather conditons
improve is agreed to.
Armed Forces High Command has issued instructions that,
on orders from the Fuehrer, the islands mentioned in the
Fuehrer Directive for the defense of the southeastern
area, i.e. Crete, Rhodes, Corfu, Ce lpha Ionia, Zante,
Scarpanto, Milos, Kos, Chios, Mythilene, Lemnos, Leros
and Samos are to be provided beforehand with supplies of
every kind to last for six months' fighting, in the same
way as Crete, if a constant supply is not sssured on account
of their proximity to the coast.
c. Black Se a:
Enemy Situation:
Our main direction-finder station at Eupatoria-
de tec ted four submarines in the northwestern part of the
Black Sea and in the area of the Crimea. At noon on 10
Oct. a submarine was bombed by one of our reconnaissance
pianos 20 miles south of Sudak. Another submarine was sighted
five miles east of Alushta .
Own Situation:
As soon as our large convoys had arrived at
Sevastopol the submarines acting as remote escort returned
to the operational area off the Caucasian coast.
165 CONFIDENTIAL
11 Oct. 19^3 CONF IDENTIAL
Three Italian midget submarines started on return passage
to Sevastopol. Otherwise there -was. no convoy . traffic,
mines weeping or PT boat operations, because of bad weather.
VIII. Situation East Asia
According to a report from Allied Headquarters, the
Japanese base of Vila on the island of Colombangara was
occupied without resistance. Japanese bombers escorted
by fighters attacked Allied positions in the area of
Fins chha fen.
According to Reuter, Japanese positions on Wake Island were
attacked by naval and air forces. In the course of this 6l
Japanese planes were destroyed on 5 ^nd 6 Oct. The attack
was carried out by aircraft carriers and Liberator bombers
of the Naval Air Force.
-166- CONFIDENTIAL
12 Oct. 19^5 CONFIDENTIAL
Items of Political Importance
According to a Swedish report, the Three Power Conference in
Moscow is to start on 17 Oct. find will last until the end
of the month. It is believed in London thpt it will be
possible to solve the Polish problem, but not according
to the wishes of the Polls Exile Government . The American
press too' is now more optimistic about the prospects of
the Conference, since concessions may be expected from all
sides in order to reach a reasonable compromise. The question
as to how Germany is to be treated after the war still remains
the most difficult problem.
The waters of the Azores are patrolled by Allied worships
according to an "AP" report from Bern.
In Croatia all Ministers have sent in their resignation to
Poglavnik, in order to open the way for the formation of a
new Government. The political situation inside this country
is extremely tense.
Conference on the Situation yith Chief _J£a
I . Army Situation
Continued attacks have given the enemy no important
gains on the eastern front.
In southern Italy the enemy has apparently completed his
assembly at the Volturno and the attack is now a waited.
Mopping-up of Istria is completed.
Chief, Naval Staff referred to the necessity of checking
the smoke screen defense of Gdynia. At the same time he
repeated the order that leave for the TIRPITZ crew is to
be arranged in such a way that adequate defensive readiness
of the ship at her repair berth is still assured.
II. Chief, Naval Staff approved the sequence of priority
for batteries in the west area proposed by Quartermaster
Genera 1 .
For the 30,5 cm. battery with all-around range the Peteamo
area has priority over the Atlantic Coast.
167 CONFIDENTIAL
12 Oct. 1943'. . CONFIDENTIAL
Chief of Staff/ Naval Staff gave as reasons for this recommend-
ation by Quartermaster Division the uncertain political sit-
uation in the northern area (Finland), less danger to the
battery there from the air without a concrete covering and
the probably lack of naval targets for heavy guns on the ..
Atlantic Coast.
Chief, Naval Staff agreed to the proposal.
Special Item s
I. Commander in Chief, Navy has decided on the recommendatinn
of the General Naval Administrition Bureau that a submarine
base should, be established at once at Memel, "which is at
present being built up as a naval port. Furthermore, investig-
ations are to be made as to whether the southern entrance to
the merchant harbor can be closed temporarily for the winter
months, in order to acquire a protected winter anchorage for
submarines at once if possible . Commanding Admiral, Submarines
had requested that the southern entrance, to the merchant harbor
be definitely closed by a mole. The Reich Minister for Water-
ways and Power and the Reich Commissioner of. Maritime Shipping
have raised well-founded objections against this project in the
interests of merchant shipping.
II. Naval Intelligence Division in brief Report on the Enemy.
Situation No. 19/43 deals with the following matters regard-
ing submarine warfare, amongst others:
1. Enemy reports about the convoy battle In the North
Atlantic in September 1943.
2. War losses of neutral merchant navies ,
3. Alleged enemy successes in the Mediterranean; also;
operations by airctaft carriers during the enemy land-
ings at Salerno, in which the UNICORN, HUNTER, BATTLER
STALKER, and ATTACKED participated. Fighter cover was
provided fy the ILLUSTRIOUS and FORMIDABLE.
This brief report also contains the announcement of the British
Admiralty regarding the operation of the Home Fleet against
our shipping in Bodoe area on 4 Oct. as well as statements
on; the French and Italian Fleets.
Finally, the report deals with the statement, already mention-
ed,, of a spokesman of the Committee for Mobilization in the
Lower House, according to which 2| million men are expected
to be transported overseas from the U. S. before Christmas.
5
•168- CONFIDENTIAL
12 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL
The Committee estimates the total ava liable shipping of -
the Allies, including tankers and coastal vessels, as over
50 million tons. The statement then goes on: .
"The sharp decrease in the sinkings by enemy submarines in
conjunction with the record-breaking construction of new
ships give us 3 million tons more than provided for in the
military plan for 19^3 « Three million tons of shipping -
•which means in a year nine million tons of freight - are
sufficient to equip If million more troops for the European
theater. The collapse of Italy gives us an additional \ a
million tons, possibly even more.
At the beginning of the year the "War Department announced that
it planned to ship- altogether nearly 5 million men oversees
and that by December 19^2 1 million U. S. Troops had been
sent aboard. The plans provided for a further \\ million men,
fully equipped, to be shipped by December 1943. The targets
set for this year will definitely be reached." . I
Naval Intelligence Division, Foreign Merchant Marine Branch
comments on the above as follows:
"The estimate that the total tonnage available to the Allies,
in overseas and coastal shipping including ships under repair,
amounts to 50 million tons (these are tons dead-weight) = 35
million GRT, corresponds with the findings of Naval Intelligence
Division. According to our findings the surplus of new const-
ructions during the nine months from January to September 19^3
amounts to about 4J million GRT, i.e. an average of \ a million
GRT per month. In June, August and September the surplus of
new constructions was considerably above the average and
amounted to 0.9, O.76 and 1 million GRT, respectively. No
opinion can be foremed as to how far this result surpassed the
expectations of the enemy.
The spokesman reckons with a shipping surplus of 3 mill! on
tons dead-weight= 2 million GRT over and above the military
plan, with which 9 million tons d.w. of freight can be
transported, in order to equip if million further troops
for the European theater. This means that the enemy reckons
with three round trips in one year(3 x 3 million d.v.= Nine
million tons dvw.) ; and uses 4 GRT per man (3x2 million
GRT for if million men = 4 GRT per man) for the transpor-
tation of gear and equipment.
According to our own experiences, frequently confirmed, it
169 CONFIDENTIAL
12 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENT IAL _
must be assumed that 8 GRT per man are necessary for the
transportation of equipment and gear and that in one year
about 6 round trips can be carried out on an average from the
U. S. to the European -theater. With these figures the same
final result is arrived at. However, this is provided that ..
all gear for ij million troops is brought over from the
United States and is not drawn from the European area".
For copy of brief report as per l/Skl 30885/43 geh. see
War Diary, File "Data on the Enemy Situation 1943".
Situation 12 Oct.
I. War in Foreign Waters
Naval Staff advises ell vessels in foreign waters of
enemy shipping movements with Radiogram 1847.
Otherwise nothing to report.
II. Situation West Area
Enemy Situation:
Over the Bay of. Biscay 43 planes were detected on
operation. One British vessel was located at 1606 in AM
0130.
2. Own Situation:
Atlantic Coast:
Off Brest two submarines were escorted out and one in.
On 11 Oct. one ground mine was swept off La Pellice. Group
West does not plan to carry out the exercises of the 8th .
Destroyer Flotilla until the foggy weather has cleared.
C hannel Coast:
Torpedo boats T "22" and T "25", "acting as -remote
escort for the convoy of mine- exploding vessel "180% sighted
two enemy PT boats at 0048 six miles north of He de Bas: after
170 CONFIDENTIAL
12 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL
firing torpedoes which missed, they withdrew from our gun-
fire "behind a smoke screen.
Mine-exploding vessel "180", which swept two mines e^st
of Les Heaux, put in to Brest st 0800 escorted by the ■
2nd Minesweeper Flotilla. Torpedo boats T "22" and T "25"
followed shortly after.
III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters
North Sea :
In the Elbe -Ho ok convoy "^63" mine -exploding vessel
"153" sustained "damage through a mine detonation in AN
8326 and is being towed in to Borkum. The rest of the
convoy proceeded on to Helder after a temporary stop on
Borkum roads .
Minesweeping in the Heligoland 3ight was hampered by fog.
N orway, Northern Waters:
1. Enemy Situation:
Over the North Se^ 10 planes were detected on
operation in the morning and 17 in the afternoon. On 11
Oct. a battery on the Ribachi Peninsula unsuccessfully
shelled en incoming Petsamo convoy with 110 rounds. Our
own battery returned fire with 70 rounds. Minor reconnaissance
activity is reported from the areas of Petsamo, Trondheim
and Bergen.
2 . O wn Situation:
The steamer AMMERLAND (5,38l, GRT), carrying
fodder for Kirkenes, sank at 07^8 ten miles west of Nordkyn
after striking a mine. The area had been closed. On 11 Oct,
a mine, which had drifted ashore at Utsire, exploded killing
three men and wounded one of the Mining and 3arrage Command.
Thirty- one ships were escorted north and 29 south. Six ships
were delayed due to shortage of escorts.
The Task Force reports that the stern of the midget submarine
first sighted has been salvaged and beached next to one
already raised. Search for the third boat was discontinued
without "result owing to current, heavy silting-up and water
depth.
171 CONFIDENTIAL
12 Oct. 19-^3 CONFI DENTIAL
Destruction seems certain for the following reasons: numerous
hits by gunfire observed for certain; a series of depth charges
dropped right at the last diving point; the submarine's
vulnerability to depth charges; protracted discharge of oil;
knocks definitely heard after 24 hours.
Naval Command, Norway reports:
"Four-fold torpedo net barrage completed in the La ngf iordbotn.
This barrage is situated about one mile vest southwest of
Vaddekei lighthouse. The barrage was- laid in order to provide
a provisional substitute for the berth at Sobnes . In the
Sobnes net enclosure the anchor-chain for the mooring buoy was
broken. The nets from Sobnes were used for the torpedo net
barrage at Landf iordbotn. Immediate restoration of the net
enclosure at Sobnes with deep-protection has been ordered."
I V . Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances , Fa 1 tic Se'a
1. Enemy Situation :
A smoke screen was put up at Kronstadt from 1630.
In Kronstadt Bay there was lively gunfire on both sides. Seven
parachutes were seen to be dropped from a plane near Tyters
at 2120, presumably carrying mines A smoke screen was put
up at Lavansaari in the afternoon by guard boats.
2 • Ow n Sit uation:
Mine laying operation "Natrium" in the Skagerrak
was carried out as planned. The NIELS JUEL is being towed to
Kiel. A fire broke out in the stern of the transport MAR DE:
PLATA of the transport Unit Copenhagen-Oslo; cause unknown.
Her crew was taken over by the escort vessel LEDA and the
convoy proceeded. The MAR DEL PLATA put in to Frederiksha vn
after the fire had been extinguished. The considerable transport
and convoy traffic in the Baltic was otherwise carried out
without incident.
Six Italian soldiers of the smoke screen company^ t Gdynia
have refused to serve, probably because of the employment
of Italian Prisoners of war in that area.
The area of Training Unit, Fleet is closed because of
the danger of mines.
Nothing to report from the area of Commander, Minesweepers,
Baltic and Admiral, Baltic States.
172 CONFIDENTIAL
12 Get. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL
V. Submarine W arfa re
Lively enemy ? ir activity -was observed near the supply
position in 3D 3 : , "which necessitated transfer.
Submarine U n 6c8 i: fired two FAT torpedoes, which missed,
on a fast motorship oroceeding on course 235 degrees in
BE 1776.
In CF 64l6 two destroyers were reported and in BE 5656 9 search
group of three vessels.
Submarine U "536" sank a steamer of 9,000 GRT proceeding
on course 260 degrees in CC 52 (500 miles south of Newf oundland)
In view of the situation in the Azores area (see War Diary,
Part C, Vol. VIII), submarines U "154" end U "516" received
orders by radiogram at 2329 to take up position in the waters
off Ponta Delhada and Horta ps temporary operational areas.
Assignment-;: Attacks on enemy warships and merchantmen^
but outside territorial waters only. Portuguese ships are
to be treated as neutrals. Incidents with the Portuguese
are to be avoided.
VI . A erial Warfare
B riti sh Isl es and Vicinity:
The 3rd Air Force had seven Ju 68 ' s out on free-lance
fighter operations over the Atlantic without result. Four
planes were out on nuisance raids against London.
No enemy air a c t i v i i t y w or th men 1 1 on ing .
Mediterranean Theate r : .
The 2nd Air Force reports 6? planes out on a bombing
operation against the harbor and 17 against the airfield
of Ajaccic. Good hits were scored. Otherwise only reconn-
aissance flights .
Air Force Command, Southeast reports only reconnaissance
activity. Enemy activity with ground-attack planes was
lormal over the front in southern Italy. Bombs were drop-
ped on Civitavecchia. In the Agean sir- field at Maritza
was unsuccessfully attacked.
Easter n Front ;
The 5th Air Force reports' the sighting of four submarines
n
173 CONFIDENTIAL
12 Oct. 1945 CONFIDENTIAL
Olenya Bay and destruction of one submarine in the entrance
to Kola Bay by one of our planes.
VI I • Warfa r e in the Mediterranean and Black Sea
1. Enemy Situation '.Mediterranean:
In the afternoon a convoy consisting of 1 transport,
37 freighters and 5 tankers entered the Mediterranean from the
west. Five freighters and one tanker put in to Gibraltar from
the. Atlantic . Two freighters left Gibraltar, -westbound.
Our air reconnaissance sighted at 1440 15 miles southeast
of Gaeta two troop transports and also five minesweepers on
alternating courses, obviously out sweeping our barrages.
No new information has been received from Sardinia and Corsica
In the Bay of Pozzubli a slight increase in landing craft was
detected and in the harbor of Naples a large increase. At 0525
there were two destroyers 35 miles north-northeast of Bari one
course northwest. On the east coast of southern Italy contin-
uous convoy traffic with destroyer escort was observed as far
as Termoli.
2. Own Situation Mediterranean:
A mine laying operation by the JUMINDA and the
KEHRWIEDER off the mouth of the Tiber was postponed because
of weather conditions.
Escort vessel LIDI was commissioned in Venice on 11 Oct. and
PT boats MS "75" §nd MAS "554" on 12 Oct.
German Naval Command, Italy reports plans to return a large
number of French steamers from Genoa to ports in southern
France and proposes that French shipping circles be informed
and three crews for a shuttle service be provided, since
Italian ports must be evacuated Immediately. The transfer
will be carried out in agreement with the Deputy for German
Sea Transportation in the Mediterranean, escort being prov-
ided by the 6th and 7th Coast Patrol Forces; for large ships
a strong air escort will be provided.
Naval Staff approves this plan of German Naval Command, Italy
and considers it necessary to carry it cut with a;] possible
speed. The Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping "has
been informed accordingly and requested, if he agrees, to make
the necessary arrangements with the French regarding supply
of the shuttle crews.
174 CONFIDENTIAL
12 Oct. 1943 C ONFIDENTIAL
German Naval Command, Italy submitted on 11 Oct. views on
the situation regarding the Adriatic Sea:
1. Supply routes along the extended, flat vest coastline,
which is particularly suited for landing operations of
all kinds and for shelling from the sea, are so
endangered that coastal traffic is essential. This
open flank is only occupied by a small number of Army
forces. There is artillery defense only at Ancona and
Venice. No naval forces are available for defense of
coastal -waters. An effective coastal defense is,
therefore, only possible by minelaying.
2. Operations Division has transferred the responsibility
for the Adriatic Sea area to Group South. Italy is now
the center of developments, as confirmed by Quartermaster
Division, Organization and Mobilization Branch in
connection with the transfer of a Naval Artillery
. Battalion from northern France to Italy. Defense
measures on the east coast of Italy in the Adriatic
should, therefore, have priority.
3. As long as Admiral, Adriatic is not yet fully equipped,
German Naval Command, Italy will assist with the means
available.
a. Immediate aims: mining of the harbor entrance
Ortona - Pescara, coastal defense barrages
between Ortona and Ancona. For this only naval
landing craft MFP "^85" is at present available.
The minelayer LAURANA has been withdrawn from
operations because she is not seaworthy.
b. The torpedo boat AUDACE is being prepared as a
minelayer. It is necessary to leave her under
German Naval Command, Italy. If ready in time and
if the . enemy situation permits, she is to lay
mines between the coast and Tremiti. It is essent-
ial that the minelayer FASAN, now nearing complet-
ion at Trieste, be transferred so that the coastal
area Ancona -Venice can be mind.
c. Group South is asked to carry out operation
"Pelagosa" 1 as ordered by Naval Staff, immediately
and with all the means available. In addition,
attempts should be made to close the Tremiti-
Lagosta area completely. This would, at the same
time,, also protect the Dalmatian coast.
4. Escort of coastal traffic and the minelaying operation
planned are essential. Suitable vessels lying in Venice
are being equipped for this purpose.
175 CONFIDENTIAL
12 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENT IAL
5. Summary: Effective defense of the open flanks on the
east coast of Italy is of decivive importance. Provision
of the necessary means (minelayers and mines) is essential.
A request for German mines -will therefore be unavoidable,
as the stocks and quality of Italian mines are inadequate.
The 2nd Air Force has been' asked to mine . the enemy-occupied
ports in southern Italy, as requested. by Commanding General
Armed Forces, South and Naval Staff.
Group South agrees in principle that, until Admiral, Adriatic
is fully equipped, operational vessels should again be made
available temporarily to carry out the task of German Naval
Command, Italy and also in future from time to time after
these tasks have been synchronized -with those of Admiral p
Adriatic. Group South has given up the plan to lay the barrage
Tremiti-Pelagosa -Lagosta , because of the large quantity
of mines needed without corresponding prospects of success,
since the barrage will not be patrolled. A new plan will be
drawn up.
Operations Division decides as follows:
On I. Views on the situation are agreed to.
On 2. The order given by Quartermaster Division, Organization
and Mobilization Branch on 10 Oct. was misunderstood.
Italy is the focal point only as far as. the west area
is concerned. Security measures oh the east coast of the
Adriatic Sea are still just as urgent as those on the
Italian Coast.
On 3, a' and b Naval Staff agrees with the plans submitted.
Water depths permit extensive use of goound mines. ..
The AUDACE is temporarily placed at the disposal of
German Naval Command, Italy for operations. The FASAN
will, as soon as completed, be assigned to Group South,
as mining of the coastal area north of Ancona must at
present take second place to the operations of Group
South.
Q n 3, c. On the line Tremiti -Lagosta mine laying only is
planned.
Qn z i Approval for continuation of measures reported
has been given separately.
Qn 5. Request for an allocation of further mines is awaited.
It must be added, with regard to the Fuehrer Directive on
further conduct of the war in Italy, that German Naval Command,
176 CONFIDENTIAL
12 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL
Italy on 7 Oct. drew attention to the fact that the task
assigned to the Navy of coastal defense against enemy landings
cannot be carried out if Army coastal defense is not avail-
able or is inadequate, as in the case vest of Genoa and south
of Piombino. Small parts of naval artillery battalions are
tied down for batteries and Sea fortresses. Naval forces
for patrol of coastal waters are inadequate. Absence of
Army coastal defense may also jeopardize coastal traffic.
German Naval Command, Italy has requested that influence
be used with Armed Forces High Command not to withdraw
coastal defense but to build it up in the area from Savoha
to the French border, since the Navy can only support but
not take over the tasks of the Army.
Armed Forces High Command already transmitted on 8 Oct.
the Fueher's decision on this matter, which is dealt with
in War Diary of 8 Oct.
3. Area Naval Group South :
a. Adriatic Sea:
i
According to report from the Port Commander,
Dubrovnik two vessels of unknown nationality passed Dubrovnik
on northerly course eta distance of six miles at Ou^O on
11 Oct. Because of the danger of a landing a state of readiness
was ordered until daybreak.
On the afternoon of 12 Oct. the steamer BOCCACIO left Cattaro
for Durazzo, the steamers PROCARICA and MERANO left Zara for
Cattaro and the tanker KNUDSEN left Durazzo for Corfu. The
steamer LEOPARDI arrived at Corfu. The steamer MARIO ROSELLI
sank in Corfu due to the bomb damage sustained. The steamer
H. FISSER (5*1*5 GRT) caught fire in Pola and had to be beached.
b. Aegean Sea :
Enemy Situation:
On 11 Oct. single planes were on reconnaissance
over the southern Aegean. At 1042 the harbor and town of Corfu
"were bombed without damage. On the evening of 11 Oct. strong
formations attacked the town of Rhodes and the airfield of
Maritza .
At 0105 on 12 Oct. our air reconnaissance sighted 15 miles
north-east of Sirina two torpedo boats on course southeast.
The boats were not located again after daybreak. In the early
afternoon there were 2 cruisers and 2 destroyers south of
177 CONFIDENTIAL
12 Oct. 19^
CONFIDENTIAL
Castell Rosso on course northwest ' end .1 cruiser and 1 des-
troyer in the Kasos Strait (east of Crete) on course north-
northwest.
During the night of 11 Oct. the battery on the southern
point of Leros shelled the Bay of Isola Vecchia ( 'JB* lymnps ) .
Own Situation:
The DRACHE reported at 0153 oy radiogram. She was
lying camouflaged in Penconda Bay during the night of 11 Oct.
Group South has submitted to- Army Group E the following views
with regard to operation "Leopard";
"1. The first task of the Navy, which was to bring up Army
forces, landing craft and naval forces to the assembly
areas around Kos, has for the most part been carried ;>ut.
The offensive mine barrage, planned in connection with
this landing operation as protection for the landing units
which has been partially laid. As far as the Navy is
concerned with this landing operation, all available
forces are in close proximity and ready to start off.
2. The actual operation upon lancing must be carried out
i- by the Army and Air Force in the absence of effective
naval forces. The tasks which still fall to the Navy
depend, not counting weather conditions, decisively
on the strength of our Air Force, which has to make
up for the weakness of our naval forces, ensure prot-
ection for our landing units by eliminating enemy
naval forces and make attacks on enemy shore install-
ations, thus making up for the lack of support by
naval guns--
3 Therefore any comment as to the advisability of further
adherence to the present operation planned against Leros
and estimation of the most promising date depend con-
siderably on information regarding the development in
strength of our own Air Force compared with that of
the enemy and its effectiveness against enemy naval forces.
This will in the long run also decisively influence the
continuation of the operation.
4. The importance of effective operations by our Air Force
new 1163 particularly in preventing the smashing of ^ur
forces; enemy naval forces must be kept away from the
landing unit in the assembly areas during the landing,
enemy batteries must be neutralized in the landing area.
178 CONFIDENTIAL
12 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
and assistance rendered, by attacks on enemy naval and
Air Forces, in assuring reinforcements by sea for the
operation going on against Leros and supplies to the
assembly area of Kos .
5. If the Air Force can fulfill these expectations with the
new forces brought up or those still to be brought up,
then the situation and decision accordingly reached to
continue the operation against Leros is clear.'
6. In this connection it must be emphasized once more that
'• the Dodecanese can only be held with Leros, if at all,
For reasons of naval strategy, it is necessary to hold
Leros in order to occupy the entire Dodecanese. It is
therefore necessary that the Air Force supply itself part-
icularly to carrying out operational tasks at sea in
connection with the movements of supplies necessary for
holding the islands.
7. The Navy is raady to carry out the landing, though with
very scanty forces. These will just suffice for the present
operation, if the Air Force supplements them, but they
represent all that could be provided at present although
losses sustained so far have been slight.
■8. No further naval forces can be brought up at present, ?wing
to the situation in the Mediterranean as a whole. The re-
quest of the Army Group for additional air forces is also
urgent as regards naval operations."
A report of the Coast Patrol Flotilla, Attica to Chief, Naval
Communications Division states that one of the .s ix . na va 1
landing craft which were lost in the convoy of the OLYMPOS
is lying pillaged in a bay of Stampalia. It must therefore
be assumed that secret documents have fallen into the hands
of the enmy. For details see Radiogram 2241.' Chief, Naval
Communications Division will take the necessary steps.
Mopping-up of Naxos by three patrol boats of Coast Patrol
Flotilla, Attica is planned for 12 Oct. A report on this
has not yet been received.
A heavy net barrage has been laid off Pont.iconisi (north of
Trikerri). The convoy of the steamer SALVATORE with 1,200
prisoners from Kos arrived at Piraeus and the convoy of the
steamer TARQUINIA carrying German troops arrived at Pe-tra.s.
from Zante. The steamer LEOPARDI with Italian prisoners
aboard is' being escorted from Corfu to Piraeus by submarine
chaser "2101".
179 CONFIDENTIAL
12 Oct. I9M3 CONFIDENTI AL
c. Black Sea:
No- PT boats were out on operation because of stormy
■weather. Convoy traffic -was canceled. Eight harbor defense
boats sank or were smashed in stormy weather at Kerch, while
in Jbodosiya 1 tug, 1 lighter and. 3 fishing smacks sank. The
net barrage was heavily damaged. In the Strait of Kerch
numerous drifting mines were sighted, some of which drifted
ashore .
An anti -torpedo barrage was laid in front of the floating dock
and dry dock at Sevastopol.
For request of Group South and Admiral, Balck see with regard
to the organization of the naval artillery battalions in the
Strait of Kerch and in the sector Ivenbeba /Feodosiya see
teletype 1145. This matter will be settled by Quartermaster
Division.
VIII. Situation East Asia
Nothing to report.
**■*•*******-*•**■#■**■*#■*-■*•**-*•*-**
CONFIDEN T IAL
-I8O-
13 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
I tems of Political Imports nee.
According to Reuter, Churchill announced in the House of Commons
on 12 Oct. that the Portuguese Government , at the request of
Great Britain, has agreed to make certain concessions on
the Azores in order to ensure better protection for merchant
shipping in the Atlantic. Agreements ere said to be of a
temporary nature. All British forces will be -withdrawn from
the Azores at the end of hostilities. Great Britain will
provide the Portuguese on the Azores with the necessary
military and other supplies. The desire of the Portuguese
Government to continue its policy of neutrality on the
European Continent is not affected.
The Portuguese Government has officially announced In this
connection that Portugal had pointed out on each occasion'
when she defined her neutrality that she was honestly deter-
mined to maintain this but that she considered it to be
qualified by the Anglo-Portuguese alliance. The Portuguese
Government has kept her obligations, under the non-aggress-
ion pact with Spain and has already notified Spain accord-,
ingly. The present concession gives new force to the old
alliance between Portugal and England and is a proof that the
friendship already exisiting has become closer.
It is officially announced in London that the United States
were kept informed, of the negotiations with Portugal and
that they approved the signing of this agreement. According
to Reuter, Roosevelt has stated 'that the United States will
use the bases on the Azores together with the British. If
necessary this will also be done by other nations at war with
the Axis powers .
It is stated that Churchill and Roosevelt decided in May
at Washington to try to have the bases placed at their
disposal.
Franco has announced, also according to Reuter, that Spain
will also continue to maintain watchful neutrality.
It is unnecessary to set down further considerations on this
event. The fact that the Portuguese can allow themselves
now to give way to British pressure without fear of German
retaliations Is en indication of the evaluation of our
situation. The strategic effects of the occupation of the
Azores at the expense of our war against merchant shipping
and in favor of increased enemy freedom of movement in the
central Atlantic are obvious. They actually demand very heavy
attacks with every means available on the island bases and
would also justify treatment of Portugal herself and all her
181 CONFIDENTIAL
13 Oct. 19^3
CONFIDENTIAL
possessions ss enemy territory. It would be necessary for
this to use adequate naval power; this is at present no
more possible than it was in 19^0 end 19*11, when the question
of an' occupation of the Atlantic islands as a precautionary
measure was considered and har to be rejected ay. Naval Staff.
Further comments on this matter are continned in W.^r Diary,
Fart Cy Vol. VIII.
Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff
Army Situation:
The enemy launched new large-scale attacks at various
points on the eastern front. In the Zaporozhe area the
situation is tense. Before the sectors of the 4th 9th Armies
of the Central Army Group a full defensive success was
gained. Only in the area of Vitebsk did the enemy gain
some ground and reach the Upper Dvine .
An enemy attack on a broad front is expected in Italy.
Otherwise no special conferences and decisions to report.
Special Items
I. Requirements of mines and anti-sweeping devices for all
theaters of war'vill be exceptionally high next spring.
Operations Division has requested Naval Ordnance Division,
Underwater Obstackes Branch to state what quantities monthly
of EMC. EMF, EMR, UMA and UMB mines and cutting floats can
be expected for the next six months within current production
and when the special program of" the Ministry of Armament and
Ammunition will commence and what the output will be. It may-
be necessary to report on this matter again to Commander in
Chief, Navy and to request him to petition Minister Speer
to speed up the mine program.
II. Group North/Fleet has recommended, at the request of
the Commander, Destroyers, that destroyer z "30" be transferred
to the west area instead of destroyer Z "34" for reasons of
. assignment to .different flotillas." Since fulfillment of this
request would mean consumption of an addional 1,000 -com. of
furnace oil, Operations Division has not approved the proposal
but left open a change in assignment of the destroyers to
different flotillas.
Otherwise Naval Staff agrees to the recommended transfers.
182 CONFIDENTIAL
♦
13 Oct. 1943 . . '.,. i CONFIDENTIAL
III. Foreign Affairs/intelligence Division reported in
Enemy Situation Report No. 18 of 2 Oct. amongst other things
as follows: .
1. Owing to the approaching Nordic -winter, large-scale
landings in northern Scandinavia are hardly to be expected
any more this year. The possibility of a restricted landing
operation in central and southern Norway, however, still
exists .
2. The large number of reports, so far fanaastic, on
operations which are allegedly imminent on the North Sea
and Channel coasts as well as on the French Atlantic coast, in-
indicates a plan to conceal and misconstrue facts. Strategic,
but especially politicll, reasons indicate that the large-
scale Allied offensive in the west has been postponed for
the time being and that it is hardly likely this year.
Operations with restricted objectives are, however, still to
be expected. • ■
3. It seems that the Iberian Peninsula is not intented as a
base for a thrust into Eurppe until the final phase of the
war. There is talk of the Azores being a demand by the
United States to compensate for the weak attitude of Portugal
towards Japan on the Timor question.
4. Only commando operations ere to be expected at present
against the south coast of France and the Ligurian coast. .:
Plans for large scale Anglo-American operations against
southern France may have been postponed for the present.
5. The development of the situation in the Balkans is det-
ermined by the trend of relations between the Soviet Union
and the British and Americans. Since no clarification is
expected in the near future and large-scale operations in %
th4 Balkan area during the winter can hardly be carried out,
the British and Americans will restrict themselves during
operations against the east coast of the Adriatic to attempts
to build bridgeheads in order to attain their political
objective of forcing Hungary and the Balkan States out of
the Axis through cooperation with the insurgents and through
air attacks. The British interests in the Balkans are very
great, while the Americans have only strategic interests there.
6. Turkey will not take any action against Germany es long
as the Balkan States are dependent on the Reich. She would
probably only join in the war on the side of England in order
to defend her position on the Straits (Bosporus and Dardanelles,
Tr.N.) against Russian aspirations and in attempt to win the
other Balkam States over to an alliance under British leader-
ship.
-I83- CONFIDENTIAL
13 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENT IAL
7. In the Eastern Mediterranean only operations for the
further, occupation of single Greek islands and perhaps against
Greece are to be expected during the current year. _ .
Foreign Affairs/intelligence Division has reached the con-
clusion that no large-scale operations are likely this winter
so that the intensification of the -war against Japan urged
by Roosevelt would naturllly follow.
Situation lg O ct,
I. War .in Foreign Waters _
1. Enemy Situation: .
According to en intelligence report of 12 Oct. naval
and air bases on the Cape Verde Island are also said to have
been placed at the disposal of Great Britain, Troop Transports
are said to be lying ready in Gibraltar for a landing in Lagos
and Lisbon in case of a German decaaration of war on Portugal,
2. Own Situation:
No messages have been received from Ship "28" since
15 Sept. On the basis of her fuel supplies, Naval Staff
estimates that she is crossing the border of the operational
area just now, so that she is expected to arrive in Japan
during the first days of November.
Naval Staff has instructed the Naval Attache in Tokyo to ■
notify the Japanese Navy that Ship "28" is returning through
the North Pacific and to request freedom of action on return
route.
Ship "28" has been advised accordingly by Radiogram 23.09
and instructed to refrain from attacks outside the opera tiara
area until a reply has been received from the Japanese.
The Japanese Liaison Officer has stated that the TANNE will
leave Kure on Tj> Oct., dock in Singapore and leave Penang
on 12 Nov. Oil will be supplied in the Indian Ocean from
German Ships. The passage from Penang to the German sphere
of influence will take about two months, Cargo for Germany
consists of 100 tons of tin or tungsten. Docking will be
necessary for unloading. Besides the new Naval Attache for'
Berlin, Admiral Hojlma, there are fourteen other passengers
aboard.
184 CONFIDENTIAL
13 Oct. 19^3
CONFIDENTLY
Submarine Division has been advised accordingly end asked
to decide port of destination as soon as possible. For copy
of order l/Skl I opa 3073/^3 Gkdos. Chefs, see War Diary, - ,
Part C, Vol. IX.
The Naval Attache in Tokyo has been advised by Radiogram
2150 that the waiting areas for the BRAKE and the BOGOTA are
to remain in force, since they were not known either to the
CAGNI or the ERITREA.
Naval Staff informs all vessels in foregin waters by Radiogram
2121 on the tankers sailing udner the American flag in the
Indian or Pacific Ocean and by Radiogram 2219 of the state-
ments made by Russian deserters regarding Russian traffic
from the United States to Siberia. This traffic proceeds
from Vancouver, Seattle, Portland, San Francisco, Los Angeles,
and along the North American coast, Aleutian Strait, Kuril
Strait, La Perouse Strait to Vladivostok; partly also to
Anadyr, Nagaevo, Petropa vlovsk/Kamchatski, Alexandrovsk/
Sachalinj the ships sail singly. Cargo to the Soviet Union
consists mostly of foodstuffs. Ships return to the United
States generally in ballast,. The United States are said to
have handed over about 60 ships in the Pacific to the Soviet
Union. Armament of the Soviet ships in the Pacific: on the
bow one heavy and one normal anti-airctaf t machine-gun, on
the bridge two twin anti-aircraft cinch ine- guns , sometime
hearvy ones, the same on the boat deck. On the stern one anti-
aircraft guns of 76-122 a.m. Armament is of American Manu-
facture.
t
II. Situation West Ar ea
1 . En emy S i t ua t i on :
Over the Bay of Biscay 4.1 planes were detected on
operation. One British vessel was located at 2032 in BF i960,
one at 2323 in AM 7720 and one U. S. Vessel at 13^9 in BD
3990.
The Intelligence Service transmits the following report from
a reliable agent in Romania, which is confirmed at the same
time from a reliable Swiss source:
"There are 10,000 ('. ) landing boats, with a capacity for
200 men eacg, lying ready for operations in British ports.
The Chief of the operation will be Marshall, who is on
his way from the United States to Great Britian. It is said
that the landing will take place during or shortly after
conclusion of the Three Power Conference in Moscow'. This
conference will be held during the week from eleven to
I85 CONFIDENTIAL
)
13 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIA L
18 Oct. The landing places will be in the area between -
Boulogne 9 Dieppe and Rotterdam. Should no agreement be
reached in Moscow about the Balkans States, landings are to
take place in Greece from the Aegean Sea in the direction
of Salonika, cutting off the penissula of Chalkidike."
Armed Forces High Command, Intelligence Division, Secret
Intelligence Section, Naval Liaison reports in this
connection: "The sources are obs'.Cure. It is possible that
this is information circulated by the enmey" .
2. Own Situation:
Atlantic Coast:
' One ELM/J mine was swept off La Pallice and two
moored. mines on the outward route from Brest. Off Brest, St.
Nazaire and La Pallice two submarines were' escorted out and-
one in. Exercises by the 8th Destroyer Flotilla are scheduled
for Ik and 15 Oct.
The port of Douarnenez has been closed since 6 Oct. ps it is
suspected that five overdue fishing boats, which had been
properly cleared, have fled to England and as further attempts
to flee may be planned.
The change of flageof the three Italian blockade runners will
take place at 1600 and 15 Oct.
Channel Coast:
Nothing to report.
III. N orth Sea, Norway, Northern Waters
1, . North Sea : , ■; - ':
Convoy -"463" Elbe -Ho ok was carried out.
Mines weeping in the, area of Commanding Admiral,
Defenses,', North was only partially carried out because of fog.
The vessels escorting convoy "463" swept three "ELxM/j mines
and one ETM mine.
The Swedish steamer P.IEGEL ran aground off Rotersand.
186- .;" CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
13 Oct. 19V3
2 . Norway, Northern Waters :
Enemy Situation ;
Over the North Sea l*f planes were detected on operation.
At 2100 on 12 Oct. three PT boats were sighted in the skerries
north of Stavanger. The steamer (*+,500 GRT) which was damaged
by our Air Force on 6 Oct, at the landing stage in Toross,
sank according to observations by reconnaissance later on.
Regarding the destruction of a submarine in Olenya Bay on lk
Oct. see teletype 1135.
• Own Situation :
At 130*+ an eastbound convoy, consisting of 5 steamers and '
h tankers escorted by M- minesweepers, 7 patrol boats, 3 sub-
marine chasers, the escort vessel BSLI and K"3", apart from
fighter cover, was attacked off Vardoe by eight bombers and
torpedo bombers. No damage was sustained.-
According to a report from Air Force General Staff, 25 out of
60 attacking enemy planes were shot down during convoy escort
operations in the Vardoe area. The convoy sustained no damage.
This is obviously one and the same operation. Clarification
is awaited.
Thirty-one ships were escorted north and 26 south. Eight ships
were left lying in harbor due to shortage of escorts.
>
The Task Force proposes the following as security restriction
for those on leave from the TIRPITZ: "Scheduled leave from Alta
since overhaul in the northern area is more suitable than in
home waters and saves transfer." Since the damage to the
TIRPITZ is said to have become known to the enemy, Group North/
Fleet recommends that this fact be included in the security
restrictions and slight damage admitted (see teletype 1200).
Operations Division will ask Commander in Chief Navy for a
decision.
IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea
I . Enemy Situation ;
No information worth mentioning has been received.
CONFIDENTIAL
-187-
CONFIDENTIAL
13 Oct. 19V3
. 2 . , Own Situation :
Berths for large battleships along the harbor railroad
station at Gdynia o.annot be used as a result of bomb hits, since
the quay installations are gradually dropping down.
The steamer ALMUT was unsuccessfully attacked at 0*4-15 hy an
enemy plane 20 miles west of Oesel„
Otherwise nothing to report.
V. Submari ne Warfare
In the North Atlantic Group "Schlieff en" , consisting of 1*+
submarines, will at midnight on 3.5 Oct. be disposed in patrol
line AK if 877 - AK 67 5S where convoy OnS 206 is awaited. This
assumption is based on the mention of AK 65l6 as the point
for stragglers in radio intelligence intercepted.
Naval Staff advises the Naval Attache in Tokyo that the two
MONSUN submarines now on passage to Penang have not yet used
up all their torpedoes and that they are therefore proceeding
via the operational area of the southwestern point of. India.
The Japanese Navy is to be advised that these submarines will
steer a direct. apurse for the rendezvous position from this
operational area. For copy of this signal see fUdiogram 2150.
VI. Aerial Warfare
1. ■ British Isles and Vicinity %
The 3rd Air Force had 51 planes out on operation in the west
and 7 over the Mediterranean, ^o special reports of success have
'been received.
There were only minor enemy penetrations during the day and night
of 13 Oct.
2 „ Mediterranean Theater ;
Our Air Force carried out reconnaissance flights in the
Italian area. Twelve fighter-bombers were out en operation agains'
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13 Oct.. 19^3
shipping targets west of Ischia and scored one hit on the stern
of a large ship and one near miss. close to the side of a heavy
cruiser.
In the afternoon enemy ground-attack planes were again over the
Italian front. In Albania the airfield at Tirana was attacked
by strong forces. Eighteen of our planes were destroyed on the
ground and 12 slightly damaged, altogether 22 of them being
Italian planes.
3. Eastern Front ;
The convoy escort success is reported under "Situation North-
ern Waters", Otherwise nothing to report, \
VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea
1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean :
At 1130 2 KING GEORGE V class, the FORMIDABLE, the
INDOMITABLE, 1 HONOLULU class and 8 destroyers left Gibraltar,
westbound. The cruiser put in Tigain at 1315, while the h large
vessels passed Tangier at 1330 making for the Atlantic.
At 1215 Tres Forcas sighted 1 battleship proceeding towards the
Mediterranean. One transport with 2 destroyers put in to
Gibraltar from the Atlantic towards noon.
Air reconnaissance sighted at about 0700 northeast of Alboran
an eastbound convoy which consisted of 30 Merchantmen. This
is presumably the same convoy as the one reported on the
afternoon of 21 Oct, to be entering the Mediterranean c The
convoy was not detected again later,
At 11^0 an 'eastbound convoy was sighted north of Philippeville.
German Naval Command, Italy presumes that this convoy was
assembled in African ports. A submarine was reported to have
been sighted 60 miles south of San Remo. No new information
has been received from Sardinia and Corsica.
According to the situation report of Commanding General, Armed
Forces, South, the coast near Mondragone (25 miles northwest of
Naples) was shelled from the sea. - Eight vessels, presumably
minesweepers, were forced to turn away from the mouth of the
Volturno by our gunfire. Fifteen km. south of the mouth of
the Volturno loadings or unloading s were apparently taking
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13 Oct. -191+3- '
•place under cr-uiser protection. Shelling of the coast immedia-
tely north of the mouth of the Volturno was continued from mid-
night on 12 Octo Minor tank and infantry forces were landed
on the northern bank in the mouth of the Volturno at noon
Two heavy vessels, seemingly one battleship and one heavy cruiser
were standing by as protection off the Volturno, Our Air
Force . reports hits on a light cruiser and destroyer off the
mputh' of the Volturno, MLnesweeping was extended to six miles
south of Gaeta under destroyer escort.
In Naples a heavy increase' in the number of ships was observed;
100 - ISO ships of- various typed were counted. According to
photographic evaluation, the shipping withdrawn from Taranto
has been moved forward to Bari and Brindisi, At Termoli an
increase in landing craft was detected.
No reports have been recieved from the eastern Mediterranean.
2 . Own Situation Mediterran ean s
At 0^17 submarine U "371" sank a destroyer of a west bound
convoy with a "Zanunkoenig" torpedo 50 miles northwest of
Philippeville. The JUMINDA £nd the KEHRVftEDER have carried out
the minelaying operation off the Tiber as planned. Convoy
traffic was carried out without incident,. The Pontine Marshes
are to be swamped again and water dammed in the Ostia area,
since encircling enemy landings are expected. Gaeta will be
evacuated, the harbor demolished and blocked e The last of our
vessels will leave the port on the vevening of 13 Oct.
The Operations Staff of German Naval Command,. Italy will transfer
from Santa Rosa to Levico (Northern Italy) within the next
few days, obviously in agreement with Commanding General,
Armed Forces, South*
Tfcds measure is not absolutely in line with the Fuehrer's inst-
ructions to hold the front south of Rome. .
Motor minesweepers R "190" and R"191" left Chalons for Marselles*
Anti-aircraft corvette SH "13" has been decommissioned and one
Italian motor minesweeper has been commissioned in Genoa as
RA "1". \ :•
German Naval Command, Italy reports on the status of the Italian
Fleet as follows s
"Following the appointment of Admrial Legnani as Under State
Secretary of the Navy, Admiral Ferrari resigned as Deputy
Chief of the Admiralty c
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13 Oct. 19V3
CONFIDENTIAL
Admiral Varoli Piazza and six officers will go with German Naval
Command , Italy to Levico as Liaison Staff. Total personnel
of the Italian Admiralty with all divisions is about 100 officers
and 3,000 assistants. The "Commandanti di Service della
Marina Italiana" will be attached to Naval Shore Commanders,
Italian Riviera ? West -Adriatic and North Adriatic as working
staffs. They will be under the Naval Shore Commanders, as
regards operations and under the Italian Admiralty as regards
technical and personnel matters. They will take up their
duties at first for harbor services, communications, coastal
reporting and lighthouse services, dockyard and arsenal work.
They will also assign volunteers for coastal batteries and
auxiliary warships and perhaps also assign volunteers for
coastal batteries and auxiliary warships and perhaps also
eacortvessels. Start of the organization is at present very
slow, since there are as yet no clear, uniform directions for
control of German and Italian Commands^ The Italian officers
have therefore not set aims yet and no enthusiasm for their
assignment. At present everything here is guided by the
principle that no independent Italian naval offices are to
be allowed to exist."
. 3 * Area Naval Group South :
a. Adriatic Sea :
The fire aboard the steamer H.FIS3ER in Pola has been
put out. Mining and Barrage Command, Pola took up its duties.
It is planned to have a convoy of three steamers put out from
Pola to Trieste on lh Oct. Four Siebel ferries and five
torpedo boats will be transferred on 13 Oct, from Pola to Zara.
Group South advises Naval Staff for information of the request
to German Naval Command, Italy for data on all naval vessels
and merchantmen found in harbors of Naval Shore Commander,
West Adriatic, so that they can be distributed over the whole
Adriatic in accordance with operational considerations. .When '
distributing the ships for the west Adriatic, coastal traffic,
Group South will give due consideration to the shipping '
requirements, already reported, for 15,000 tons of supplies.
Operations Division (Naval Staff) has also been asked to
submit data available. (See teletype 1850.)
b. Aegean Sea ;
Enemy Situation :
The harbor and the sea area of Kos were attacked by
planes between 1300 and 2000 on 12 Oct. One plane was shot
down.
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13 Oct. 19^3
* ■ .
The two* destroyers reported on the afternoon of 12 Oct, south
of Castell Rosso are escort vessels of the HUNT class, accord-
ing to photographic evaluation, At 1900 on 12 Oct,, 1 cruiser
and 2 destroyers were located in the Scarpanto Strait, One
motor boat, 1" barrage vessel and 1 vessel, apparently a motor
boat, were lying in Alinda Bay %Leros) at the same time accor-
ding to photographs.
According to a report from Commander,. Submarine- Chasers, there
were 2 destroyers on alternating courses from 2000 on 12 Oct
off Kos 9 Pserino and Kalymnos, They definitely withdrew to
the north into Turkish territorial waters „
At 01^5 on 12 Octo the DRACHE reported two destroyers east of
Kalymnos, course not stated, and from 2155 at the same position
again two destroyers on southerly course.
Weather conditions made reliable air reconnaissance impossible
on 13 Oct.
At 1600 on 12 Oct. there was a submarine • south of Kalymnos.
Our own decoy vessel registered no further location after
two depthcharge' runs.
Own Situation ;
Group South reports further postponement of operation
"Leopard" until 1*+ Oct. because of wind strength 6 and
seaway 5.
The convoy of the steamer INGEBORG was detected by enemy air
reconnaissance and put in to Syra. Since the weather deteriora-
ted, passage to Kos was not continued e
The DRACHE laid two new barrage sections east of Kalymnos,
Commander, Submarine Chasers reported on 12 Oct. that the
regular appearance of enemy destroyers shortly after darkness
shows that a direct threat to the weak landing flotillas for
operation "Leopard" must be expected at any time.
The steamer SANTORINI -was attacked by enemy planes while on ;
passage from Kos to Piraeus and returned to Kos, Most of her
Greek crew jumped overboard* The unarmed crew of a rubber
dinghy, sent ashore on the Turkish peninsula of Akri-by- armed
fishing vessel KFK "2" in order to pick up survivors sighted
there, was' overpowered by soldiers, apparently Turkish, who
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13 Oct. 191+3
suddenly appeared, KFK"2" left Turkish territorial waters
again after a short stay.
The steamer SALVATORE put in to Piraeus with more than 1,000
British prisioners. The tanker Knudsen arrived at Corfu. So
far approximately 1,200 Italians have been evacuated from
Scarpanto.
In the enemy air attack on Corfu at noon on 11 Oct. 35 men.
were killed and 100 wounded in the Italian prisoner of war
c amp ,
Teletype communications "between Sofia and Athens will probably
be interrupted for a long time.
One inquiry from Naval Staff regarding operations by our sub-
marines in the Aegean, Group South reports;
"1. The plan is to have onesubmarine each. operate east, of
Leros and Kalymnos, the second submarine to operate, according
to the situation, in the sea area west of Leros, Kalymnos and
Kos against enemy destroyers and perhaps cruisers which are
operating every night in that area and especially from the
east cut of Turkish territorial waters against thelanding which
is about to- take place.
2. The continuous presence of enemy surface forces in
this sea area very much endangers the assembly of units for the
landing operation and might lead to the smashing of our forces
before the landing operation, at present held up by bad
weather, is started.
3. The purpose of our submarine operations is therefore
not the sinking of enemy shipping but the warships endangering
our operation* These warships are at the same time carrying
out reinforcement of defense on enemy-occupied islands.
h. No enemy submarines have so far been discovered in
the narrow waters between Leros and Kalymnos. Cessation of
submarine chase is not of great importance for our naval and
air forces in this area, since already only the most limited
forces are available in the entire Aegean area for submarine .
cha& ; - and these are mainly participating in thelanding operation.
5. The appearance of our submarines in the areas where
landings are planned would, apart from direct prospects of
attacking enemy warships, considerably limit the enemy T s present
unobstructed freedom of movement and thus substantially facili-
tate our tasks in occupying and holding the Dodecanese."
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13 Oct. 19^3
Finally Group ^outh submits thefollowing observation:
"The population in Greece has expressed general satisfac-
tion about numerous recent enemy air attacks. In Piraeus the
appearance of enemy planes was greeted with jubilant demonstration
This proves that our propaganda has so far been inadequate and
requires immediate intensification. "
c. Black Sea s
Admira a Black Sea reports ;
1. Bad weather continues, so that there has been no resumption
of convoys yet; no patrol lines were taken up„
2. The storm and high water have caused the mooring jetty
at Genichesk to break away; naval artillery lighter MA.L "11"
drifted away and ran aground at the bow. An attempt to tow
her off was unsuccessful owing to the present weather conditions.
3. The jetty at Eupatoria was heavily damaged. The possibility
of loading is considerably restricted.
Submarine U "20" put in to Constanta from the operational area.
Group South reports that the Bulgarian Ministry of War has
agreed to further use of the ZAR FERDINAND and the BURGAS in
the Balkans for supply traffic if these ships are in future
used only;
a. between Bulgarian and Romanian ports, or
b. in the area between Salonika and Piraeus.
These ships can therefore only be used for supplies from the
Black Sea to the Aegean on transfer passage.
VIII. Situation East Asia
Nothing to report.
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lh Oct. 19^3
Items of Political Importance
In the first commentary on the Three Power Conference "Pravada"
rejects all conjectures which deal with the problem of Russian
borders or the status of the Baltic States. The most urgent
problem is the quickest possible concentration of joint war
efforts so as to shorten the war. The solution of post-war
problems after the collapse of "Hitler Germany" is dictated
by the interest of all Allied countries. The Spanish 31ue
Division has been withdrawn from the eastern from, according
to Reuter.
The foregin press represents Portugal 1 s conduct with regard to
the Azores as an example for other neutral countries, e.g.
Sweden, Ireland and Turkey. A Swiss paper writes that the
decision taken by Portugal, who despite her neutrality on the
Continent has joined in the war on the side of the Allies,
will enable Allied pressure to be increased on Spain and
Argentiana. It is . saidin Lisbon, according to Reuter, that
the German Ambassador assured Salazar on 12 Oct. that
"Germany appreciates Portugal's difficult position. Germany
will still regard Portugal as a friendly neutral*"
This statement sounds absolutely unreliable.
The Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate has
adopted a resolution in which the United States pledge them-
selves to post-war cooperation for the maintenance of world'
peace.
The Badoglio Government has announced a declaration of war
on Germany. At the same time Badoglio Italy has been
recognized by Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet
Union as an ally. This does not affect the armistice terms.
Conference on the Situation with Chief. Naval Staff
I . Army Situation .
On the eastern front the Russians have pushed into our lines
in the Zaporozhe sector.
On the Volturno front it was possible on the whole to repulse
the enemy attack.,
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l 1 * Oct. 19'+3
II. Quartermaster General reports:
Armed Forces High Command, Operations Division has not
approved the withdrawal of a naval artillery battalion from
France to Italy* German Naval Command, Italy has meanwhile
reported that Commanding General, Army Group B regards £he-
coastal sector Venice-Grando as particularly vulnerable to
landings and has requested mining by the Navy and' reinforce- ■■
ment of coastal guns especially by long-range guns. Commanding
General, Army Group B-has also requested that a basic change
in emplacement of the batteries be considered, since they •
are known to the enemy and not always set up correctly from
the tactical point of view. German Naval Command, Italy ■
has replied:
"Investigations regarding the possibilities of- setting up ■•... :
further batteries in the area of Naval Sliore Commander, West ■
Adriatic are being mad:
This depends particularly on the available personnel. The Navy
at present has no reserves. Requests have been made repeatedly
to High Command, Navy to assign the naval artillery battalion
as planned but this is not to be expected before a month from
now. In general it will be impossible to move stationary bat-:
teries as this would require a long time and much labor.' The'
question of long-range guns is under investigation*".
I I I o Chie f , Ope r ati o ns Branch. Op e rati o ns Division :
— — «— J— — i7"i. i i i i — ii — ^«K Wjp — ap— <^>w p it i | I in jl i.Mi n. i w i il m i iirni mm ah ui ■ i n I ; n i n ■ ■ ■■■ —
a. Naval Staff proposes the following security rulings
within the Navy with regard 'to operation "Paul" (repairs to
the TIRPITZ) :
"The dockyard period of the TIRPITZ, planned already for
some time to take place this winter, will be carried -out in
the northern area since both at Wilhelmshaven and at 'Kiel the
TIRPITZ would be' too much exposed to sudden enemy air attacks
There are already so many other ships of the Fleet in Gdynia . ,
that this harbor can no longer accommodate the TIRPITZ, Other
ports 'In home waters are out of question for the dockyard period
of the' TIRPITZ, Furthermore, the serious fuel situation makes
it undesirable to transfer her to home waters and later
back to the northern area. Damage sustained by the TIRPITZ
through British midget submarines is not the cause for
carrying out repairs in the northern area."
Chief, Naval Staff agreed,. Instructions to this effect will
be sent by order 1/Skl I op 28785A3 Gkdos. Copy in War
Diary, Pafct C, V 1. Ha.
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. -I96-
CONFIDEN TIAL
lh Oct 19^3
A recommendation that slight damage be admitted to the Naval
Attaches of foreign navies was not approved by Chief, Naval
Staff since the British certainly know nothing definite and
are simply beating about the bush with Mil their assertions
so far,
b, Commanding General, Armed Forces, South has advised
Naval Staff, for information, of the request from Armed Forces
High Command, Operations Division to the effect that at least
one operational minelayer from the area of Group South be
assigned at once to German Naval Command, Italy for tasks on
the west Adriatic coast. Futther more, that the shipping,
including escort vessels, required on the same coast for
supplies of up to 600 tons daily be left with German Naval
Command, Italy and not be transferred to Group South.
IV. Chief, Naval Ordnance Division reports that a request has
been sent to the Ministry of Armament and Ammunition to place
the 15,000 tQns of iron seized for the Navy in Italy at the
disposal of Commander in Chief, Navy, so that this quantity
does not go entirely to shipbuilding. Commander in Chief,
Navy is not yet certain whether the entire quantity will be
seized for the Navy, as difficulties may have to be expected
during collection in Italy.
In a Highly Restricted Circle ;
V . Chief,, Operations Branch., Operations Division s
The request of Group South regarding submarine operations in
the Aegean is approved in principle by Naval Staff. It is
proposed that Conmander, Submarines, Mediterranean by instructed
to transfer a submarine to the Aegean Sea. %
Chief, Naval Staff agreed.
VI. Quartermaster General reports that six war transports
built in the Black Sea have already been fitted-up and comm-
issioned as submarine chasers.. Another eight are still under
construction. The Navy also cannot do without these eight
vessels as submarine chasers* It is, therefore, impossible
to hand over to the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping
these constructions, or iron for eight other constructions
from the Navy quota.
Chief, Naval Staff agreed,
VII. A meeting took place on 13 Oct at the office of Commander
in Chief, Navy with the Chariman of the Main Committee for
Shipbuilding, Director Merker ; Chief Naval (Ship) construction
Division participated. For notes on this meeting as per
OKM k. Stb 2812/Gkdos see War'- Diary, Part B, Vol. V.
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Ik Oct. 19^3
Special It ems
I. Armed-Forces High Command, Operations Staff has. requested
Commander in Chief, Navy, Commander j_ n chief, Air Force and
Commanding General, Armed Forces, South and Army Group B to
report the number of purely Italian formations which already
exist, subdivided as to categories, and which might later be
taken over intact into the Italian Armed Forces.
Armed Forces High Command futhermore advises that no change
in the boundary between Army Groups B and F is planned and th
that the area from Fiume to Susak will remain an operational
area in its previous form*
Both of these matters will be dealt with further by Quartermaster
Division, Organization and Mobilization Branch,
II. Chief, Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command has
issued the following instructions to Army General Staff,
Ari Focre, Operations Staff and Naval Staffs
"In the interest of authenticity of Armed Forces reports and
of military communiques it is imperative that the Branches of.,
the Armed Forces release for publication even reports which
are unfavorable for us. Experience has shown that rumors of
such events circulate through large sections of the pouplation,
assisted by enemy propaganda^ and are only enchanced by our .
silence. Reports can and should be made public when 'circum-- '••••'
stances make it certain that the enemy. has full knowledge of
the events. Anyhow the Fuehrer will decide in each individual
case whether and in what form unfavorable news is to be
made public.
However, for this it is necessary that such news be submitted
at least in draft and in the desired form and not be hushed
up altogether."
III. Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff on 13 Oct.
established the new tasks of the German Armistice Commission.
Copy of order as per 1/Skl 29030A3 Gkdos.. in- .War Diary, Part
3, Vol. V.
IV. Naval Intelligence Division has issued in "Evaluation of
Intelligence on Foreign 'Navies" statements about fast new
submarines of the U. S. Navy. The information concerns
twelve submarines of the TAMBOR class of l $ h75 tons, launched
from 1939 to 19^1, which are said to have a surface speed
of 21 knots. The submerged speed is unfortunately unknown.
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l*t Oct, 19J+3
COHFIDENTIAL
The constructional form above the waterline is striking in
that, when the bow is seen from a great distance, it may lead
to confusion with destroyers, escort vessels or submarine
chasers. The new CATO class of 72 submarines, launched
19^1/19^2 and having a displacement of 1,525 tons, shows only
slight variations. Of this class another 120 boats are said
to have been ordered _. Attempts are being made to shorten the
time required for construction to nine months. Naval
Intelligence Division also reports in "Brief Intelligence on
the Enemy Situation" No. 20 A3 on: the joint declaration made
by Churchill and Roosevelt; a statement by the Secretary of the
Navy with regard to submarine warfare; new German torpedoes;
the attack by British midget submarines; British and Greek
shipping losses; the strength of the U.S e Fleet on 1 Oct., etc.
For copy of brief report as per 1/Skl 3 1379 A3 goh* S ^ G War
Diary, Part D, "Data on the Enemy Situation".
V. A summary of enemy intelligence gained by radio decipher-
ing and radio intelligence from *+ to 10 Oct. is contained in
Radio Monitoring Report No, L t-lA3 of ^hief , Naval Communications
Division. No special comments are necessary.
Situation A Oct .
I . War in Foreign Waters
1. Enemy Situation:
Radio deciphering now shows that the U.S. Commanding
Admiral, Pacific requested "Nortra"on 23 .iug. to report by
radiogram whether three of his whaling ships were at approxim-
ately 21° 30 * S 70° 20 T on 27 Aug. On 20 Sept. "Nortra"
received a further radiogram from the same command .
-.ir transfers over the North Atlantic decreased in August 5
378 planes vere dste-ctod on flights to England and 126 on
return flights to the west; 8*f planes flew from Brazil to
Africia to England and 172 in the other direction.
All vessels in foreign waters were advised of the enemy situa-
tion by Radiogram lbl3.
2.. - Own Situation :
The Naval Attache in Tokyo reported at 0810 (received
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l*f Oct. 19^3 . ; .:.
at 1639) :
"Ship "28" reports; Position largo grid square OD 69. Rende,zvou;
arranged."
Contrary to our estimation, therefore, arrival of the auxiliary
cruiser at Yokohama is to be expected already on 17/13 Oct. A
fuller report as to why the operation was cut short- is to be
awaited Instructions given by Naval Staff on 13 Oct. are
anyway < superseded.
The Naval Attache in Tokyo also reported;
"1. The TANNE left Kure for Singapore on 13 Oct.; plans
to leave Penang on 12 .Nov. at twelve knots for position
"Tannenwald" , where she will arrive about 20 Nov.
2. The BOGOTA leaves Singapore on 9 Nov. through the
Sunda Strait for position "Tannenwald" via point "D" .
3. The KIEFER will leave Japan for Singapore probably
on 5 Nov." •
Operations Division has drawn up sailing orders for the block-
ade runners TANNENFELS, DRESDEN, ELS A ES3BERGER, OSTFRIESLAND ,
HIMALAYA, PIETRO ORSEDLO and FUJIYAMA and sent the orders to
Group West or the Naval Office at Bordeaux for temporary
delivery to the captains of the vessels. Copy of order
1/Skl I k 2761 A3 Gkdos. Chefs, in War Diary, Part C, Vol,
The ships are to carry goods to Japan. They will be ready
to put out from the end of October or end of November.
Permission to depart will be ordered separately by Naval
Staff.
Group Wes t , which will control their passage as far as
30 IaT. , will , fix the exact dates for departure.
II. Situation West Area
1, Enemy Situation ;
No reports have been received on air operations over the
Bay of Biscay. OneeBritish vessel was located at 20l7 200
miles southwest of Rockall Bank and one around midnight on
1*+ Oct, 3^0 miles southwest of this Bank. Our air reconnai-
CGNFIDSNTIAL
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lh Oct, 19V3.
saance sighted at 1035 in CF3121 (*+00 miles west of Cape Ortegal)
a southbound convoy of 60 merchantmen with 1 cruiser and 12 .
escort vessels.
i,
2. Own Situation
: Atlantic Coast ;
The 8th Destroyer' Flotilla (destroyers Z "23", Z "2V',.
Z "32", Z "37") with torpedo boat T »lV ! , the FaLKE and the
KONDOR left Royan at 0800 for torpedo firing exercises in the
southern paet of the Bay of Biscay. The route from Brest to
the Bay of Biscay ("Liebesbank" ) has been closed because of
mining. Four ELM/J mines were swept off St.. Nazaire and one
off Lorient, Six submarine chaser are on patrol on route
"Liebeslaube" . One submarine was escorted from Royan to
La Pallice.
Channel Coast :
It is planned to transfer three boats of the 5th PT Boat
Flotilla from Dieppe to Boulogne during the night of lVOct.
Patrol positions in the Channel were not taken up because of
bright moonlight, ; . ■
Otherwise nothing special to report,,
III . North Sea, Norway. Northern Waters
North Sea s
North of Terschelling, northwest of Borkum and southwest
of Helder altogether five ground mines were swept in front of
convoy uL i-63" on 13 Oct. Between lM+5 and 1523 an enemy for-
mation of about 30 planes flew to 150 km. north of Terschelling
on easterly course, later oh southerly course t& 70 km., north
of Borkum and from -there to the west.
The steamer RIEGEL was refloated from Rotensand.
Norway . Northern Waters
1 . Enemy Situation: ■ •'•- •
Over the North Sea 26 planes werede.tected on operation.
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lh Oct 19V3
Our air reconnaissance over the area of the Faroe Islands and
of Jan Mayan was without tactical result,,
On 12 and 13 Oct, single reconnaissance planes were sighted in
the areas of Vardoe, Banak, Stavanger and Utsire One Airacobra
was shot down off Vardoe « Boats of the 30th M.T e B. Flotilla
were at sea west of Stavanger during the night of 1*+ Oct.,
according to radio intelligence.
2 » Own Situation ..
PT boat chase north of Stavanger was carried out without
success on 13 0ct o
The steamer AMMERLAND , lost on 12 Oct„ near Nordkyn, was probably
sunk by a torpedo 'hit according to observations of the escorting
BV 138.
Naval Command, Norway reports, with reference to the air attack
on our eastbound convoy on .13 Oct. off Vardoe;
"Our eastbound convoy, consisting of 5 steamers, h tankers and
16 escort vessels, was attacked in AC 3*+33 at' 1255 on 13 Oct.
by about 10 IL 2 r s which approached at a low altitude. They
dropped bombs and fired their machine-guns, A light hit was
scored on the bow of the steamer ALSTERDAM, There were some
casualties through gunfire. Two planes were shot down by an
escort vessel, At 130^ there was a high-altitude attack.
Three torpedoes were dropped by parachute from an altitude of
2,000 m. After hitting the water the torpedoes ran on the
surface with alternating courses. Bombs were also dropped;
no damage to the convoy There was subsequently an attack
by three- Bostons which approached at a low level and dropped
two torpedoes, one detonated in the middle of. the convoy
and the second sank down. The torepdoes were dropped from
a height of 15" m. and a distance of 2,000 m. Two planes
were shot down by an escort vessel Two men were wounded."
Commander in Chief, Air Force Operations Staff replied as
follows to the inquiry from Naval Staff see War Diary 7 Oct.):
"1. Further reconnaissance and fighter formations for the 5th
Air Force are impossible at present.
2. The 5th Air Force is investigating possibilities of a
transfer of fighter forces from the area of Northern
Finland to central Norway in order to strenghten convoy
escort in this area when the Arctic nights begin.
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1*+ Oct. 19V3
3« The air fuel situation will be settled independently of
this." . .-•-.-
IV. Skagerrak. Baltic Sea Entrances. Baltic Sea
:■ 1. Enemy Situation ;
At 0022 minesweeper M "30" was unsuccessfully attacked by
a submarine south of Tyters (surface runner). Depth charges
were dropped. The submarine was not located.
In Kronstadt Bay there was minor gunfire. Slight traffic con-
sisting of tugs and guardboats was observed,
2. Own Situation:
The patrol position in the ^kagerrak against blockade-
runners was occupied by four boats. At 1830 on 13 Oct. a
patrol boat in the Sound captured a Danish motor fishing .
vessel with three Danish officers and three civilians who were
trying to escape, A Swedish bomber, which flew over one of
our patrol boats in the Sound, was fired on. In the Baltic Sea
entrances 27 vessels were out sweeping channels. In the Samsoe
Belt one mine was detonated. At 2120 on 13 Oct. the escort
vessel TELDE of the Aalborg-Oslo unit struck a mine in Aalborg
at a position which had been passed over 22 times since
the last enemy flight.
On the morning o.f 1*+ u ct, mine-exploding vessel "131" of the
Oslo-Aarhus convoy detonated two mere mines south of Anholt*
Naval Command, Baltic draws attention to the danger of mines
on route "38" because of the shallow water depth and the almost
continuous crosscurrent. Escort vessel BATAVlA'.XlI was lost
in 19^2 on the same route, Naval Command, Baltic recommends
that convoys, from Aalborg to Oslo and vice versa be suspended
at once and a transport service from Frederikshavn to Frederi-
kstad l3e inaugurated instead with' fast single vessels. Until
this is done it is suggested that convoy traffic from
•aalborg to Oslo be transferred to the Aarhus-Oslo route.
On 9' Oct. a torpedo recovery boat of the Air Force sank after
striking a mine outside the swept area off Gdynia. On. the
afternoon of 13 Oct. a mine detonated north of Gdynia roads
300 m, from a steamer. The firing area in the Putzieger Wik
has been closed owing to suspicion of mines.
Convoy and transport traffic in the entire area of Naval
Command, Baltic was otherwise carried out without incident,
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1*+ Oct. 19^3
Naval Command, Baltic submits the following reports;
I . From Commander , Minesweepers, Bal t ic;
"li The Russians are taking advantage 'of any possible
weather conditions to s\\reep the "S.eeigel" barrage.
2. It is deduced from press reports that the enemy plans
to push forward south of Veliki Luki in a northwesterly direction
towards Riga, He is therefore preparing mine-free routes now
as far as possible, so that he can then land .troops at once in
large numbers on the Estonian coast west of Hungerburg, This
would make the situation for the northern flank of the eastern
front particularly difficult. It is requested that Commander,
Minesweepers, Baltic and Admiral, Baltic States be kept informed
continuously on the course of the fighting, so that counter-
measures can be prepared in good time should -the situation
become-more tense. In this case it is planned to reinforce
"Seeigel" barrage 6 A and 7 A as far as Kiskolku Riff with
cutting floats and mines with snagline,"
Naval Command, Baltic approves this plan.,
II. From Admiral, Baltic States ; "
Z "According to advice received from the 18th Army Command,
a large-scale attack from the Leningrad area is to be expected
soon against the Pushkin sector as. far as the coast." Railway
Battery "Biuecher" will, therefore, be withdrawn during the
night of 1m- Oct. in agreement with the 13th Army Command.
This Battery is restricted to the railroad route near the
front. The 13th Army Command .plans to use it near Krasnoye
Selo« Since sea targets cannot be shelled from this position
Admiral, Baltic States will try to have the 13th Army
Command, set up the Battery elsewhere. The outcome will be
reported."
V. Submarine Warfare
I. Enemy Situation ;
The Polish Admiralty has announced the loss of the
destroyer ORKaN, according to Reuter. The destroyer was
sunk while escorting a convoy which was destined for Russia
(presumably via Basra) and was crossing the Atlantic.
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Ih Oct. 19^3
2 Own Situation ;
Submarines U ,,L f-55 n and U "631" collided in the North
Atlantic in xik 5255. 30th submarines sustained damage.. Two
meeting points for stragglers of the awaited convoy ONS 20 have
become known through radio intelligence. A rendezvous in Al
2955 on course 290° has been intercepted for 1300 on 15 Oct.
The convoy has obviously been delayed by the continuously heavy
westerly winds.
Commander in Chief, Air Firce, Operations Staff advises Naval
Staff, in reply to the request of 5 Oct. (see War Diary 5 Oct.)
regarding the use of BV 222' s in the Atlantic, that it is
planned to use these planes, as long as the air situation
permits, even after assignment of the 5th Long-Range Reconnai-
ssance Group (Ju 290 , s)| further expansion of the ground
organization at Biscarosse is impossible at present owing to
lack of workers. Therefore until further notice not more than
two flying boats can be out on operation at the same tim;
ie.
VI o serial Warfare
British Isles and Vicinity : .
No special reports have been received from the west area
on daytime activity. Detection of the convoy in the Atlantic
has been reported under Situation "West Area" .
Shortly after noon a heavy bomber formation of 300 - 350 planes,
with heavy fighter escort as far as Holland, flew into Germany.
The armament works in Schweinfurt were heavily attacked by
about 250 'Fortr esses and were seriously damaged. The main
works, especially the ball bearing plants, are temporarily out '
of action. Traffic installations also were badly damaged. In
all 333 fighters and heavy fighters' of Air Force Command, Center
were sent up and the enemy was engaged. The 3rci Air Force ■
reports *+9 planes on operation but no engagements with the
enemy. According to reports'received up tcrnow, 121 enemy
planes were shot down. Fourteen of our planes were lost and
15 damaged. The enemy only admits the loss of -63 planes in •'•■
all and claims to have shot down 121 German planes. This proves
how unreliable American figures are. In the evening- and
during the night of 1*+ Oct. no important operations took
place.
Mediterranean Theater ;
No bombing operations against naval targets by us in the
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1*+ Oct* 19^3 ;.-'•'
Mediterranean are reported. Reconnaissance was limited to the
Italian area and the Southern. Aegean.. .In the morning the enemy
attacked the station and railroad ' installations in Terni (north-
east of Rome), Three freight cars with ammunition and nine with
heavy bombs exploded. Two of the attacking planes were shot
down. Further attacks were carried out on Grosseto, Orbotello
and Tarquinia. •• ...
In the Aegean, the airfield: of Argos was, attacked. One of our
planes was damaged and one shot down in aerial combat. No
planes were shot down by us.
■ Eastern Front ;
Nothing to report. ...
VII. War fare in the Mediterranea n and_.J31ack Sea
1. Enemy Situation Mediter r anean ; .
Nine freighters and 1 tanker,, all in ballast, put in
to Gibraltar from the Mediterranean* A convoy of 20 freighters
and 3 tankers, left Gibraltar for the. Atlantic,
Our air reconnaissance sighted at 0735 20 miles north of Araeu
1 cruiser, 3 destroyers and 5 fighters on southwesterly -course.
At 0955 6. miles from Cape Tropez a submarine fired on one of
our convoys consisting of 5 barges, 1 naval landing craft and
2 harbor defense boats* The submarine submerged when our
boats returned fire, •■ One bare .sustained slight .damage.
Another' submarine position was reported at 2250 110 miles, west
southwest of Ajaccio, ••':.•< ■ •'.."'
In the Naples area an increase of cruisers and minesweepers
was noted, On the afternoon of 13 Oct, a convoy was observed
putting into the Strait of Otranto. »;•;•'
Radio intelligence intercepted at noon on lA Oct, lively
operational and tactical rac^io traffic in the eastern
Mediterranean* A British vessel, 'presumably the leading, ship
of light naval forces in the Aegean, transmitted a tactical
signal to Alexandria.
The U e S. Navy Department announced that two U.S. destroyers have
sunk as a result of underwater explosion off Salerno and at
another point in the Mediterranean.
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ih Oct, 19V3
2 a Own Situation Mediterranean:
German Naval Command, Italy will transfer to L evico
during the night of I 1 * Oct,
According to a report from German Naval Command, Italy, Command-
ing General, Armed Forces, South has made urgent demands for
closing of the Leghorn Wall over Elba to Nettunia and also for
coastal defense barrages on the east coast of Italy; this is
in addition to immediate mining of Gaeta and the coastal streteche
as far as Nettunia which are vulnerable to landings.
This demand exceeds the program planned. German Naval Command,
Italy has begun the mining of Gaeta, in view of its urgency,
and intends to carry out further operations within the next
few days. Naval Staff is asked to approve this.
3. Area Naval Group South ;
a. Adriatic Sea ;
Enemy, Situation ;
• On 13 Oct. our air reconnaissance sighted a submerging
submarine 30 miles southwest of Zara. An enemy plane dropped
bombs on Durazzo.
Own Situation ;
Traffic from Pola to Fiume is closed. A fuller
report has not yet been received. Departure of the steamer
B0CCACI0 from Durazzo to the south is planned for the evening
of 1^ Oct, Transfer of the Siebel ferries and infantry land-
ing boats from Pola to Zara has been postponed.
The following former Italian naval batteries are reported ready
for action, but are temporarily manned by the Army:
Valona: batteries with three l*+.9 cm. and four 12 cm guns;
Sasseno; battery with six 15.2 cm. guns;.
Durazzo sector; batteries with four 12 cm. and four 7«6 cm guns. .
The 621st Naval Artillery Bate Hi on is manning in Pola two
medium batteries and in Fiume and Trieste one light battery >
each. ."'■"-'
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■ CONFIDENTIAL
Ik Oct. 191+3
According to a report from Admrial, Adriatic the 623rd Naval
xi.rtillery Battalion has arrived at Ljubljana, without the pos-
sibility of further transport*
b« Aege an Sea;
Enemy Situ ation;
On 13 Oct. a single reconnaissance plane was sighted
in the southern. Aegean. At noon three planes dropped bombs
on Gavdos
During the night of 13 Oct. leaflets were dropped on Kalymnos
stating that the British would land on 16 Oct.
During ; the night of 13 Oct.. between 2250 and 00 50 two destroyers
were' repeatedly sighred in the area cf Kos, The radar station
at Scarpanto located between 0220 and 03*+0 about 25 miles east
of Scarpanto tow shipping targets on' southeasterly course. On
the evening of ih Oct. several units were again operating in
the area between Kos and Kalymnos as well as off the island
of Nisyros south .of, Kos,
The following were sighted;
At 2230 two naval .vessels four miles south of Nisyros and
At 2250 two destroyers south of Kalymnos on northeasterly
.= course^
At 23^0 submarine chaser "2101" reported an engagement
■ • with two enemy PT boats, presumably 'off Kalymnos
roads „
: ■" Shortley after midnight on 1*+ Oct. two destroyers
' shelled Kos .;
At 0955 an attack was carried out by 76 planes on the airfield
of Argos. Most „of the bombs fell on. the town and some' on the
runway. Heavy damage was caused to buildings in. the town.
Seven Germans were killed..
Own Situation ;
The steamer MARGUERITA of the convoy from .Vrgostoli to
Patras sank at 21^0 on 13 Oct. 30 miles west of Patras,
apparently through striking a mine. Five German soldiers
are missing. Of the 900 Italian prisoners aboard 350 were
rescued. The steamer TARQUINIA (7^3 GRT( caught fire in the
harbor of Argostoli and was beached. The origin of the
fire is unknown. Most of the crew was rescued.
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1*+ Oct. 19^3
, The tanker KNUDSEN with 2,000 prisoners aboard and
submarine chaser "2105" dropped anchor off Leucas at 0630 on
1*+ Oct. Further passage to Patras is planned for the evening.
The hospital ship GRADISd is to leave Patras at 0^00 on 15 Oct,
for the exchange of wounded. The ship will be escorted by a
coast patrol boat as far as eight miles southwest of Argostoli.
In connection with operation "Leopopard" the convoy of the
steamers KARI and TRARaNI, carrying German troops and escorted
by two submarine chasers and one motor minesweeper, left
Piraeus for Kos at 1550. The convoy of the INGEBORG will
follow 2h hours later „ The steamer GERDa TOFT, with German
troops aboard, coming from Patras dropped anchor off
I stria in the morning.
Admrial, Aegean reported on 13 Oct. to Group South as follows:
"Experiences of the last few weeks in the operational use of
freighters as troop transports reveal continuous difficulties
between the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping, the
Mediterranean shipping office and my demands. The civilian
office is naturally not in a position to know the requirements
and plans of the operational command. It therefore manages
shipping as it thinks fit, which is quite out of proportion
under present conditions.
as Commanding Admrial I am there fore restricted in may
freedom of action in my very own sphere, i,e. in the use of
all shipping. At the present moment I must regard all trans-
ports as naval war materiel. T ese conditions cannot be . i-
allowed to continue, especially as operations are being
intensified. They are caused, however, by the financial
basis of the Mediterranean shipping office, which has to
cover the costs of its organization from freight charges in
free traffic. It is therefore imperative- for the future that
the Commanding Admiral, Naval Forces have transports at his
disposal to a greater extent."
Gdoup South transmits this report to Naval 'Staff and the Reich
Commissioner of Maritime Shipping with the comment that the
Group is of the same opinion and, in view of the present
naval situation and the operational tasks assigned to the
Navy, considers it essential to give Admiral., Aegean the
right to decide on the use of all available shipping in '. the
Aegean Sea until futher notice. Group South has ordered
this as a command ruling. ;.:'. '........
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1*+ Oct 19^3
c. Black Sea ;
Convoys have not yet been resumed because bad weather
continues o ... •■
Patrol lines have not been taken up. . . :
VIII. Situation East A.sia
Nothing to report.
4 ^-^ yW *A^ "Jr* K A* ^L* ^* ^A* ^^ ^^ sj^ N^ jj^ -*J-i" ^*- ^L* *X* sLf <J-J X^ *X* ^L* *J> J<
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15 Oct. 191+3 '
I tens of Political Importance
Tho article . in "Pravda" on the Moscow Conference (see War Diary
1*+ Oct,) has caused a considerable stir in Anglo-American
circles, as was to be expected. "United Press" reports on the
general opinion, with the comment that the points for discussion
between the three parties at the Conference were not ciearecb
up without some trouble.
It can be assumed that England would not have sent her Foreign
Minister or political advisers to Moscow had the Russian
Government been unwilling to discuss political matters.
Attention is also drawn in London to Churchill f s statement
according to which no subject was to be excluded from the
Conference.
Conference on the Situation with Chief. Naval Staff
A , Report by Naval (Ship) Construction Division on the cond-
ition of the TIRPITZ
.1 survey report on the first tubines has been received
from Vice Admiral Stiegels it appears that repairs can be
carried out on the spot despite rather serious damage. Damage
of a constructional nature and to armament can also be
repaired aboard. Naval (Ship) Construction Division
estimates that entire repairs will take four months.
This, of course, makes necessary the transfer to Kaafjord of
quite a number of auxiliary vessels (two repair ships, power
and heat ships, diving tenders, caissons and small vessels).
Accommodation for tho 600 workers to be assigned from home
ports presents the most difficult task and is planned en the
very large passenger steamer STAVANGEHFJOED-.
Commander in Chief, Navy decides that all possible measures
must be taken to protect this large assembly of ships from
the enemy attacks which are to be expected. In particular the
workers must be accommodated on shore and aboard the TIRPITZ
in place of the crew, part of which is on leave, in order to
spare the large and very conspicuous passenger steamer. He
orders Quartermaster Division to make the necessary arrangments
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15 Oct. 19^3
B. Situation;
I . Army Situation :
During the heavy defensive battle, which reveals several
points of concentration, our lines in the sector of Zaporozhe
were penetrated. It may be impossible to hold the bridgehead.
II . Q uartermaster General reports on the command ruling of
Group South regarding rights over merchant shipping in the
J^egean Sea by Admiral, Aegean, as per report in War Diary ih
Oct. Objections have already been raised by the Reich Comm-
issioner of Maritime Shipping. It is suggested for the time
being that Admiral, Aegean be asked to state concrete cases of
inappropriate control by the Reich Commissioner of Maritime :.'•
Shipping.
Chief, Naval Staff agrees.
In a Highly Restricted Circle ;
III. Chief. Operations Branch. qOperations Division ;
a. The Military Attache at Bangkok reported on 8 Oct.:
The Japanese Command is actually making preparations for
defense against the enemy outflanking operation against Burma,
but expects that this operation will only be on a small scale.
It will be impossible for the Japanese to attain air superiority
since only about 1,000 planes can be made available for this
sector. Lack of shipping hampers the dispatch of troops.
b. The exchange of German and British seriously wounded
started today with the departure of the hospital ships
.provided. For details see War Diary, Part C, Vol, VIII..
Special Items
I. The telegrams exchanged between the Emperor of Japan and
the Fuehrer -on the occasion of the presentation of the two
German submarines, are to be found, as per 1/Skl. 27263 A3 Gkdos.
in War Diary, Part 3, Vol. V.
II. According to an intelligence report, based on information
from the British Ministry of Transport and shipping circles,
the Allies will have sufficient shipping available by the end
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15 Oct. 19^3
end of 19*+3 to transport 6-7 divisions without having to
resort to traffic engaged elsewhere; this is due to present
favorable conditions in the war against merchant shipping and
the present shipbuilding situation in Great Britain.
Sufficient shipping for 12 - lh divisions will be available in
spring 19^+, if present developments contineu* Only for a
large-scale offensive in the west will it be necessary to make
still further large provisions of shipping.
This report is under investigation by Naval Intelligence
Division.
III. Lt. Cdr. Becker has made a report on the interviews which
Captain Grossi and Commander Borghese had with the Duce, Marshal
Graziani and Admiral Legnani. For copy of report see War Diary,
Part C, Vol c XIV.
Situation 15 Oct .
1 . War in Foreign Waters
1. Enemy S i t uati on :
: Nothing to report o
2. Own Situation : •
By radiogram 1105 Naval Staff confirms to ^hip "23" the
report on her position, transmittedby the Naval attache in
Tokyo as being in 0D 69, and adds that Radiogram 2309 of
13 Oct.. is superseded by this message.
By Radiogram 2318 the following instructions are dispatched to
Ship "28" and the Naval Attache in Tokyo:
"1. Contrary to the views expressed in Radiogram 2258 of 15
Sept., Naval Staff presumed that Ship "28" might remain
longer in the operational' area, ' since "the requested report of
arrival was not received. Therefore a new assessment of the
situation was dispatehed on 13 Oct. by Radiogram 2309.
2. Should there be any difficulties with the Japanese
■about the delay .in reporting the return of Ship "23", you
are to assert that fuel shortage forced her to return and
that the report on this from Ship "28" was not heard."
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15 Oct. 19^3
The Naval Attache in Tokyo reports that the waiting areas for
the BOGOTA became known to the commanders of the AQUILLA sub-
marines in discussions regarding intermediate supplies. As
these waiting areas are the same as for supplies to combat
submarines, disclosure is to be assumed. A change will, there-
fore, be necessary after all,
II. Situation West Area
1. En emy Situation:
I , II - ■!.! ■■■ .. — " I T» Ml , 1 I II I IJ I I
Over the Bay of Biscay V6 planes were detected on operation,
One British vessel was located h-5 miles south of Rockall Bank,
one 120 miles southeast of Rockall Bank, one 350 miles west-
southwest of Brest and one 270 miles west of Rockall 3 ank.
2. Own Situation :
Atlantic Coast :
Exercises by the 8th Destroyer Flotilla with three torpedo
boats have been carried out as planned. The destroyers are
putting into the Gironde and the torpedo boats into La-
Pallice,
One ELM/J mine was swept off Lorient, one northwest of La-
Pallice and one south of Archacon. Six submarines were
escorted out and two in.
The Sth Destroyer Flotilla has submitted its report on the
torpedo firing exercises , For copy see teletype 1950. It is
especially noteworthy that a light gray paint over the entire
boat has again proved superior to a camouflage paint of
alternating colors „ Smoke sceens again did not afford
sufficient protection.
Channel Coast :
Patrol positions were not taken up. Three boats of the
5th PT Boat Flotilla were transferred from Dieppe to Boulogne
as planned. Two of the boats continued their passage to
Le Havre, where they arrived at 2230.
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15 Oct. 019^3 ,
III . North Sea, Norway, Nort hern Waters
North Sea;
Convoy "h6h" Elbe - Hook, consisting of two steamers and
three escort boats, left at ' 1^+00 „-
Mine escort operations were partly hampered by fog.
Otherwise nothing to report.
Norway, Northern Waters ;
1. Enemy Situation:
Over the North Sea ^3 planes were detected on operation,
presumably flying in the direction of the north Norwegian coast .
Our air reconnaissance sighted at 1020 20 miles northeast of
the Faroes (AE 9615) 1 aircraft carrier, 3 cruisers and 2
destroyers on course 2 l f0° e Group North/pleet presumes that an
operation against our shipping was broken off owing to the
weather. Air reconnaissance has been out again*
According to a report from the reconnaissance plane, the group
was again located by radar at 1650 in AE 9869, No observations
were possible owing to showers. The plane was fired on by
light anti-aircraft guns.
2. O wn Situatio n;
At 0710 on 13 Oct. an. enemy submarine unsuccessfully
attacked one of our convoys between Bas Fjord and Sylte Fjord.
At 13^0 on ih Oct. an incoming Petsamo convoy was unsuccessfully
shelled with 62 rounds by a battery on the Ribachi Peninsula,
Naval Command, Norway reports that, in view of the submarine
danger close to our prescribed channels off Vardoe, it is
planned to lay two deep LMB barrages there across the ship-
ping route, which barrages will be passed over by our ships.
Naval Command, Norway plans to draw enemy submarines on to
this barrage during attack and mine-laying and requests
approval of this plan and provision of the mines. For
situation of the barrage see teletype 1.600.
Naval Staff has decided as follows:
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15 Oct. 19^3
"1. Reliable clearance of mined areas is not achieved, as
is shown by the loss of the steamer AMMERLAND and the sweeping
of three more mines five weeks after the enemy minelaying off
Nordkyn was ascertained.
2. Deep barrages on the route prevent effective mine-
sweeping and anti-mine escort against the remains of old
minelaying and new minelaying expected at this point by Naval
C ommand , Norway .
3. If no time setting has been ascertained, the minelaying
must be regarded as a protection against operations by enemy
submarines in the same area for about a year.
h. Deep flanking barrages will prevent enemy submarine
operations against our convoys only if laid not too far away.
Comments on Route "Gruen", which is urged by Coast Patrol
Unit, Arctic Coast, are still awaited."
Thirty ships were escorted north and 22 south. In all 18 ships
were delayed owing to shortage of escorts,
Group North/Fleet transmits views of the 5th Air Force on a
request made by it on 3 Oct. regarding air reconnaissance. The
5th Air Force agrees with the opinion of the Group but is
unable to carry out the required reconnaissance because of the
order to save aviation fuel. A concentration of fighter forces
in Bodoe does not offer any adequate defense for prevention of
attacks. Heavy long-range fighter planes would be required
but such are not available at present, since every one is being
used for home defense. The 5 th Air Force has suggested that
in this area also single ships be assembled into convoys,
so as to strengthen defense. Group North/Fleet again requests
Naval Staff to prevail upon Air Force, Operations Staff to ease
fuel restrictions. It assumes that Naval Command, Norway
will take over responsibility for the request regarding air
escort for convoys and will inform the 5th Air Force that
in this particular case it was not single ships that were
involved but a convoy of four vessels.
Naval Staff cannot do anything further in this matter, since
Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff has already
replied in the negative to the request made by N a val Staff on
7 Oct. A separate investigation of the fuel question is
promised. Group North has been advised of the views of
Commander in Chief, Air Force.
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15 Oct. 19V3 ;;
IV. Skagerrak. Baltic Sea Entrances. Baltic Sea
1, Enemy Situation;
During the night of 13 Oct, three PT boats were sighted
17 miles southeast of Helsinki, On 15 Oct. there was a
minesweeping group of 27 vessels off Vigrund.
2. Own Situation :
In the Samsoe Belt one ground mine was swept. The NIELS
JUEL arrived at Kiel on the afternoon of 1*+ Oct.
Otherwise nothing to report.
V. ■ Submarine Warfare
In the North Atlantic a convoy, consisting of more than
30 steamers, was detected at 21^+0 by submarine U"3¥+" in AL
1822. This is presumably the expected westbound convoy. Th
submarine lost contact after being dept-charged for three
hours. Group "Schlieff en"'' has been ordered to move at mid-
night on 16 Oct. 120 miles further north, since the position
detected lies about 30 miles north of the ONS route.
Otherwise nothing to report.
VI . Aerial Warfare
British Isles and Vicinity :
The 3rd. Air Force had *+3 planes out on operation over the
west area and 13 over the Mediterranean.
A convoy of 12 steamers and h escorts was detected at 1025 off
Start Point on easterly course. At 1300 the unit was again
reported, consisting of 20-30 steamers.
Air Commander, Atlantic Coast plans armed reconnaissance on
16 Oct. against the convoy preceeding towards Lisbon and
radar reconnaissance against a northbound convoy southwest of
the Portuguese coast.
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15 Oct. 19V3
During the day two enemy formations flew into Air Force area,
Holland, but did not attack. Fighter formations which flew in-
to western France also carried out no attacks. Only in
northern France did single planes attack a transformer plant
south of Boulogne. In the evening nine of our bombers started
out against London and one plane each against Southend and
Harwich.
Only very small enemy air formations were on operation over the
Norwegian and Dutch coasts and over Poland; also from the south
into the area of Prague via Klagenfurt. The flights to Poland
and to Prague were presumably made for landing agents.
Mediterranean Theater:
No bomber operations were carried out by the 2nd Air
5 Command, Southeast. Ii
only reconnaissance was flown,
Force Command, Southeast. In the Italian and Greek areas
Enemy air activity was lively over the Italian front. Army
anti-aircraft guns reported one plane shot down,
During daylight attacks on the airfields of Sedes and Maga
(Salonika) four of our planes were destroyed and nine heavily
damaged. Our defense measures were unsuccessful. During
the night of 15 Oct, 50 high-explosive bombs were dropped on
the airfield of Maritza (Rhodes). No report on damage has
been receivedyet.
From Italy harassing raids on Tarquinia and Chiampino were
reported.
Eastern Front ;
Over the Army front 50 enemy planes were shot down on
1*+ Oct, The *+th Air Force carried out photographic reconnaissance
over ports in the northern part of the Black Sea..
Reconnaissance evaluations of the 5th Air Force in the North
Sea have already been dealt with under "Enemy Situation Norway' 1 „
VII . Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea
1, Enemy Situation Mediterranean;
No reconnaissance reports have been received from the
Gibraltar area or from the Western and Eastern Mediterranean.
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15 Oct. 19V3 — ~~~
One submarine was sighted off Toulon and one in the Elba Strait.
There were two futher submarines at 1900 30 miles southwest
of Cannes. No shipping movements were observed in Gaeta Bay*
2 . O wn Situation Mediterranean 1
During the night of Ik Oct. specially armed Siebel fer -
ries three times had engagements with enemy motor gunboats in
the Piombino Strait. Shore Battery "Elba" took some part in
the .engagement. One enemy boat' was sunk .and another set on
fire.. One of our. Siebel ferries caught fire and sank after
return to port. Six men were killed and eleven are missing.
Demolitions in the port of Gaeta were continued. The coastal
routes from Spezia to Leghorn were checked, since mines were
suspected after a mine barrage was located by echo-ranging eleven
miles southeast of Spezia running across the coastal route.
German Naval .Command, Italy reports in connection with the order
received from Quartermaster Division to prepare for transfer
of motor minesweepers R "190" and R "191" from Genoa to' the
Adriatic via Placenca, that transport is impossible at
present since the bridge at Genoa is blown up and investigation
of the waterway of the Po River is not yet concluded .
The hospital ship AQUILIA left Spezia at 1900 for Oran.
With regard to the request made by Commanding General, Armed
Forces, South (see War Diary 13 Oct.), Armed Forces High Command,
Operations Staff has decided as follows, in accordance with
the advice from Naval Staff %
The Navy has o take the requirements of all parties concerned
into consideration when distributing the vessels.
Re 1) The shortage -of minelayers in the Aegean Sea and the
risk involved prohibits withdrawal of a minelayer from the
Aegean. High Command, Navy has placed the Italian torpedo
boat AUDACS at the disposal of German Naval Command, Italy
for this purpose in the West Adriatic.
Re 2) It is planned to assign to German Naval Command, Italy
one third of all naval landing craft becoming available,
up to ten, and $0% of Siebel ferries, also- 'up to ten. ' Further-
more, the formation of harbor defense flotillas has been
ordered. •- - ' ■■•- -
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15 Oct. 19^3
The measures taken will require some time to come into effect;
until then coastal traffic must be carried on provisionally
with the vessels in operation."
3. Area Naval Group South :
a. Adriatic .Sea :
Durazzo reports three minesweepers ready for operation.
The steamer OLYMPIA left Trieste for Durazzo. The steamers
ITALIA and ARGENTINIA are to proceed in the evening in convoy
from Trieste to Durazzo via Pola and Zara, Five Siebel
ferries and five infantry landing boats left Pola for Zara.
The steamer H. FISSER sustained only slight damage and is -to
bring the rest of her cargo of provisions to Zara. The Italian
torpedo boat MISSORI supported the advance of the Army from :
the sea east of Fiume, passed through the _ Moral acco Channel and
carried out reconnaissance of the area around Veglia, She
was fired on several times by the enemy. Her crew suffered •
slgiht casualties and, in spite of its willingness, proved
inefficient for any serious situation. The boat is lying •
in Trieste out cf war readiness.
b. Aegean Sea :
Enemy Situation :
Our air reconnaissance sighted at 2120 on 1*+ Oct a 90
miles east-southeast of Castello Rosso 2 naval vessels of an
unidentified type on course 300°. According to a sighting
report 1 vessel, presumably a cruiser, and 3 small naval
vessels were lying in Castell Rosso at 1520 oh 15 Oct.
During the day our radio intelligence intercepted lively
air reconnaissance in the Aegean area; our convoys, primarily
landing boats, were reportedseveral times.
The DRaCHE reported at 1216 sighting a submarine off Pezcnda
Bay (Kalymnos). This submarine submerged at 13^0 after
destroying a sailing vessel and withdrew eastward.
A submarine, presumably the same one, shelled Pezonda Bay at
1503 and, after being fired on by a decoy ship, submerged
again at 1630 south of Kalymnos. According to a further
report fron the DRACHE, two destroyers passed westward 10
miles north of Pezonda Bay, one at 1506 and one at 1515.
Shore batteries from Leros shelled the northern point of
Kalymnos at 1610.
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15 Oct. I9V3.
Own Situation ;
The enemy submarine detected south of Kalynrios was
probably sunk by coast patrol boat GA uI f 5" .
Radar Station Scarpanto was fired on by insurgents on the
evening of lV Oct, Mopping-up operations on Naxos continued;
l^f Italians have been transported to Piraeus.
The tanker KNUDSEN put in to Patras from Corfu at noon'.
The convoy of the' KARI and theTRAPANI , on passage' -from Piraeus
to Kos'j, was detected by enemy reconnaissance east of Naxos .in
the morning and turned about at 1325 northeast of Amorgos, as
ordered. A submarine chaser escorting this convoy reported
at 1702 enemy naval forces in sight from a position four
miles southwest of Darusa, Admiral, Aegean plans to have
the convoy proceed on from Naxos to Kos on the morning of
16 Oct. The- convoy of the INGEBORG is to follow 2k hours
later .
The DRaCHE received orders in .the afternoon to break through
northward- to Piraeus, taking advantage of the enemy forces
withdrawing to the west.
Start of operation "Leopard" has been fixed for 17 Oct. at the
earliest.
The hospital ship GRADISCA left Patras at 0515 for Oran.
Convoy traffic in the central and northern Aegean was carried
out as planned. Group South suggests, in connection with the
order received from Operations Division for one -submarine to
be transferred immediately for operations in the Aegean, that
she be put- under the command of Admiral, Aegean. . .
Chief, Naval Staff will be asked for a decision.
Commander, Submarines 5 " Mediterranean reports, in connection
with the same order, that immediate transfer of a submarine is
impossible. ; All submarines in the Eastern Mediterranean are
at present at the dockyard in Pola. U nl +53 M will be ready
on 23 Oct., and is then to carry out a mine laying operation
off Brindisi. U "^-07" will be ready on 21 Oct., and/U "596"
and U "81" probably not until the middle of November.
Commander, Submarines, Mediterranean considers a withdrawal
of submarines from the .Western Mediterranean to be unsuitable.
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15 Oct. 19^3
Group South reports that, owing to disclosure of the order for
closed areas for submarine chase through ransacking of the naval
landing craft in Stampalia, these areas in the Aegean have been
renamed. For particulars see. teletype 1330.
c . Black Sea;
Enemy Situation;
According to photographic reconnaissance the following were
detected on 15 Oct.: at Gelendzhik 12, at Novorossiisk l f
landing boats; at Primorskoye 100 and at Yeisk 75 boats.
Other evaluations are of no great importance.
Between 2025 and 20^+0 the coast at Cape Opuk was shelled
from the sea.
Own Situation
Ship "19" and three armed fishing vessels left Sevastopol
for submarine chase in Eupatoria Bay.
Submarine U "2h" unsuccessfully attacked a coastal vessel off
Suchum with torpedoes.
Convoys on the west coast have been resumed, In order to
relieve congestion at Sevastopol a convoy of ^3 vessels put
out via Ak Mechet for Odessa.
In view of recent losses in naval landing craft and the
difficulty of quickly replacing small vessels in the Aegean,
Naval Staff will ask the Foreign Office to approach Turkey
regarding transfer of naval landing craft from the Black
Sea through the Dardanelles. Naval Staff expects, however,
that this attempt will only be successful if naval landing
craft, to be spedially marked, are finally stripped of their
character as naval vessels and we undertake not to use them
for operational assignments but solely for transportation
purposes on certain routes, with civilian crews, civilian
captains and flying the merchant flag.
Group South and, for information Admiral, Black Sea, are
advised accordingly and the former ordered to cable whether,
under these restricted conditions, a withdrawal of naval
landing craft from the Black Sea will be acceptable there and
if so to report the number.
Return to the Black Sea for use as auxiliary war vessels will
be out of question. Group South is also to report for Naval
Staff's information numbers, state of readiness and operational
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15 Oct. 19^3
CONFIDENTIAL
plans for naval lair'ing craft in the .Black Sea.
VIII. Situation East Asia
According to an Allied report, Rabaul-was attacked on
13 Oct. by strong British air formations.. In this attack
177 Japanese planes are said to have been destroyed, 3
destroyers, 3 merchantmen, V3 small freighters and numerous
harbor vessels sunk and 1 submarine and 3 large supply
ships damaged.
According to a further report, the entire island group of
New Georgia is in the hands of the Allies.
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16 Oct. 19^3
Items of Political Importance
According to a report from "Domei", the Japanese Ambassador
in Lisbon has been instructed to make representations to the
Portuguese Government on the occupation of the Azores by
British troops and their use as a military base. This action
by Portugal, it states, is a violation of her neutrality. .
According to Reuer, Willkie intends to run again for President
in 19^ • He blames the Roosevelt administration for not having
armed in time for the unavoidable war with Japan or Germany
or with both..
Iu Argentian three members of the cabinet,, who had agitated
for a breaking-off of diplomatic relations with the Axis
powers, have resigned under pressure of the military opposition,
Chief, Naval Staff is absent from Berlin for discussions at
Fuehrer Headquarters.
Conference on the Situation with Chief of Staff. Naval Staff
I • Army Situation
On the eastern front hard fighting has broken out
along the entire line. Seven centers of attack are apparent;
1 Melitopol/Zaporozhe,
2. Kremenchug,
3, South of Kiev,
h. South of Gomel,
5»' Orsha,
6, Smolensk and '
7. Veliki Luki/Nevel. ■
Concentration of exceptional numbers of enemy guns caused
heavy losses to our troops at places.
In Italy an offensive has started on the entire Volturno front.
Centers of attack are at Campobasso and in the area of Capua.
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- ... ' - CONFIDENTIAL
16 Oct. 19V3
II. N aval Situation ;
No special conference or decisions
Special Items
I . The Japanese Liaison Officer transmitted the following
report on 16 Oct,:
"The Russian Naval Attache in Stockholm recently paid a visit
to the Japanese Naval Attache in Swed en, in order to introduce
the newly arrived Russian Assistant Naval Attache. The
latter had traveled to Sweden via Vlandivostok, the United
States and England. In the course of the conversation the
Russian repeatedly stressed that it was very fortunate that
friendly relations were being maintained between Russia and
Japan. The Japanese Naval Attache is of opinion that the
emphasis placed on this friendly relationship was not
formal but quite -genuine. .
In reply to the question by the Japanese as to the presumable-
advance of the British and Americans, the Russian replied that
for various reasons it was very probable that the British
would penetrate into the Balkans. In reply to the question
of the Japanese Naval Attache as to whether this undertaking
would not be against Russian interests, the Russian smiled
and did not answer. On the question as to how far the -
Russi3.ns plan to advance on the eastern front, he said that
he was not informed en this matter, since he was an Attache
In Sweden j moreover he seemed to be unwilling to. enter into
a discussion on the situation on the eastern front."
II. 1. Commander in Chief, Navy has ordered that equipment
of submarines with 3.7 c -» anti-aircraft guns be carried out
as a priority measure of submarine warfare. For the present
single 3.7 cm. guns are entailed.
2. The first four submarines are already being re-equippad.
3. ^s soon as the 3.7 cm. guns of the serial production
can be regarded as ready for operational use, which is
expected to be in October 19^3, the submarines will be
equipped with 3*7 cm. anti-aircraft guns as they become
available, in place of the quadruple maching-gun.
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16 Oct. 19V3
*+. Priorit " of equipment:
Submarines in Western France, •'
Operational submarines from home waters,
Submarines in Northern Waters and in the'
Mediterranean,
Newly constructed submarines .
5. The number of guns available is still small,
Production will be speeded up.
Situation 16 Oct .
I . War in Foreign Waters
1. Enemy Situation:
Radiointelligence reveals the following figures regarding
single vessels during the second half of September (first
figure - British, second figure - U.S. ships):
South Atlantic as far as Freetown
West coast of South Africa
East coast of South America
Indian Ocean, Northern part
Indian Ocean, Southern part
East coast of South Africa
Pacific, Southern part
Unidentified area
This survey is incomplete, All vessels in foreign waters
were advised by Radiogram 1813.
2, Own Situation :
The Naval Attache in Tokyo is given the following in-
struction by Radiogram 2130 5
1. Since position "Tannenwald" lies very far to the east,
. Naval Staff suggests that supply should not be carried
' out at position "Tannenwald" but only a meeting and
agreement on a new rendezvous about 3 - *+ days ! run
CONFIDENTIAL
• -226-
11
and
1 1
10
ti
1
he
I!
2h
37
»!
7
6
11
13
5
1!
5
1!
26
h
!!
2
CONFIDENTIAL
16 Oct. 19^3
further west, depending on weather conditions and
traffic.
Give your views.
2. No change in waiting areas and points in the sailing
orders is intended; they remain in force as reference
areas and points. Waiting positions and rendezvous
will be ordered specially according to the situation.
The photostat copies forwarded by the Naval Attache
in Tokyo of the 'War Diary of Ship "28", of the
UCKERMARK and the copy of "Current Doctrine Cruisers
USF 21" are blurred and unreadable. The Naval
Attache in Tokyo has been ordered to submit new
copies when possible.
II. Situation West Area
1. Enemy Situation:
Over the outer part of the Bay of Biscay 37 planes
were detected on operation. One British vessel was loce'ted
180 miles southeast of Cape Farewell (Greenland) .and one 3o0
miles west-northwest of Belfast.
according to an intelligence report received.. via Lisbon, the
following ' ships carrying troops and war materiel put in from
the United States and Canada during the last two weeks of
September : '
. at Plymouth 12
at Cardiff- ' . 70
at Swansea- . . .18
at Liverpool 62
at Middlesbrough .• • .25
at Hull " 35
Since the middle of September no transports- which had arrived
in England have started back to America. Portuguese military
circles assume from this plans for 'invasion on .the western front.
According to a further intelligence '.report,, leading members of
the sabotage organization which' has been discovered in France
and is directed from England have, -upon apprehension, revealed
the code word which is to signal the Anglo-American invasion
in France. It is a message (for context see teletype 1215)
which is to be given out by the British radio in two parts,
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16 Oct. 19^3
CONFIDENTIAL
as a warning and as an executive signal. A further intelligence
report from Toulouse states that 25 Oct. is the date fixed for
the large-scale landing operation on the north coast of France.
Simultaneously acts of sabotage are planned in Germany, amongst
other things an attempt on the life of the Fuehrer. ...
2 • Own Situation :
Atlantic Coast :
Destroyers Z "2h" and Z "23 M left for Pauillac. Five sub-
marines were escorted in»
Three Italian supply ships have been taken over by the Naval
Office in Bordeaux,
Channel Coasts
Patrol positions were not taken up because of bright
moonlight. Group West advises Naval Staff for information
that three boats of the 5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla are to be
temporarily placed under Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West
for combatting enemy
is to be carried out
PT boats in the Channel. The operation
fiuring the coming new-moon period.
Subsequently the boats will be transferred back to the west
coast,
the KONDOR
Commanding /idmrial-, Defenses
West is to transfer
the FALKE and the MO EVE to Le Havre as soon as
possible. Torpedo boat T "lV 1 , which is to go -on to horn-:
waters during the coming new-moon period, will join
Torp
these boats.
;do Boat
Group West expects the first operation by the . 5th
Flotilla to be carried out at the earliest on 21 Oct. from
Le Havre, For copy of relevant order see teletype 2355.
Ill " North Sea. Norway „ Northern Waters
North Sea ;
Our patrol boats at position "Kairo" repulsed an attack
by five enemy PT boats at 0100. ' One PT boat was probably sunk;
no casualties were suffered. For brief report see teletype
19^1 .
Convoys "1183" Hook - Elbe and "h6h" Elbe - Hook 'Were carried
out as planned. So far no incidents have been reported. The
westbound convoy has put in to Helder temporarily.
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16 Oct. 191+3
Norway. Northern Waters :
1. Enemy Situation ;
Over the North Sea 20 enemy planes were detect 3d on
operation.
On 15 °ct, three flights were reported in the Vardoe area and
on 16 Oct. and attack by six planes on the Army coastal battery
in North Fjord..
2. Own Situation;
Thirty ships were escorted north and 18 south. Fifteen
ships were delayed owing to shortage of escorts.
Naval Command, Norway reports the disposition of our forces as
on 15 Oct. For copy as per 1/Skl. 28923A3 Gkdos. see War
Diary, Part C, Vol Ila. ?■ . ;
In connection with the exchange of seriously wounded, the
British hospital ships ATLANTIS and EMPRESS OF .RUSSIA are on
passage to Gothenburg. Positions of both vessels are given
regularly and continuously.
IV. Skagerrak. Baltic Sea Entrances , Baltic Sea
1. Enemy Situati on;
- - - i *i ■ ■ - i - i
North' of Kogland minesweeper M "18" had a brief engagement
at 0153 with three PT boats, which put up a smoke screen and
withdrew to the northeast. At 1200 a gun carrier leaving
Kronstadt Bay was shelled in the channel, so that it was
forced to return after putting up a smoke screen.
2. Own Situation ;
In AhTbaek Bay one mine was swept by a plane. Altogether
33 vessels and 3 planes wer engaged in minesweeping in the
area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses', Baltic.' Transport and
escort operations were carried out as planned. On 15 Oct. one
of our steamers observed mines being dropped by a plane north
of Pristerort. The area has been. closed.
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16 Oct. 19^3
Finnish PT boats have mined the area west of Lavansaari and
laid a barrage south of .Aomeri. Minelaying northwest of
Schepel could not 'be carried out.'.by our coastal: minelaying,'
as the boats were driven off by Bussian patrol vessels. A
naval landing craft is stranded in the harbor of. Tyters.-
The hospital ship METEOR and RUEGEN are leaving .Swinemuende
for Gothenburg for the exchange of seriously wounded,
According to a report from Admiral, Baltic States the. l8th
Army Command has recommended that Battery "Bluectier" be
withdrawn at once in view of the enemy situation. ' As the
track was unwisely blown up by the Army when the Battery
was brought up, return will not be possible until the track
has-been repaired. According to the report of Admiral, Baltic
States (.for. copy see teletype 08 1 +5) the Army postsare rather
strained so that further blunders are expected...
V. Submarine Warfare
Enemy Situation:
According to an intelligence report, there was a convoy
of 9 freighters escorted by 3 destroyers and 7 PT boats at
0600 on 13 Oct* off Casablanca on westerly course. On the sa
same day at 1800 19 freighters, h destroyers and 5 gunboats'
left Casablanca, with air escort, to the southwest.
2. Own Situation ;
The westbound convoy in the North Atlantic was again
detected towards 2000. The shadowing submarine torpedoed a
steamer of 6^000 GRT in AK 3739 but was subsequently driven,
off by a destroyer. The. enemy- was obviously employing
heavy air formations. Four submarines have reported. attacks
by planes. One was sunk.. in a bombing attack." The operation
is being continued. From the Indian Ocean submarine U "168"
reports no targets off Bombay- en 29 and 30 Sept. Six
freight sailing vessels were sunk by gunfire. On 2 Oct. a
freighter of. ^,000 GRT was sunk in MH. 67. . ' '
VI.' Aerial Warfare
British Isles and Vicinity .
Forty-six planes of the 3rd Air Force, were out on operation
.0 ■ ....
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16 Oct. 19^3
CONFIDENTIAL
over the west area (6 of them FW 200 f s) and 13 over the Mediter<
ranean. During the night of 16 Oct; 3 bombers were sent out,
on a harassing raid on London and k fighter-bombers against 7.
Hastings. .Minor enemy forces carried out machine-gun attacks ,
on vessels and radar stations on the north coast of France
during the day and harassing flights in the west of Germany
in the evening.
Mediterranean Theater ;
Our Air Force carried out teconnaissance in the Italian
sea area and over the southern Aegean- One He 111 unsuccess-
fully attacked .an enemy destroyer off Leros e Eight Ju 88's
attacked battery positions on Leros with. good results.
In Italy the enemy attacked the railway station at Ankara
and the airfields of Chiampirii and Marcigliana near Rome In
Greece he attacked our vessels west of Kos and the airfield of
Skutari. In the evening and during the night of 16 Oct, ten
enemy reconnaissance planes were detected over the Aegean
and three supply planes over the Balkans area.
Eastern Front ;
The 5th Air Force reports an engagement in ' the morning
between three FW 190 T s. and enemy PT boats 90 miles west-
northwest of Bergen, One PT boat was machine-gunned. • One
FW 190 sustained damage.
The Vth Air Force reports - photographic reconnaissance of
Primorsko and Yeisk, according to which altogether 25 landing
boats and!05 other boats were spotted.
VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea
1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean :
No reports on shipping have been received from the Gibr-:
altar area and the western Mediterranean.
The two submarines reported at 1900 on 15 Oct, 30 miles
southwest of Cannes had unsuccessfully fired their guns on
a unit of naval landing. craft and five barges the same
morning near St.Tropez and had submerged when our vessels
returned fire. The submarines were attacked by seven Arado's
success is possible.. Submarine chasers " 2208" and " 2211"
were probably successful in destroying., a submarine on the
day west-northwest of Spezia.
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CONFIDENTIAL
16 Oct. 19^3
On 16 Oct. there were two PT boats and two patrol vessels off
the Strait of Bonifacio $ presumably sweeping our barrage. Most
of the ships in Salerno Bay have meanwhile been moved to
Naples. Supplies from Sicily to the Bay of ^aples are carried
by single vessels.
Traffic between Malta and Alexandria is increasing heavily,
according to radio intelligence.
2. -' Own Situation Mediterranean :
No operations were carried out by PT boats owing to
weather conditions. Minesweeping south -of Spezia was continued.
The minelayer JUMENDA left Spezia southwardbound. for a minelay-
ing operation. Minelaying operations by naval landing craft."
on the west and east coasts were- carried out unnoticed and
according to plan.
On 15 Oct. submarine U "371" sank a freighter of 6,000 GRT out
of a westbound convoy in CH 7729; a further- one was probably
sunk* The .Naval Communications Officer at Toulon is contin-
uously transmitting the positions of the hospital ship
AQUILIA from Spezia and the GRADISCA from Patras, both on
passage to Or an,
Leghorn is at present without anti-aircraft defense. Request
for transfer of a fresh anti-aircraft battery has been dispatched
The harbor of Ortona was demolished by the Army on the evening
of 15 Oct., according to plan.
3» Area Naval Group South :
a . Adriatic Sea :
Enemy Situation:
On air reconnaissance sighted two submarines at 1900 on
15 Oct, south of Hvar. In. the. morning of the same day 15
planes were observed over Valdna.
Own Situation :
At Dubrovnik the steamer SAN GIGI (3,666 GRT ) was hit by
a bomb and sustained damage. Naval Shore Commander, South
Adriatic has taken over his duties at Durazzo,
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16 Oct. 19^3
CONFIDENTIAL
Two small passenger steamers, 2 tugs, 3 steam boats, h motor
boats and one former Austrian torpedo boat of 78 tons are
reported in operational readiness at Cattaro.
b. Aegean Sea ; ■.
Enemy Situation :
,0n 15 Oct. at 1600 two vessels .were, sighted between . ....
Kalymnos and Nera; this has given. rise to suspicion of mines,
In the evening two destroyers, withdrawing to the north at
high speed ten miles west of Kalymnos, were attacked by our
planes. At OV35 on 16 Oct. the' attack was repeated 6n '
destroyers proceeding south in the same area. In the early
.morning four small vessels were lying in Stampalia Bay
according to our air reconnaissance.
At 1500 there were 1 cruiser and k destroyers .making for
Rhodes 90 miles southeast of Crete and at l5*+0 2 destroyers
and 2 merchantmen on northwester ly course 70 miles south-
southeast of Rhodes. According to radio intelligence, the
Italian radio station on Levitha received orders in the
afternoon to offer resistance under all circumstances and to
destroy code, material in case of danger. During the day
much tactical radio traffic was intercepted, probably in
connection with the Aegean operation*
Own Situation :
It is now reported that on the afternoon of 1*+ Oct, a short
exchange of gunfire took place between two harbor defense
boats and a surface submarine in the Kasos Strait east of Crete.
No damage was sustained by our vessels.
The convoy of the KARI AND TRAPANX'-was "again' detected by enemy
air reconnaissance at 0800 and attacked at 1100 by a submarine
between Amorgos and Levitha. — ■'*--■
The steamer KARI (1,925 GRT) with 500 troops aboard was sunk. •
No. success was observed from depth-.charging. The TRAPANI and
one submarine chaser continued their passage. One motor
minesweeper remained at the point where the steamer sank.
Fifty survivors from th? KARI are prisoners on Levitha. The
ING2B0RG convoy was detained as there are no safe berths
available in the Kos area in view of- the present number ol
ships there.
The DRaCHE is on passage from Kalymnos to Piraeus.
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
16 Oct. 19^3
During the night of 15 Oct. Kos, Xalymnos and the airfield of
Maritza on Rhodes were attacked by enemy planes.. No damage is
reported.
In the Santa Maura Channel west of Levkas aerial mines are
presumed.
The tanker KNUDSEN dropped anchor in Corinth. The steamer
LEOPARDI took over 1,000 Italians from the KNUDSEN and is now
on passage from Patras to Piraeus. The steamer BOCCACIO
arrived at Corfu from Durazzo.
For- brief report of the 21 st Submarine Chaser Flotilla on the
destruction of the OLYMPOS convoy on 7 Oct. see teletype 1200.
c. Black Sea :
On 15 Oct. the coast near Cape Opuk was shelled,: apparently
by PT boats or motor gunboats. During the night of 15 Oct.
Feodosya and Cape Hi were bomber and amachine-gunned by
enemyplanes. No damage was sustained.
Ship "19" and two submarine chasers attacked and probably
destroyed a submarine located west of Eupatoria in the afternoon,
Four naval artillery lighters left Gelendzhik to shell enemy
batteries near Stepanovska and enemy positions on point Lolot-
shnoye . ....
The 1st Battery of the 6l3th Naval Artillery Battalion on Cape
Takil has three guns ready for action. Convoy traffic was
carried out as planned and without incident.
VIII. Situation East Asia
Nothing to report*
*^0 *A^ ^L* ^to ^L* *^£ *^ *4r* S^g *j^ *b' ^r -A ■ -i* *^^ -.Lf -N^ ^^ ^^ ^Lf ~±r m^f
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
17 Oct. 19V3
Itoms of 'Political Importance
According to Reuter, "Isvestia" stated in its leading article
of 16 Oct., presumably on official orders, that all matters
which might be discussed at the Moscow Conference such as, for
instance, the treatment of a conquered Germany, would have to
take second place to the questionof opening the second front.
According to "DNB M , the German Government' also handed the ■'
Portuguese Government a note ' of protest on 15 Oct. about the
facilities afforded the British Government on the Azores, which
are described as a serious violation of Portugal's neutrality.
Details in War Diary, Part C, Vol, VIII.
Conference on the Situation with Chief of Staff. Naval Staff
No special conferences or decisions e
Situation 17 Oct .
I . War in Foreign Waters
1. Enemy Situation;
recording to an intelligence report from an official
Portuguese source, Great Britain is demanding Lagos as a
naval base. The troops which were sent to the Azores as
reinforcements are to be -"^brought back to Portugal as available
shipping permits,. Calling up of reserves who served from
1935 to 1938 with the infantry and engineers is imminent c
2. Own Situation:
The BRAKE has been given orders by Radiogram 1336, super-
seding previous instructions, to arrange departure in such a
way that she reaches KU 27, left lower corner, on 5 Nov. and
to be ready to supply three submarines. The individual supply
operations will take place at long intervals, with a waiting
period of about four weeks between. The waiting area will be
grid square KU.
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
17 Oct. I9V3
II . Situation West Area
1. Enemy Situation ;
Over the Bay of Biscay ^9 planes were' detected on operat-
ion. One British vessel was located at 2122 in AM 1 +530, one
at 2130 in AM 5^0 and one at 21^2 in A M M+50.
according to intelligence reports, 6 British steamers escorted
by 1 destroyer and 2 corvettes left the mouth of the Tagus
southward on the afternoon of 16 0ct o Five other steamers
are lying in the Tagus ready to sail and are to join a convoy
bound for England on 17 Oct. .,.'-..'.* ■
The operation by six FW 200 T s against a part-convoy expected
in Lisbon on 16 Oct. was without result.
In the Channel targets were located byradar from 0205 to 0^20
between' lie des Bas and Les Sept lies.
A landing exercise was carried out in the Portsmouth - Isle of
Wight area, according to radio intelligence.
2. Own Situation :
Atlantic Coast : ...
Two submarines were escorted out and one in. South of
the Girode one SLM/J mine was swept. At 1030 mine-exploding
vessel "180" and a patrol boat were attacked by six enemy
fighters while on a check sweep for ground mines off 3rest c
Casualties were sustained. One attacking plane was shot
down.
The torpedo boats F.iLKS, KONDOR and T M lV" are to tnansfer to
Brest and will leave La Pallice at 1900 on 18 Oct.
Channel Coast : . "■■
At 1710 Battery "Lindemann" fired ten rounds on three
British prtrol vessels off South Foreland. One of the
vessels was probably damaged. Patrol positions were not
taken up because of bright moonlight.
CONFIDENTIAL
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17 Oct. 191+3
III. North Sea. Norway. Northern Waters ■
North Sea :
One EL W J mine was swept off Terschelling. Otherwise
nothing to report. , .
Norway. Northern Waters :
1. Enemy Situation :
Over the North Sea 18 planes were detected on operation
in the afternoon. On 15 and 16 Cct, single planes were
reported in the Banak and V^rdoe area and over Alta Fjord.
2. Own Situation : 1
In the area of Naval Command, Norway 18 ships were
escorted north and 25 south. Twenty-two ships were left
lying in harbor owing to shortage of escorts
Group North/^leet submits a request from the 5th Air Force to
Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff for an increase
in fighters on the Norwegian coast in view of- experience's
regarding fighters on the Norwegian coast in view of experiences
regarding the enemy operation on k Oct. in the Bodoe area.
For copy of request see teletype l*+50. The request states
amongst other things:
"Our observations during and after the attack,, supplemented
by statements of prisoners and numerous enemy. radio and
press reports, reveal the following facts:
a) The attack was meant to hit our supply traffic at its.
weakest point. Strong air defense was not expected.
b) The German Fleet was to be drawn into battle at the same
time. Since it did not put out for -defense enemy photo-
graphic reconnaissance, which observed an oil trace by
the TIRPITZ, is taken as a confirmation that the TIRPITZ
was damaged by the midget submariheoperation and that
the German Fleet is therefore out of action. Enemy
reports and comments further show that the Home Fleet,
strengthened by UrS, units, has now become free to
operate at another- points It must certainly be expected,
however, that the obvious lack of bomber and fighter forces
will be a strong inducement to the enemy to repeat such
operations in central Norway and in the Lofoten area."
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
17 Oct. 19*+3 -
*
Group North/Fleet quite correctly; observes that the statements
of the 5th Air Force Command stress its own requests regarding
intensification of air reconnaissance and fighter cover.
On 18 Oct. : the 5th Air Force plans evening reconnaissance in
the western, outlet of the Skagerrak as. far as 30° E'. fo]
laying operation "Kalium".
IV. Skagerrak. Baltic Sea Entrances. Baltic Sea
— — — i iti^i n i ■■■ ■ niijii nm — — .i m i mi . iiwumii t m i iw i mimmm *m v* «— i mm mmm p— >' ■ tmmmm ■■*■■■■■■■■■ ■■■ i
1. Enemy Situation ;
* No new information obtained,
2 . Own Situation:
The hospital ship METEOR and RUEGSN are proceeding' to
Gothenburg through Swedish territorial waters under control of
the Swedish Navy. The British hospital ships ATLANTIS and
EMPRESS OF RUSSIA will be off Lindesnes at 0600 on 3,8. 'Oct.
No special reports have been received from the areas of
Commanding admiral, Defenses, Baltic and Commander, Minesweepers
Baltic. Convey and escort operations were carried out as
planned e
Naval Command, Baltic transmits the following report from
Admiral, Baltic States regarding the situation with the, 1st
Army Corps and the 18th Army Command on. the evening of 16 Oct.:
"It may be assumed that preparations for the anticipated
large-scale attack on the Leningrad front are generally completed,
considering the enemy's inactivity. S'tart of the attack is
to be expected within the next day or two . Preparatory
local attacks must be 3xpected at any time. In the remaining
area of the 18 th Army there is the same tendency,- with concen-
tration at the Volchov bridgehead north of Novgorod,"
Naval Command, Baltic also advises Naval Staff of the difference
of opinion between Admiral, Baltic States and the 18th Army v : .
Command as regards changing the position of Battery . "31uecher" .
Naval. Staff has been asked for a decision.. For copy see |
teletype '1^53 • 'Naval Staff thereupon despatched the following
teletype to the Naval Liaison Officer with .irrny General Staff ;
"'1 .' Naval, C ommand , 'Baltic, cables ;• :
,0- ••/^:; !; ' ; . - ' ! "" ; " : :>r r.' ■■ CONFIDENTIAL
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17 Oct. 191+3
CONFIDENTIAL
a. The 18th Army Command has requested that the plan to
change the position of railway Battery "Bluecher" be
canceled and that it be used at Krasnoye Selo, since
a railway coach is not available on account of the
transport situation 5 the Battery could take part in the
heavy ground fighting expected near Krasnoye Selo and
could still also be used against sea targets. Naval
Command, Baltic has stated in reply that Battery
"Bluecher" must be withdrawn at once for the following
reasons; it is urgently required for defense of the
Estonian coast near Kunda; the situation regarding
ammunition of captured Russian 15«2 cm. guns demands
economic use; the crew of Battery "Bluecher" is not
trained for firing on land targets; its position at
Krasnoye Selo is absolutely unsuitable from the naval
point of view. Naval Command, Baltic has' therefore
ordered that the Battery be moved to Kunda, (
b. The transport gear for the parts of Battery "Prinz
Heinrich" is on its way to Reval, except for special
coaches for firing cradles and barrels, These will
only be released by the 13th Army Command for immediate
use, A request has been made to make them available
within three days. The track for withdrawal passes
1,200 m, behind the main defense line and can already
only be used at night u
2. Naval Staff is of opinion that naval batteries in the
Leningrad area should not be used up in the land
fighting, as they represent the only available coastal
artillery for reinforcing the Estonian coast. The
matter should therefore be brougnt to the attention of
Army General Staff and views regarding immediate
dismantling reported."
V. Submarine Warefare
The operation against the convoy in the North Atlantic
was continued. Nine submarines report altogether 1*+ air
attacks. Several losses are to be feared* The enemy has
obviously adopted a considerable deviation, presumably west
to southwest, so that shifting of our patrol lino north will
lead to failure. So far only one steamer of 6,000 CRT has
been sunk.
The absence of our air reconnaissance sets Our submarines
andimposible assignment. Search for the enemy by the submarines
themselves is not only hopeless but also involves losses,
in view of the exceptionally strong enemy air cover. The
Naval Attache in Tokyo receives the following instructions by
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CONFIDENTIAL
17 Oct. 19^3
Radiogram 1/Skl. I.U.3190A3 Gkdos, Chefs.
"1. Schneewind will relieve Schaefer as commander of
submarine U M l83". Schaefer will take over the
duties of Schneewind. k
2. Submarine DOMMES is to be equipped with six G 7a and.
nine G 7c torpedoes.
3. Attempt will be made by three MONSUN submarines to
■call at Penang.
^o The submarines from the operational areas of the Gulf
of Aden and off Bombay are now operating in the Gulf
of Oman. The one off Bombay reported on 29 and 30
Sept. no targets off and in the harbor. Very heavy
traffic consisting of cargo sailing vessels in all
directions, especially in the northwest close to
shore. Six cargo sailing vessels- sun& by gunfire on
2 Oct. northwest of Bombay. One freighter of
^,000 GRT sunk 5 no naval, patrol. On 5 Oct. strong a
air activity by twin-engine planes during the day."
No further reports of success have been received from the
Indian Ocean.
VI . Aerial Warfare
British Isles and Vicinity :
Sixty-eight planes of .the 3rd a±t Force were out on
operation over the west area and 12 over the mediterranean.
During the night of 17 Oct. 19 planes were out on operation
against London, There was only a small number of enemy ,
flights during the day. During the night also only minor
formations were on operation in the coastal areas of the west
area and over the western part of Germany. Nine high- explosive
bombs were dropped on Aachen. For particulars see Daily
Situation.
Mediterranean Theater ;
Nospecial reports have been received from the Italian
area. In the area of .iir Force Command, Southeast our formations
attacked Castell Rosso and Porto Lago (leros). ''An enemy unit
south of Rhodes was also attacked c Two direct hits by SC 2^0
bombs were scored on a cruiser. One enemy plane was shot down
CONFIDENTIAL
-2^0-
CONFIDENTIAL
17 Oct. 19^3 '
]astern Fronts
Nothing to report,
VII. v/arfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea
!• Enemy Situation Mediterranea n;
On the afternoon of 16 Oct, h tank landing craft and 2
destroyers and in the morning of 17 Oct, 3 U.S destroyersand
6 gunboats put in to Gibraltar.
A convoy of 10 freighters in ballast, escorted by 2 destroyers,
passed through the Straits of Gibraltar at 1715, westbound,
No reports have been received from the western and eastern
Mediterranean, On 16 Oct, 10-15 vessels, presumably PT boats,
were detected in the harbor. of Ajaccio. A submarine was
reported off -Sestri Levante at 1300
2. Own Situation Mediterranean;
No report on minelaying operation "Juminda" has .yet
been received. There were no PT boat operations because of
weather conditions , MLnesweeping on the coastal route from
Spozia to Leghorn was without result* This route is now open
to traffic. The harbor basin of Ortona was mined. Submarine
U "73" fired a spead of four torpedoes which missed- -on a -large
westbound freighter and a destroyer in CH 8511. ... • . ,, •
The attention of Commander, Submarines, Mediterranean is
drawn by aval Staff to the fact that the situation demands
mining of'Brindisi as soon as possible. Thus an advance in the
date when submarine U "^53" is ready for operations is
necessary as far as this possible. Commander, Submarines,
Mediterranean, reports in this connection that date of
departure cannot be scheduled before 21 Oct., in view of the
moon, ■;■. - ..■ :
Naval Staff is of opinion that a few more hours of darkness
can already be reckoned with some days before the above
date.
The hospital ship DJSNNE left Marseilles at 1700 and the
hospital ship SINAJA at 2100, both bound for Oran in connection
with the exchange- of wounded. ;.
CONFIDEN TIAL
-2*fl-
•
CONFIDENTIAL
17 Oct. 19^3
Commanding General, Armed Forces, South reports with regard
to the decision of Armed Forces High Command (see War Diary
15 Oct.) that his own request of 13 Oct. crossed with Naval
Staff's decision about the same matter to German Naval
Command, Italy.
Commanding General, Armed Force, South when despatching his
request, did not have in mind a minelayer from the Aegean but
the minelayer FASAN, which will be ready shortly and has
been promised' to Group South he request that this vessel be
put under German Naval Command, Italy for a short time.
Commanding General, Armed Forces, South reports, with reference
to point 2 of the decision, that investigations are being
made at present as to whether his transport requirements in
%he Adriatic Sea can be met with the vessels which are
available and those which can be expected, in the near future.
Furthermore, Commanding General, Armed Forces, South advises
Naval Staff for information of the following report to Armed
Forces High Command, Operations Staff:
"The naval gunners (about 2/3 of the 6l6th Naval Artillery
Battalion) at present available in the area of Commanding
General, Armed Forces, South are not sufficient to man
those batteries available and ready for action which are
absolutely necessary for the defense of Elba and the Piombino
Strait. The three 15 cm. and one 9cm. batteries manned so
far are already operating with a minimum of personnel and
have to be supplemented by Italian volunteers » At least
another two 10 cm. batteries will, have to be manned. German
Naval Command, Italy plans to withdraw the remainder of the
6l6th Naval Artillery Battalion, now in Leghorn, and to
transfer it to Elba or Piombino „ The personnel to be
withdrawn from Leghorn should be: replaced by a corresponding
unit from the Naval Artillery Battalion at Spezia.' No
direct agreement about this transfer has been reached with
Army Group B. A decision is therefore requested. Particular
reference was made before.- to- the importance of Elba by
firmed Forces High Command."
3« Area Naval Group South
a. Adriatic Sea ;
On the morning ofl6 Oct*: an unidentified ship was ••
sunk -by our gunfire when entering the Corfu Channel. Admiral,
Adriatic fears that it might be the steamer 30CCACI0.
according to an enemy report, two steamers were seized by a
British torpedo boat during the night of 15 Oct. in the North
CONFIDENTIAL
-2>+2-.
CONFIDEN TIAL
17 Oct I9V3 "~
Adriatic; one of the steamers was scuttled and "the other one
was brought in. Group South assumes that the steamers' involved
are the POCARICA and the MSRANO which were on their way from
Zara to Cattaro, Steamers which have to use the routes west
of the Dalmatian islands are geing detained for the present.
The steamer POTESTA was damaged by a bomb in an air attack on
Cattaro and beached..
The steamer ITALIA put in to Zara from P©la on the afternoon
of 16 Oct.; she was unsuccessfully shelled by enemy batteries
during her passage..
b. Aegean Se a;
Enemy Situation ;
"Kds was bombed on 16 Oct, At 0037 on 17'. Oct * two destroyers
attacked the convoy of the steamer TlAPANI and submarine chaser
"2109" on the east coast of Kalymnos. The convoy put in to
Atti Bay, where submarine chaser "2109" was shot up at 0100
from close auarters. The, steamer vTRAPANI and naval landing
craft MFP "333" were set on fire.
During the same night enemy PT boats were detected in the
Kalymnos area.
At 03^3 two destroyers shelled the steamer SANTORINI in Vathi
Bay (Samos) .
At lM+5 a naval vessel was. sighted 15 miles north of Samos on
easterly courses and a cruiser with three torpedo boats 120
miles south-southeast of Scarpanto on course 3^0° • In "the
evening two enemy destroyers swelled Calino. ■ ;
It is now reported. fron the night of 15 Oct. that light PT
boat LS "5" was shot up in an attack by seven enemy planes
northwest of Kos and beached on the evening of 16 Oct, on
the north coast of Kos.
Own Situati on ;
— — — — — — — — ~— .— — v
1- he DRACHE and submarine chaser "2110" .put in to Piraeus.
When submarine chaser "2109" was destroyed in Atti Bay five
of the crew were killed^
CONFIDENTIAL
-2V3-
m
CONFIBSNTIAL
17 Oct. 19^-3
Motor minesweeper R "211" was unable to rescue any survivors
of the steamer KARI because of heavy seas. Two crash boats
despatched from Milos had to return because of bad weather.
A Do 2h sea-rescue plane had an accident when taking off and
sank. Only submarine chaser "2110" was able to rescure
180 survivors, some of whom were badly wounded. Later, coast
patrol boat G "h2" searched the scene of the disaster without
success, another 50 survivors are- on Levitha. They cannot be
taken off the island on account of the unsettled situation
and weakness of our naval and air forces.- Another 20
survivors have been brought to Kos by a Do 2h plane. ■
According to a report from coast patrol boat GA nl +l", the
steamer SaNTORINI was heavily damaged in Vathi Bay when shelled
by two destroyers.
Coast patrol boats sustained no damage e
At 1853 Naval Staff despatched a report by teletype on the
above losses to Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff,
Navy and to Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff,
Naval Liaison, Order 1/Skl. 29103A3 Gkdos, in War Diary,
Part C, Vol. XIV.
The tanker MUDS EN is on her way through the Corinth Canal
to Piraeus, The steamer LEOPAKDI dropped anchor off Corinth
on the afternoon of 16 Oct.
Co Black Sea ;
On the morning of 16 Oct. Feodosiya and Cape Hi as
well as ships on the roads were bombed and machine-gunned.
No damage was sustained.
On the morning of 17 0ct o air attacks, also unsuccessful,
were reported on the southern point of the Crimea and near
Cape Chauda.
The large evacuation cnnvoy from Sevastopol, comprising Army
landing boats, was twice attacked on 17 Oct, by enemy planes
with torpedoes, bombs and machine-guns off the western point
of the Crimea. One naval landing craft was heavily damaged
by a torpedo hit; however, it was impossible to tow it into
Ak Mechetc The convoy proceeded on to Skadovsk.
Four naval artillery lighters shelled the north coast of the
Sea of asov in the area of Stepanovka with good results,,
Slight resistance, by heavy enemy guns was ineffective. The
shelling could not be repeated during the night of 17 Oct.
owing to weather conditions,
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
17 Oct, 19V3
PT boat S rrl +7" was transferred from Constanta to Ivanbaba.
.it 2131 on 15 Oct. submarine U "23" torpedoed a freighter of
2,000 GRT out of a convoy off Poti. Sinking was not observed.
VIII . ' Situation East Asia
Nothing to report.
CONFIDENTIAL
-2^5-
^
18 Oct . I943... . CONFIDENTIAL
Items of Political Importance
According to Reu'ter a report issued by the Naval Committee
of the U. S. Senate states, that the crisis in submarine
■warfare is now on the decline. The Battle of the- Atlantic is,
however, still heavy and subject to hourly changes.
In two reputable English publications, the "Yorkshire Post"
and the "Quarterly Review* , anxiety is expressed about British
merchant shipping. After the war the United States will
probably; possess two to three times as many freighters as
Great Britian. The British merchant Navy has lost its best
ships. New ships, which are much inferior, have taken their
place. The revival of normal trading. is in danger,, since
Great Britain is still dependent for her whole existence
on overseas trade.
Conferenc e "with Chief, Naval S te f f
A. Notes on discussions held at the Fuehrer Headquarters
on 16 and 1? Oct as per l/Skl 3392/^3 Gkdos. Chefs, are
contained in War Diary, Part C, Vol. VII.
B. Discussion wi th Air Commander Atlantic C o^st, Lt.
General Kessler:
Chief, Naval Staff stated that submarines had during the
last weeks searched the North Atlantic unsuccessfully for
enemy convoys. No air reconnaissance is carried out in the
North Atlantic. It was true that in one case a convoy, which
was within the range of the long-distance reconnaissance
planes, was contacted, but transmission of beacon signals
by the plane did not lead to the target. Obviously also
the position was incorrect. Air Commander, Atlantic Coast
replied that new navigational aids (Radiosonde: devices
for recording weather conditions and wind speed at great
altitudes - Tr . N. ) had considerably increased the- accuracy
of fixes by the planes .
Commander in Chief, Navy stated that the purpose of the
discussion was to ascertain what assistance the Air Force
could give to submarine warfare in the near future, espec-
ially by reconnaissance from Norway and Western France* ■•■
Air Commander, Atlantic Coast replied: -
1. A squadron of He 1 TT i will be available on 23 Oct.
-Single Ju 88 H2's will probably be on operation from
the beginning of November as long-range fighters.
-246- CONFIDENTIAL
18 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
2. On 4 Nov, a squadron of FW-200's equipped with radio-
controlled glider bombs and a spare tank, and "
3. On 8 Nov.. a squadron of Ju 290' s will be on operation.
Transfer of planes to Norway is possible, if advice
is given on the area where reconnaissance is desired
about 2-3 days beforehand.
Commander in Chief, Navy considers appointment of a Liaison
Officer of Air Commander, Atlantic Coast to Submarine
Division in Berlin to be necessary. Air Commander, Atlantic
Coast approved this appointment.
Commander in Chief, Navy explained that the transmission
of beacon signals is more important at first than the
despatch of the reconnaissance report itself.
Commander in Chief, Navy further inquired when action may
be expected against the enemy air escort of convoys in the
sea area west of Portugal.
Air Commander, Atlantic Coast considere this certainly poss-
ible with Ju 88 H2's and perhap with He 177' s. This matter
will be investigated.
Air Commander, Atlantic Coast urged that submarines utilize
British location transmissions for taking a bearing, as
seems possible in the. case of planes. "What he had in mind
was the way in which the British had utilized the radiation
of the Metox set.
Commander in Chief, Navy considered this facility impossible
for submarines, since the Metox was a continuous transmitter,
whereas radar only sends out beams in a certain direction.
Air Commander, Atlantic Coast was asked for fuller information,
which was promised.
C. Situation:
I. Army Situation:
The enemy offensive continues along the entire eastern
front. There is heavy pressure on the area Melitopol/Zap-
orozhe. The situation has become extremely critic 11 north
of Kremenchug. Here the Russians have broken through with
exceptionally strong forces end advanced 25 km. Our material
losses through gunfire are serious. Our reserves are at
present not ready for action. Assignemnt of the 24th
Armored Pivision from northern Italy and of the l4th Armor-
ed Division from France will be too late end is also badly
247 CONFIDENTIAL
18 Oct. 1943 . , C ONFIDENTIAL
hampered by traffic difficulties. The break-through at
Kremenchug must be regarded as extremely serious in view
of the devisive strategic consequences. South of Cherkazy
also the enemy succeeded in penetrating at some points.
In the area north of Kiev the situation has also developed
unfavorably. Here the enemy carried out no less than 23
stubborn attacks by day. Two of our division are cut off and
have been ordered to fight their way through. In the area of
Gomel our forces have been withdrawn to the "Panther 11 pos-
ition. In the area of Orsha enemy attacks have assumed
proportions so far unheard of. The attack was preceded by
a barrage of funfire of previously unknown intensity. One
throusand ground-attack planes were out on operation. It
was possible to hold our position, however, even though
losses on our side were heavy.
In the area of Velikl-Luki our forces gained a full-scale
defensive success. South of Leningrad the enemy concentrat-
ion has not yet been completed. Apart from all the above
mentioned focal points, the enemy is assembling further
strong assault forces in the area east of Toropez and
Veliki Luki.
The general situation on the eastern front is, therefore,
extremely tense. In Italy two of our divisions from the
north arrived at the "Bernhard" position. The enemy Is only
following our withdrawal movement to this line with hesitation.
In the area of Ljubljana fighting has again become lively.
Bridges on the main traffic lines near Agram were blown up:
this hampers our movements considerably. The center of the
enemy's concentration is observed in the area of Sarajevo.
A large-scale attack on this town is expected.
II. Re: Operation "Pau l":
Considerable objections have been raided by Commanding
Admiral, Task Force and Naval Command, Norway against the
instructions of Quartermaster Division regarding accommo-
dation of 600 Dockyard workers on the STAVANGSRFIORD.
Billetting these workers on shore, as plsnned, also
meets with difficulties.
Chief, Naval Staff considers it unnecessary for High Command,
Navy to deal with all details of this matter. He merely
requests that the workers be accommodated in such a way
that they are protected against submarine attacks, i.e. that
all ships which are brought up for this purpose should be
put in net enclosures.
248 CONFIDENTIAL
18 October 1943 '-"* • CONFIDENT IA:
Commanding Admiral, Group North/Fleet and Chief , Naval '."'*
(Ship) Construction Division participated in the discussion'
on this matter. Chief, Naval Staff demands that repairs to ■-/:'.
the TIRPITZ ""be speeded up by all available means. Chief, Naval
(Ship) Construction Division will be able to report the final 1
date as soon as the investigation commission has returned to :j
Berlin. According to present estimates, four months will be
needed from the date when repairs are in full swing. This is
provided that all the necessary facilities - tugs etc. -
are available for operation "Paul". It is expected that
repaird will be started at latest on 15 Nov., and will be
completed by the middle of .March.
III. Deputy Chief, Naval Communications Division reports that
in the "Netzhemd" trials a setback has occurred, since certain
necessary conditions could not be observed.
IV. Q uartermaster General; , ;
In connection with the ruling of Commanding Admira.l,
Group South regarding operations by merchantmen -in the
Agean Sea, the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping
has submitted the. following reply:
"1. The fact that operations and military requirements in
the Aegean area have precedence over all others is to
me a matter of course.. Shipping has so far been put
into operation only according to this principle.
2. Supplies to the areas in question have been continuously
held up through the lack of escorts and delays in convoys,
as can be proved. ...
3. The Mediterranean Shipping Office' is not a commercial
undertaking which has shipping at its own disposal.
Shipping is managed only by the Deputy for German Sea
Transportation in the Aegean, as a political office.
4* I refer to the Fuehrer's order of 30 May 1942, which is
still unchanged and in force. I refer further to the
order of Commander in Chief, Navy of 22 April 1943- I
have not heard of any change in these two orders. Before
they are changed the Deputy in the Aegean should in any
case be heard and an agreement 'reached with me on such a
change . "
Before further measures are taken, concrete data which Admiral,
Aegean has been asked to produce must be awaited.
-249- CONFIDENTIAL
18 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
In a Highly Restricted Circle:
V. Group South transmits the following teletype of Command-
ing Genera 1, Army Group E to Armed Forces High Command,
Operations Staff. A copy of this teletype was sent to the
Naval Group for information:
"On the basis of personal observations of conditions
around Kos and of the convoy battle on 15 Oct. I report:
1. The British are not using Leros . Apart from a unit
off Caste 11 Rosso there are always two destroyers,
which are continuously relieved, standing by in a
Turkish bay during the day. They come out to meet
our convoys on receipt of an air reconnaissance
report. During the night they sail round Kos and
Kalymnos, escorted by search planes.
2. I have given orders that the TRAPANI convoy be
brought up in such a way that it reaches Kalymnos before
dusk on 16 Oct; the troops are to be disembarked at
once and the ships concealed individually in bays.
Discharging later on according to the situation.
Although the destroyers search the bays every night
with searchlights they have found no ships so far.
Daytime passage of the convoys under air escort may
be successful but passage in the Kos area at night
will lead to destruction. Nightly ferry traffic from
Kos to Kalymnos by single naval landing craft and'
motor sailing vessess in the periods between two
destroyers is proceeding with minor losses despite
intense night air reconnaissance. The submarine which
has been disturbing our traffic was sunk yesterday.
3. Transfer of the landing troops to Leros with many
boats must lead to an encounter with destroyers, sine
one trip alone from Kos to the landing point on Leros
takes five hours. A bridgehead being. Vbuilt up could
not be supplied and the irreplaceable naval landing c
craft would be lost, also troops and equipment. The
destruction of the OLYMPOS convoy on 7 Oct. has proved
that naval landing craft are absolutely powerless
against destroyers. In this engagement not only the
steamer, but also her escort of six naval landing
craft and one submarine chaser, were sunk within a
very short time.
4. 3$y original order to General Mueller for operation
"Leopard" contained the condition that there was
no direct danger from warships. This, however, is now
continuously the case.
-25O- CONFIDENTIAL
18 Oct. 19^3 _ :_ , . CONFIDENTIAL
Operation "Leopard" -has, therefore,, been delayed
permanently unless Turkey closes her territorial
waters or permits us to engage the enemy in battle
there .
5. In my opinion only two. "ways are left to us for the
.occupation of Leros, which has not lost its importance
to us :
a. A landing similar to previous plans for operation
"Leopard", with the cooperation of powerful naval
forces, suddenly brought up. Admiral, Aegean could
provide 2 destroyers, 2 torpedo boats, 1 submarine
and 3 PT boats for this by 5 Nov.
b. An entirely new operation from the north via Chios
and Samos for gradual encirclement of Leros. Adm-
ire 1,. Aegean favors this solution, which I do not
propose as it would require too much time and too
. many troops, I recommend the more risky solution
■ a), as it would probably lead to an early success,
and request approval, I have, however, not yet
altered the present operational order, so that
any chances of success which may offer themselves
can be made use of."
Group South has commented as follows in this, connection:
"1. It is observed that the Air Force has so far neither
given a clear- picture of ■ enemy naval forces in the Aegean area
nor of enemy movements there and sottheast of Rhodes. The Air
Forces has also been unable to eliminate enemy forees or stop
r e inf or cements .
2. .The increase in fighting strength through captured ^
Italian destroyers -and torpedo boats should not be overestim-
ated, as they are in no way equal in armament, speed and
training to experienced British naval forces.
3. Group .South doubts whether the forces of the Army
and Air Force a.rq sufficient for the landing on Leros under
present conditions-,' but. cannot judge here. Anyhow the Navy is
ready to use all its • facilities, for carrying out the. operation
Group South is fully aware of the possibility of heavy .losses
during and after Landing, owing to lack of defenses on our
part. . -. ••
k. Postponement of the operation, regardless of whether
it is according to previous plans or via Samos, means a
serious loss of time, which offers the enemy the possibility
of further reinforcement and weakening of our forces through
losses .
251 CONFIDENTIAL
18 Oct. 1945 '• CONFIDEN TIAL
■ withdrawal of our forces until a Inter date in order to
minimize such losses -would give the enemy full freedom
of action, possibly also for an at trek on Kos .
5. The ides of carrying out our attack via S r mos is
not to be rejected in itself, but will require additional
forces and we may expect the same difficulties through
enemy naval forces and also, while we are making preparations,
reinforcement of his position on Leros until it is impreg-
nable.
6. Group South is therefore of opinion that the landing
should be carried out as soon as possible, provided that
there is a considerable strengthening of the air forces
participating. "
Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff advises Naval
Staff for the information of the following instructions to
0| Commanding General, Armed Forces, Southeast-:
"l. The Fuehrer has decided that present plans 'for oper-
ation "Leopard" <sre to be adhered to and that the operation is
to be carried out according to the situation, either in a sur-
prise attack without awaiting reinforcement or, if this is
impossible, after arrival of the additional light navnl
forces provided.
2. Permission to engage British naval forces in Turkish
territorial waters cannot be granted.
3. With regard to the requested reinforcements of the
Air Force it can be expected that a bomber group will be
■transferred to the southeastern area already in October.
Transfer of a further bomber group is planned, but the date
when it will be in operational readiness cannot yet be
definitely assessed.
4. The evacuation of- the Italians from Rhodes ■ is to be
carried out as quickly as possible, using all available means
and even at, the risk of losing ships and military internees.
In order to offer an 'incentive to the Air Force to
evacuate the Italians also by air, the Fuehrer has approved
that all Italains removed by air are to be at the disposal
of the Air Force as- workers . "■
Chief,. Naval. Staff states- .that the main point of the operation
lies in the strategic value of the islands, Chief of staff,
Naval Staff draws attention to the political considerations ■
which are devisi^-e for holding the Aegean islands. The heavy
sacrafice of irreplaceable shipping would not be justified froi
a purely military point of view. "The time will come when we
will have no more vessels,"
252 CONFIDENTIAL
18 Oct. 1Q43 CONFIDENTIAL
"With regard to the report of Commanding. General, Army Group E, ..
Chief, Naval Staff is forced to state that intervention in
natters which solely concern naval warfare, without consult-
ing Naval Staff, is not prenis.sable and must be rejected.
The following personal teletype from Commander in Chief,' Navy
is therefore dispatched to Chief, Armed Forces High Command:
"I an: responsible to the Fuehrer for naval warfare in all
theaters of war. I therefore request that Commanding Generals,
Armed Forces be instructed that letters, such as the one from
General. Loehr (Amy Group E) la 0227/43 Gkdos . Chefs, of 16
Oct. 1943, be sent to Naval Staff at the same tine as to
Armed Forces High Command, so as to enable me to express my
views in time on the execution of the naval operation."
Group South also reports the following in connection with
operation "Leopard":
"1. In the Kos area 1 submarine chaser, 4 naval landing
craft, 4 motor minesweepers, 3 decoy ships, 1 armed fishing
vessel ready. In view of last night ; s incident, no bay is
considered 'safe any more. Request of Admiral, Aegean for
permission to withdraw operational vessels during the night
has therefore been approved. The remaining vessels will be
assembled for defense, together with Army units, in the ports
of Kos and Calino.
2. According to a telephone converse t Ion with Army Group ,
E, it does not wish to cancel this old operational order, 3D
that General Mueller can utilize any favorable opportunity for
starting out. According to information received from the
Army Group, the Fuehrer has decided that, if such an opport-
unity does not offer itself before, the solution proposed by
Army Group E according to the old plan shall be retained after
however, destroyers and torpedo boats have become ready for C
operation.
3. Admiral, Aegean has therefore been ordered to comply
with the request of Genera 1 Mueller to utilize any favorable
opportunity for starting out, but otherwise to effect with-
drawal especially of slow vessels in agreement with General
Mueller. No favorable opportunity should be missed out, on
the other hand, the vessels are, If possible, to be disposed
in such a way that not all of them can be found and destroyed
by the enemy.
For copies of teletypes as per l/Skl 3110/43 Gkdos. Chefs,
29128/43 Gkdos. anC 3H3/43 Gkdos. Chefs, as well as order
l/Skl 29197/43 Gkdos. see War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.
253 CONFIDENTIAL
^PT
♦
18 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
With regard to control of submarines in the Aegean,
Chief, Naval Staff has decided that tactical control should
rest with Admiral, Aegean "while the transmission of orders
by radio should remain in the "hands of -Commander, Submarines,
Mediterranean.
Special Items
I. Admiral, German Naval Command, Italy brought -with him
a list of Italian warships as of 11 Oct. 1943. For copy as
per 1/Skl 29209/43 Gkdos. see War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.
II. Chief, Naval Ordnance Division, Bureau of Naval Armament,
as Naval Representative for War Economy submitted to Commander
in Chief, Navy on 12 Oct. a written report on the effects of
the raw material assignments during the last quarter of 1943*
in order to give an insight into the present situation
The steel assignments to the Navy during the last quarter of
1943 were, contrary to the agreements between Commander in
Chief, Navy and Minister Speer, made for specific purposes
and are absolutely inadequate for fulfillment of requirements.
The following are figures in tons per month (excluding the
warship construction quota):
Requirements Assignments
Guns 19,029 11,100
Ammunition for guns 32,440 14,000
Torpedoes 14,634 - 11,495.
Mines • ' 36,564 20,344
Other purposes
(general requirements) ■ 40,034 19,800
TOTAL: 142,701 ■'■ 76,73 9
The tasks ordered cannot be carried out as assignments are
below requirements. In order to carry out the most important
and essential t^sks of naval warfare the following addit-
ional assignments of steel (and corresponding metal assign-
ments) are necessary for the last quarter of 1943:
Guns
Ammunition for guns
Torpedoes
Mines
Other Purposes
Total additional assignment 21,4.30 tons per mo.
254 CONFIDENTIAL
4,155
tons
per mo.
1,200
!!
ti ti
6,000
It
II n
10,075
tl
!! tl
18 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL
Warships construction (ship and ships' engines) Is not
induced, in the above figures .
These further assignments must be made in addition; if
necessary they must be made available from the quota for
warship construction at the expense of the Fleet Construct-
ion Program. The 15,000 tons per month promised from Italy
must be used for the above purposes.
This assignment of raw materiel to the Navy confirms the
demand made time and time again that a distribution for
specific purposes by offices which are not within the Navy
is impossible and that a total quota (including warship
construction) must be assigned to the Navy, the distrib-
ution of which to individual tasks of the Navy can only be
effected according to the decision of Commander in Chief, Navy
through High Command, Navy. For copy of the report for Chief
of Staff, Naval Staff, with an annex showing the effects
of the short assignment in detail, as per 1/Skl 32155/^3 geh.
see War Diary, Part B, Vol. V.
III. Naval Intelligence Division, Foreign Navies Branch
reports on new informatoon obtained regarding British landing
craft, According to this report, the Landing Craft Support
(LCS) has been supplemented by a large type of boat which is
armed with a strong mortar battery. Probable designation
"Landing Craft Support" (Large) I LCS (L) . Armament consists
of J>2 mortars probably of 8.1 cm. caliber, shells weighing
6.9 or 9 kg. and being fired electrically, either singly
or in groups. This report also contains particulars of
the LCM III and also of "Landing Craft Flak" (LCF) of
a heavier type, with a main armament of four 10.2 cm.
anti-aircraft guns in twin-mountings and four 2 cm. anti-
aircraft guns .
For copy of report as per l/Skl 3l65V^3 gen. see War Diary,
Part B "Evaluation of Intelligence on Foreign Navies".
Situation 18 Oct.
I. War in Foreign Waters
1. Enemy Situation:
Nothing to report.
2. Own Situation:
■A.t.1331 the following message was received from the
Naval Attache in Tokyo:
"1. The MICHEL torpedoes! and sunk at 0230 (Tokyo time) on
17 Oct.
255 CONFIDENTIAL
18 Oct. I943 C ONFIDENTIAL
by an enemy submarine 120 miles south-southeast of
Grozaki.
2. At 1145 on 18 Oct. one lifeboat with Lt. (j.g.) 16
non-commissioned officers and 53 men landin at the southern
point of the Izu Peninsula.
3. The Japanese Navy is searching the position with
planes and ships for further lifeboats.
First of all information must be awaited as to what
security measures were taken for the ship, whose loss-
just before completing a long and successful opera tloi
is felt to be especially tragic. The Naval Attache in
Tokyo has been requested to report what .measures, have
been taken and already carried out and .whether the
ship was escorted by naval or air forces. «. .'•'.
II. Situation West Area;
1 . Enemy Situation :
Over the Bay of Biscay 33 planes were detected on
operation. On British vessel- .was located at 18.14 in CG 4360.
Radio Intelligence observed In the Channel practice radio
traffic between Portsmouth and four vessels and eleven
other stations , which indicates a tactical exercise being
carried out in the Portshouth area .
At 1042 two PT boats in BF 3323 were shelled with five
rounds by our battery at Gris Nez. The boats withdraw at
high speed.
2. Own Situation: ■■ .
Atlantic Coast:
Five- boats of the 4th Torpedo Boat Flotilla are being
transferred from 3rest to Concarneau for torpedo firing and
exercises with the. Air Force. Transfer of the FALKE, KONDOR
and T "14" has been postponed fro 24 hours owing to suspicion
of ground mines off La Pallice. The outer Gironde is closed
to traffic as ground mines are suspected there. On 16 Oct.
a plane swept two ground mines off the Gironde, a mine-
exploding vessels swept one off La Pallice and a minesweeper
swept another one off La Pallice.
256 CONFIDENTIAL
18 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL
Channel Coast
The tanker OSTRRIEDSLAND Was transferred on 16 Oct.
from Rouen to Le Havre." Patrol positions w^re not taken up
because of bright moonlight. Convoy traffic was carried out
in the Channel Islands area only. The anti-aircraft defense
of the radar station at Gris Nez and naval anti-aircraft
guns shot down two Spitfires in the Griz Nez area.
At 2315 motor minesweeper RA "l 1 struck a mine off Ostend;
she was under slung and towed into Ostend. Motor Minesweeper
RA "2", which was assisting RA "1", also struck a mine at
2358 and capzized, without any casualties being sustained.
Both boats probably struck mines with snag lines.
Group Vest has requested permission to use the "Aphrodite"
and "Drachen" decoys for the NORDVAARD and MUEN3TERLAND
Channel convoys. Submarine Division has raised objections,
eearing disclosure of "Aphrodite". Chief, Naval Communications
Division considers it doubtful whether use of the "Aphrodite"
will be effective. Chief, Naval Staff has therefore decided
against its use, since prospects of success, in view of its
adaptation for submarines, are too small in comparison to the
risk of disclosure.
III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters
North Sea :
Minor casualties were suffered when seven enemy planes
attacked the ferry DINTELSAS and two boats of River Mine-
sweeper Flotilla. Otherwise nothing to report.
Norway, Northern Waters :
1. Enemy Situation:
f
Over the North Sea in the morning 18 planes were
detected on operation and later on 12 planes. On the evening
of 1? Oct. the Air Force radar station on Fed je -located a
naval target proceeding at a very high sp@ed, possibly
a PT boat. Admiral, West Norwegian Coast believes, however ,
that a false location is likely.
According to a report from submarine U ll 757 ,, j there are
submarines off Advent Bay. and Ice Fjord. It is possible
that the base is being supplied by submarines.
-257- CONFIDENTIAL
18 Oct, 19^3 C ONFIDENTIAL
2. Own Situation:
At 0113 the SCHARNHORST reported noises similar to sonic
telegraphy or echo-ranging which were clearly heard first by
the SCHARNHORST and subsequently by a barrage patrol vessel.
The barrage patrol vessel dropped depth charges, whereupon
these suspicious noises ceased; they were also observed by
the destroyer RIEDEL apart from the SCHARNHORST and the
barrage patrol vessel. The alarm in Lange Fjord has been
lifted, but intensified security measures remain in force.
In the area of Naval Command, Norway 23 ships were
escorted notth and 31 south. Twenty-t-wo ships were delayed
owing to shortage of escorts.
Weather observation ship KOBURG reports her position as 75
degrees 20' N 1? degrees 30' V in heavy peek- ice. Alternative
camps are planned on the ice and on shore. Commander in Chief.
Air Force, Operations Staff advises Naval Staff for inform-
ation of orders to the 5th Air Force that reconnaissance
for operarion "Bassgeiger" is regarded as unnecessary,
but that supplies by air which become necessary are to be
carried out.
IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Batlic Sea
1. Enemy Situation:
Nothing new to report from the are^ of Admiral,
Baltic States and Commander, Mineweepers , Barlic.
2'. Own Situation:
Mine laying operation "Kalium" in the Skagerrak :,"■
was carried out by the minelayer ROLAND with four minesweepers
and two patrol beats. The hospital ships METEOR and .R-UEGEN
put in to Gothenburg at 1100. The two British hopsital ships
are expected on 19 Oct.
The Haval Liaison Officer to High Command, Army, Army General
Staff reports that Chief, Army General Staff agrees with the
view held, ; by Naval Staff- regarding withdrawal of Battery
"Bluecher" and that Army Group North has been advised. The
questions of using the naval batteries in the Ipnding fight-
ing has been settled with Admiral, Baltic States.
Otherwise nothing to report
:58 CONFIDENTIAL
18 Oct. 1945 CONFIESNTIAL
V. Submarine Warfare
The operation against the convoy in the North Atlantic was
discontinued at noon, as interception seemed unlikely and the
submarines are too far apart for further operations.
The convoy "was reported at 2000 in AK 0115. The submarine
giving this report observed strong night air activity. The
complete failure of this operation -was undoubtedly due
to the strong air escort. The main point of defense of this
convoy was obviously the air escort, since sighting of only
one destroyer was reported during the entire operation, it
must therefore be assumed that the majority of the six sub-
marines missing were lost through air action. Thus the enemy
has now adapted his defesse to our tactics which led to
success in the convoy operation "Leuthen". It will be
necessary to strengthen the anti-aircraft defense of submarine
by an increase in caliber.
VI. Aerial Warfare
British Isles and Vicinity:
In the afternoon an enemy formation of about 150 Fortresses
with strong fighter escort flew Into the area Aachen - .
Malmedy - Cambrei via the Scheldt estuary and Le TrepoPt; 50?
of our fighters went into operation. One Spitfire was shot down
and we lost five planes.
Minor formations also flew into the areas of Bremen and
Frankfurt on Main, but carried out no attacks. In the even-
ing another concentrated attack was carried out by strong
enemy formations on Eanover, which caused ■considerable
damage especially to the outskirts of the city and to indust-
tial installations. Further damage was sustained -in Ne us s ,
Duisburg and at the August Thiessen Foundry at Hamborn. Our
fighter defense consisting of 2^6 planes has so far reported
15 enemy planes shot down. During the same night four of our
planes were out on operation against London.
Mediterranean Theater :
Our air reconnaissance extended as far as the Oran area.
The enemy attacked the airfields at Viterbo and Siena and,
in the Aegean Sea, the airfields of Candia end Antimachia
near Kos . Further air attacks are reported from Skolpye,
where railroad installations and a German transport train
were hit.
259 CONFIDENTIAL
18 Oct. 19^3 CONF IDENTIAL
One of our convoys was successfully attacked in the Aegean
Sea. (The steamer SINFRA).
Eastern Fronts .
The 5th Air Force had altogether 43 planes out on
operation. No special reports have been received.
VII • Wa rfare in the M editerranean and Bl ack Sea:
1 . Enem y Situation Mediterranean;
A small amount of shipping, inward and outward
bound* is reported from the Gibraltar area. Our air reconnaiss
ance observed heavy westbound traffic between Algiers and
Oran. Between 1405 and 1420 northwest of Oran 22 freighters,
2 cruisers and 3 patrol vessels were reported on westerly
course, the cruisers and patrol vessels putting in to Oran;
also north of Arzeu 13 freighters on southwesterly course and
northeast of Arzeu 23 naval vessels on course 240 degrees.
Submarine U "73" detected a small westbound convoy 50 miles
west of Algiers and probably sank a steamer of 6,000 GRT
out of it.
In Oran 22 freighters and 8 LST's were sighted and on the
roads 11 freighters, 1 tanker and 1 LST.
In Mers el Kebir there were 11 Liberty ships, 7 freighters,
2 passenger steamers, 2 tankers, 2 heavy cruisers and 6
destroyers.
Increasing ferry traffic was observed in the Strait of
Bonifacio. According to our radio Intelligence, the transfer
of British submarines to the eastern Mediterranean is to
be inferred from radio traffic.
2. O wn Situ ation Mediterranean:
1 " ' ■"■ ■■ h ■ ■ ] — m am ■■■■ . n . i ... i.» — i , i ■ , ,. , , ...
The minelayer JUMINDA and three motor minesweepers
carried out a mine laying operation from Nettunia according to
plan. This unit was unsuccessfully attacked in the morning
by four enemy fighters south of Ostia, while on return
passage. The torpedo boat IMPAVIDO was commissioned as TA "1"
and the torpedo boar PAPA as SG "20," at Genoa on 17 Oct.
According to a report from German Naval Command, Italy the
260 CONFIDENTIAL
18 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL
measures taken by the Liaison Staff of . Commanding General,
Armed Forces, South in Rome are producing very few Italian .
volunteers. Recruiting is now being put into Italian hands.
In addition, German Naval Command, Italy is trying to recruit
volunteers through its own offices in the ;large naval bases.
German Naval Command, Italy submitted mine laying plans' dated
10 Oct. for the west coast of. Italy, the Rivera and the Ad-
riatic Sea. A mine barrage for the defense of Spezia and
Leghorn, having top priority, has already been laid by the
BRANDENBURG and the POMMERN. The following have been carried out
or are being carried out off the threatened coast from Civit-
avecchia to Gaeta : •".'-■
Mine laying off Nettunia
Closing the entrance to the Tiber mouth
Closing of Gaeta harbor
Mining of the coastal stretch of Terracina.
Further, reinforcement of mine defense is being prepared
through a barrage from Cape Linaro to north of Civitavecchia
It is also planned to lay a mine barrage, taking in the island
of Elba, as far as Giglio Orbetello. It is planned to start
this in the south.
This will be followed 'by defense of the Riviera., especially
priority laying of a defensive mine barrage off Genoa.
For mine defense of the Adriatic coast it is planned to mine
Ortona, to lay a barrage belt between Tremiti and the coast
and small flanking barrages on the anticipated coastal route
of the enemy. Offensive use of mines is planned by mining of
Olbia , Ajaccio, the Strait of Bonifacio and the main ports on
both coasts. Naval Staff has approved in principle the plans
and priority sequence of the various sectors.
J>. Area Naval Group South ;
a . Adriatic Sea : ■
The steamer BOCCACIO coming from Corfu put in to
Patras on 17 0&t.,The apprehension felt about her loss is,
therefore, unfounded. ■. •
The steamer ITALIA with five Siebel ferries and five infantry
landing boats arrived at Zara on the afternoon of 16 Oct.
from Pola . The 6l2th and 623rd Naval Artillery Battalions
arrived at Trieste on 18 Oct.
-261- CONFIDENTIAL
•>
*
18 Oct. I945 ; CONFIDENTIAL
Naval Shore Commander, North Adriatic moved on 16 Oct.
to Duifo near Trieste.
Group South reported on 15 Oct. details of barrage projects
for the Adriatic Sea and mine requirements. Naval Staff has
already. approved barrages RA "23',' "24" and "25" and assigned
the required mines.. Naval Staff points out, -with regard to
future, barrage projects off Cape Promontore and Cape Ploca,
that these areas are especially favorabee for enemy submarine
operations.. Laying of the barrages, -which are very desirable,
is hindered by shortage of UMB mines; they can therefore
only be laic gradually. Of the two barrages planned, the one
off Cape Ploca appears to be the more important, since it
protects the traffic along the Dalmatian coast.
b. A egean Sea :
Enemy Situation: :
.The two destroyers -which shelled Calino on the
evening of 17 Oct. -were reported at 2250 on 17 Oct. ten miles
east of Stampalia on course 210 degrees proceeding at high
speed. According to a later report, one of them "was a cruiser.
At 0130 on 18 Oct, . destroyers or torpedo boats -were' sighted
off the northwest point of Kali'mnos on course 250 degrees and
subsequently putting in to Leros . At 0545 there were three
vessels, presumably torpedo boats, east of Leros off the
Turkish Coast. Remarkably heavy - trai fie consisting of steamers
and sailing vessels has been o served for days off the Turkish
coast, according to a report of Commander, 21st Submarine
Chaser Flotilla .
At 1446 1 cruiser and 3 destroyers were located. 90 miles'
south of Rhodes on northerly course, At Castell Rosso, accord-
ing to photographic reconnaissance, there were 9 PT boats,
2 M.tG.B.s, 1 L.S.T. and 1 seaplane. According to a sighting
report, there were at 0540 2 motor minesweepers or PT boats
on easterly course northwest of Castell Rosso.
Own Situation:
Reports so far reveal that of the 500 men aboard
the steamer KARI 320 survivors have been rescued, of whom
180 are wounded. Fifty survivors and parts of Parchute
Company "Brandenburg" overpoweded the British garrison on
Levitha* A mopping-up party of Assault Division "Rhodes"
occupied the island of Calchi without enemy resistance. On
the afternoon of 16 Oct. two naval landing craft probably shot
down an enemy bor..ber on the north coast of Kos .
-262- CONFIDENTIAL
18 Oct. 19^3 .CO NFIDENTIAL
According to a report from Group South, the following ships .
have become total losses in the operations against Kos and
Leros so far; The steamers OLYMPOS and KARI, the minelayer
BULGARIA, submarine chasers "2 109 "and "2111" and six naval
landing craft.
The steamers SANTORINA and TRAPANI, light PT boat L3 "5"
and one naval landing craft sustained damage. The TRAPAINI
is afloat, according to the latest report. Her engines are
undamaged but the fire in her bow has not yet been exting-
uished. The local Naval Commander on Kos has been authorized
by radio to carry out temporary withdrawal of the nav^I
forces and steamers which are endangered to the Cyc lades
area, in agreement with General Mueller, should operation
"Leopard" not be carried out during the night' of 17 Oct.
The steamer GERDA TOFT with 2,000 prisoners aboard put in
to Piraeus from Cepha Ionia on the evening of 17 Oct. The
steamer SINFRA put in to Suda on the morning of 18 Oct.
from Candia and put out for Piraeus in the evening.
c. Black Sea : :
A large convoy of Army boats in two groups left
Sevastopol in the afternoon for Nikolayev escorted by
five naval landing craft. Ship "19" and three submarine
chasers were sent out on anti-submarine patrol west of
Eupatoria. Three naval artillery lighters and two combined
operations boats left Genichesk to take up patrol line off
the northwest coast of the Sea of Asov.
Submarine U "24" put in to Sevastopol from operations and
is to leave again on the evening of 19 Oct.
VIII. Situation Wast Asia
Nothing to report.
•* * •* -* ■* * * -* -* ■* ■* ■* •* * * ■*•* ■* * ■* ■*"*- * •* ¥r
263 CONFIDENTIAL
#)
♦
19 Oct. 1943 : • - • ' ' : i • CONFIDENTIAL.
Items of Political Importance
Eden and Hull arrived in Moscow on 18 Oct. According to .
an "Exchange" report, "Krasnaja Swesda ' , the publication of
the Russian High Command, has, on the eve of the Conference,
again commented on the problem of the second front and design-
ated this question as decivive for the future conduct of- the
war. At the same time "Isvestia" attributes the critical
state of the war to the hesitant attitude of the Western
Democracies
These statements prior to the opening of the Confernnce are-
a clear indication of the Russian plans for discussion.
According to a Swedish press report, -well-informed circles
in London have affirmed that Moscow intends to demand Allied
recognition of the Ribbentrop/Molotov demarcation line of
1939.
It is to be assumed that the above is a ruse. No stone is
being left unturned to induce the Russians to discuss
political matters, It is, however, obvious that the Russians
will not discuss anything until the question of the front in
western Europe has been dealt with. The fact that the British
and Americans are well aware of this is proved by the really
pitiful attitude of The Times" which attempts repeatedly
to put forward political questions and from the start to
offer the Russians the boundaries of 194l as a bait.
Conference on the Situation With Chief, Naval Staff
I. A rmy Situation
On the eastern front, extension of the enemy break-
through at Kremenchug is serious. The situation remained
more or less stable at the other points of' attack.
In Italy our withdrawals to the final defense line were
carried out slowly and according to plan.
In a Highly Restricted Circ le
on
for the
II. a) Chief, Naval Staff expressed his deepest regret
the loss of Ship "28". The report on Japanese measures
safe escort of the raider into ports, are to be awaited. It
is hoped that these measures were equa.l to our endeavors for
safe escort of the Japanese submarines KIRSCHBLUETE and
FLIEDER.
-264- CONFIDENTIAL
19 Oct. 19^3 C ONFIDENTIAL
b) The failure of submarine operation "Schlieffen" is to be
attributed to enemy air action. A loss of 6 submarines out
of 18 on this operation is most serious. Chief, N-°val Staff
has induced Minister Speer to take the necessary steps at once
for equipment of submarines with "Orgel" (improved light,
multiple barrel anti aircraft guns ? Tr. N. )
c) Chief of Staff, Naval Staf f brought up for discussion the
question of intensified submarine operations in the Black Sea.
Transfer of submarines overland and long the Danube takes an
extremely long time. The question as to whether submarines can,
be built at Black Sea dockyards should be investigated again.
Special Items
1. A chart showing all naval forces and merchantmen in the
Mediterranean as on 15 Oct. 19^3* which was drawn up for a
report, of Chief, Naval Staff to the Fuehrer, is contained
in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.
II. Admiral, German Naval Command, Italy submitted on 7 Oct.
a proposal of the Under Secretary of the Italian. Navy to
set up again in Berlin a Liaison Staff to High Command, Navy
which will assume the tasks of the Naval Attache and of Admiral
Bertoldi at the same- time. Naval Staff has requested. Armed
Forces High Command, Operations Staff to give its approval
that the Lt. Dr. de Mori, who is at preseht in Berlin, be
recognized as Liaison Officer and later, according to develop-
ments in the situation and the requirements resulting there
from, be granted a. Liaison Staff as is requested by the Italians
This has been approved- and the German ^aval Command, Italy adv-
ised accordingly.
The Naval Attache's Section has been ordered to advise Lt . Dr.
de Mori. ..*'... ...
III. High Command, Navy, Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division
issued the following order on 16 Oct.:
"1. In accordance with the instructions received from Armed
Forces High Command, Naval Staff is taking the necessary meas-
ures, as far as the Navy is concerned, for utilization of the
Italian' forces .
2. Quartermaster Division, Organization and Mobilization Branch
is obtaining information, in cooperation with the other offices
of High Command, Navy and operational Commands, for drawing up
demands to the Italian Armed Forces and will issue the necess-
ary instructions regarding organization.
265 CONFIDENTIAL
19 Oct." 19^3 C ONFIDENTIAL
3. Vice Admiral Welch old, "who will' remain under Chief
of Staff, Naval Staff, will be -instructed to submit,
the demands of Naval Staff to- the High Command of the
Italian Navy, In close agreement -with the Organization and
Mobilization Branch, and to come to an agreement regarding
execution of the measures necessary for thier fulfillment.
Situation 19 Oct.
i. War in Foregln Waters •'•■••■
No new reports have been received regarding Ship 1, 28".
II, Situation West Area
1 . E nemy Situation;
Over the Bay of Biscay 29 planes were detected
on operation.
2. Own Situation:
A tlantic Coast:
Two submarines were escorted out. Destroyer Z "32"
was transferred from Le Verdon to Pauillac. Five boat3 of
the 4th Torpedo Boat Flotilla carried out exercises off'
Concarneau.
During the night c.f 19 Oct. torpedo boats T ".14 J the FALKE
and the KONDOR will be transferred from Le Pallice as far
as Brest.
Cha nne 1 Coast:
On 17 Oct. one ELM/ J mine was swept off Zeebruegge
Otherwise nothing to report. : .
III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Wate rs
North Sea :
At 1000 30 Beaufighters attacked patrol and salvage
266 CONFIDENTIAL
19 Oct. 1943 CONF I DENTIAL
near the wreck of the STRASSBURG north of Ijnuiden; four planes
have so far been reported shot down. The STRASSBURG caught fire
Some of our vessels sustained damage and suffered casual-
ties. At 1130 the hJ "07" ( the converted ABRIANA) was attack-
ed by eight planes on the West Scheldt and was heavily damaged.
Boats of the River Minesweeper Flotilla shot down two Typhoons".
Four ground mines were swept off Texel.
Convoy "465" Elbe - Hook consisting of two steamers left at
1400.
Norway, Northern Waters:
1. Enemy Situation;
Over the North Sea 13 planes were detected on operat-
ion. Our submarines off Spitsbergen reported at 1018 1 steamer
and 2 destroyers and at 1210 5' destroyers putting in to Ice .
Fjord. Four abailable submarines are taking up position off-
Ice Fjord. In the afternoon 1 light cruiser with a ship's
plane and 3 destroyers were sighted in Advent Bay and at
2345 4 vessels leaving Ice Fjord at high speed, westbound.
Submarine U "737" was rammed and damaged at 1655 during the
attack on destroyers off Barentsburg but is luckily able
to submerge and has started on return passage. The cruiser and
destroyers from Advent Bay were reported at 2200 withdrawing
to the west.
The appearance of such strong forces at Spitsbergen is
worthy of note. Economic reasons can hardly be decisive
for this . On the other hand, the strategic value of the base
seems to be rated very highly by the British now, which
is easily understood In view of the Russian interests in
this area. From this aspect operation "Zitronella" now gains
Increased value.
Minor reconnaissance activity was reported in the Petsamo/
Vardoe area on 18 Oct.
2. Own Situation:
In the area of Naval Command, Norway 36 ships were
escorted north and 26 south. Owing to shortage of escorts
21 ships were left lying in harbor,
Group North/Fleet submits a report from the SCHARNHORST about
the noises heard on 17 Oct. For copy "see teletype 2333* Neither
the Task Force nor Group North/Fleet are able to account for
the incident.
267 CONFIDENTIAL
•)
19 Oct.. 19^- ' • '• ••' ..- CONFIDENTIAL
Group North/Fleet has no operational objections to barrages
"WW' 62" and "63" planned by Naval Commend, Norway.
IV. S kagerrak , Baltic -Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea .•
1 • Enemy Situation:
In the evening our coast on Kronstadt Bey was shelled
from the sea, presumably by guardboats. A minesweeper unit
southeast of Little' Tyters was fired on at noon by mines -
sweepers of our barrage patrol-; it put up a' smoke screen and
withdrew to the north.
The British hospital ships went on at 0715 from the anchorages
a through Swedish territorial waters to Gothenburg.-.
2 . Own Situation:
Minelaying operation "Kalium" is the Skeggerrak was
carried out by- unit ROLAND according to plan. . --.
One ground mine was swept north of Arknoa and one north of
Seelands Rev.
In view of the enemy's minesweeping operationa and the.
expected enemy offensive in the Leningrad area, Naval Command,
Baltic has approved the plan of Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic
to. reinforce :"Seeigel" barrages "6a" and "7a" at once.
The Finns have laid a shallow minefield at the northern point
of Hogland. . .- " :
Naval Command, Baltic transmits the following report of
Admiral, Baltic States on the situation in the area of the 18th
Army Command:
"1. Southern Sector: .
Following the increased railroad traffic observed lately •
from the direction of Moscow towards Mai -Vishera, heavy-
enemy attacks from the Volkhob bridgehead, must be expected. .
in this area. Since 18 Oct . the enemy has "been attacking here .
in groups up to the strenghh of a company.
2. C entral Sector; " : . . ' . . •
The second local point of the expected attacks is on the
268 COFFIDENTIAL
19 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
front of the 28th Army Corps in the direction of Lyubaii .
with the object of reaching the highway and thus dividing the
Army into two parts. -,-■ : ,; - .
3 . Northe r n Sector :
Heaviest concentration of attacks in front of the 50th
Army Corps; the direction assumed is Gatshina. Out of the 650
enemy planes known to be in the whole area 450 have been
assembled, according to latest observations; it is therefore
to be expected that the attack will be carried out with strong
assistance from ground-attack planes and also tanks. The attack
is to S:tart on 20 Oct., according to statements made by
deserters. It must be assumed that the enemy has completed
all preparations, since everything was quiet in this area
yesterday. No reconnaissance could be carried out yesterday,
as the enemy did everything to prevent this.
Own preparations:
The sector of the 170th Infantry Division has been made
smaller and the 215th Infantry Division has been moved into
position between the 170th Infantry Division and the 8 1st
Infantry Division. A further division has been withdrawn
from the sector east of Mga and is being held in readiness
for the points of concentration to be expected. Anti-tank
defense has been reinforced."
V. Submarine W arf are .-.
In view 00 the expediences in convoy b^t&le . "schlieffen"
attempts will be made in the next operation, by keeping the
submarines closer together, to enable quicker approach or the
dispersal of defense.- Should too strong enemy air escort
be encountered attempts will be made, by breaking off the oper-
ation in time, to avoid excessive losses. It is necessary to
strengthen the anti-aircraft armament of submarines.
Submarine U "154" was off Ponta Delgada from 14. to 16 Oct.,
but sighted nothing. The harbor was empty.
Submarine U "648." intercepted on 11 Oct. in BF 57. and 48
a momentary location transmission on the centimeter wave.
Regarding submarine warfare in Northern Waters see Situation
Northern Waters,
A pleasing report on successful operations has been received
from the Mediterranean. ■ :
■269 CONFIDENTIAL
Wr •
19 Oct. 1945 C ONFIDENTIAL
VI. Aerial Warfare
British Isles and Vicinity:
The 3rd Air Force had 58 fighters out on operation in the
west and seven planes in the Mediterranean.
During the night of 19 Oct. six bombers were out on operation
over London,
During the day the enemy carried out machine-gun attacks in
the west area, besides the attack reported on the S.TRASSBURG.
Two dredgers were damaged.
Mediterranean Theater:
Our Air Force carried out reoonna issance over the western
Mediterranean and the Italian area. Air Force Command, Souty-
east now reports regarding 14 Oct. that a destroyer which
was attacked in the Aegean Sea by two He Ill's was probably-
damaged. On 19 Oct. ten Ju 88' s attacked the harbor and sea-
plane base in Cartani Bay (Leros), One Ju 88 attacked a freighter
or in the harbor of Samos.
During the day the enemy attacked the airfields of Tuscania
(west of Viterbo), where one Ju 88 was destroyed by fire; :>ne
Spitfire was shot down by anti-aircraft guns. Further attacks
were carried out on the sea -rescue station of Crete and on
Syros. Six reconnaissance planes were detected over the Aegean
and nine west and south of Crete.
Eastern Front:
During an attack by 30-35 enemy planes on one of our
convoys off Kybert our fighter escort shot down 14 planes.
The convoy sustained no damage. No report on this has yet
been received from naval offices.
VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea :
1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:
Three destroyers left Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.
At 1600 a convoy of 43 freighters and 1 tanker, all in ballast-
passed through the Straits of Gibraltar, westbound. Six
freighters and 21 tank landing craft put in to Gibraltar from
the easto
270 CONFIDENTIAL
19 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
Three U. S. destroyers, 5 gunboats, 9 tank landing. craft,
2 freighters and 1 tanker left Gibraltar in the afternoon,
westbound.
Cape Spartel reported at 1500 a convoy of about 40 ships
heading for the Mediterranean.
Submarine U "431" detected and then successfully attacked a
-westbound convoy at 0306 in CH 7^96. Two freighters of
10,000 and 8,000 G.R.T. -were sunk, 1 freighter (10,000 GRT)
probably sunk and 1 steamer (12,000 GRT) torpedoed.
According to evaluation of photographic reconnaissance the
folio-wing were identified on 18 Oct.: freighters amounting
to 226,000 GRT and 9 loaded LST's on the roads in the harbor
of Oran; freighters amounting to 153,000 GRT and tinkers
amounting to 16,000 GRT in Mers el Kebir, also 36 L.C.I.s
proceeding towards the harbor. According to evaluation of
photographic reconnaissance of Algiers, there were 88 merch-
antmen in port at 1230 on 19 Oct. Reconnaissance sighted at
1305 50 miles northeast of Algiers 7 destroyers on easterly
course. Ferry traffic across the Strait of Bonifacio was
still lively. It is likely that minesweeping operations are
being continued. On the afternoon of 18 Oct. there was a
convoy consisting of 7 freighters southeast of Cape Spar-
tivento on northerly course, presumably carrying supplies
to Taranto. At 0935 on 19 Oct. two submarines were sighted
20 miles east of Toulon. The steamer AVERSA (3,723 GRT)
was sunk at 1212 off Rapallo.
Naval Intelligence Division, Enemy Situation Branch summarizes
British submarine operations in the Mediterranean during
September 19^3 s s follows:
The number is assumed to be unchanged at present, being about
50 submarines .
The success of operations against our shipping makes it un-
likely that a withdrawal of submarines from the Mediterranean
can be expected in the near future. The route between Corsica
and the mainland was the main center of operations in Sept-
ember and next to it the Aegean Sea .
Sufficient targets will be offered in future by the traffic
between Italy and Greece, along the Dalmatian coast,
'coastal traffic in southern France and Italy and especially
in the Aegean Sea. Furthermore, supplies to the Insurgents in
the Balkan area may assume an important part.
Enemy submarines in the Mediterranean sank in September
altogether 13 of our merchantmen totaling 15,246 GRT, 1 Ital-
ian submarine
271 CONFIDENTIAL
€>
O
19 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
Enemy submarines in the Mediterranean sank in September
altogether 13 of our merchantmen totaling 15,246 GRT, 1
Italian submarine chaser, the minelayer BRANDENBURG and
3 auxiliary warships, Two merchantmen totaling 11,23^ GRT
were damaged.
The approximate achievement of the submarines is estimated
at 4l GRT per submarine per day. The corresponding figure
for July and August were 40 and 49 GRT respectively.
Both we and the enemy reported only the Greek submarine
KATSONIS sunk in September.
The First Lord of the Admiralty stated on 16 Sept. that
4l British submarines have been lost in the Mediterranean
since the beginning of the war.
According to data available to Naval Intelligence Division,
out of the total of 62 British submarine losses so far known,
of which 58 are confirmed by the .Admiralty, 28 were estab-
lished to be in the Mediterranean. It has been ascertained that
another 12 submarines were sunk outside the Mediterranean.
It is quite possible that of the 18 sinkings, the locations
of which have not been determined and which we cannot yet
account for, 13 took place in the Mediterranean.
2. Own Situation Mediterranean:
Coastal traffic consisting of small vessels was
hampered by bad weather. No PT boat operations were carried
out for the same reason.
German Naval Command, Italy reports that the JUMINDA carried
out her operation on 16 and 1? Oct. with Italian mines, min-
ing strip one mile wide to sea from the 10 m. line be-
tween 13 degrees 14 ' East and 13 degrees 17' E. One naval
landing craft each mined Gaeta and Ortona on 15 and 16 Oct.
The hospital ship DJENNE put in to Oran.
Group West has reported, V ith reference to the return of
French steamers to southern France, that no German crews
are available in southern France and that French sailors
refuse to go to Italy on account of the armstice conditions
and losses sustained. Group West has hesitations about French
ship owners being involved, since the plan to return the
steamers would thus become known to the enemy.
Naval Staff does not consider the last reason to be sound,
since our plans would in any case not remain secret to the
enemy. German Naval Command, Italy, for information Group
West, is therefore ordered to investigate and report how
272 CONFIDENTIAL
19 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL
high danger- ■ of loss is estimated to be, taking risks into
consideration, and -whether the efforts expended for return
will be justified by advantages attainable. The attention
of Group West is drawn to the fact that participation of
French s&ip owners does not rest with the Naval Office at
Marseilles but is a matter for the Reich Commissioner of
Maritime Shipping.
3. Area Naval Group South :
a . A driatic Sea:
The Army plans to occupy the islands of Previci
and Zlarin near Sibenik on 19 Oct. The Navy has made five
Siebel ferries and four infantry landing boats available.
The steamer E. H. FISSER (5,1^5 GRT) was sunk by a submarine
at 1550 on 18 Oct. six miles off Dubrovnik. The crew was
rescued. The steamer MERANO (3,705 GRT) and the tanker POZARICA
(7,751 GRT) are overdue en route from Zara to Cattaro. This
might confirm the report of 17 Oct. of one steamer being
seized by enemy torpedo boats and scuttled.
b. Aegean Sea :
Enemy Situation:
The following were located: on the evening of 18
Oct. two shipping targets passing through. the Scarpanto Strait
at high speed; during the night of 18 Oct. two other ship-
ping targets proceeding at high sp.eed on southerly course
in the Ka sos Strait. Air reconnaissance sighted at 0050 ten
miles south of Kasos two vessels, apparently destroyers, on
course 30 degrees. At 2030 and towards 2400 on 18 Oct. the
town and harbor of Kos were shelled by two destroyers. At
09^5 on 19 Oct. a cruiser and two destroyers shelled the
harbor of Kalymnos. At 0530 a damaged destroyer was seen
being towed by another destroyer on southerly course in the
southern bay of the Gulf of Medella .
Own Situation:
Unloading of the damaged steamer TRAPANI is being
continued. The steamer SINFRA (4,470. GRT) was sunk en route
from Suda to Piraeus by enemy bombers at 0237 north of Suda .
The ship had 204 German and 2,389 Italian soldiers and also
71 Greek convicts aboard, apart from her cargo. According to
reports received so far, 566 men have been rescued, includ-
ing I63 German Soldiers .
273 CONFIDENTIAL
i)
€>
19 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
During rescue operations one Do 24 Was sunk by enemy planes
and a crash boat and a rescue veesel damaged. At 10^0 coast
patrol boat GK "51" "was sunk by an enemy plane north of
Cape Sparta without any casualties being sustained.
Group South requests that reports on submarine sinkings
should not be published as a general rule so that, even
when the enemy presumes a loss, he is kept in the dark
regarding its cause and, for instance, may think it -was
due to mines.
c . Black Sea :
Enemy Situation:
The radar station on Cape Takil reported naval
forces at 2007 2 miles south of the Strait of Kerch on
southerly course and at 2021 in the same area -what -were
presumably heavy forces on -westerly course. According to
radio entelligence an enemy reconnaissance plane transmitted
a report on one of our convoys vest of Cape Tarshanskutki
to seven submarines in the operational area. The convoy was
unsuccessfully attacked at 0748 by two torpedo bombers.
Own Situation:
Shelling of the north coast of the Sea of Asov by
naval artillery lighters has been postponed until 20 Oct.
at the request of the 44th Army Corps. Barrage "S 71" has-
been laid as planned.
The steamer THEODERICH ran aground on 18 Oct. ten miles west
of Ochakov, while en route from Nikolayev to Odessa. Salvage
operations are under way.
Chief, Submarine Branch, Quartermaster Division has made
investigations with regard to the possibility of repairing
submarines at Salonika and of expanding the base. Group
South has submitted a preliminary report. According to this,
it will be possible within six months to set up emergency
submarine repair facilities for three VII C type submarines
and six smaller submarines with the present installations at
Salonika. A final solution lies in the construction of a
protected ase at Tusla, 20 km. southwest of Salonika. At
least two years will be required for its construction. , For
copy of report see teletype 1050. This matter will be dealt
with further by Quartermaster Division in cooperation with the
Main Committee for Ship Construction.
274 CONFIDENTIAL
19 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIA L
Group South reports that Admiral, Aegean plans' to use
naval landing craft -which are transferred to his area
solely for transportation purposes, as further merchantment
In view of the lack of merchant marine personnel, Admiral,
Aegean has suggested that naval personnel be given civilian
clothes and papers accordingly. Group South does not consider
this course practicable and requests that civilian crews be
made availabel. Admiral, Black Sea estimates that at least
90 naval landing craft are required for cureent tasks. How-
ever, Group South is of opinion that in view of the situation
in the Aegean Sea eight naval landing craft must be trans-
ferred from the Black Sea, as soon as Turkish persission for
passage through the Dardanelles has been obtained (see
teletype 2135).
Quartermaster Division has advised the Reich Commissioner of
Maritime Shipping and Armed Forces High Command, Supply and
Transportation Office of the Armed Forces Overseas that Army
Group A has urgently requested Group South for further sea
transports for dispersal of forces from the Crimea; an incr-
ease of the previous daily average transport from 500 tons to
1,500 - 2,000 tons is required. Quartermaster Division points
out that it is necessary to lay down the tasks on which
available shipping in the Black Sea is to be concentrated by
the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping.
VIII. Situation East Asia
Nothing to report.
*******-******#..#.*.x..**.
C ONFIDENT IAL
-275-
r '
20 Oct. 19^3 C ONFIDENTIAL
Items of Politic al Importance
A few statements of a speech by Smuts on 19 Oct. are
noteworthy. He stated, amongst other things, that all
branches of the Armed Forces must be concentrated for the
final large-scale assault on the fortress of Europe -
and they will be next spring. It is quite possible that
American troops -will play a decisive part in these oper-
ations. A decision is to be forced next year as early as
possible. The Allies will first concentrate on Europe, then
on Japan. The future organization which will be respon-
sible for security of the nations after the war can only
be effective if it carries out its work with steadfast
determination.
Commenting on the situation in the various theaters of war,
Smuts emphasized that the battles for Stalingrad and El
Alamein were the turning points in this war. Referring to
the Russian losses, Smuts declared that the maintenance of
Russian attacks following their heavy losses was aston-
ishing and British admiration unbounded, but that this should
not lead to underestimating one's own achievements. The
Allied air offensive has assumed proportions which are
equivalent in effect to a large additional front. Plans
were laid quietly and much progress had been made. Still
greater progress can be expected with confidence, espec-
ially in southern and southeastern Europe. The ring around
the fortress of Europe will be closed in the coming winter
and preparations are being made for the attack next year.
The manpower of the United States will be ready for the
decisive battles in this attack.
♦ >
Smuts then outlined conditions in occupied Europe and stated
in this connection that there is little time left and that
from now on every moment is valuable. The morel and physical
conditions, especially in the occupied conn tries, are In-
describable. If Europe is to be rescued from unspeakable
misery, endeavors must be made to finish the war as quickly
as possible. In conclusion, Smuts declared that the Atlantic
Charter already outlines the future security plan.
Smuts' statement about the offensive in Europe are described
in Washington as a preliminary clarification for the Moscow
Conference.
Reporting on the opening of the Moscow talks, "Exchange
Telegraph" states that there is basic agreement with regard
to the agenda. The subjects of a purely military nature will
be dealt with when discussing each individual theater of war
No communiques on the progress of the discussions will be
issued, according to Reuter. Stalin will not participate
personally in the discussions.
276 CONFIDENTIAL
20 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
"Associated Press" reports that Hull, in contrast to Eden and
Molotov, is not authorized to make final resolutions, so that
the British and Americans can always evade embarrassing
situations -which may arise during the proceedings.
According to "DNB", Turkish and neutral circles in Ankara
are impressed by fears which the British Ambassador there
has expressed abouththe Russian plans for Europe. The
Ambassador is said to have declared that the pro-Soviet
tendency of certain British newspapers, which would like to
promise large areas of Europe to the Soviets, are in no way
shared by official British quarters, The present united war
against Germany does not exclude the fact that England will
also find it necessary one day to stop the Soviet advance
into Europe.
According to a Swedish press report, it is expected in London
that the British and Americans will request at Mpscow the
concession of air bases in Russian territory for attacks on
Japan. The fact that Russia is not at war with Japan must at
all events be obviated.
According to a radio announcement from London on 19 Oct., a
new lend-lease agreement has been signed between Great Britian
the United States, Canada and Russia; this is said to provide
for considerable increases of war materiel to Russia.
According to Radio Daventry, the British aircraft carrier
DETROIT (23,000 GRT) has been placed at the disposal of the
U. S. Navy for operations in the Pacific Ocean.
Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff
I. Army Situation:
Heavy defensive fighting continues at the centers of the
Russian offensive. At the critical point of penetration
north of Dnepropetrovsk our thin defensive line is being
built up. Things were comparatively quiet in front of the
9th and 4th Armies and in the area of Nevel. The enemy attack-
expected for days on the northern sector of the eastern front,
has not started yet.
The situation on the Italian front is more or less unchanged.
II. The Naval Liaison Officer to High Command, Army, Army
General Staff has reported to Chief of Staff, Naval Staff on
277 ' CONFIDENTIAL
20 Oct, 1943 C ONFIDENTIAL
the Crimea. For copy as per l/Skl (space left blank - TR.N)
Gkdos. Chefs, see War Diary, Part C, Vol. XlVa .
III. Chief of Staff, Naval Staff points out that we^r
and tear to shipping in the Aegean endangers the supply
situation. It is therefore inexcusable that the establish-
ment of building sites for naval landing craft at Salonika,
requested by Naval Staff, makes no progress. Chief, Nav^l
Staff orders that Minister Speer be approached direct on
this matter.
IV. Quartermaster General reports that taking over of very
heavy Italian guns of English manufacture, as urged by Field
Marshal Rommel, is being investigated.
In a Highly Restricted Circle"
ft V. By order of Chief, Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division
issued on 13 Oct. the following instructions to Commanding
Admiral, Task Force and to the TIRPITZ, with copy to Group
North/Fleet:
"1. In view of the possibility of further attacks, the
nature of which is unknown, sufficient manning of damage
control and anti-aircraft guns must be assured when granting
leave. Guns for firing at nav- n l targets must also be in
defensive readiness should heavy nav^l forces penetrate into
Alta Fjord. Please confirm.
2. The situation may demand thpt the TIRPITZ be used
elsewhere as a floating battery, for instance if a landing
in northern Norway is detected in time. State your oponion
about possibilities of use for this and of transfer."
*■ Commanding Admiral, Task Force gave detailed views in this
connection which were transmitted on 17 Oct. by Group North/
Fleet. After dealing in general with the psychological value
of leave for the TIRplTZ crew, these give particulars of
readiness with regard to personnel and materiel:
I. a) until the dockyard period commences all weapons, with a
few exceptions, are ready for action;
b) from the beginning of the dockyard period the following
will be ready: 1 heavy turret, 1 medium gun turret, 50^ of
anti-aircraft guns and corresponding fire control ^pp^ratus
c) leave for 100 men per week means 5^ reduction in
gunnery personnel. The lowest number will be reached on about
278 CONFIDENTIAL
20 Oct. 1943 C ONFIDENTIAL
5 December.
d) -with this minimum figure the following van be manned:
1-J- heavy gun turrets, 2§ medium gun turrets, 60fo of anti-
aircraft guns and corresponding fire control. There will,
therefore, be sufficient reserves on boatd in relation to the
material facilities during the dockyard period;
e) leave schedules provide that the increasing readiness
of guns at the end of the dockyard period is fully met as
regards personnel.
2. Engines:
a) The turbines have been out of action since 22 Sept. and
will remain so even until the final date for constructional
repairs. Readiness of all power installations and, at about
the same time, restoration of a "limited" sailing readiness
will thus not be possible before the final date owing to
dependence on constructional repairs.
b) About 125 bottom valves must be opened and examined or
repaired after cover boxes have been fitted." The ship can-
not be moved until then,
c) It is planned to repair the rudder with a large caisson
(diving chamber). As long as this Is out (date and length of
time unknown) the ship cannot be moved.
d) Two thirds of the crew iill always be aboard and
defense of the ship therefore assured.
3. a) Leave has been promised; it is considered necessary
and has started. Under the above conditions any interference
appears to be undesirable, since only up to the beginning
of the dockyard period will personnel fall a little below
material readiness; on the other hand, keeping anytiing
more than the weapons named under l.b in action readiness
will prolong the docktard period. The letter also applies
to maintenance of towing readiness owing to the current work
by divers on the bottom of the ship.
b) In our opinion transfer with the assistance of tugs
during the dockyard period is out of question, especially for
the reasons specified under 2. a-c) and in view of the
slight degree of readiness of ship's weapons; also owing to
the long time required, which might certainly exceed the
warning notice to be expected in winter.
c) Should such an operation be ordered only Raftbotn, Leir-
botn, Talvik and Aaroeysd can be considered as operational
points in view of the state of readiness of the ship. It will
hardly be possible
279 CONFIDENTIAL
20 Get. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
to control the ship with tugs in battle. Anchoring will be
extremely difficult. The tug situation "will be most critical
in case of alarm, owing to reguirements for the SCHARNHORST,
etc.
4. To sum up, Commanding Admiral, Task Force is of opinion
that the consequences which were foreseen from the decision
to have the dockyard period in the northern area must all be
borne and that use of weapons during this period, the dur-
ation of which is to be curtailed by all conceivable means
of a materiel and personnel nature, will only come into
question for the ship's own degense at her anchorage, util-
izing smoke screens and with the aid of an advanced gunnery
observer, which will be impossible at any other place. All
other exceptions are unrealistic and formulated without
sufficient consideration of existing conditions.
A Group North/Fleet reports in addition:
We fully concur with the comments of Commanding Admiral,
Task Force regarding the operational possibilities of the
TIRPITZ, as they correspond with the earlier views of this
Group which are already know. We request that for the time
being, i.e. until the ship is again re^dj to proveed to
a certain degree,, the TIRPITZ should still remain at her
present anchorage, as this offers the b-°st facilities for
defense. It the TITPIYZ, whiah would be moved with difficulty
were towed from this position it might entail operational
possibilities for her guns, few of which are anyway in read-
iness, against surgace forces but, on the other hand, would
make the immovable ship considerably more vulnerable to
enemy bombs, torpedoes and other weapons. Group North/Fleet
therefore requests that from now on any transfers be definit-
ely ruled out and that all efforts be concentrated on the
0\ fegense of the present anchorage and on speeding up the
dockyard period.
Naval Staff cannot agree to a definite tying-down of the
ship.
Situations may arise which may force use of the battleship's
weapons elsewhere. In an emergency, batteries which are
ready for action must not lie idle. The accusation of an un-
realistic conception must be rejected. This matter will be
dealt with further by Quartermaster Division, with Operations
Division participating.
Chief, Naval Staff agrees with the views of Naval Staff. •
280 CONFIDENTIAL
20 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
Special Items
I. In order to ma Ice preparations in time for further
supplies to and possible evacuation of the Crimea by sea,
it is. absolutely necessary for the Navy to know to -what
extent supplies or evacuation over land are considered
possible and accordingly what demands must be expected
for sea transports.
Naval Staff therefore request High Command, Army, Army General
Staff, via the Naval Liaison Officer, to see that the Navy is
informed on this as scon as possible. Group South and Admiral,
Black Sea are being instructed to make preliminary invest-
igations in their areas. Copy as per teletype l/Skl 29592/43
Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XlVa .
II. Army General Staff, Operations Division has urgently
requested that for the time being the projected withdrawal
to the Adriatic of naval crews from six Army batteries in the
Crimea and of 500 seamen from the coastal defense of Genichesk
should not be carried out, as the Crimea is. now already very
sparsely occupied and it is impossible to man batteries with
Army personnel, a decision as to whether the Crimea can be
held will have to be arrived at within the next few days.
Admiral, Black Sea has already, on his own initiative, stop-
ped the evacuations ordered by Group South, at the request
of the Army. High Command, Army, Operations Division is
advised first of the following views of Operations Division,
Naval Staff without prejudice to the decision of Chief, Naval
Staff:
"The withdrawal of naval gunners from the Crimea was
ordered despite the expected developments, since not all of
these men can be employed there at present on the tasks for
which they have been trained. However, they are urgently
needed for naval tasks elsewhere (it Is planned to use them
for reinforcing the entirely inadequare Adriatic coastal
defense). It is therefore an impossible state of affairs
that these men are being, detained in the Crimea for Army tasks,
just because they were passing through there, while the urg-
ent tasks for which they are required elsewhere are left
undone.
Insofar as the men are in action at present, their
release will of course not be possible until reliefs can be
brought up by the Army. "
III. German Naval Command, Italy has drawn attention to the
special hydroplane for two torpedoes, speed 40 - 45 knots,
range 360 miles, which is being developed in the Italian
Navy. Operations Division instructs Quartermaster Division to
take up this project if it does not affect the Fleet Construct-
ion Program 1943.
281 CONFIDENTIAL
20 Oct. 1943 C ONFIDENTIAL
IV. A discussion on 18 Oct. bet-ween Naval (Ship) Construct-
ion Division, Naval Ordnance Division and Ngval Staff regard-
ong plans for submarines types XX B and XXIV revealed that
the new type XXB (supply and transport submarine ) proposed
by Naval (Ship) Construction Division is out of question.
Submarine Division rejects this type as a supply boat. Endeav-
ors made to arrive at a combination of types XX and XlVa have
thus fa iled .
Type XIV can therefore at present not be abandoned. Whether
another type (XXI ) can take its place is still to be Invest-
igated. The discussion further showed that type XXIVA is appr-
oved on the -whole..
V. Naval (Ship) Construction Division dre-w up on 15 Oct.
notes on the origin of the joint directive of Commander in
Chief, Navy and Minister Speer. This matter is dealt -with in
War Diary of 5 and 7 July 19^3. Copy of notes as per l/Skl
29566/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part B, Vol. V.
VI* For report of Quartermaster Division regarding evaluation
of current -war experiences as per l/Skl. 31927/43 geh. see
War Diary, Part B, Vol. V.
VII. By order of Quarter master Division of 11 Oct. 19^3
Commander, Submarines, Mediterranean comes directly under
Naval Staff (Operations Division) as regards operation.
Situation 20 Oct.
I. War in Foregln Waters
1. Enemy Situation:
For advice to all vessels in foreign -waters on the
strength of the United States Navy on 1 Oct. 1943 see tele-
type 1955* The large number of aircraft carriers and auxiliary
carriers is noteworthy. It is known that In all 62 such vess-
els are in service or under construction.
2. Own Situation:
Regarding the loss of Ship "28" the Naval Attache in
Tokyo reports that at 0230 onll7 Oct. at 33 degrees 31' N
139 degrees 05' E in bright moonlight the ship was hit by the
first torpedo, causing her engines and current to fail, so that
no radiogram could be transmitted. The attacking submarine was
obviously submerged since she could not be seen
282 CONFIDENTIAL
20 Oct. 1945 CONFIDENTIAL
•although starshells -were used. Five minutes later a second
torpedo glanced off the starboard side aft but shortly
after-wards a third one hit her at this point. A fourth
torpedo missed and a fifth hit her on the port side,
forward end of the bridge. The auxiliary cruiser sank
quickly stern first at 0245. At the same time a sixth
torpedo missed forward. After the second hit the order
was given: "Abandon ship". Heavy smoke lay over the scene
owing to explosion of the smoke floats. Following the
sinking the submarine was seen surfaced and seems to
have taken survivors on board. One cutter and two rubber
dinghiss landing on Izu 33 hours later. A search started
immediately by the Japanese Navy was without result up to
1925 on 20 Oct.; it is being continued.
According to interrogations so far, the ship was proceeding
almost as in peacetime, no zig-zag courses, only one officer
on watch (Lt. j. g, Horn), no Wartime watch, the order that
watertight doors be kept closed not strictly enforced, ell
personnel not on watch below deck undressed in their bunks.
This report does not give an answer to Naval Staff's enquiry
about measures by the Japanese Navy to meet the ship e The
information given about the state of readiness of the ship
is almost unbelievable. If true, it means that where was extra-
ordinary laxity.
Naval Staff has asked the Naval Attache in Tokyo for inform-
ation regarding the schedule date of departure of submarine
DOMMES and the AQUILA submarines.
II. S ituation West Area
1. Enemy Situation:
Over the Bay of Biscay 36 planes were detected on
operation. One British Vessel was located at 1943 in AM 7920.
Aerial reconnaissance sighted at 1200 on 19 Oct. in Plymouth
harbor, 1 battleship, 4 destroyers, and 3 minesweepers.
According to an intelligence report via "Ostrov", the RENOWN
put out to sea from Pembroke on 25 Sept. Two other large
battleships put in to this port, including on 24 Sept. the
ANSON with several cruisers.
According to further intelligence reports from sources as
yet not proved, an Anglo-American landing near Brest and
Morlaix is said to be planned for 20 Oct. For details see
teletype 1050. Furthermore Lagos is to be occupied from
Gibraltar on 23 Oct. (see teletype 1840).
283 CONFIDENTIAL
20 Oct. 19^3 C ONFIDENTIAL
2 . O wn Situation;
Atlantic Coast:
Two submarines were escorted out from La Pallice.
Exercises by the 4th Torpedo Boat Flotilla are so far proceed-
ing to plan. Boats will start on their return passage to Brest
at 0200 on 21 Oct. Two ELM/J mines were swept off La Pallice
and one off the Gironde.
Torpedo boats T "14", the KONDOR and the FALKE put in to Blest
at ll^O and proceeded on to Cherbourg at 1820.
Channel Coast :
Nothing to report.
III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Water s
North Sea ;
Convoy "465" Elbe - Hook was carried out as planned.
Seven ELM/J mines were swept north of Terschelling and one
north of Ijmuiden. The report that two Typhoons were shot down
on 19 Oct. by the River Minesweeper Flotilla has not been
confirmed. Mines weeping activity in the Heligoland Bight was
hampered by stormy weather.
Norway, Northern Waters :
1 . Ene my S 1 1 ua 1 1 on :
Over the North Sea five planes were observed on
operation.
MTB "626" (30th MTB Flotilla) was at sea at 1120, according
to radio intelligence.
From Spitsbergen (ice Fjord) no new information is reported.
Light gunfire was reported in the Petsamo area on the after-
noon of 18 Oct. At 1616 on 19 Oct. batteries on the Ribachi
Peninsula shelled an outgoing Petsamo convoy with 100 rounds,
forcing it to return. Fire was returned wtth 99 rounds.
2 . O wn Situation:
The success by fighters reported by the 5th Air Force
284 CONFIDENTIAL
20 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
On 19 Oct. was achieved at 1435 near Kybert, while escort-
ing our westbound convoy. Besides the fourteen enemy planes
shot down by our fighters, one plane was shot down by naval
batteries. Around 0200 on 20 Oct. the steamer ZEROD of the
transport fleet "Speer" was machine-gunned by two Planes
west of Askevolt.
Twenty-six ships were escorted north and 25 south. Altogether
15 ohips were delayed owing to shortage of escorts.
Group North/Fleet reports the following fin^l plan for the
transfer of the deetroyers:
"1. Destroyer Z "27" will be transferred with
destroyer ZH 11" during the October new-
moon period to the west area
i
2. The destroyer RICHARD BEITZEN and Z "38"
will be tansferred on 22 Oct. to the north
ern area. On their arrival the destroyers
FRIEDRICH IHN and THEODOR RIEDEL qwll re-
turn to home waters for dockyard period. The
destroyers will stop over at Kristian-
sand South for three days for operations
against blockade -runners, the first 2 on their
north end the other 2 on their way home.
3- The destroyers ERICH STEINBRINK and Z "34"
with Commander, Destroyers will be trans-
ferred on 1 Nov. 1943 to the northern area,
without stopping at Kristiansand South.
Upon their arrival the destroyers KARL
GOLSTER and Z "31" will return to home
waters. Whether they are to stop over at
Kristiansand South on their way has not yet
been decided. "
The Task Force Reports:
"1. Investigation of the midget submarine by
a techinal commission has been concluded.
2. The Task Force proposes that the TIRPITZ be
assigned scrapping of the remains of the submarine after
the magaetic survey has been effected."
285 CONFIDENTIAL
i
20 Oct. 19^3 ."' "- CONFIDENTIAL
IV. Sk agerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea .
The hospital ships METEOR and RUEGEN As veil as the
British Red Cross Ships EMPRESS OF RUSSIA and ATLANTIS and
the DROTTNINGHOLM will leave Gothenburg at 0700 on 21 Oct,
Naval Command, Baltic and Admiral, Baltic States have.. been
informed by Naval Staff as follows:
"1. Army General Staff agrees with the views held by Naval
Staff that the naval batteries in the Leningrad area should
not be used up in the landin fighting, as they are the only
available coastal guns for reinforcement of the Estonian
coast. Army General Staff has therefore agreed to withdrawal
of Battery "Biuecher". Army General Staff has advised Army
Group North accordingly.
2. It is pointed out once more that naval batteries should
remain as long as possible in the Leningrad Area for use on
the naval front. They will not we withdrawn until the sit-
uation demands it. The decision as to when the batteries should
be removed will be reached by Admiral, Baltic States according
to an estimate of the locat situation. Naval Staff is of opin-
ion that dismantling of all batteries which must be trans-
ported by rail must now be started, whereas batteries which
can be transported by road can remain at the front for the
time being."
Otherwise nothing special to report,
V. S ubmarine Warfare
* Nothing to report
VI . Aerial Warfare ■- .
British Isles and Vicinity :
During the day there -were many flights by the enemy into
the occupied west areas and the Rhine/Westphalian industrial
area. Here a formation of 200 Fortresses -with fighter escort
attacked various places including Troisdirf and Dueren from
Altitudes at times ranging between 9,000 and 10,000 m. ; in-
dustry sustained heavy damage. Although 453 of our fighters
went up only 1 enemy plane was shot down for certain and 6
probably shot down.
--286 -- CONFIDENTIAL
20 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
In the evening about 300 planes flew into Germany and
assembled in the Magdeburg - Stendal area, from where a
large-scale raid on Berlin was expected. The bulk of planes,
however, flew off the other way. Part-formations dropped
bombs over the industrial area of central Germany. Bombs
were reported to have been dropped on Emden, Bremen, Berlin,
Leipzig, Moelkau, in the district of Leipzig - Torgau and also
in the area of Coblenz-Trier. Air Force General Staff assumes
that weather conditions prevented the enemy from carrying
out a concentrated attack.
Further flights by small enemy formations are reported in
the areas of Coblenz, Cologne, Crefeld and via Stolp as far
as Warsaw; also, coming from the south, via Klagenfurt into
the area of Pilsen.
Thirty-eight planes of the 9th Air Corps carried out a
harassing raid on London and 51 attacked the town end harbor
of Hull.
Mediterranean Theater :
Our Air Force carried out reconnaisaance. In Italy the
enemy attacked Ancona, the road at Grosseto and the airfield
of Marcigliani north of Rome. In the Balkans Nish was attack-
ed by a strong enemy formation, Furthermore, twelve planes
raided Kos . At Marcigliani and at Nish a number of our plans
was destroyed or damaged. No defense successes are reported.
Eastern Front:
r
Nothing to report.
VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea: (
1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:
Of the eastbound convoy which was reported by
Cape Spartel on 19 Oct., 10 freighters entered Gibraltar, while
9 freighters, 1 tanker and 1 gunboat joined the convoy from
there. At 1735 it was detected consisting of 57 ships 20
miles east of Alboran. At 1550 air reconnaissance sighted
60 miles north of Oran 2 destroyers and 1 merchantmen on
easterly course and at 1440 50 vessels leaving Algiers.
Reconnaissance of Corsica and Sardinia was incomplete
owing to weather conditions. The following were sighted:
off Bonifacio 1 transport and 1 destroyer; at Maddalena
sixPT boats presumably engaged in harassing our coastal
traffic, and 3 merchantmen; at Olbia for the first time
2 destriyers. On the supply routes
287 CONFIDENTIAL
20 Oct. 19^3 CONF IDENTIAL
to the Gulf of Naples only light traffic was observed. For
the first time again for days, a large convoy of 14 steamers
and 2 escort vessels was sighted on northerly course 20 miles
northeast of Ustica, presumably carrying supplies to Naples.
There was a large number of ships in the Gulf of Naples but
only a few vessels were lying in Salerno Bay. Three PT boats
unsuccessgully attacked our convoy of the steamer GIORGIO at
0110 on passage from Piombino to Genoa . No shipping movements
were observed on the east coast of Italy and in the eastern
mediterranean.
2. Own Situation Mediterranean:
Four PT boats left Civitavecchia in the afternoon
for an operation in the area Salerno - Ustica. Coastal traffic
was again carried out as planned. Bombs were dropped on the
center of Rome during the night of 19 Oct. At noon on 20
Oct. a heavy raid was carried out by J>6 four-engined bombers
with strong fighter cover on the coastal area mine miles north
of Civitavecchia. Enemy landing preparations in this sector
must be reckoned with, although landing craft located in .
Naples at present are sufficient only for the transportation
of 0.4 U.. S, Divisions.
The hospital ships AQUILEJA, GRADISCA and SINAIA arrived
at Oran; they are to sail for Marseilles together with the
DJENNE on 21 Oct.
Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff has decided, with
regard to the request of Commanding General, Armed Forces,
South of 17 Oct. that the plan of German Naval Command, Italy
to transfer the 6l6th Naval Artillery Battalion further south
should be carried out.
3. Area Naval Group South
a . Adriatic Sea:
The steamers MILANO and SANSEGO were unsuccess-
fully shelled by an Insurgent battery on Cherso (east of
Pola). Air Commander/ Croatia has been asked to bomb this
battery. The convoy of the steamer SEBENICO was unsuccess-
fully shelled by the 10. 5 cm. battery at Morto (Northwest
of Sibenik), Fire was returned, effectively assisted by our
battery. At the barrage gap at Asinello an auxiliary sailing
vessel had a brief engagement with an armed auxiliary sailing
vessel and was shelled from shore near selve lighthouse and
again attacked by two auxiliary sailing ships near Isto.
The vessel put In to Pola with casualties. A seaplane on a
flight to Split with part of the staff company of the Naval
Shore Commander has been overdue since 0700 on 19 Oct.
288 CONFIDENTIAL
20 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL
Occupation of islands of Previci and Zlarin near Sibenik
was planned for 20 Oct. Execution of this operation has not
yet been reported.
According to a report from the Port Commander at Cattaro,
5 vessels, suitable as minesweepers , 2 floating docks (4,000
and 1,500 tons), 6 launches, 2 tugs, 2 floating cranes and 12
barges have been seized in the Bay.
Admiral, Adriatic has transferred to Belgrade.
Group South emphasizes the necessity of our Air Force
operation in the following teletype to Naval Staff and
Army Group F:
"1. Supplies to the entire Adriatic coast are only possible
by sea. Required in this connection:
a) The ports must be serviceable;
b) Repair of the ships requisitioned (warships and
merchantmen) and continuation of new constructions.
It is therefore necessary that dockyards, dock installations,
etc. continue to function.
2. The large dockyard capacity at the Adriatic ports must,
if possible, also be made us of for the Aegean area, since
it is impossible to bring up shipping from other areas. It
is also planned to build submarines here. Maintenance of cap-
acity is therefore decisive for fighting at sea and on land.
j5. Defense of harbors, dockyards, etc. from attack by sea
is a matter for the Navy. Such defense will be built up by
Admiral, Adriatic.
4. On the other hand, dockyards and ports are defenseless
against air attacks. The enemy knows the location and import-
ance of the objectives in the area, especially through Ital-
ian betrayal. The dockyards particularly are large and
vulnerable targets. Enemy bases are in the immediate vicinity.
The formation of Close Combat Unit "Middle East" in Southern
Italy indicates such aims.
5. Therefore immediate introduction of strong air defense
is very pressing in order to avoid this elimination of fac-
idi 4 1 ? 3 f° r buildln g and repairing vessels for the Adriatic
and the Aegean and to avoid crippling of sea traffic and
a'rflnca'lculalle!"" " instailations > the consequences of which
289 CONFIDENTIAL
(
20 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
v. Aegean Sea :
Enemy Situation:
At 2300 on 19 Oct. 3 destroyers and 2 fast escort
boats were attacked by our Air Force south-west of Kalymnos.
The destroyers -withdrew to the northwest and the escort boats
to the east. At 23^6 surface forces attacked Kalymnos Bay.
No details have yet been reported. During the night of 19
Oct. light PT boat LS "5" and naval landing craft F "l^l" were
torpedoed and sunk by attacking PT boats on the northern
shore of Kos . Naval landing craft F "330" burnt out north
of the harbor of Kos - cause still unknown; the ammunition
aboard detonated. An enemy plane spotted the convoy of the
steamer INGEBORG at Syra . Radio traffic Indicates that an
attack is imminent. This assumption is strengthened by the
sighting of several destroyers and escort boats southeast
of Scarpanto on northwesterly course at 1605 on 20 Oct.
According to an intelligence report from a reliable source,
the Balkan operation, especially the attack on the islands,
was to have been carried out during the sefond half of
September/beginning of October. The operation was postponed
for political reasons, in order to await the outcome of the
Moscow confernece, but is in any case still to be carried
out •
Own Sitiation:
The troops aboard the convoy of the steamer INGEBORG
were disembarked in view of the enemy situation. The airfield
of Kos is reported unserviceable due to the air attack during
the night of 19 Oct. Syra may only be entered on prescribed
routes .
Preparations are being made for mopping~up of Stampalia. From
Crete and the other islands 21,100 Italians and 270 British
are still to be removed.
Group South plans to use transport- submarines for supplying
the islands in the Aegean Sea, in order to relieve surface
supplies which have now almost come to a standstill and which,
will later also be very risky. Group South considers that
transport-submarines will be required even after the islands
have been mopped- up and the enemy bases in the Aegean Sea
eliminated. It therefore requests investigations regarding
speedy availability of these submarines. Quartermaster Div-
ision will deal with this matter further. (See teletype 2020).
290
CONFIDENTIAL
20 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
c . Black Sea :
Enemy Situation;
The report regarding heavy enemy forces south of
the Strait of Kerch on the evening of 19 Oct. -was based on
a false location. Our PT boats, sent out to investigate,
sighted nothing. At 0050 our night reconnaissance planes
sighted six miles south of Anapa 3 boats, presumably motor
minesweepers, 2 coastal vessels and 2 PT boats on northerly
course. Minor enemy forces are reported to have attempted
a landing in the evening towards 2200 near Cape Chauda.
Our PT boats which were sent out detected nothing at the
landing place. Three gunboats and three PT boats were out
to sea on easterly course.
The Intelligence Service has submitted a report on the C
new composition of the Russian Black Sea Fleet and
personnel, based on statements made by naval officers who
had deserted. For copy as per l/Skl 31709 and 31710/43
geh. see War Diary, Part C, Vol. XlVa .
Own Situation:
Three naval artillery lighters and three naval
landing craft left Genichesk in the afternoon to shell the
north coast of the Sea of Asov. Four PT boats were transferred
from _ from Nikola yev to Sevastopol via Feodosiya. Submarine
U "24 i! left Sevastopol for the operational area. Mine laying
operation "S72" was carried out as planned.
The Danube Flotilla is making preparations for an operation by
five vessels on the Sava against insurgents.
On 17 Oct. the ALEXANDRA assisted our Army patrols by firing
for an h^ur on mountain positions opposite Orsova. The steam-
er THE0D0RICH, which ran aground near Ochakov, is being light-
ened .
Convoy traffic proceeded as planned and without incident.
VIII. Situation East Asia
Nothing to report.
291 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
21 Oct. 19^3 '"' '
I.tems of Political Importance
In connection with the lend-lease agreement, signed in London
on 19 Oct., a Spanish report from New York states that shipments
to Russia particularly of fighters and scarce raw materials,
such as nickel, tin, copper and aluminum, are planned.
According to a Swedish report from New York, the appointment
of General Marshall, at present Chief of the U.S B General
Staff, as Supreme Commander for the invasion of Europe is to
be announced on 25 Oct, The appointment will be announced
from Moscow and it is hoped fchat this will contribute to '
realization of at least the limited results of the Conference
which Washington has resignedly accepted. These are said to
consist of an agreement on military plans and the creation
of one or more permanent organizations for inter-allied
consultations „
According to a Reuter report from Moscow, England is showing
considerable interest in the "Free German Committee" said to
have been set up in Russia.
According to a further Reuter report, the speech -by General ,
Smuts predicting a large-scale Allied attack on Europe for
next year has taken- the Allied representatives in Moscow by-
surprise.
Conference on the Situation with Chief. -Naval Staff
I . Army Situation
An enemy attempt to land with minor forces near Feodosiya
was repulsed.
i ' ■■ . • ■
The situation! s serious, in the area of the large break-through
in the direction of Krivoi Rog, which the enemy was able to
extend. : r \ ■
A further;. break- through with a depth of 20 km.' has occurred
south of Orel.
Altogether there. are about 256,000 persons in the Crimea,
including Rumanian forces, the Todt Organization and all
others. "Evacuation has not yet been ordered.
Army General Staff, Foreigrl Armies West believes that an
attack on the; west coast of France must be considered possible,
CONFIDENTIAL
-292-
CONFIDENTIAL
21 Oct. 19^3
according to fresh news on invasion preparations in the west
area.
Fighting in Italy was slight. A new landing behind our lines
somewhere in the area of Civitavecchia is considered possible.
Our supply lines in Italy and in the Balkans are subjected to
constant and intense attacks by enemy air forces.
An attack on Agram by insurgents is expected.
Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff has issued the
following instructions to ensure supplies to the 2nd Tank
Army Command;
"Continuous supplies to an accumulation of winter stocks for
the units of the 2nd Tank Avmy Command stationed on the r
Dalmatian and Albanian coasts is impossible merely overland by
rail and trucks.
An additional transport by ships of about 100,000 tons per
month, at latest starting on 1 Nov, 19^3 will be needed. The
following measures are necessary .for this:
1. Army Group B is to clear the railroad .Ljubljana-Fiume of
enemy forces by the end of October and is responsible for
continuous and effective defense of. this railraod.
2. Chief, Armed Forces, Transportation will see to it that
the railroad Ljubljana-Fiume is repaired at onee and costantly
kept in operation, so that from about 1 Nov. 19*+3 a daily run
of 9 trains of ^00 tons each is guaranteed on this line to
Fiume.
3. Armed Forces High Command, Supply and Transportation
Office of the Armed Forces Overseas, through the Reich
Commissioner of Maritime Shipping, will see that the
required shipping for the transportation of 100,000 tons
per month is provided.
h. High Commandj Navy, Naval Staff, Operations Division is
requested to provide the necessary escort forces.
5. Commanding General, Armed Forces, Southeast is. to protect
coastal traffic by mopping-up the Dalmatian coast as far as
possible, and will clear the islands from which insurgent
gunfire harasses our shipping.
6. Commander in Chief, Air Force is requested:
a. to ensure, as from 1 Nov., adequate air defense for
the supply base of Fiume,
CONFIDENTIAL
-293-
CONFIDENTIAL
21 Oct. 19V3
b. to assist the supply convoys proceeding along the
coast by sea reconnaissance and air escort,
c. to keep down any insurgent gunfire which might occur
while our supply convoys are passing.
7. Army General Staff is requested to ensure the turn-over
of 100,000 tons per month in Fiume from 1 Nov. by preparing the
storages and providing the necessary manpower and trains."
II. In order to carry out this directive, which Naval Staff
has transmitted to Group South, Admiral, Adriatic and, for
information, to German Naval Command, Italy, Naval Staff orders;
"1. Fitting-up and commissioning of the three torpedo boats
and six escort vessels provided for the 11th Coast Patrol
Flotilla is to be speeded up by all available means. Besides
this, all vessels in the area of Admiral, Adriatic which are
suitable for escort duty are to be requisitioned, fitted-up
and commissioned as soon as possible. Admiral, Adriatic is to
regard it as his most important task to ensure supplies to
the 2nd Tank Army Command by sea and especially to provide
the necessary es c ort forces for this.
2. German Naval Command, Italy will carry out mine-laying
operations on the east coast of Italy, for which torpedo boat
AUDAC2 (TA " 20") is required, if possible in such a way that -
TA "20" can be placed at the disposal of Admiral, Adriatic at
the beginning of November."
vtfith reference to h) of the instructions from Armed Forces High
Command ( provision of the required escort forces by Naval
Staff), Naval Staff reports to Armed Forces High Command,
Operations Staff, Quartermaster Division, with copy to
Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, N a vy, as follows:
"1. The 11th Coastal Patrol Flotilla is being formed under
Admiral, Adriatic. Three Italian torpedo boats (one already
in service) and six steamers converted into escort vessels
have so far been requisitioned for this Flotilla and are
being fitted-up. All these vessels are expected that
further vessels suitable for escort duty will be taken over.
Instructions for speedy requisitioning, fitting-up and commis-
sioning of such vessels have been given.
2. Besides the above, steps have been taken to transfer
motor minesweepers and PT boats from the western Mediterranean
overland (Genoa-Piacenza-River Po). These vessels are, however,
not expected to be in operational readiness in the Adriatic
until December.
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21 Oct. 19V3
CONFIDENTIAL
3« Naval Staff points out that the weak defense forces
which can'be made available in the Adriatic will make it
possible to assure supplies to the extent requested as
soon as the enemy sends out major forces from ports and
airfields in southern Italy against this traffic. Cosider-
ably less transport and quite serious losses must then be
expected. 1 '
Ill . -According to a report from Armed Forces n igh Command,
Operations Staff, the Fuehrer has ordered the following with
regard to an increase of small shipping in the Aegean Sea:
"1 The development of the war situation in the Aegean Sea
requires unusual measures in order to increase small shipping
since the present transfers of barges from France via the
Danube and Siebel ferries from Holland, as well as the C;
delivery of new constructions and converted vessels, can no
longer be awaited.
2. Altogether it will cause a decrease of shipping in the
Black Sea which will be hard to bear, 1,500 to 2,000 tons
capacity of small shipping are to be transferred as quickly
as possible through the Dardanelles to the Aegean Sea, in
agreement with Armed Forces High Command, Supply and
Transportation Office of the Armed Forces Overseas,,
3. Since Turkey at present prohibits the passage of warships,
including naval landing craft, through the Dardanelles,
samll vessels purely for supplies, such as Siebel ferries and
motor ships, must be made available for these purposes.
h. Army General Staff, Quartermaster General agrees to the
transfer of the above tonnage, provided that it is replaced
as quickly as possible. Steps must, therefore, be taken to
see that either one or two large ships are transferred from
the Aegean to the Black Sea or that equivalent shipping
which is being converted at the Danube dockyards for the
Aegean Sea is withdrawn. In addition investigations should
be made as to whether a balance cannot be effected by
barges from France, the transfer of which is planned via the
Danube a
5. Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff and Commanding
General, Armed Forces j °outheast are to be kept advised of
measures taken.,"
Quartermaster Division will inform Armed Forces High Command
that the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping is responsible
for carrying out this Fuehrer directive,
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IV. Group South has now submitted, as requested, concrete
expamples in connection with its command ruling regarding
merchant shipping in the Aegean Sea being at. its disposal.
Group South reports altogether five cases during the period
from 2 to .10 Oct. in which measures taken by the shipping
companies are contested. However, these cases in no way
affect the basix aspect of ' this problem. This would only
be the case if the requests of Admiral, Aegean for shipp-
ing for military or operational tasks had been met inadequately
or not at all by the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping. :
Quartermaster General is therefore of opinion that the command
ruling of Group South cannot be upheld. unless the basic
Fuehrer directive is altered* Group South has itself
reported that its, ruling does not affect the rights of the
Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping to have at his .
disposal the .supply shipping not required by Admiral, Aegean,
The ruling was issued with the sole intention that -the
demands of the Naval Commander, as opposed to the Reich
Commissioner of Maritime Shipping as a civilian authority,
might be assured in accordance with the requirements of
naval operations and might be speeded up and simplified.
Chief, Naval Staff agrees with the views held by Quartermaster
General. Group South and the Reich Commissioner of Maritime
Shipping are to be advised accordingly. Quartermaster
General will take the opportunity to discuss this matter
personally with the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping
during the armament meeting at. Gdynia.
V. Quartermaster General r eports that the teletype ( see
Mar Diary 20 Oct.), which it was' intended to send to Minister ■'
Speer with regard to the erection of building sites for
naval landing craft in Salonika, will be held back until the
outcome of today ! s new discussion with the chairman of the
Main Committee for Ship Construction is known. If the matter
is not arranged according to the wishes of the Navy at this
discussion the teletype will be despatched.
Chief, Naval Staff agreed.
VI. Quartermaster Division. Submarine Section reports on the
results of the investigations by Chief, Submarine Section on
the cons^rvlQtion of a submarine base at Salonika.
The recommendations are the same as those contained in the
report by Group South, already dealt with on 20 Oct.
Quartermaster General proposes that the recommendation of
the Group and Chief, Submarine Section be approved and that
a decision be reached to construct at first an emergency,
unprotected submarine base in Salonika, the final solution -
the construction of a protected submarine base in Tusla -
being started at the same time.
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21 Oct. 19V3
Chief, Naval Staff decided' on this.
CONFIDENTIAL' ,
VII ». ' Naval Command, North has requested that I tali an : prisoners
of war should not be employed at dockyards where free Italian
workers and voluntary soldiers are working at the same, time,
in order to avoid psychological difficulties which arise from'
different treatment of the Italians. .-.-..
Commander in Chief, Navy does not agree with the objections. .
-raised by Naval Command, North. He believes that, if -
f l,rmly exercised, such different treatment can be used very
effectively to the advantage of labor discipline.
In a Highly Restricted Circle
VIII «, Operations Division, Naval Air and Air Force. Liaison
Section r eports on the general aerial warfare situation.. For
copy of this comprehensive and clear review see files 1/Skl I
L 2, Vol. Vie
Special Items ;
I . A summary of enemy intelligence obtained by radio decipher-
ing and radio intelligence in the period from' 11 to 17 Oct. is
contained in Radio Monitoring Report No. ^2/^3 , Noteworthy:
For the diversions and delays as intercepted during combat
of convoys in the North Atlantic see pages h and 5.
II. According to an intelligence report from an agent on the
destroyer PINDOS, this vessel has been equipped with the
latest depth charges which have .rocket" propulsion.
■o
Situation 21 Oct . f ' '■ ,
I o War in Foreign Waters
1. Enemy Situation:
According to an intelligence report from, a diplomatic ','■
source in Lisbon, the U S. Government is said to have asked .
Portugal to place at its disposal and aircraft base on the
Atlantic coast, allegedly for purposes of the Clipper Line. :
Bolama in Portuguese Guinea is mentioned*
According to a further intelligence report from the same
source, a convoy carrying coastal guns, other war material and
provisions for the Azores bases sailed on 15 Oct. from ports;
on the east coast of America. These bases are to be used .*•>*'
by the United States with : the same rights as England.. A . .
U S. mission, is said to- be expected in Madrid at the',
end of the month, in order to take up discussions on the
lease of bases on the Balearic Islands and in Northern Spain.
Vigo is mentioned.
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21 Oct. 19^3
According to another unconfirmed report, England, under pressure
from the U.S.A., is said to have made a request on the day
following the Azores agreement for Lagos Bay. This was,
however, definitely rejected by Salazar.
2. Own Situation;
Nothing to report „
II. Situation West Area
1, Enemy Situation:
Over the Bay of Biscay 23 planes were detected on opera-
tion • One British vessel was located at l*+32 in AM 7&10 and
one at 1815 in AM 5^30; one D,S. vessel was located at 1631
in BE 2610.
2. Own Situation ;
Atlantic Coast ;
The hVa Torpedo Boat Flotilla put in to Brest at 0330
after completion of exercises. ......
Channel Coast;
The KONDOR, FALKE and T "ih" of the 5th Torpedo Boat
Flotilla put in to Lezardrieux in the morning and went on
at 1800 to Cherbourg..
Otherwise nothing special to report.
Ill . North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters
gorth Sea :
North of Schiermonnikoog and north of Terschelling' four
ELM/J mines were swept „ A fishing smack Struck a mine and
sank 16 miles west of Neuwerk. At Dordrecht one harbor
defense boat sank in the dock, probably owing to sabotage
at the quay.
It is now reported that eight planes (not four) were shot
down- by naval anti-aircraft guns in the enemy attack on the
wreck of the STRASSBURG at noon on 19 Oct.
Norway. Northern Waters ;
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C ONFIDENT IAL
21 Oct. 19^3
ii ';'• Enemy. Situation :
Over' the North. Sea Ih. planes were detected on .operation. .
At L t-55 a submarine alarm was given off Vnrdoe. .-''.
According to an intelligence report from the Secret State
Police in Oslo, a convoy is said to have sail, .from Murmansk
on 20 Oct, A convoy is said to have left United States ports
for Murmansk at the same time., '../:..:
2. O wn Situation '^ "' • - • ■•
Thirty-five ships were escorted north- and.. 35 south* ■ Alto-
gether 18 ships were delayed due to shortage of escorts e
Admiral, Northern' Waters reports that submarines have been
withdrawn from positions off Ice Fjord to northern attack
areas in the Bear Strait,
Submarine U "355" has been despatched to the north for weather
operation "Kreuzritter."
Reconnaissance of the bays in Ice Fjord by Submarine U "956 M
revealed nothing new.
IV . Skagerrak, Baltic Sea E ntranc es, Baltic Sea
1 . . Enemy' Situation s
There was a group of minesweepers at 0750 four miles south
of Lavansaarie
According to an intelligence report from Sweden, the DICTO
and the LIONEL have, changed their berths and have been
located 10 km„ west "of UddeValla,' fully manned and ready to
sail. . * . .
2. Own Situatio n:
One mine was swept 30 miles south- southwest of Ahholt.
The hospital ship RUEGEN and METEOR left Gothenburg- at the
same time as the British hospital ships and proceeded through
Swedish territorial waters first to Treileborg. The three
ships proceeding to England anchored at the southern outlet
of Oslo Fjord in' the evening.
In the area of Commander, Minesweepers^ Baltic five naval
landing craft are lying ready at Kotka for minelaying operation
"Seeigel Villa". . ..
Naval landing craft MFP u l" : 3". was damaged by a mine off
Reval outside the channel, but was able to put into port under
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C
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21 Oct. 19^3
her own power and without casualties. Repairs on the Juminda"
net barrage were hampered by bad weather; for the same reason
minelaying off Schepel by coastal minelayers had to be
discontinued.
Battery "Koenigsberg" was shelled from the sea at 2125",
presumably by a guardboat. The battery returned fire and
observed one hit.
V. Submarine Warfare
Two anti-aircraft submarines in the Bay of Biscay report
having driven off one enemy plane each.
The supply point of submarine- tanker ,,L f-88" was moved to BD
2819, as the rendezvous was detected by an enemy carrier-borne
plane .
In the Indian Ocean submarine U "532" on 20 Oct. attacked a
oonvoy of ten ships including four freighters in MS 8230.
One ship of 6,000 G.R 6 T. was probably sunk„ Operational
conditions were unfavorable because of strong phosphorescene
of the sea and smooth water . The submarine is proceeding to
Penang for a brief overhaul.
VI. Aerial Warfare
British Isles and Vicinity ;
The 3rd Air Force had hS planes out on operation in the
wesf'^Yea and 6l In the Mediterranean.
During the night of 21 Oct, four bombers and thriteen fighter-
bombers raided London, Single enemy fighter formations approach-
ed the coast of the west area during the day without carrying
out any special attacks.
Single reconnaissance planes were reported over Germany.
During the night of 21 Oct. a few bombs were dropped in the
areas of Dortmund and Duesseldorf e
Mediterranean Theater ;
At lMf5 an east bound enemy convoy of about 50 ships was
detected 20 miles north of Mostaganem. This convoy was attacked
between 1&+5 and 1905 by 13 Do 217 »s of the 2nd Group of the
100th Bomber Wing and 28 He Ill's and 8 Ju 88 ' s of the 1st and
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21 Oct. 19V3 CONFIDENTIAL
Groups of the 26th Bomber Wing, The convoy put up a smoke.,
screen. Fifty-four aerial torpedoes and twelve H3 292 bombs
were dropped. According to reports received so far, 15
steamers and 1 tanker totaling 108,000 G.R«T.. and 1 destroyer
were hit and heavily damaged. Only two targets were hit by
bombs; the remaining success must be ascribed to the aerial
torpedoes.
During the night of 21 Oct. 113 planes of the 2nd Air Force
attacked shipping targets in Naples. In Italy strong enemy
forces attacked traffic targets in the area Viterbo-Terni and
Civitavecchia during the day. Harassing flights were also
carried out in the Bolzano area.
Eighteen enemy planes raided Skoplje in the- Balkans, where rail-
way cars and locomotives were destroyed* During the night of
21 Oct. the airfield of ^aritza on Rhodes was again attacked.
Planes were also reported on reconnaissance over the Aegean
and supplying insurgents in the Balkans.
Eastern Fron t:
Over the Black Sra reconnaissance was carried out.
Nothing special to report
*
VII ,. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea
1, Enemy Situation Mediterranean ;
Seven transports with troops put in to Gibraltar from
the Atlantic, a large convoy of 4 ^9 freighters and 9 tankers
with 8 escort vessels entered the Mediterranean in the after-
noon. Parts of this convoy put in to Gibraltar* In addition,
1 French battleship of the RICHELIEU class with 2 destroyers
passed through the Straits of Gibraltar, bound for the
Me d i t err ane an .
It is now reported from 20 Oct. that 13 LCT's put in to Gibraltar
from the Mediterranean. On 21 Oct. futher craft of the new
U.S.LCT type arrived at Gibraltar.
The withdrawal of alanding craft from the Mediterranean
and their assembly in Gibraltar attracts attention.
The transfer of merchantmen, which has increased in
the last few days, is also noteworthy, Unfortunately
there is no knowledge of the extent to which this
shipping is destined for the Mediterranean itself and
is not passing on through the Suez Canal.
The eastbound convoy reported east of Alboran on the afternoon
of 20 Oct, was detected again at 070*+ 10 miles of Arzeu consist-
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21 oi-t. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL
ing of 50 ships, including h2 freighters, on course east-north
east.
In the harbors of Corsica and Sardinia there was only a snail
number of ships. No assembly for new operations is to be seen
here. On the supply route from Palermo to Salerno only single
vessels were sighted. The number of ships in Apulian harbors
was still small.
Enemy air activity over the area of Civitavecchia has increased.
2. Own Situation Mediterranean :
Our PT boats operated unsuccessfully during the night of
20 Oct. in the area of Salerno-Ustica. Six boats will repeat
this operation during the night of 21 Oct.
,i ) Submarine-chaser "2110" carried out an attack on a submarine
north of Porto Ferraio. Destruction of the enemy submarine is
probable..
The minelayer JUMINDA left Spezia southbound for a minelaying
operation,.
The group consisting of naval landing craft MFP " 5l^ M and motor
minesweepers R "187" and R "201" was attacked by numerous enemy
planes while proceeding to the area north of Civitavecchia on
a minelaying operation. One plane was shot down and no damaged
was sustained by our boats.
The Italian Liaison Staff to German Naval Command, Italy arrived
at Levico»
<5 >
The four hospital ships are on passage from Oran to Merseilles
according to plan.
3. Area Naval Group South :
a. Adriatic Sea :
Our morning air reconnaissance observed numerous small
fishing boats near the islands of Mljet, Korcula, Brae and Hvar.
The islands of Alupca, Prvici and Tijat have been occupied
without any fighting „
The operation against Zlarin has started. In the F arising Channel
northeast of Pola two steamers were again unsuccessfully shelled
by insurgents,
A battery with four modern 9.^3 ecu anti-aircraft guns has
been occupied north of Fiume. There are no range-finders.
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21 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL
Submarine U !,I f53" left Pola for a minelaying operation off _ .
Brindisi.
b, Aegean Sea
Enemy Situation s
Ships' guns shelled the port of Rhodes with 15 rounds at
2350 on 20 Oct. Kos was shelled without effect by 1- cruiser
and 2 destroyers at 21*+8 •
According to our air reconnaissance . there were 2 destroyers
and 1 freighter escorted by 3 fighters 20 miles south of Gastell
Rosso on course north-northwest at 1200 on 21 Oct. ; at 1520
there were 1 cruiser and 5 destroyers on course 330° *+0 miles
northwest of Castell Rosso. One of our shadowing planes was
shot down by the enemy fighter escort, At 1000 a submarine
was attacked by one of our planes east of Cape Sideros (east
coast of Crete). The British scouting unit from Leros which
landed on Kalymnos on 19 Oct, has been taken prisoner.
Own Situation:
The report on the torpedoing of light PT boat IS "5" off
the northern shore of Kos has not been confirmed.
The Corinth Canal was temporarily closed to shipping, as a
lighter had sunk due to a landslide caused by engineering work.
The INGEBORG convoy is lying at 2h hours 1 readiness.
c. Black Sea ;
The enemy landing on the Kerch peninsula near Cape Chauda
was carried out by 250 men, who embarked again at 0^00 . During
the night of 20 Oct. continuous flights were reported into the
areas of Stary Crimea, Sudak and the Yeila Mountains, presumably
for landing troops.
An enemy submarine torpedoed and sank a naval alanding craft
off Yalta on 20 Oct.
The north of the Sea of Asov was shelled by three naval landing
craft during the night of 20 Oct.
Three PT boats took up patrol line off Cape Opuk during the
night of 21 Oct.
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21 Oct, 19*+3
VIII . Situation East Asia
Nothing to report.
i
<n
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22 Oct. 19^3
Items of Political Importance
No news of special interest has been received.
Conferenc e on the Situ ation with Chief, Naval Staff
I. Army Situation
The heavy enemy pressure on the eastern from continues
unabated, especially in the sector Melitopol-Zaporozhe and in
the area of the break-through northwest of Dnepropetrovsk,
II. Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff has sent the
following instructions to Chief, Army Equipment and Commander,
Replacement Army, Commanding Generals ? \rmed Forces, West ,
South, Southeast, Netherlands, Norway 9 Baltic States and
White Ruthenia, Army Group B, Commander, Armed Forces, Denmark
and the 20th Mountain Army Command, with copy to Naval Staffs
"In future all reports submitted direct to Armed Forces High
Command which concern naval warfare are also to be sent to
Commander in Chief, Navy who is responsible for naval war-
fare in all theaters, so that he is able to express his views
in good time with regard to carrying out naval operations."
The request made by Chief, Naval Staff on 18 Oct. has
thus been compJ.i.e..dwith 8
III . Admiral Legnani was fatally injured in al motor accident
near Venice on 20 Oct.
Commander in Chief, Navy has sent a telegram of condolence to
Mar shal Gr azi ani •
Marshal Graziani has mentioned, to Admiral, German Naval Command,
Italy Admirals, Vaoli, Tur or Falangola as possible successors
to Legnani and asked that the views of the German Navy be
obtained. For discussion of this question and decision of
Chief, Naval Staff see notes by Chief, Operations Branch,
dated 22 Oct; and remarks of Naval Intelligence Division as
per 1/Skl 3225A3 gen. in War Diary, Part C, Vol- XIII.
Chief, Naval Staff has left Berlin to attend the armament
meeting in Gdynia.
e
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22 Oct. 19^3
Special Items
I, In accordance with the decision reached by Chief, Naval
Staff, Quartermaster Division, Shipping and Transport Branch
has despatched the following teletype in connection with the
command ruling of Group South regarding merchant shipping in
the Aegean Sea (see War Diary 21 Oct.);
I. To Group South and Admiral, Aegean; '
"Commander in Chief, Navy orders that;
1. The order issued by Group South that decisions on the use
of ^11 available shipping rest with Admiral, Aegean, is to be
canceled, since placing all shipping at his disposal is in no
way intended.
2. Distribution of merchant shipping for operations by Admiral,
Aegean is approved, insofar as from time to time the operational
situation demands his intervention. In general the basic
organization ordered by the Fuehrer, giving the Reich Commiss-
ioner of Maritime Shipping control over shipping, must remain
in force. Closest cooperation between the Naval Offices and
the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping is necessary,
3. The Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping has been
advised of the incidents reported. He has been asked to
remedy these and to prevent their recurrence in view of the s
serious effect on naval warfare, and , furthermore, to appoint
at once a representative of the Reich Commissioner to be
attached to Group South with authority over the. three Deputies
for the three seas, in accordance with your request.
h» The necessity of furnishing crews for merchantmen has
again been pointed out to the Reich Commissioner of Maritime
Shipping."
II. To the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping:
"1. Group South has been instructed to cancel the order
regarding use of all shipping- in the Aegean Sea. "'"'
2. If the operational situation demands it, the Commanding
Admiral must, however, 'intervene in the disposition of shipp-
ing in order to assure the prompt' and suitable execution of
operations, if this is' not guaranteed otherwise. The Fuehrer
directive remains effective in principle. As operations have
priority, the closest and most understanding cooperation and
speedy execution of the tasks assigned' by all concerned is
necessary. Details of the incidents in this connection are
being forwarded to you
CONFIDENTIAL ' ;
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22 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL
3. The request of Group South by teletype 2^89 Gkdos, of 7
Oct„ par. 5 9 which has not been answered up to now, is most
definitely supported. Commanding Admiral, Group South, who .;
is responsible for all operations in the three seas, must be
in a position to assure the availability of shipping for
operations direct with the representative of the Reich
Commissioner of Maritime Shipping (who is authorized to give
orders to the Deputies for the Adriatic, Aegean and Black
Seas) without each Commanding .idmiral of an area negotiating
again with the Deputy for the sea area, who in turn must ask
Rome or Berlin for a decision.
h. According to reports from Commanding Admiral, Group South,
the situation with regard to crews for merchantmen in the
Aegean Sea is such that even the execute on of operational
tasks is hampered. An immediate remedy s essential; the
Naval Office in Hamburg sent off 28 seamen on 20 Oct. This does
not alleviate the difficulties „ "
The request of Group South of 7 Oct.. referred to above,
concerns the appointment of a representative of the
Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping to be attached
to the Group with authority over the three Deputies
in the command area of the Group,
II . Naval Intelligence Division has made the following extract
from the "Evaluation on the Enemy Situation of 20 Oct* by
Army General Staff, Foreign Armies West:
"1. Area of England;
Besides reports about major troop movements from the United
States to England new information has been received from the
Atlantic area regarding the gradual preparation of freighters
loaded with dupplies (ammunition etc.)', which are to be
assembled and held in ports of northwest England.
2. Mediterranea ns
The sailing of landing craft from the Mediterranean into
the Atlantic, reported for the first time, is worthy of
special note; also increasing reports about embarkations of.
troops at ports on the Atlantic coast of Morocco (Casablanca)
French vessels being primarily reported. This information is
to be connected with the preparations in progress for an
attack against the west coast of France. In southern Italy
it is possible" that the relatively small success gained
despite large expenditure of forces and' materiel nay induce
the enemy to abandon bringing-up further forces to the
front in favor of outflanking landings.
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22 Oct. 19V3
adequate forces for these are available not only in the rear
but also on Sicily, The detection of a large number of ships
in Naples may be connected with this. Whether the shipping
Movements in the sea area Sardinia-Corsica indicate that forces
from this area are to participate in such an operation, is not
yet discernible, certainly, however, it is to be assumed
that strong air bases are being built up on these islands for
attacks against Italy and Southern France.
In the Eastern Mediterranean a definite increase in enemy
naval activity (increased submarine operations, thrusts by
light naval forces) is noticeable, directed against our lines
of communication with the advanced island bases. The enemy's
main target in this area will at first be building up air
bases and capturing further ones. Further plans will be
then to cut off completely the islands in German hands, followed
( by intensified operations by naval forces and landings from
the air. Heavy air attacks against important traffic junctions
on the Belgrade-Salonika line show that the enemy is making
endeavors to weaken our defense in the southern part of the
Balkans by eliminating our supply routes and they are taken
as an "indication of plans in this area."
<D
Situation 22 Oct .
I . War in Foreign Waters
1. Enemy Situation ;
Nothing to report.
2. Own Situatio n;
The BRAKE was ordered by Naval Staff with Radiogram 2027
not to put out yet, D upply at earliest on, 15 Nov. . ; ,. .
The Naval Attache in Tokyo was advised by Radiogram 2355 that
the thried M0N3UN boat, submarine U "532" (Junker), en route
to Penang for repairs and supplies will arrive, as also
submarines "Schaefer" and 2Luedden" , on about 2 Nov, and that
the .submarines will report their exact dates of arrival when
passing 86o E.
The Naval Attache in Tokyo replied to Naval Staff's inquiry
about the measures taken by the Japanese iNl avy for bringing
Ship 28" into port (see War Diary 18 Oct.) as follows:
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308
CO NFIDENT IAL
22 Oct. 19V3
"I* The Japanese Navy was advised on 2J+ Oct, about the
position and course of the MICHEL. On the following
day Kobe was decided as her port of call and rendz-
zouse agreed on for the afternoon of 17 Oct. off
Dashinosaki.
2. Constant naval and air escort of the ship was not
requested, as this is not customary for the sea areas
around Japan, and also owing to lack of suitable
vessels would certainly have been impossible, especially
as over . 50 miles from the coast. Single Japanese
vessels as well as entire convoys, which in most
cases are escorted only by one slow escort vessel
according to reports from captains of chartered ships,
rely on constant air patrol of the adjacent sea areas.
This patrol was especially reintorced for the MICHEL,
according to information from the Chief of the Operat-
ion Division. According to statements by survivors,
flying boats were, however, sighted only twice „
3. Captain Gumprich, and especially Lt. CmdE» Trendtel
as former chief of the Yokohama office, were fully
aware of the situation owing to the length of time
spent in Japan, According to a report from Behrendit
was therefore also intended that a light PT boat be
sent out for escort at dawn. If .this measure was
not introduced earlier, it was probably because up
to now submarine activity against traffic has been
observed close to shore only,"
Fuller investigation is required as to how far it was possible
to carryoout more extensive security measures for the returning
ship in the limited time available. For every good reasons
Naval Staff had ordered that her position be reported in good
time. Therefore the fact that this order was not followed is
possibly the key to the disastrous end of this auxiliary cruiser.
II . Situation West Area;
1. Enemy Situation;
Over the Bay of Biscay W planes were detected on operation
as far as 18° W. Our air reconnaissance reported at 1053 a
convoy consisting of 22 merchantmen and five escort vessels in
BE 8196 on course 60° c This convoy was detected at 1530 in
BE 8292 on course 20°,
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Oct
19^3
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2. Qwn Situation ;
Atlantic Coast:
Brest
and
Two submarines were escorted in and one out off
La Pallice, Spanish fishing vessels southwest of the Girode
and north of San Sebastian were searched without result by a
group of minesweepers, as they were reported by the Air Force
to be suspected of carrying radar. Two ELM/J mines were
swept off La Pallice.
i
The MUENSTERLAND
on the first
is to preceed today from Brest to Le Havre on
of her transfer. The Channel is not to be
of the new-moon period. Group
West plans to transfer blockade-runner OSTFRIESLAND .from
Le Havre to Bordeaux
stage
passed until around the end
;r the blockade-runner
on about 2h Oct.
Five boats of the Vth Torpedo Boat Flotilla left Brest at 1800
to provide remote escort as far as the Channel Islands for the
MUENSTERLAND, which left the port at 1500 escorted by six
minesweepers and two patrol boats.
Channel Coast:
i) \
Group West plans to have the convoy of the NORDVAARD
start from Le Havre during the night of 22 Oct. or 23 Oct.
After a stop at Kieppe and at Boulogne this convoy is to
go on from the latter port during the night of 27 Oct.,
since an eastbound British convoy is expected to pass through
the Channel during that night. Departure from Le Havre has
been ordered for 2^00, with an escort consisting of 3 motor
minesweeper depot ships, 7 motor minesweepers
boats,
md 5 patrol
Torpedo boats T ,, l 1 + u , the FALKE and the KOHP'OR of the 5th
Torpedo Boat Flotilla arrived at Cherbourg at 0330, They
will probably resume their passage in two days, after the
necessary engine repairs on the F/J1KE have been completed.
Transfer of the *+th and 8th PT Boat Flotillas from the Hook t
to Amsterdam is planned for the night of 22 Oct. . ;
III . North Sea, Norway. Northern Waters
North Seas
Minesweeping operations were hampered by bad weather,
especially in the western part of the area of Commanding
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22 Oct. 19^3
Admiral, Defenses, North, One ground minewwas swept north of
Schiernonikoog and one west of Heligoland. Convoy "1133" Hook-
Elbe consisting of three steamers sailed eastbound at 1330.
A convoy of two steamers from Flushing to the Hook was carried
out a planned.
At 150*+ boats of the Rhine Flotilla shot down three enemy
planes over Walcheren. In the evening naval anti-aircraft
guns shot down one plane over Ameland.
Norway, North e rn Water s;
1, Enemy , Situation ;,
Over the North Sea 23 planes were detected on operation.
Enemy batteries on the Ribachi Peninsula and our own batteries
exchanged fire in the area of Petsamo after one of our
Kirkenes convoys. had passed through a
2. Own Situation ;
Thirty ships were escorted north and 23 south « Altogether
33 ships were delayed owing to shortage of escorts,
IV . Skagerrak, Baltic S ea Entrances, Baltic Sea
1. Enemy Situation ;
No new information has been received. The- 18th Army
Command believes that the enemy has not yet completed his
preparation for the expected attack,
2. Own Situation ; .
In order to intercept the DICTO and the « LIONEL single
boats will be stationed in the evening in the Skagerrak patrol
line from AO M+28 - L fl23„ During the night the patrol line will
be moved closer to' the Swedish coast (AO M+38 - L t-l67),
The hospital ships RUEGEN and METEOR continued their passage
east via Trelleborg and anchored off Swinemuende at 1630.
The three British ships passed Kr iris tia'iis and South at 1520.
East of Neuf ahrwasser torpedo boat T "157" struck a mine and
sank at 1725. The practice area of Training Unit, Fleet in
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22 Oct. 19^3
Danzig Bay is again closed.
In the area of Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic minelaying
operation !, Seeigel Villa" and one off Schepel were not
carried out today either, because of unfavorable weather
conditions.
Transports and convoys in the entire Baltic Sea area proceeded
without incident.
v • Submarine Warfare
Submarine U " 516" lay off Horta from 18-21 Oct., but had
no opportunity for attack outside territorial waters. Five
ships and one destroyer were observed in port. There was one
patrol vessel off the northern, and one off the southern
entrance and also Portuguese vessels P "1" - P nL i-" equipped
with minesweeping gear. No planes were sighted.
Otherwise nothing special to report from the North Atlantic and
the Indian Ocean,
VI Aerial Warfare
British Isles and Vicinity :
The 3rd Air Force had 180 planes out on operation over
the west area and 15 over the Mediterranean, One Martin flying
boat was shot down in aerial combat by a BV 222 at 1623 315
miles west-northwest of Cape Finisterre.
During the night of 22 Oct. 13 of our planes were out on
operation against London.
During the day strong enemy formations attacked airfields in
northern France and Belgium. Five bombers were shot down by
anti-aircraft guns. During the night of 22 Oct. strong enemy
forces flew over Germany* Avery heavy attack was carried out
on Cassel and a heavy one on Frankfurt on Main. For detailed
report of the considerable damage sustained see Daily Situation.
According to reports so far, 300 of our night fighters shot ,
down 30 enemy planes, while anti-aircraft guns shot down
another one.
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22 Oct. I9V3
Mediterranean Theater ;
Our Air Force carried out reconnaissance over the western
Mediterranean and the Italian area. In the Aegean Sea two
enemy destroyers were attacked between 0128-G1H-5 in the area
of Calino-Kos, but results were not observed.
For further details of the successful attack on 21 Oct, by for-
mations of the 3rd Air Force on a large convoy see Daily
Situation.
In Italy the enemy attacked the railroad and highways in the
area of Grosseto. In Greece the airfieT of Eieusiswas
attacked o
E astern Fr ont;
Over the Army front on 20 and 21 Oct, 190 enemy planes
were shot down, six of ours being lost,
No special reports have been received from the 5th Air Force.
The J+th Air Force located the following by photographic
reconnaissance at l*+00 in Anapa; 11 motor minesweepers i 2
patrol boats, 6 tugs 3 *+l landing craft; also on the roads
1 PT boat, 7 motor minesweepers 5 7 tugs, 3 landing craft,
3 lighters and other small vessels,, These may indicate a
preparation for landing operations.
VII . Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Se a
1 c Enemy Sit uatio n Mediterranean ;
Of the convoy which passed through the Straits of Gibr-
altar on 21 Octe eastbound, 3 steamers, 1 tanker and 1 destroyer
entered Gibraltar. At 0900 on 22 Oct. 2k U.S„ LCT ? s and 28
further landing craft with 2 escort vessels left Gibraltar for
the Atlantic, Our air reconnaissance sighted at 1200 30
miles east of Cape Tenes 1 cruiser and 3 destroyers on westerly
course and at 1218 55 miles east of Cape Tenes 2 destroyers
on northwesterly course. The large eastbound convoy attacked
on the evening of 21 Oct. off Cape Tenes by the 3rd Air Force
has not been detected again.
Reconnaissance showed few changes in Sardinia and Corsica.
There was still a large number of ships in Naples. No enemy
sightings were reported from the' Gulf of Gaeta. A submarine
position was reported 20 miles southwest of ^avona, An
intelligence report states that a U.S* Submarine Chaser Flotilla
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) )
22 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL
has arrived at Naples. The boats of this Flotilla are
equipped -with the most modern sntl-subcm er ine devices and
underwater acoustic gear. They also carry new radio direction-
finder sets and depth charges of a new design with increased
explosive sffect. The Flotilla is to be used for block-
ading the areas around Corsica and Sardinia and on the
west coast of Italy.
No enemy sightings are reported from the Eastern Mediterranean,
2. Own Situation Mediterranean:
ws
The PT boat operation during the night of 21 Oct.
was again fruitless. The boats put in to Civitavecchia.
German Naval Command, Italy is of opinion that, due to
decrease in traffic, PT boat operations promise little
success without advance reconnaissance and unless guided
by shadowing planes.
Enemy air activity in the area of Civitacecchia continued to
be very lively. During an attack on motor minesweepers and
one of our barge convoys only slight damage and casualties
were sustained.
The minelayer JUMINDA was sunk by submarine torpedoes at
01^5 two miles west of San Stefano before carrying out
her mine laying operation. After the second hit the Italian
minesaaboard detonated, causing her to sink within a few
seconds; only 16 survivors could therefore be rescued.
The hospital ships DJENNE, SINAIA, GRADISCA and AQUILEJA
are on return passage from Oran to Marseilles, according
to plan.
5. Area Naval Group, South:
a . Adriatic Sea:
The Albanian port of Milena was shelled by enemy
warships during the night of 21 Oct. Full reports are still
outstanding. In an enemy air attack on Split at noon on 21
Oct. one steamer sustained damage. Escort operations in
the Adriatic Sea were carried out according to plan. The
torpedo boat MISSOURI is our of war readiness until 1.3 Do
v^ .
Group South reports in connection with the control of
submarines :
"I. The sending out of submarines from the Adriatic area
carrying out operational assignments in the Adriatic
•or Ionian Seas, apart from new distribution of
operational areas in the Western and Eastern
Mediterranean
?m CONFIDENTIAL
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22 Oct. 19^3
including., submarine operations there, raises the
question as to control of the passage of submarines
through the Adriatic and Ionian operational areas.
2. Operational assignment and passage in these sea areas
must be synchorized with other operational tasks of
Admiral, Adriatic such as operations by our surface
forces, minelaying., anti-submarine measures, control
and escort of convoys and commitment of the Air Force
for naval operational tasks.
3. Submarines in the Mediterranean, and especially in
the aforesaid operational areas is well as in the
Aegean Ses, constitute only part of naval warfare as
a whole and not the sole means of war against merchant
shipping as in other operational areas far from our
own coast such as at present the Western Mediterranean
and areas outside the Mediterranean 5 special tactical
commitment is required for these there and has been
carried out.
*+. Considering the present situation and possible develop-
ments in the operational areas of the Mediterranean,
command having no uniformity will clause difficulties,
such as have already arisen with the departure of
submarine U ,rl f53" which left for an undisclosed
operational area and a task of Commander, Submarines.
■Everything -must be done to avoid our shipping being
endangered and the Air Force Commands responsible for
the entire Adriatic Sea area (Air Force Command, South-
east, Air Commanders , Albania and Croatia), being
unable to coordinate their operations in time."
Group South refers in this connection to the extract from its
War Diary of 20 Oct,, dealing with the question of command in
the eastern Mediterranean and requests a decision in accordance
therewith. This question will be dealt with by Quartermaster
Division, Organization and Mobilization Branch, together with
Operations Division.
b. Aegean Sea;
Enemy Situation s
On 21 Oct. at 2056 our planes attacked 2 destroyers west
of Kalymnos. At 2150 our air reconnaissance sighted 10 miles
northeast of Stampalia 1 cruiser and k destroyers on southerly
course, ; and .on 22 -Oct. at 0128 about h miles east of Leros
2 cruisers on course, souths outhe as t„ At 2310 on 22 Get, our
air reconniassance detected 2 destroyers 5 miles northwest of
Leros on southwesterly course and 20 miles south of this
position another destroyer on southerly course.
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confidential :.
22 Oct. 19^3
Own Situation :
It is now reported that in the air raid on the steamer
SINFRA on 19 Oct. one plane was shot down for certain and
another probably shot down.
Mopping-up of the islands of Paros and Naxos has more or less
been completed. The operation against Stampalia has started.
At- 0700 two radio stations were destroyed by dive-bombers. At
0710 one company of parachutists made a landing and an airborne
unit of 100 men landed from six Ju seaplanes.
The first reports state that the operation is progressing
according to plan. German prisoners have been liberated.
An enemy FT boat torpedoed naval landing craft F "131" with
a surface runner during night repairs on the eastern shore of
Kos.
Escort operations in the Aegean Sea proceeded without incident.
■
c. Black Sea ;
Enemy Situation ;
Air reconnaissance reported an increase in the number of
ships in Anapa.
One of our submarines sighted an eastbound convoy consisting
of 1 tanker with 3 motor minesweepers and 2 minesweepers 20
miles west of Suchum. Submarine U "23" sank a coastal freightei
of 1,000 GRT 20 miles northwest of Poti shortly after mid-
night on 22 Oct.
Naval Intelligence Division has' made a summary of a great ; deal
of intelligence on Russian plans for landing in the Black Sea
and the Sea of Asov. Copy of this summary as per 1/Skl 29298/
>+3 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XlVa.
Own Situation ;
The 1st PT B-oat Flotilla in patrol line southwest ;0f
Kerch sighted at 0130 gun flashes from a vessel, apparently a
PT boat. Our bo-,ts did not succeed in establishing contact.
During the night of 22 Oct. four boats of the 1st PT Boat
Flotilla made a torpedo attack on boats assembled on > Anapa • ■
roads. No details have been received yet... Four Italian PT •
boats put in to Nikolayev in the afternoon. The steamer
THEODERICH, which ran aground near Ochakov, was refloated
after lightening and put in to Odessa, While towing off the
THEODERICH a tug struck a mine and sank 200 m. northeast of
the point where she ran aground.
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22 Oct. I9V3
On 21 Oct. units of the Danube Flotilla on the Sava. were
several times fired on by machine-guns and small -arms 'from
the Bosnian and Croatian area. One man was badly wounded.
Gun trials of the heavy battery at Cape Khersones will be held
on 22 and 23 Oct.
Submarine U "9" is returning to Feodosiya from the operational
area. Escort poperations were carried out without incident.
Group South and Admiral, Black Sea have been instructed to
advise Naval Staff of their views and plans regarding the use
of naval forces (including naval landing c aft and. naval
artillery lighters) for the defense of th" Crimean coast against
enemy attempts at landing.
In accordance with the order received from Naval Staff (see
i/\Jar Diary 20 Oct 3 , Special Items I) Group South reports the
^following .preliminary considerations in agreement with Admiral,
'Black Sea about preparations for further supplies to and
possible evacuation of the Crimea by seas
"1, If all large freighters which are at present available in
the Black Sea, 9 auxiliary sailing vessels, 20 tugs, 5 freight-
train ferries, 25 lighters and 85 naval landing craft are
used from Rumanian ports to ports in the Crimea or vice versa
and if weather and convoy conditions are normal, it will be
possible to transport 2c,300 tons daily, as required. Losses
will, however, reduce the volume accordingly. It must be
expected that the quantity transported will fall to 1,500 tons
daily in case of bad weather and winter conditions (especially
from January to April).
•2..- The present Black Sea shipping and tanker's available will
make it possible to supply or evacuate 280 tons. of furnace oil
and fuel daily „ This is based, on previous experiences regard-
ingtimes taken for the round trip.
r
3« a. Feodosya (capable of handling up to 1,000 tons daily)
must be included, since transhipment facilities by rail and
truck at Sevastopol are limited to 1,5'00 - 1,800 -tons daily.
< b. Yalta, Ak Mechef and Eupatoria are only suitable to
a certain .extent, as further alternative ports owing to lack
of rail connections. Priority construction of a breakwater
at Eupatoria will be necessary. (.It is planned to sink a
Russian monitor as part of this breakwater) ,
h. While the Danube is frozen, Bulgarian ports must also
be used as discharging and loading ports; if small ships are
used a large '••:...
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.: -317-
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22 Oct. 19^3
number of breakdowns must be expected from Constanta on, since
lighters and tugs have only been made provisionally seaworthy."
VIII . Situation East Asia
Nothing to report.
^* ^f» ^f> ^^ ^^ ^P ^^ ^^ ^1* ^P ^^ ^F ^^ *5*^^p ^^ T^ T^ ^^S ^p ^T*
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23 Oct. 19^3
Items of Political Importance
Considerable porgress is aaid to have been made at the Moscow
talks, according to Reuter. The Coneference is presided over
by Molotov. "The Times" writes that the impression is that
the statesmen have already reached a closer agreement than
has ever existed between the three Governments before.
The British press shows anxiety about the slow advance made in
Italy Terrain difficulties and bad weather are no longer
accepted as a reason*
According to an "Exchange" report regardi" ± Mountbatten's
visit to Chiang Kai-Chek, a campaign on ^and against the Japanese
in Burma is not to be expected as much as an amphibious
operation which might lead to the conquest of Burma, Indo-China,
Si am and Cantoru
Conference on the Situation with Chief of Staff, Nav al Staff
I • ^rmy Situat ion
Further advance by the enemy at the centers of attack in
the southern and central sector of the eastern front was
halted by very stubborn defense A strong counter-attack by
our troops in the area of Smolensk j however, failed. Our losses
were heavy. In the northern sector, where a large-scale
enemy attack has been expected for the last ten days, everything
was still quiet today.
In southern Italy a large-scale attack was repulsed in our
main defense line. Three of our divisions have formed a
large pocket in the area of Ljubljana, where mopping-up is
in progress.
II. According to a report by Chief, Operations Branch and
Army Liaison and Land Warfare Section, Operations Division
on the withdrawal of naval personnel from the Crimea for
the Adriatic (see War Diary 20 Oct,, Special Items II) Chief
of Staff, Naval Staff has decided that the men, about 500
in number, now stationed in the area of Genichesk are to
remain there for the present. The remainder are, however,
to be withdrawn as reinforcement for Adriatic eoascal defense,
in accordance with the instructions of Group South,
Otherwise no special reports and decisions.
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23 Oct. 19^3
Special Items
I. In reply to the request by Quartermaster Division regarding
withdrawal of a naval artillery battalion from France for
Italy, Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff has decided
as already advised for information, that weakening of our
position in Northern France by setting up a naval artillery
battalion for Italy cannot be agreed to.
II. Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff requests
High Command, Navy to issue an order directing that ships !
anti-aircraft guns participate in air defense while ships are
in port or on the roads.
This matter will be dealt with further by Quartermaster Division,
III .Naval Staff lias issued the following instructions to Group
South, Commander , Submarines, Mediterranean, Admiral, Aegean,
admiral, Adriatic and German Naval Command, Italy, with regard
to the question raised by Group South regarding control of
submarines in the Mediterranian:
"Present control of submarines:
1 Commander, Submarines is responsible for conducting
submarine warfare in the Mediterranean.
2. Commander, Submarines will advise all Commanding
Admirals whose areas are affected of the movements
and operations of submarines *
3. The local Naval Commanders will advise the necessary
Air Force Commands.
1 +. In case of special operations, Naval Staff will •
order transfer of the tactical control of the
submarines assigned for the operation in question
to the local Naval Commander, e.g. the intended
operation by submarine U "565" in the Aegean Sea.
5. Commander , Submarines will establish and try out
communication with Admiral, Adriatic at once with .
Admiral, Aegean before the start of the operation
by submarine U "565" in the Aegean Sea.
6. Commander, Submarines will despatch one of his
officers to Admiral, Aegean for the operation by
submarine U "565"."
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23 Oert. 19V3 ■
IV. The Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping states, in
connection with the transfer of barges to the southeast area,
that it is planned first to transfer 150 freight "barges and
20-25 tank barges from the Belgian and French areas to the
Black Sea via Dresden and Ingolstadt e Furthermore, investiga-
tions are being .made as to whether it will be possible to
transfer 30 Seine tankers in parts by rail to Nikplayev.
Finally, it is planned to transfer 7 auxiliary coastal
sailing vessels to the Black Sea by the route Rhine-Main-Lud-
wigs Canal-Danube. ..' '■'<
No small merchant vessels will be transferred at present from
the Western Mediterranean to the Adriatic Sea on the overland
route Genoa-Piacenza, since there are sufficient small vessels
available in the Adriatic Sea
CI «
V. The deputy of the Naval (Ship) Construction Division for
the building of war transports at Nikolayev has asked Op?£ations
Division for a decision on whether final work on the completed
war transports, KT "17" and "23 ;i , which will take a week,, is to
be carried out or whether it is to be postponed for about six
weeks until a netlayer is completed, as requested by Admiral,
Black Sea. In view of the fact that the final work on the war
transports will only take eight days whereas repair of the
netlayer will require six weeks v Operations Division has
decided that the war transports '.should be completed first*
The order in question, 1/skl 29631A3 Gkdos,, is contained in
War Diary, Part B, Vol. -V.
VI. Baval Intelligence Division reports in its "Evaluation of
Intelligence on Foreign Navies" on serial production of LCa's
and on U.S„ landing engineers. Copy as per 1/Skl 32609 and
32195A3 geh in War Diary "Evaluation of Intelligence on
Foreign Navies".
VII „ The Intelligence Service has submiatted photostat copies
of Portuguese Consular reports of 16, 1" and -18 Sept, from
Exeter, Leicester, Brington, .Norwich arid Bath, which deal with
the question of an enemy landing from southern. England All
reports describe very .forcibly the obvious indications., of and
observations on preparations for an imminent large-scale .
operation in the Channel, . One of. these reports states that
there is nothing, to show that the .plan to attempt an offensive
in the Channel and the North Sea has 'bean given up e The
movement of troops from the interior into the tien prohibited
coastal area shows, it is stated, that the plan s i ill exists
unless it is an immense bluffintended to necessitate strong
German forces being- tied down on the French coast while the
attack is carried out on another front, The author does not
feel inclined to come to this conclusion, since he does not
believe that such a large number of personnel and quantity
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23 Oct. 191*3
of materiel are involved solely for a strategic ruse. It
remains to be investigated whether the Consular reports them-
selves do not represent a very much easier method of tying-
down German forces. Naval Intelligence Division has, however,
so far no reason to doubt the authenticity of the reports.
Armed Forces High Command, Intelligence Division, Naval
Liaison is of the same opinion,
VIII. In May 19*+3 Operations Division drew up considerations
on a possible war with Sweden, Copy as per 1/Skl 1568A3 Gkdos
Chefs, in War Diary, Part C, Vol. Ill;
In view of the latest developments in the situation it now
seems advisable to investigate and decide what measures
would arise for the Navy in case Sweden should enter the war
on the enemy side and according to what points of view a
war against Sweden can and must be waged by us. The above
mentioned consid rations have therefore been sent to Group
North/Fleet with the request to submit a study as soon as
possible which takes into consideration that Sweden r s entry
into the war may also coinside with a British landing in
southern Norway, Jutland or western Sweden. Only the most
limited investigations and Naval Commands, Baltic and Norway
are to participate to the extent necessary.
Situation 23 Oct .
I . War in Foreign Waters
1. Enemy Situation ;
Nothing to report.
2. Own Situation ;
The Naval Attache in Tokyo is instructed that submarine
DOMMES is to put out via Penang in order to receive codes and
for consultations with the commanders of the MONSUN boats on
mutual experiences. Naval Staff has agreed to empty torpedo
tubes of submarine DOMMES and the MONSUN boats being loaded
with rubber.
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23 Oct. 19^3
II. Situation West Area
1. Enemy Situation s
Over the Bay of Biscay 3*+' planes were detected on operation
as far as 18° 30 ? W, One British vessel each was located
at 0917' in BF V766
. -. at 1015 .in BF >+290
. at llJf6 in BF 3V70 ,.. ' :
at 1856 in BE 5330 ■.-
at 1930 in AL 6670 : ':
at 2056 in CF 3130 '. : A
. • . at 2351 in AL 6770 ..-.:•
Our air reconnaissance sighted at 0905 in BE 6535 a, convoy of
seven merchantmen on. course h0°» - .. ..
Targets were several times located "between 0027 and 023Vin-
the Channel about 10-12 miles northeast to north of Los Se.pt
lies. • ': ....
2. Own Situations , ■■■ ■'
Atlantic Coast
One submarine was escorted in to Brest B Eight Spanish
fishing vessels, suspected of carrying radar on board, were
searched without result by two patrol vessels ten miles north
of San Sebastian. . .■ A
Channel Coast ; ■•'.,.',
The l+th Torpedo Boat Flotilla, acting as remote escort
for the convoy of the MJENSTERLaND , had a .vrief but successful
engagement with an enemy cruiser and destroyer at 01^3 in BF
2916 (north of Les Sept lies). The cruiser was sunk by
torpedo and two destroyers were torpedoed- Sinking of at
least one of the two is probable. Our boats'" -suffered no
damage or casualties. The convoy arrived safely at Lezardrieux c
For brief action report of . Commander, *+th Torepdo Boat Flotilla ■
see teletype' l 1 +05o . Chief, Naval Staff has expressed special' '
appreciation to the ^th Torpedo Boat Flotilla.
In view of the continuation of this- escort operation-, the
Commander of the Flotilla has proposed that the report on
this success should not be announced before 2h Oct* and that
participationof the torpedo boats should not -be desclosed*
Group West, however, considers an immediate publication
advisable, contrary to the opinion of Commander, Vth Torpedo
Boat Flotilla.
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•
CONFIDENTIA L
23 Oct. 19^3
Operations Division has ordered that the request of the .Commander
be complied with.
The convoy of the steamer NORDVAARD. left Dieppe at 18^5 for
Boulogne. The convoy of the MDENSTERLAND will be transferred
during the night of 23 Oct. from Lezardrieux to Cherbourg „ F
Five boats of the *+th Torpedo Boat Flotilla left St. Malo at
1330 for reriiot escort and will subsequently proceed to Brest.
Nine boats of the 5th PT Boat Flotilla will provide further
remote escort.
The KONDOR, MOEVE, FALKE and T "lV" of the 5th Torpedo Boat
Flotilla are to proceed during -the- same night frmm Cherbourg
to Le Havre.
a torpedo operation from the. Hoof den. (northeastern entrance
to the English Channel, Tr.N.) by the 2nd, Vth, 6th and 8th
PT Boat Flotillas was planned against a northbound convoy on
the east coast This operation had to be. discontinued because
of, stormy weather. All. PT boats put in to I.jmuiden, Patrol
line positions were not taken up for the same reason.
Ill . North Sea, Norway, Northern Water s
<
North Sea s
Convoy "1183" Hook - Elbe was carried out" according to plan.
Minesweeping activity was hampered by stormy weather*
Norway. Northern Wat ers :
■ ■ I l 1 " - ■■■! ■■ !—»■ ! . . ■ .1.1 1 " ■ —
1 . Enemy Situation :
Over the Ncrth'Sea 25 planes were- detected on operation.
There was only minor gunfire and air activity in the Petsamo
and Vardoe areas on 21 and 22 Oct. According to a reconnaissance
report of the 5th Air Force, the coal mine on the southeastern
slope of Longyearbyen, is still burning, while 500 m. north-
east of the old brokendown transmitter. masts at: Tunheim on
Bear Island two new masts' 10 - 15 m.> high with antenna were,
observed.
.2. Q\m Situation ; ,' ■ . \ "f, • ...
Thirty-four ships were escorted north and 23 south.
Shortage of escorts delayed 2.9 ships- i';U.V
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
23 Oct. 19^3
IV. Skagerrak. Baltic Sea Entrance , Baltic Sea
1. Enemy Situation :
Nothing to report. ,
2. Own Situation ;
the boat IK "32" sank at 0300 in the north harbor dockyard
in Copenhagen, obviously owing to sabotage.
Otherwise nothing special to report.
V . Submarine Warfare
Anti-aircraft submarine U "271" reports that she was
attacked by a carrier-borne plane and four Catalinas on 21
Oct. at the supply point and sustained slight damage. On
22 Oct. submarine U "21V' sank a single vessel (7,000 G.R.T.)
in DP 6178. This submarine reports lively traffic near Colon
consisting of single vessels, some of which are escorted,
and continuous unskilled location from shore and at sea.
VI. Aerial Warfare
British Isles and Vicinity :
■ ■ i fc ■! 1— t w^ — — 1— ■ — ■— «■— — wmmmtamm i i 11 ■■■ ■ , n I , '
The 3rd Air Force reports 12 bombers, 16 heavy fighters
2h reconnaissance planes and 15*+ fighters out on operation
over the west area without special incident. • --■
In connection with the attack on*Cassel it is now reported
that our defense shot down 57 enemy planes for certain. At
' 1200 on 23 Oct. two Ju 88*s attacked nine fishing boats, .....
apparently Danish, outside the fishing grounds; the effect
was not observed. '..*'■";
"" During an attack on a convoy of seven LST's in BE 6590 four
FW 200 1 s probably sank one LST and heavily damaged .a second
one'.
During the night of 23 Oct. 39 of our planes were sent out
against Great Yarmouth and nine against London. Three Do
217 T s were lost.
During the day enemy planes machine-gunned trains in
western France. Single bombs were dropped on vessels off the
island of Cezembre v but- missed the targets. One Typhoon was
shot down.
-325- CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENT IAL
23 Oct. 19^3
Mediterranean Theater :
Our Air Force carried out reconnaissance .in the. Italian are^..
Towards evening 67 planes started out again for an attack on '
the harbor of Naples. No report has yet been received. In the
attack on the eastbound convoy off Tenes 3 He Ill's and 2 Ju .: ,
88 ? s were lost; 15 planes were lost during the attack on Naples
on 22 Oct. , .
Air Force Command, Southeast reports altogether 30*+ planes out
on operations. Harbor installations of Leros and Porto Lago
were attacked without the effect being observed. West of Kos
a bomb was dropped close to an enemy destroyer »■ No report on
the result has. yet' been received. • ,.'
Four Spitfires approached Montenegro and 30 Lightnings flew"
into the Straits of . Otranto, of which 6 machine-gunned the
airfield of Tirana., All h Spitfires and 1 Lightning were shot
down in aerial combat.
The qenemy was very active over the' Italian front' and one
small airship, among other things, was sent in r , Attacks were
carried, out on railroad installations between Romeaand
Florence, the area Bologna-Venice-Bolzano and the airfield
of Guidonia near Rome. • .-, .
In the Greek area the airfield of Candia and the island of
Syros were- raid.;ed;-. Over the Dodecanese a heavy-fighter, patrol ...
by 3-5 planes and «. reconnaissance activity were observed,
Eastern Front: •'■ v . ; '■'... '.-,'.;■
A Swedish courier plane, was. shot down at 2300 oyer the
Skagerrak a The Air Force is. interested, (for- intelligence
reasons) in the maintenance, of courier communications between
Sweden and. England. If a furthervintensificatipn. .of night
fighter activity over the Skagerrack- should cause Sweden to
discontinue her courier service, the Air^orce intends to
propose that Swedish courier planes make an intermediate
landing at Aalborg' by day.rn Commander in :Chief,> Air Force
enquires: how the' Navy reacts to : - tjais, proposal in view of our
convoy and patrol traffic.
In the Black Sea photographic, reconnaissance of _po: ',s,was
carried out. For re suits-/, see Enemy Situation Black Sea and .
Daily Situation.
VII . Warfare in the Mediterranean and.B&ack Sea
1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean: '
In the morning 19 LCT T s left Gibraltar for the Atlantic
-326- CONFIDENTIAL
23 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL
and h transports with troops, 15 freighters and ltanker .left
for the Mediterranean. One AURORA class was reported putting
in from the Atlantic. At 17^5 a convoy of 21 freighters and
h tankers with h escort vessels and k corvettes passed through
the Straits of Gibraltar bound for the Atlantic. Of this
convoy 10 ships and the k corvettes put in to Gibraltar.
No shipping movements were detected in the Western Mediterranean*
According to photographic reconnaissance, altogether 5^
merchantmen totaling about 300,000 G.R.T. and 2 large and 17
medium-sized landing boats were lying in Naples on 22, Oct.
In the Strait of Bonifacio heavy traffic consisting of small
vessels was observed and on the west coasts of Sardinia. and
Corsica on 22 Oct. for the first time heavy supply traffic.
In Ajaccio were lying 2 destroyers, 2 boats, apparently escort
vessels, and 3 small freighters. There was heavy enemy air
patrol over the west coast from the front line as far as
Civitavecchia.
No sighting reports have been received from the Eastern
Mediterranean.
2. Own Situation Mediterranean ;
Naval landing craft MFP " 5*+l" was torpedoed by a submarine
and sunk on the morning of 22 Oct. near the harbor of Imperia.
Thirteen men \\rere killed. Otherwise coastal traffic, was
carried out without incident. German Naval Command, Italy,
reported s
"Evacuation from central Italy of captured goods has started
at a great pace on the west coast. Commanding General,
Armed Forces, South now requires also large supplies by sea
because of the increased danger from the air to the overland
supply routes. Owing to the great danger from the air by
day and lack of protection from our own fighters, ships can-
not easily make round trips sincd only night passage is still
possible. Ports are also very open to air attacks during
the day. Anti-aircraft guns are knot available in general.
Siebel ferries and naval landing craft shot down six enemy
planes between 11 and 29 Sept."
Sighting of 1^0' enemy planes' near Olbia indicates that there
is a large number of planes based on the airfields of Sardinia
and .'Corsica.
German ^aval Command, Italy reports with reference to the
instructions of Operations Division of 21 Oct.s
"1. The vessels SALVORE, SAN GIORGIO nnd F "1^9" at
pres present lying in Venice are indispensable, if the
task arising here in coastal traffic for Commanding
General, Armed Forces, South and Army Group B- are
to be carried out. ■ The SAN GIORGIO is at present
•-327- ■■
. . ■ CONFIDENTIAL
«
♦
CONFIDEN TIAL-
23 Oct.. 19^3
. being equipped as a minelayer so that the most
urgent barrages in inshore waters can be laid,
With order 0p e 36rGkdos. Chefs. Group South placed
these vessels temporarily at bur 'disposal for
operations here. .
2. The AUDACE will require at least two weeks for
trials after her crew is complete, since, for
instance, men of Branch. II are almost all engineers.
The boat will not be ready '' for- -minelaying operations
until the first half of November. '■'■'■ - ■ ■'■■
3« Please confirm that the boats mentioned will romair
und e r G e rman . N a v a 1 . C omm and , I taly un t i 1 the tasks
■ here are completed ;" " : "~- ■ •• '
Group Sout states in his connection: .
"le From the vessels allotted to It by Operations
Division, Group South agreed to make .operational
vessels of Admiral, Adriatic, from time to time ■ ■■ ...
temporarily available tq German Naval- Command, Italy..
Group South must, however, reserve the right to decide
whether vessels can be made available. ',-'.'.
■ v.- ■ . .,. .
2. Therefore all vessels, whether still being equipped
or already in operational readiness, are solely at
the disposal of Admiral, Adriatic until- Group South
can make a decision on the basis of definite operations,
. fixed as to time and location, which; are submitted'
by German Naval Command, . Italy , ■■■-■-'.
3 e Especially with regard to the AUDACE^ manning,
training and decision as to' her operational readiness
must rest with Admiral,' Adriatic., .After Group- South
'. has advised German Naval Command, Italy of her ...-.■'
operational readiness, the latter can submit a re-
quest accordingly," ,. '"■'.'.
Naval Staff thereupon despatched the ' following order to German
Naval Command, 'Italy, with copy to .Group South and Admiral,
Adriatic 1 • . :■
"German Naval Command, Italy has .been advised fully of
the extent and. great importance of the new tasks assigned
to Admiral, Adriatic 9 - The three torpedo boats and six
vessels of the 11th Coast Patrol Flotilla' will hardly
suffice for these tasks., German Naval Command, Italy
must therefore try to carry out its operations as far as
possible with the means available. -to it* As regards
the torpedo boat AUDACE,. directed agreement is to be
■ arrived at with Admiral, Adriatic:,.. ■>:$£ aval Staff agrees
■■' to the AUDACE being left at the disposal of German
Naval Command, Italy until about the' middle of November"
'■- : -328- ' ■ r ...' CONFIDENTIAL
23 Oct, .19^3 .. CONFIDENTIAL
:" ■•- .f or minelaying operations planned on the east coast of
Italy.:": ' .•* .;j
The hospital ships DJENNE and SINAI A put in to Marseilles at
0800. .:•:■; r ::■• ■
3« Area Naval Group ^outh :
a. Adriatic Sea :-.
Enemy Situation;
According to a report from the Naval Attache in Istanbul
of 15 Oct.. the (Japanese, Tir.N.) Military Attache in Ankara
deduces from reports regarding withdrawal of several divisions
of the 9th British Army from the Near East to southern Italy
that a large-scale Allied attack on the Aegean Sea and Greece
has been postponed until further notice and that the transfer
to Italy signifies preparations for an operation against the
Balkans via the Adriatic Sea.
Our own data confirms the withdrawal of two divisions of the
9th Army to the Italian area. The conclusions drawn by the
Japanese are, however, in no way sound. For details see order
1/S'kl 31922A3 geh. in VJar Diary, Part C, Vol . XIV.
Own Situation; .'■'■•■.
Our air reconnaissance sighted four small merchantmen at
"112 1 + on 23 Oct. off the island of Vis and at 1150 35 miles
northwest of Dubrovnik. Operations for occupation of the
islands of Cirje and Murtes (off Sibenik) have started.
Cirje-North was occupied at 1500. Guns on Murtes were
destroyed. :
The steamer BQjaNO and aRSIA, en route from Durazzo to Cattaro,
have been overdue since the .evenings of 20 and 21 Oct, respecti-
vely. Apparently the latter was seized by British destroyers
on 22 Oct. She was seen in tow at 0800 on 22 Oct. near Cape
Rodoni .
Port Commander, Sibenik reports 1 torpedo boat, 1 minelayer,
2. submarine chasers, 2 minesweepers and 3 small tugs. in
operational readiness, and 1 PT boat, 2 minesweepers and
several other small vessels in need of repairs,
b. Aegean Sea ;
:.- ffnemy Situation : ...... - • .
According to air reconnaissance, at 1^+5 there were one
crMser and two destroyers about. 120 miles southeast of
Scarpanto on course 3^0°. During the day eight reconnaissance
planes were detected over the Aegean Sea,
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
23 Oct. 19^3
O.wn Situation:
The island. of Stampalia has been in our hands since noon
on 22 Octo The entire garrison consisted of 670 Italians and
100 British, .Forty -eight German survivors were liberated,,
From the Aegean Islands altogether 29,^5*+ Italian and British
prisoners were evacuated to the mainland by sea up to 22 Oct.
About 6,000 men were drowned through enemy action from these
transports.
Motor tanker ME "3" has been detained^by Turkey in the Dardanelles.
Investigation is under way. Convoy traffic in the Aegean Sea
proceeded according to plan and. without incident „
c. Black Sea ; ■•'.•'•
^ --■ ■ Enem y Situation : ".'
Group South reports that, according to photographic
reconnaissance, the number of vessels in harbors of the Sea of
Asov has increased to about 17 landing vessels and 2h small
naval vessels since 10 Oct, . Some of these landing vessels were
brought to Yeisk by rail". : The transport capacity of the land-
ing vessels is estimated to be sufficient for about 2,000
men. About 70 landing vessels and 35 small naval vessels have
been detected at Black Sea ports, their disposition within
the harbors varying . Transport capacity is estimated to be
sufficient for about 2, 5'00 men. Most of these vessels are
assembled at Anapa.
Own Situation : .,....,•,.-,..•.,..
In the operation by the 1st PT Boat Flotilla against
Anapa during the night of 22 Oct., in conjunction with night
reconnaissance, torpedoes were fired against berths of the
vessels located by air reconnaissance e Several torpedoes
detonated and fires lasting a short while were subsequently o
observed.
At 1700 four boats of the 1st PT Boat Flotilla left again on
an operation against shipping targets off Anapa and against
supply traffic off the coast* The patrol line positions off
Genichesk and south of the Kerch Peninsula were taken up
during the nights of 22 and 23 Oct. and during the night of
23 oct. positions in the Strait of Kerch also,
There were no special incidents during the night of 22 Oct.
A ground mine was swept 25 miles eastnortheast of Odessa.
Convoy traffic was carried out - as planned .
CONFIDENTIAL
-330-
CONFIDENTIAL
23 Oct. I9V3 ■
According to a directive from Armed Forces High Command,
Operations Staff to Army Group A, the Fuehrer has,' Th view of
the exceptional importance of the Crimea as a corner-stone of
the eastern front, now ordered extension to the entire Crimean
fortress of the : authority- for the coastal. areas given to
Commanding General, Army Group A through Directive No.^O
as regards the Commands of the branches of the Armed Forces,,
civilian offices and untis and organizations outside the
Armed forces. Commanding General, Army Group A has been,
authorized to transfer this extended authority to the Command-
ing General of the 17th Army.
VIII. Situation East Asia
The Naval Attache in Tokyo reports, on the basis of informa-
tion received from the Japanese Admiralty:
"A submarine-borne plane detected the following on YJ Oct.- at
Pearl Harbor: h battleships, h aircraft carriers, 5 cruisers
and 17 destroyers. Another submarine-borne plane sighted
on 19 Oct.. at Suwa (Fiji Islands) :' 8. transports, 1 destroyer-'
and 17 corvettes. Enemy reports, about the air attacks on .
Rabaul are ■ greatly esaggerated. On 12 Oct. only one large
ship- was 'sunk and a few damaged \ only 19 grounded planes
were destroyed. The situation in the area of Finschhafen has
improved; there has. been continuous and successful support- •_.-•;
by the Japanese Air Forces." •;..•
«^, «^, ^. +\, y *Xm -Jir ^r -^-. -X* -^r ~£r -Jf «^ ^L- ^i- •J^ 3^ yLr ^tg
CONFIDENTIAL
^331-
«
- *■ ■ ■■ ■ CONFIDENTI AL
2h Oct. 19^3
Items of Political Importance ■ "
■ I ■ !-■■ m — — ■■■ I. !!■■!■■» ■■■Ill II II I I ■lllll ■ ■ II II* Ml -I. ■■WII^HI
"Exchange Telegraph" reports from Moscow that the course of
the Conference so far- has strengthened the impression that
Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt will meet before the end of
the year. "Exchange Telegraph" is obviously endeavoring in
its reports, on the Conference to create the impression that
the discussions are proceeding favorably, as a matter of
fact nothing is divulged regarding the actual course of
affairs. .'"..'
Conference o n the Situa tion with Chief of Staff, Naval 'Staff
————fi — P— — C— i ■»— — II I I.I 1» — I ■ «l !■■ I i— ^— — m I —— ^»a— — ■p— w—™iw*ww V I W^W^W#M««—i^— ^M^W— »— I— »
No special reports or decisions.
Special Items . .,'.
I. Naval Intelligence Division in Enemy Situation Report No.
20A-3 of 20 Oct. estimates the 'situation as a whole as. follows :
"According to reliable reports, transfers of troops from the
United States to Great Britain are continuing* No indication
is given by direct observation as to the volume. The concent-
ration of forces in southern England for some time now
definitely seems to have been maintained. The assembly of
landing craft in the same area is reported from various reliabl;
sources. There, are-- also authentic' reports ' on the assembly of
a considerable freighter reserve (allegedly about ^.00 , 000 •• -
500,000G.R.T.) on the west;' coast of England. These' freighters
are loaded with war materiel and ready for immediate use a
Even if the absence of adequate air 'reconnaissance; does, not
permit a clear picture of the volume of landing craft and ■■
large ships assembled, in the English area, all information
indicates that enemy preparations for a decisive attack against
northern and western Europe 'are making 'constant progress *■ No
concrete information is available about the -date of ■ the attack
planned and its direction. It must be emphasized -that a
continuous hindrance through weather conditions to operations
by sea either in the northern area or in western Europe may
not be presumed even in the coming winter months, . :
In the North Atlantic, bases on two' Azores' islands have been
ceded by Portugal to the Western Powers. The gap- in. the air
patrol' of the Central North Atlantic, which so far could nnly
be bridged-over provisionally by plane s from; auxiliary- carriers
can now be closed by planes from thV Azores. Through the;.: •. ■
CONFIDENTIAL
-332'-
CONFIDENTIAL
2h Oct. 19^3
newly acquired bases a chain of airfields for land-based planes
is formed on the periphery of the North Atlantic, which will
shortly be under enemy air control along its whole length..-
This offers enemy merchant shipping in the North Atlantic, apart
from increased air escort, greater facilities for scattering
traffic pver the center of the North Atlantic.
In the Mediterranean indications of future, enemy planes are
very difficult to conclude owing to less freauent insight into
landing craft and- shipping, at the enemy ports.; At present no
concentrations for new operations are reported.
It is expected that future enemy operations in the Central
Mediterranean will be aimed at" the Dalmatian- Albanian coast.
Therefore the Apulia-n harbors situated closest to this area .
require'dspecial attention.' '
In the We stern Mediterranean increased movements observed dur-
ing the last few days in the Corsica area are worthy of note.
Increased and continuous appearance of enemy surface forces
in the Aegean Sea indicates that the enemy intends to "hold this
aea area. It must be expected that the enemy will recapture
the islands lost in the Dodecanese and that enemy positions
will gradually advance further to the north along the Turkish
coast,"
■ With ...regard to the convoy situation in the Mediterranean,
Naval Intelligence Division states:
"Supply traffic to the Mediterranean^ was carried out as planned..
No troops were transferred. Between ,1 and 15 Oct. about 1,000,000
G.R.T. o.f freighters and about 200,000 G.R.T. of tankers
were transferred to the Mediterranean, while in the same
period about 500,000 G.R.T. of freighters and 80,000 G.R.T . of
tankers left the Mediterranean again through the Straits of
Gibraltar.
Photographic reconnaissance of West Algerian ports, carried
out in the middle of October, confirmed the presumed disposi-
tion of large ships in the Western Mediterranean (about 1,000-
000 G.R.T.).
Landing craft were withdrawn from the Mediterranean for. the
first time on 19 Oct. when 21 LCT's left for Gibraltar or .
the Atlantic (9for the Atlantic) . The significance of this - i
movement, which has so far been limited, cannot yet be
ascertained.
No definite information has been received on the exyent of . ."._"
traffic through the Mediterranean to and from the Indian ". .''.
Ocean. ; " " . ■ '. .-. ,
-333- CONFIDENTIAL
+
♦
CONFIDENTI AL
2k Oct. 19^3
Theoretically it is considered likely that at present about
>+50,000 G.RoT. monthly of freighters from the former Cape .
traffic are at present passing through the Mediterranean in
both directions. No through-traffic in tankers is assumed i:
*
II. In connection with carrying out the Fleet Construction
Program 19*+3 j experiences gained in cooperation with the
Main Committee have shown that it is unnecessary to establish ■...••
special departments within the Naval (Ship) Construction
Division. The Ministry of Armament and : W.ir Production therefore
agrees that the independent departments,' subordinated as
regards technical matters to the Main Committee, .be dissolved
and that the tasks again be taken over by the groups "of
the Division. Effective immediately, the former organization
of the 'Naval (Ship) Construction Division is therefore re- . : ,-
established.
Situation 2k Oct .
I . War in Foreign Wa ters •
1 , Enem y Situ ation s
Nothing to report,
2- Own Situations
The Naval Attache in Tokyo reports. that the Japanese; ■■
Navy agrees to the proposal of Naval Staff as per Radiogram
2130 on 16 Oct. (see War Diary 16 Oct-.).,
The C mmander of the T'ANNS has been instructed to make the
necessary arrangements' at Singapore with' the captain of the
BOGOTA. ,.'■■■ \'. •' • ;•■■•'
II. Situation West Area ' : •• '
~ • ...
1* • Ene my Si tu ation ; ._ •-■ ., ..•.. r, ■'.;.;': • -.■:■*:■■■
Over the Bay of Biscay 51 planes were detected on
operation as far as lk° W*- One British vessel was located- at
1635 in BF. ^630. and one at 1902- in BE.399Q. , "■';'■' -.:•;•;. ■'."•;-■
Our air reconnaissance sighted at 1122 in BE 5925 a convoy • r .
of 30 merchantmen and 5 escort vessels on course 210°,
Our air reconnaissance sighted , at 1-515 on. 23- Oct, 3- rubber ■
dinghies and 1 large rowing boat, unmanned, at the scene of ;
the. engagement, of., the Vth. Tropedo- Boat Flotilla. in BF 1921.
The Sea Rescue Service at Brest sighted some further wreckage
-33^r ' •• - ' L; "' '. CONFIDENT IAL ".' ■>
2*+ Oct. 19^3
2. Own Situation ;
Atlantic Coast;
CONFIDENTIAL
Off the bases three submarines were escorted out and
four in. Five boats of the *+th Torpedo Boat Flotilla put in
to Brest at 0900. Minesweeper M ,,L m-3" ran aground on 23 Oct.-
at the inouth of the Ad our and is probably lost.
Submarine chaser "1^03" was lost from sight at 0315 in BF 5J>12,.
when returning from anti-submarine escort. A search revealed
wreckage. One officer and M? of the crew were brought ashore '
at Concarneau by a French fishing smack. No particulars
have yet been received
Channel Coast ;
Transfer of the NORDVaARD from Dieppe as far as Boulogne
was carried out as planned.
The convoy of the iMUSNSTERLAND put in to Cherbourg at 0V30.
The torpedo boats KONDOR, MO EVE, FALKE and T M lV« of the 5th
Torpedo Boat Flotilla were tranferred from Cherbourg t.o
Le Havre.
The 5th PT Boat Flotilla was sent out, without success, against
targets located south of Alderney, presumably PT boats in
waiting position. The Flotilla put in to Cherbourg. It is
planned to transfer it to Boulogne during the night of 2h .
Oct. Five boats of the 18th Patrol ^oat Flotilla were
unsuccessfully bombed by an enemy plane at 2205 on 23 Oct.
while en route from Boulogne to Dieppe.
A raid was carried out by 2*+ planes on the harbor of Cherbourg
between 1513 and 1531... The steramer Muensterland was set on
fire, one patrol boat sunk and the boiler ship in the arsenal
destroyed.
During the night of 2^ Oct. the 2nd, hth and 6th and 8th" PT
Boat Flotillas started a torpedo operation from the Hoofden
jagainst a northbound convoy off the east, coast of England.
The operation begins to appear in radio traffic' intercepted.
At the request of Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff,'
Navy, Group West's weather report with regard to the possibility
of landing on the Atlantic and Channel coasts will be passed
on daily at 1930 to Armed Forces High Command, Operations
Staff until further notice.
1
Ill , North Sea. Norway. Northern Wat pes
North Sea;
-335- CONFIDENTIAL
2h Oct. 19^3 CON FIDENTIAL
Convoy Ml +66 M Elbe Hook consisting of h steamers and 13
escort vessels left the Elbe at 1300. Southwest of. Heligoland
one mine was swept. The 7th Minesweeper Flotilla and. the
9th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla have been sent out on minelaying
operation "Fasold" .
Nor way, No r thern Waters ;
1. Enemy Sit uation;
•■ '
Over the N.orth Sea 26 planes were detected on operation.
On the evening of 23 Oct. an enemy penetration was reported .
north, of Sogne F'jord.
2 • Own Situations
Twenty- six ships were escorted north and 20 south.
^ Altogether 13 ships were delayed owing to lack of escorts,.
Naval Command, Norway has submitted the following , new barrage
plans? ...... ...;.""-. • ■■■•■ ■••' - '
"1. Laying of five new flanking barrages In order to' reinforce
those in the area between the. islands of Fugloey, Arnoey
and Mager oey,
2. Laying of the anti-sweeping devices 'already approved but
not yet supplied in front of the new flanking barrages or
the ones already laid.
3. Reinforcement of the Rognsund barrage "Nfa f" ». ' ' <; :
h. Measures during the dockyard, period of the. TIRPIT-Z;
a. • Laying -of a ^arrage'in the' Vargsund,,
b. •- .Minelaying of ■ the ;St jernsund northeast of Skarvsk.jaer ■■■■'■
. ••■ in case, of emergehceyV " ' '
5* In addition, correspondence Is .being" exchanged between . - ■
Naval Command, Norway ■ and the Task Force ". about 'a staircase
barrage in Alta Fjord." ; ;/ '.'-..,.'.. .../, •• ■•;■ ;: ; .
Naval Staff has decided' with regard 'to" the above request: as '■'■
follows: '■ "• -'; • ; ; -'''..'.. .-.« ' ' : " ■
'..■«*" * , - ■ ■ \"n ' • '
"Re 1. t The projected- reinforcement' of the outer barrages' has ; • '
no direct connection, with; -the defense of Alta Fgordj •';<■
it ffiannot prevent suj?afce forces entering by the deep '*■■•■
.waterway through the Loppa passage, which it must
be assumed is known to the enemy*. Similarly it
will be impossible to- -prevent- the "penetration of
submarines through by-passing or diving under, the... A.,.:-
barrages. The barrages in question were only reinforced
this year and must, therefore, ..be regarded still 'as
-336- "..,"'",'; CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
2h Oct. 19^3 ~ —
effective. The mine situation as a whole prohibits
a new reinforcement before' the stormy winter, weather
sets in # , -\ r ■
re. 2. Allocation of EMR mines has started; further supplies
of about 200 mines monthly can be expected.
re. 3. Mine reinforcement of the Rognsund approved. ■ -
re. h. Group North/Fleet should state its views. Closing
of the Vargsund means foregoing the special advantage
of second outlet from Alta Fjord; additional mine-
ing of the Stjernsund (Naval Command, Norway should
report on ,the exact position of the barrage) will
mean complete closing of Alta Fjord for operational
vessels.
re. 5. Proposals are awaited."
IV. Skagerrak. Baltic Sea Entrances. Baltic Sea
1. Enemy Situation:
Our patrol at the "Seeigel" barrage had an engagement off'.
Namsi Bank between 13^7 and l^fl^ with an enemy minesweeper
group of 2h vessels which, after putting up a smoke screen,
withdrew to the north.
2. Own Situation:
In the area of Commanding admiral, Defenses, Baltic 3*+
vessels were out sweeping channels in the Baltic Sea entrance
and Ik in the Baltic Sea. West of Cape Kullen three ELM/J
mines were swept. The destroyers BEIT ZEN and Z "33 1 ' put in
to Kristiansand South at 05*+5. The extensive escort service
in the entire Baltic Sea area. was. carried out without incident.
The 1st Motor Minesweeper Flotilla' together with five naval
landing craft laid barrage "Seeigel Villa" as planned. Motor
minesweeper R "120" sustained heavy damage .probably through *'
striking a displaced Russian mine (moved from its original
position during sweeping, Tr.N. ). The chartered' Swedish
tanker SVEa REUTEER, on which emergency repairs following
a torpedo hit were carried out at Riga, will be towed by the
tug WOTAN to Stockholm via Kalmar on 2b Oct. Naval Command,
Baltic is informed that Naval Staff attaches special importance
to safe transfer of the ship, since the damage she sustained
already gave rise at the time, to difficulties with Sweden.
V. Submarine Warfare
Submarine U "170" : reports sinking a freighter (^,500 G.R.T .)
-in GA 3§» Otherwise nothing to report from the Atlantic and
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2k Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL
Indian Oceans.
.VI„ : Aerial Warfare
British Isles and Vicinity
t 6 '■ ■'...'
Six bombers of the 3rd Air Force attacked London during
the night of 2k Oct. dropping *+,l tons of high- ex plosive bombs.
During the day single enemy planes flew into Germany on
reconnaissance as far as the areas of Ealberstadt and Osnabrueck.
In Holland three airfields were attacked and slight damage
sustained. Airfields In BelgTurr'and/Northern France were
also attacked by strong forces., At Montdider damage was such
that the airfield is out of service. Three of tha attacking
planes were shot down. Strong formations attacked an air-
field in Western France and' also "the 'arsenal' and the harbor
railroad station. at Cherbourg,, Altogether., seven planes were
shot down* In the evening 100 planes flew into the Heligoland
Bight- as far as Heligoland itself, probably on a minalaying'
operation* Thirty enemy planes dropped single bombs over the'
Rhine-iAfestphalian industrial area.
Medj t er r ane an The at er :
The 2nd Air Force reports 90 bombers., on operation against
Naples; kk planes were over the target. Because of bad-
weather 32 bombers broke off the operation and landed in
southern Germany, Twelve planes have not returned yet/ Results
of the -raid have not yet been received „ Strong night 'fighter
activity was encountered over the target area. ; : . l
Seven bombers of Air Force Command ,-- Southeast attacked \ :
shipping ' targ-et area. ; '
Seven bombers of. Air Force Command,. Southeast attacked"' shipping-
targets hear Leros. A small .freighter was. sunk and another-,'
damaged* Close hits, were also observed, on :an- auxiliary- ship. :: •
Seven other bombers successfully attacked the off ice. of- -the
Naval Command at Porto Largo P Fighting on land- by our- troops
on .Levi tha was supported by 8 bombers and 5 diver-bombers.
There was a flight by 100 enemy bombers and. 60 .'fighters from
the Italian" front via the Adriatic. Sea, Lake Balatan, west of
Bratislava, Vienna, Leobeh and Agram into the ..area of 'Wieher-
Beustadt.
Several- bombs were dropped on small towns in Hungary and 50-30
high-explosive bombs on Ebonfurt, No concentrated attacks
could be carried out because, of fog*' Our; fighters scored no
success for the same reason.' *" ; "' ""
Several enemy planes were observed in the area of Bologna- '■ .
Florence. ,it noongighways, rail installations and bridges
in the area south of Florence were raided. The airfield of
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2h Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL
of Tirana was put out of service by the last heavy air attack.
Three of our planes were destroyed and four damaged.
Our own as well as enemy planes carried out reconnaissance
in the Aegean area.
Eastern front ;
Nothing to report.
VII . Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea
1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean :
Two transports with troops aboard put in to Gibraltar from
the Atlantic on 23 Oct. One of these, a French transport, left
for the Mediterranean after a brief stay, escorted by three
destroyers. Altogether about 10,000 men are said to have been
aboard four transports which entered the Mediterranean on 23
Oct.
One LOT . and one minelaying cruiser put in to Gibraltar on
2k Oct. from the east. The AURORA class cruiser which arrived
at Gibraltar on 23 ^ct. went on into the Mediterranean.
According to the situation riport of Commanding General Armed
Forces, South, altogether 180 LCT's and LCG's are said to
have left for the Atlantic in the course of a few days up to
noon on 23 Oct. This figure is being checked by N aV al
Intelligence Division, since it does not correspond with our
data.
In the afternoon our air reconnaissance sighted only slight
traffic in the coastal area of Oran - Algiers. The number of
ships in Olbia and Maddalena showed a slight increase; the ..
number in Apulian harbors was still only slight; only at . 3ari
were there a few more landing craft, than previously detected.
At 0752 a submarine was spotted off Genoa in an unsuccessful:
attack on one of our convoys consisting of two steamers and
one war transport.
No reconnaissance reports have been received from the Eastern
Mediterranean.
2. Own Situation Mediterranean; j :■ .'•'■
A minelaying operation was carried out by naval landing craft
and motor minesweepers off the west coast of Italy as planned.
PT boats made a thrust in' the direction of Olbia. Bay as
flanking defense and. intercepted, four gunboats j although no
engagement took plaOe,- : :. ■■ \ ,. ; : v. .;.
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2h Oct. I9V3 . CONFIDENTIAL
<
Submarine: U ,,:i +53" carried out a minelaying operation off Brindidi
according to plan.
Coastal traffic was carried out without incident. The hospital •
ship GR.iDI.SCA, without any exchange prisoners of war aboard,
put in to .Marseilles on the afternoon of 23 Oct. The aQUILSJA
arrived at 1030 on 2m- Oct.
The DJENNE and AQUILEJA will leave Marseilles for Barcelona at
noon on 25' Oct « after taking on British exchange prisoners of
war. The GRADISCA, which consumed about 2,000 tons of coal
on her. empty run, will be ready- on 28 Oct c for return trip
from Marseilles, to Patras. . • .• ■
3. -ire a Naval Group South ; ■.. •
■a. Adriatic Sea :
Enemy Situation ;
According to air reconnaissance a steamer (about 3,000
GRT) was lying stranded 30 miles southeast of Cattaro at 1315
on 23 Oct. Five large ships of unknown nationality and type
were sighted at 1920 on 23 0ct o off Ml jet- (25- miles west of
Dubrovni.k) ; recognition signals were not answered and upon
subsequent shelling -they turned away to the north.
O wn Situation s
The island operation off Sibenik has been completed. About.
^0 small vessels were seized, prisoners brought in and' old guns
demolished. The Army has acknowledged the good cooperation
and support afforded by the Navy. - "
Minesweeping operations in the Faresina Channel were begun by
five motor fishing vessels with German gear. Defense is.- ' .
assured by an armored infantry regiment from shore. ...'•.■' . ;
The officers and men for the torpedo boat INSIDIOSO have- arrived
at Trieste r . '. ' . : . .■,::■ :■ -
In order to reduce shipping losses, orders' have been" issued that
ships are only to put out following reconnaissance and to proceed
along the 'coast in short stages-' . •. : : ■
a further 15 • 2 cm. battery: is reported ready for action at f>
Ancona. Railroad connection -with Pola has beeh restored since
22 Oct., according to advice received from Naval Shore Commander,
North Adriatic.. :"■..:..
The channel off Orsa, Bado Bay east of Pola and Medolino Bay
southeast of Pola may be considered. as, alternative bases for
motor minesweepers and PT boats. ' ; ''
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2k Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL
Group South has ordered:
"The 159 Croatian gunners who have been ready at Genichesk
since 3*+ Sept. to leave for Dalmatia are to be sent to Agram
at once. Report to the Croatian Naval Command at Agram."
The Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping has advised
Naval Staff that the Deputy for German Sea Transportation in
the Mediterranean regards as premature the proposal of ^niiy
Group B already to put out of service such merchant ships
in Adriatic ports as are not being used, as a precaution in
order to prevent them possibly falling into enemy hands. Naval
Staff advised Group South and German Naval Command, Italy on
7 Oct. of this matter with instructions that a precautionary
demolition of shipping not in use is considered premature at
present, but that preparations for destruction of the ships,
according to the situation and in agreement with the Mediterr-
anean Deputy, are regarded as appropriate. A proposal of
Group South submitted on 29 Sept. to dismantle ships not in
use has been forwarded by Naval Staff to the Reich Ministry
concerned, advocating; this for ships over 20,000 GRT.
b. Aegean Sea :
Bnomy Situation :
The unit consisting of one cruiser and two destroyers was
again detected at 210? and at 22^-0 on 23 Oct. The last position
was lh miles north of Scarpano, course 330°.
Two small ships leaving the ScarpantrStraut were located at
2^00. According to a report from coast patrol boat GA ,,L (-5 M ,
the British escort boat HURWORTH L "23" struck a mine and sank
at 2230 on 22 Oct. off Kalymnos. Five survivors are
aboard the GA "h$" .
A British commando company landed on Levitha during the night
of 23 Oct. The western and eastern parts of the island, as
well as the harbor, are in en:eny hands. During the same night
the airfield of Candia (Crete) and the island of Syros were
attacked by enemy planes.
Group South reports that the Turkish Police Radio Station at
Guemuesluek or Bodrum is transmitting coded situation reports
continuously from the Kos area. Deciphering is just as easy
for the British as it is for our radio intelligence. Group
South has therefore asked' our Naval Attache in Istanbul to
investigate possibilities of stopping such reports. Naval
Staff is asked to take suitable steps to prevent these
transmissions, which endanger our operations in the Dodecanese.
For particulars see War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII.
From one of these Turkish reports is was learned on the evening o:
-3^-1- CONFIDENTIAL
2h Oct. 19^3 " : ' ■' : ' CONFIDENTIAL.
23 Oct, that of 195 men aboard a British torpedo boat none could
be saved; other dead .were buried In Guemuesluek and wounded
brought to. Bodrum. ' . „ . :: '■
This may be a matter of further successes, of our mines.
• Own- Situation: . . ■
Liberated German soldiers have been transferred from. . :
Stampalia to Phaleron by air. Submarine chaser ""210V' was
found listing and naval landing craft MFP nl +96 i ' ('of the
0LYMP0S. convoy), which was still loaded and had been hit in
numerous places' '-by- gunfire, was found burned out on the beach.
Naval gunners have been .transferred to Stampalia by air to
man Italian batteries.
Assault Division Rhodes broke off a reconnaissance operation
against the island of Sini (north of Rhodes) because of engine
trouble.
Mopping-up of Kasos was carried out without resistance.
On the morning of 22 Oct, a combined Army-Navy operation under
the Naval Shore Commander was carried out against insurgents,
mostly Communists, in the area northwest of Kalamata. About
*+90 men between the ages of 15" and 60 were arrested.
Due to the shortage of escorts two steamers are unable to
leave Piraeus for Crete; one tanker for Salonika and one for
the Straits are also unable to leave.
c - Black Sea:
Enemy Situation :
.according to radio intelligence, there were two submarines
in the northwestern part of the Bi^ck Sea and east of the
Crimea two approaching and one on return passage.
Our submarines reported in the evening a westbound convoy
consisting of four vessels 25 miles west of Suchum. At 13 L t-2
six planes raided the harbor and town of Yalta. The anti-
aircraft gun emplacement aboard the auxiliary sailing vsssel
GELOJii sustained a direct hit. One plane was probably shot
down.
CONFID ENTIAL
-3^2-
2h Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL
Own Situation ; ;
One of the guns of the 5th Battery of the 6l3th Naval
Artillery Batallion in the Strait of Kerch was put out of
action by enemy gunfire. No damage was sustained in dive*
bomber attacks and shelling of the command post at Eltigen.
The 1st FT Boat Flotilla carried out an operation against
Anapa during the night of 23 Oct. Our night reconnaissance
planes could not start out because of ground fog. Upon
reaching the coast our boats at once had an engagement with
two gunboats and two patrol vessels. They were detected by
coastal searchlights and shelled by 7«6 cm* guns, so that
they had to withdraw to the southwest. The rest of the
operation proceeded without special incident.
Submarine U "9" left Feodosya on operations.
Convoys were carried out as planned and without incident;
VIII . Situation East Asia
Nothing to report.
CONFIDENTIAL
-3^3'- '
25 Oct. I9I+3 CONFIDENTI AL.
Items of Political Importance , '<
The statements of the "Washington Post" and the "New York Times"
which endeavor to minimise the significance of the Moscow talks
Ere worthy of note • It is said that important decisions
are to be left to the heads of the &:overnments.
The Russians are accompanying the Conference in a remarkably
obstinate way with a press campaign which pursues the call for
a second front and effec tive military achievement by the
'Western Powers,
According to a Swedish agent's report from Ankara, Stalin is "",'.
said to have appointed the Chief for Political Affairs in the
Red Army, General Tschermagow, as Secretary of the Central
Committee of the Party, thus strengthening the ties between. .' .
^ the xirmy and the Party.
Chief, Naval Staff returned to Berlin from the armament conference
at Gdynia, ' ',.
C onfere n ce on the Situ ation with Chief, Naval S t af f
!• Army Situation '■•' ' :
Melitopol was lost on 23 Oct. The enemy broke through 'our, . .
lines south of the town,. It was still possible to repulse
another strong attack near Zaporo-zhe, but new enemy attacks .on
2h Oct, near Dnepropetrovsk were again successful * At Krivoi
Rog the' workers have assumed a menacing attitude and have been
able to arm themselves to some extent. In view of this
development the situation in the. southern part of the eastern
front can only be viewed .with the greatest rnxiety. After
penetration of the Melitoppl - Z'apbrozhe line, which forms the
last bulwark for defense of the entrance to the Crimea from
the "north, there is- only between the front and the Dnieper .
the absolutely flat steppe which is bare of natural obstacles'
nnd most unfavorable for defense, It seems very doubtful
whether bringing-up of the divisions of the 17th Army with*
drawn from the Crimea and a few tanks and infantry divisions .
from France, northern- Italy and the Balkans will be able' to .
master the situation in time. 30 far no order has yet. been /'.'
given by the .Fuehrer to evacuate the Crimea* On the contrary,
the peninsula is to be held under all -circumstances, according
to the latest orders.'
CONFIDENTIAL
- 3 M+- ~ ~
25 Oct. 19^3 CONFI DENTIAL
In Italy the enemy 1 s main activity was still concentrated on
attacks against our supply lines,
II. In view of the possibility that the "Moscow Conference"" may
again make an enemy invasion of France an immediate problem,
Chief, Naval Staff orders that our minelaying plans be re-
examined and that endeavors be made to speed up the production
of time -setting devices « The minelaying operation off Brindisi
is to be repeated if possible,,
III. Admiral, Fuehrer Headquarters reported on 21 Oct. that
Armed Forces Eight Command, Operations Staff plans to submit
to the Fuehrer the following two directives:
a.. "Reinforcements of troops and supplies of material to
southern Greece, Crete and the islands in the Ionian .and
Aegean Seas, which are in great danger, demand the all-out
use of seagoing shipping available in this area, In order to
ensure the important supplies to this area the following is
ordered so as to clarify responsibility and commands
1. Army General Staff, Quartermaster General, Southeast
is responsible for bringing up supplies overland,, Distribution
to the ports of loading is to be effected in closest cooperation
with the naval offices in charge of sea transport.
2. The naval offices only are responsible for sea trans-
port in the Aegean and Ionian Seas, Quartermaster General, Army
Group E, who receive? his instruct Ions from Army General Staff,
Quartermaster General, Southeast, is responsible for fixing
the order in which shipments are made. .. ;
3* The Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping will see
to provision and management of the necessary shipping and
replacement of merchant shipping lost. In order to discharge
its responsibility with regard to sea transport, the Navy is
authorized to intervene in the plans for replacement of
shipping and to demand of the Reich Commissioner of Maritime
Shipping all information required for. estimating the number
and operational suitability of ships to be provided.
These instructions refer to, the transfer of ships by sea. or . . .
overland as well as to replacement by new constructions and
conversions and applies already to the Fuehrer directive issued
with OKW/WFST/Qu 1) (M) No. OOolOl/s-3 Gkdos. of 18 Oct. .
Transportation Office of the Armed Forces Overseas, with copy
In order to advise the Kight Command, Admiral,
Aegean will report to Armed Forces High- Command, Supply and
CONFIDENTIAL
-3^5-
•
25 Oct. 19M-3 CONFID ENTIAL
to Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, on the 1st
and 15 th of every month the amount of sea transport considered •.
possible during the following 30 days,' 1
b s Supplies to the troops in southern Greece, Crete and on
the islands in the Aegean and Ionian Seas are in serious danger
through shortage of suitable sea transports Exceptional
measures are necessary to procure the necessary number of
small seaworthy ships of adequate fighting strength,
1. High Command, Navy, in cooperation with the Reich Commissioner
of Maritime Shipping, will make every endeavor to have suitable
small vessels from conversions and new cons tructions put into
operation quickly in the Aegean Bea.
2. The Main Committee for Ship Construction is requested to
provide the iron quota, stated by the Navy and the Reich
Commissioner of Maritime Shipping to be necessary, for erection
of the construction site at Salonika and for increasing the
construction of small vessels Reference is made to the =
request of Chief, Armed forces Right Command to Minister
Speer (W.F.St./Qu 1 (M) No. I f75 I +A3 geh„ of 6 Oct, 19 } +3)
asking that the iron quota for the construction of Siebel fer
ferries, stopped by the Main Committee for Ship Construction,
be released again and that the Navy is granted the material,
for' the construction of 150 ferries to start with,"
Naval Staff , Quartermaster Division rrv. poses that Quartermaster
General, Operations Staff-, Armed Forces High Command be advised
that the Navy holds the following views %
"a. High Command, Navy accepts general responsibility for sea
transports, ..•/.
3. 1. With regard to shipping and as a theater of war, the
Adriatic, Aegean' and Black Seas must' be regardedas
one area 'under Commanding Admiral, Group South.
' Therefore control of sea transports and distribution
of shipping is only possible within the entire
area through a uniform command,
2. Supplies to the German economy must be included in
the general arrangement, '■;
3«. Re-organization in view of the transport crisis already
existing c%n only' be effective if the local offices
of the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping are
not dissolved and if the naval offices concerned
'< CONFIDENTIAL
*
-3^6-
25 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIA L
have the right to issue instructions with regard to
the use of merchant shipping. •'.
C- !• The Reich Commissioner of Maritime -Shipping will remain
responsible for the management and the loading and
unloading of ships, as before.
' 2. The Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping will also
remain responsible for provision and replacement of
-" : shipping 5 including small vessels, as up to now.
The requirements which arise from the war situation
with regard- to provision and replacement will be
submitted by High Command, Navy to the Reich Commis-
sioner of Maritime Shipping, High Command, Navy must
be kept informed of plans,
3. As everything depends on. acquisistion of the necessary
shipping in the southeastern area, the Main Committee
for Ship Construction must make available the
necessary quotas and facilities.
*+. Transport requirements and priority for warfare and
ec uioTiy should be decided by the Armed Forces Offices
concerned, and ports of shipment and destination :
in agreement with the Navy. v. >
5v It is impossible to give information about the ■
probable amount of transport in the manner requested.
As proposed } special arrangements must be made
'■ ' "■';•' between High Command, Navy and the Supply and
Transportation Office of the Armed Forces Overseas." 1
Chief, Naval Staff agreed.
IV .Cu^rtermaster General reports that Armed Forces High Command,
Operations Staff has requested the Navy to man two 21 cm.-
Army batteries (each of four guns) and to set up two medium-
heavy batteries (of four guns each), for strengthening the
defense of the Channel coast. This matter is under investigation. ■
It may be possible to draw the required personnel from Italian
volunteers, with the exception of officers.
V. Chief, Naval Intelligence D ivision reports:
Ambassador von Papen, on instructions, has tried to find out
whether Turkey would consider taking -over the Dodecanese, ■
which is now in Italian hands.,- The answer was that Turkey
would only do so with British consent, .
CONFIDENTIAL
-3^7-
•
•
25 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL
I n a Highly Restricted Circle
VI. Report by Chief ? Operations Branch Operations Divisions
a. According to information from the Bureau of Naval Armament,
the monthly requirements of 180 tons of tungsten (from
Portugal) are at present short by 1+0 tons. Until autumn 19*+*+
the required quantities can, however, be met from stocks •
b« Re. New plans for o p eration "Le o pard" ; Group South transmits
the following new directive of Commanding General, Army Group
S:
le- Target of operation "Leopard" is still the occupation
of Lei os by Assault Group Mueller with the Army forces
provided so far. More light naval forces and air
forces will be employed. Following operation
"Leopard" the island of Samos isto be occupied at
the earliest possible date s
2. Lieutenant General Mueller is in command of the
operation, in which Admiral, Aegean and Commanding
General, 10th Air Corps will assist
3c Start of "Leopard" (X-day) will be ordered by Army
Group E on the day previous at the latest at l300„ -
The earliest X-day is 6 Nov,
h. Irrespective of the above, Lieutenant General
Mueller is definitely to utilize any chance of
success which may arise to carry out "Leopard"
by surprise. Sudden enemy shipping losses, absence
of enemy naval forces, fog etc. might create such
a favorable situation
5. Admiral, Aegean is to move the following to the
.jumping-off area Kos-Calino by 5 Nov.;.
a. all operational naval landing craft, torpedo
boats, PT boats and motor 'minesweepers,
b. nine infantry -landing boats from Salonika,.
c. the sic Siebel ferries due to arrive from the
Adriatic Sea by . 1 Nov,,
d. all other small vessels available and suitable
• for this operation,
CONFIDENTIAL
-3^3-
25 Oct. I9V3 . CONFIDENTIAL..
e. the convoy of the INGEBORG,
f. the battalion of the 11th. Air: Force Infantry ,.,
Division, which is assembled at Piraeus.
6, The appearance of newly assembled surface forces
must under all circumstances be kept secret from
the enemy, Thet may therefore not be engaged in
other operations in the Aegean prior to " Leopard".
This, however , does not refer to the operation of
submarines against enemy naval forces «.
7* British naval forces in Turkish territorial waters
are not to be attacked.
8. The Air Force, with the strongest formations
possible, is to preparfe the way for the operation
^oy attacking enemy ships and Leros itself and will
closely cooperate, with Lieutenant General Mueller
in supporting operation "Leopard' 1 .
9« At 1000 on Tuesday, 26 Oct, I will hold a conference
at the headquarters of the 68th Army Corps at Athens;
the following will be presents
Lieutenant General Mueller, the Commander of the
participating naval forces, Admiral, Aegean,-
Commanding General, 10th Air Corps, Participation
of further officers, which is to' be limited as far
as possible 5 is left to the commanding officers.
At this discussion Lieutenant General Mueller will
report in detail on his plans and Admiral, Aegean
and Commanding General, 10th Air Corps are requested
to state their plans *"
Group South reports in this connection;
"The directions given under 5 and 6 of the above,
which interfere with the rights of Admiral, Aegean
as the party responsible for naval operations, ■ and
the obscurities arising therefrom will be clarified
during the discussion on 26 Oct."
In addition, ■ Army Group S regards' a .temporary reinforcement of
our weak naval forces in the Aegean Sea through the allocation
of four more submarines absolutely necessary for a^ successful
execution of operation "Leopard" and for the- subsequent
occupation of Samos, and remarks that the sudden appearance of
these submarines on- and after 5 Nov. offers the best chance
of suedes s. . • -. '
Group South is well aware of the fact that the submarines,
also requested by it, are not available at present.
-3^9- CO NFIDENTIAL
',
#
25 Oct. 1943 CUBrlU ^TiAJ,
Chief, Naval Staff orders that the outcome of the discussion
on 26 Oct. regarding responsibility be reported, so that he
can approach Commanding general , Army Group E once more, if
necessary,,
VII, Group South has reported as follows: : ; ' ■
"Preliminary considerations with regard to the evacuation of
the Crimea show the necessity of transferring shore units and
naval forces to Transnistria, Rumania and Bulgaria. Basic
approval of the Rumanian and' Bulgarian Governments should be
requested now, so as to guarantee a smooth transfer of the
offices evacuated: if such should be deemed advisable."
This matter will be dealt with futher by Quartermaster Division,
Organization and Mobilization Branch,
Special Items
1* According to the notes of the discussions held on 28 Sept.
by the Sub-Commission "Landing Craft" of the Shipbuilding
Commission, views have become evident on various points
which require correction. This has been done in a letter from
Quartermaster Division, Naval Staff of 16 Oct, addressed to
the Main Committee, Shipbuilding Commission, Chief, Army
Ordnance Division - High Command Army, Commander, Replacement
Army and other Army and Air Force Commands concerned. This .:
letter states, amongst other things:
I,, The report on the discussion shows that the Shipbuilding
Commission m Its discussion "Sub -Commission, Landing Craft
and Supply Vessels" on 28 Sept. occupied itself with questions
which are not in its sphere. The decision as to -whether cer
tain types of ships are to be dropped- from ' the Fleet Constr-
uction "Program for 19^5 rests solely with Naval Staff or
Commander in Chief , 'Navy personally; this has been emphasized
on several occasions by i ,the Chairman of the Shipbuilding
Commission, Rear Admiral" Topp. It is a matter for the Snip-
building .Commission to make recommendations reagding types,
in accordnnce with instructions' of"T~0'ct7~r9 i -!3 for this
Commission. Only mi litary offices are In the position to decide
"whether certain types of "ships Can be dispensed with in the
course of these discussions regarding types. This is express-
ly stipulated in the joint order dated 22 July of Commander
in Chief, Navy and the Minister of Armament and Ammunition, .
reading as follows:
"If the Commission reaches no agreement then the decision, as
far as warship construction is concerned, rests with Command-
er In Chief, Navy, personally."
350 • CONFIDENTIAL
25 Oct. 1943 C ONFIDENTI AL
Naval Staff considers it imperative to emphasize the above
once more .
II. With regard to the construction of small transports the
folio-wing must he stated: Construction of small transports
is so urgent in theaters of war -where allocation of trans-
ports by sea or land is impossible that any delay may have
serious military consequences. From this angle it is there-
fore irresponsible that the construction of a building site
for na va 1 la nding era ft at Sa lonika , as dema nded by N-*"> va 1
Staff, has been rejected by the Main Committee and that the
measures already taken -with regard to its construction
(despatch of Dr. Bonny for investigation of construction
facilities ) have been stopped.
Recent losses of such ships show how urgently small transports
are required in this sea area . The transport situation there
is drifting towards a catastrophe if the measures demanded,
i. e. the building or transfer of naval landing craft for
this area, are not carried out at once.
In this connection 'High Command, Navy defines its views with
regard to further construction of Siebel ferries as follows:'
Formerly the view .was held that 200 Siebel ferries, demanded
by Commanding General, Armed Forces, South, could be built
if this would not hamper construction of our ' own naval
landing craft and. naval artillery ligr. ters , This provision
still holds good; a reduced a liocarion of iron and facilities
to the Navy to the detriment, of the Fieet Construction
Program 19^3 is /impossible and mixat therefore be rejected.
However, considering the demands detailed below Naval Staff
considers it neces_8a_ry_^, in 'view of the general construction
situation and the L > equ ; ests.,HGjade still to be expected from the
other services, that the construction of Siebel ferries be
continued, provided the r-rovision of fuel is guaranteed be-
forehand from elsewhere, The Navy can also not untertake the
arming of the additional new Siebel ferries. The required
iron quotas and construction facilities must therefore be
made available as an addition.
III. a. With regard to the question of naval landing craft,
Naval Staff is of the following opinion:
"Under the Fleet Construction Program 19^3 the final
figure called for 5^0 naval landing craft per year.
According to the current building program approximately
410 naval landing craft are at present under construction
or scheduled. Together with the approximately 3^0 naval
landing craft present in service, (excluding naval land-
ing craft (artillery) which are purely gun carriers and
cannot be counted since they are unsuitable as landing
or transport vessels) this
351 CONFIDENTIAL
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25 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
■total of 750 naval landing craft. This will cover
(about ..20$ in.loss.es per year being taken into ■■
' account) requirements- Of naval warfare, including
considerable transport ^tasks for the Armed Forces so
far as these can be carried out by the naval landing
craft. - . . _• ^ .
In" '.tliisV connect ion it. must be borne in mind that:
"I.. Any future . operational requirements of the Army
. (f orpins tance a large-scale . landing operation)
have 'no j: been taken into account, because they
a^e unknown.
2. New demands arising from the developments of
naval .--warfare must be submitted separately.
(Naval Staff for instance requests the fitting-
up of 2h naval landing craft as river mine-
exploding vessels. These 3 just as the naval
landing craft (artillery), are to be substract-
ed from the total of naval landing craft avail-
able as landing and transport vessels.) Under
the above conditions Naval Staff can, after
the present building program of naval landing
craft (410) is completed, make do from about
September or October 19^ by maintaining the
number of naval landing craft on hand, i. e.
the construction of replacements must cover
naval landing craft lost by enemy action and
those becoming obsolete, A monthly output of
30 naval landing craft is considered necessary
for this." . ■ '-
b. As regards naval artillery lighters it is stated:
"An initial series of 12 naval artillery- lighters has
been built up to now. By order of the Fuehrer they
were put into operation at once wihtout awaiting the
outcome of trials, owing to the difficult situation
in the Sea of Asov. Although a few dificienci.es came
to light, such as are natural with any new type, the
naval artillery lighters have proved excellent in
operation. Four Russian gunboats were sunk and the
ports and the Mius front were successfully shelled
without the boats themselves sustaining any serious
damage. The deficiencies that came to light have
been given consideration and will be corrected in
the second series under construction. In comparison
the specially armed Siebel ferries did not come up
to expectation in a similar operation on Lake Ladoga
in the spring of 19^2.- Naval Staff cannot, therefore
do without naval artillery lighters for certain
specific operations, especially since naval cons-
truction, engineers: guarantee that, as regards sea-
worthiness,' their operational possibilities are at
least equal to those of SiebeT ferries . The question
352 CONFIDENTIAL
25 Oct. 1943 C ONFIDE NTIAL
brought up (see page. 13 ) at; the -meeting, on 28 Sept., as to
■whether these tasks can be. -taken over by the Stebel ferry,
must therefore be answered in, the 'negative."
c. Quartermaster' Division "then corrected the false views
held with regard to the engine question, of naval landing
craft and Siebei ferries. The Deutz engine of the naval
landing craft g3've performances hitherto not thought
possible. High gasoline consumption and increased infl-
ammability of this fuel speak against the introduction
of the BMW 6ms chine. Neither of these engines is the
ideal propulsion for this type. They- -were, however,
used because they were available in the required number.
d. The idea of building in future only a vessel of stand-
ard type (surface and en pa city) is attractive from the
point of view of production. Unfortunately this is not
feasible operationally, since one cannot do with one ^
type of vessel only in naval warfare even under the
most severe restrictions, Although we are today in
a much more difficult position than the enerrry as re-
gards the production situation, it must be pointed
out that he has about lb different types of "landing
craft at his disposal. The plan to fit an easily re-
mobable superstructure on a flat vessel, so as to
combine the advantages of the flat vessel with those
. .of the capacious one, is entirely out of question in
any case. Naval Staff must therefore reject such a
s lu t ion for the follow ing re r \ s ons :
1. The already deficient seaworthiness of the flat
vessels will be affected to mi impossible extent
by:
a. immediate destruction (of the superstructivc ) ^
in heavy seas if lightly constructed.
b. Creation of a large wind trap on a vessel
which already drifts easily.
c. Great difficulty in managing the vessel when
maneuvering, coming alongside or casting off
by abolition of any visibility.
2. Considerable enlargement of the silhouette and thus
3. a larger target for the enemy,
4. considerable overloading ahd unwieldnness , if the
superstructure is heavy. ' This - will eliminn te the
load capacity. / . ■■' ■'.'■.
5. Surface will be considerable decreased, because a
gangway -must remain on either side for maneuvering,
making feat ropes, etc. -
• - 353 . CONFIDENTIAL
♦
25 Oct. 19^3 UO[M l''ii^JVi l _.U-b
6. great risk of fire if. constructed of wood in
order to lessen the weight (the enemy is lately
using phosphorus against ships),
In conclusion Naval Staff emphasized once more the necess-
ity of carrying on the construction of small transports
with all available means on the basis of the requirements
stated above.
2. Because of the "t)uke of Aosta" incident the Foreign
Office on 8 Sept. gave instructions to the Ambassadors that
the Armed Forces Attaches should address reports, even if of - a
purely military nature solely via the Foreign Office, .
On this matter Naval Staff advised Armed Forces High Command,
Foreign Division, with copies to Commander in Chief, Air '[..,
Force and High Command, Army (Attache Section) on 12 Oct.'
1943 as follows : •
"I, Naval Staff can agree if the reports deal pith
internal matters or those of a purely political
nature, i. e. which will have no operational
consequences It may, however, be extremely
difficult to judge how far political action in
wartime has operational consequences-; Should it
be a matter of political news whicn is passed
on to the Naval Attache direct by an agent or
reports which might give rise to strategic
a nd opera t i ona 1 de 1 iber a t j ons , the Amba ss.a dor
and Commander in Chief, Navy (through Naval
Attache Section, High Command, Navy) must
be advised simultaneously. The Foreign Office
is partly responsible. .' ,
2. As a line can hardly be drawn between politics ..
and warfare, it must be insisted here that the
reports be submitted to Commander in Chief, Navy
and to Ambassador simultaneously, namely through
direct channels. The Ambassador may thus comment
on such reports; there must, however be a guarantee
that the reports reach Commander in Chief, Navy or
Naval Staff through the Naval Attache Section,
High Command, Navy as quickly as possible, i. e.
through direct channels, since military decisions,',
which usually permit no delay, depend on this. The
Foreign Office is responsible, in agreement with
High Command, Navy.
3. Information of a military nature should at once
be submitted direct to Commander in Chief, Navy
vie the Naval Attache Section, High Command, Navy.
The Ambassadors may be Informed at the same time,
orally, as provided in the Fuehrer's directive
to limit knowledge to the most restricted circle.
The parties responsible will be Armed Forces High
Command or the Service, Branches of the Attaches.
354 CONFIDENTIAL
25 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL '
The following arguments speak for direct reporting:'
1. Directive of the Fuehrer, according to which military
reportsare to be limited to the most restricted circle, which
is not assured if reports are submitted thr ought the Foreign
Office. High Command, Navy is ready to submit evidence support-
ing this allegation.
2. Reports must be despatedbed direct, since forwarding
through the Foreign Office entails a normal delay of 1-5
days in the most faroable circumstances: even delays up to
12 days have already occurred. Here too High Commnd, Navy is
able to submit evidence. It is unbearable that High Command
is unable to make the necessa-ry decisions at once because
important military reports are delayed. At the same time it
is requested that the system of forwarding messages be re-
examined, i. e. that the Naval Attache be given the opport-
unity, if necessary, of sending coded military telegrams via
the Foreign Office, which are passed on direct to High Command,
Navy. Information from Naval Staff., Operations'" Division to the
Foreign Office is not affected by this.
On account of the above, Armed Forces High Command will raise
objection to the Foreign Minister's order, which was issued
without previously informing Armed Forces High Command.
3. Report on the incident "Captain von Kamptz" which occur-
red In connection with the execution of operation. "Achse" is
contained infiies in W«r Diary, Part C, File Ap A (enclosures
of a personal nature),
4. Chief, Naval Communications Division began publication
on 14 Oct. of "Reports on tactical naval radar service", which
will probably be published every month,. These reports are to
serve Naval Commands as an aid in operational control. For
cops as per l/Skl 28892/43 Gkdos . see War Diary, Part B, *
Vol. VI.
5. Naval Intelligence Division reports on the development
of the American radar set on the basis of the U. S. Naval
Magazine "Our Navy", August 1943 issue, and on the extension
of the railway network In Northwest Africa. ' !
For copy of these reports as per 11 Ski. 31234/43 geh. and
32854/43 geh. see War Diary, Part D "Evaluation. 0^ Intelligence
on Foreign Navies". . .
355 CONFIDENTIAL
25 Oct. 1943 CONFIDE NTIAL
Situation 25 Oct. ■...-■■.■-> -\ "":■■■' •: :"•'
I. War in Foreign Voters
^ • Enemy Sit ua ti on:
Nothing to report ;. ... -"
2. Own Situation:
Another seven, survivors of Ship "28" were found on
the island of Hachiuoshima, according to a report from the
Japanese Navy. Their teansfer to Yokohama has been ordered.
Naval Staff does not intend to release the news of the loss
of this auxiliary cruiser yet. The Naval Attache in Tokyo will
be advised accordingly and will be asked to state his opinion.
Naval Staff advised the Naval Attache in Tokyo by telegram 2359
that submarine "Luedden" is due at the rendezvous one hour
past sunrise on 28 Oct.
The Naval Attache in Tokyo reports that all three AQUILA sub-
marines were handing over to him by the Japanese N- n val Min-
ister on 22 Oct. and added that a report on their condition
and sailing date will follow.
II. Situation West Area
I. E nemy Situation :
Over the Bay of Biscay 31 planes were detected on
operation. One British vessel was located at 2028 in AM 7880,
one at 1031 in BE 6540 and one at 1558 in BF 164-0.
Reuter announced the loss of the cruiser CHARYBDIS and the
destroyer LIMBOURNE off the French coast on 23 Oct. The des-
troyer is said to. have been scuttled.
Our own air reconnaissance reported:
At 0845 re-location of the convoy of 30 merchantmen in BE
o464 on southerly course.
At 0945 a convoy of 60 merchantmen escorted by 1 cruiser and
6 escort vessels (presumably SL 138) in. DJ 1259 on course
300 degrees .
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25 Oct. 1943 - CONFIDENTIAL
At 2040 in CG 8459 20 ships, presumably the landing craft
which left Gibraltar on 23 Oct., and 2 escort vessels on
course 350 degrees.
At 1145 in BE 6361 8 merchantmen and 4 destroyers on course
240 degrees speed 18 knots.
Own Situation:
a o
Atlantic Coast:
The loss of submarine -chaser "1403" on 24 Oct. is to
be attributed to a mine. The Commander and six of her complem-
ent are missing, Fourteen moored mines of an enemy barrage
were swept on coastal route "Liebesbank" . At 1400 the air-
field of Brest-South was raided by 25 enemy bombers heavily
escorted by fighters.
Destroyer Z "23" was transferred from Bassens to Verdcn roads. f <£-
Ch annel Coast :
In the air raid on Cherbourg on 24 Oct. altogether
eight of the attacking planes were shot down, two of them by
forces of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West and two by
naval anti-aircraft guns.
The steamer MUENSTERLAND is disabled and can therefore not
be moved further east for the time being.
During a planned torpedo operation by the 2nd, 4th, 6th,
and 8th PT Boat Flotillas, led by Commander ?T Boats,
against a northbound convoy northeast and east of Cromer
our boats encountered six enemy destroyers and numerous .
motor gunboats, which effectively prevented our attack on
the convoy. PT boats S "88 M and S "63" of the 4th Flotilla (g
were lost. Our own forces rescued 20 men from the S "63"
and 3 men from the S' ; 88".
Nineteen men of the Flotilla leader S "88" were captured by
the enemy, according to radio intelligence. Lt. Cmdr. Luetzow
Commander, is amongst those missing.
PT boat S "116" ran aground off Egmond- op-Zee, but was later
on towed into port. For brief report from Comma rider, PT" boats
see teletype 1Q00.
The steamer N0RDVAARD left Boulogne at 2015 heavily ^escorted.
Shortly after, enemy targets were located in BF 3356 uppere
center, BF 3329, BF 3331 center and BF 3359 center right.
Three enemy formation leaders received operational radio-
grams and were ordered not to acknowledge,
357 CONFIDENTIAL
•
25 Oct. 19^3 ' • - CONFIDENTIAL
receipt. Dover reported from 2030 to 2200 continuous
locations of the formation, which from 20*10 to 2110 approached
MTB "235" from 8,6 to 2.2. miles. Furthermore at 2059 long-
range shelling commenced and continued, until 2236. Nineteen
rounds were counted. Patrol boat VP "1506" whichvas close
to the steamer, . Sustained slight damage. One impact was ,
observed on shore 'near.. Calais. .Two naval gunnetfs ; were killed.
The convoy was then ordered to proceed to Calais" where It
put in at 2300. Our batteries returned the fire until 2237
with 22 rounds of' the heaviest caliber.
At 2^00 the convoy went on from Calais to Dunkirk.
Ill, North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters
North Sea :
Convoy "466" Elbe-Hook was carried out without incident.
One ground mines each was swept west and southwest of Helig-
oldnd and north of Terschelling . Minesweeper M "23" ran aground
in the Molengat (Helder).
Salvage operations are under way.
Norway, Northern Waters :
I . Enemy Sit uation:
Over the North Sea 26 planes were detected on
operation. On 23 Oct, one plane was reported in the Banak
area and two in the area of the Sylte Fjord. At 07^5 on
25 Oct. two PT boats shelled the Norwegian cutter KILSTRAUMEN
and drove her on .shore at Bessaker (north of Trondheim) . . The
PT boats put up a smoke screen when shelled by harbor defense
boat MOEYE and withdrew to the north and later to the vest.
One of the boats was destroyer by oar fighters.
According to a report from submarine U "956" Advent Bay is
occupied by the enemy. Two wooden hats, apparently new, and
radio masts were sighted. The submarine was also fired on
by anti-aircraft guns from shore. Reconnaissance of Barents -
burg was carried out' without defense being encountered.
2 • O wn Situatio n :
Twenty-six ships were escorted north and 35 south.
358 CONFIDENTIAL
25 Oct. 19^5 ■". ^CONFIDENTIAL
Eighteen ships were left lying
of escorts . '■ :;/-'
in harbor' owing to shortage
Weather ship K. J ? BUSCH- (operation "Kreuzritter" ) was met
at 0615 on her way in from the operation;.
The destroyers BEITZEN and Z "38" proceeded northward from
Kristiansand South on the evening of 26 Oct. A stay of 24
hours is planned at Bergen, from whence they are to proceed
direct to Narvik.
Naval Command, Norway reported on 2k Oct. with reference to
the comments made by Naval Staff on 16 Oct. regarding mane-
laying projects "NW 62" and "63" as follows:
"I. The Amerland was sunk by torpedo. The mines discovered
near Nordkyn. seem to have been laid recently and have nothing
to do with the loss of the AMERLAND.
2. Depth setting of the anti-submarine barrages requested is
minus 17 meters. This will not hamper our own minesweeping
operations .
3. The sea area of Vardoe seems particularly promising after
further investigation. Approval requested for provision of
mines . "
Operations Division then decided:
"With a depth setting of minus 17 meters mines will not be
effective against submarines at periscope depth and If set
shallow they will hamper our own minesweeping operations.
In view of the shortage of UMB mines their use is only,
justified with a depth setting that promises results,
Barrages "NW 62" and "63" must therefore be dispensed with" .
IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea
I. Enemy Situation :
The 18th Army Command considers the situation and
assessment of the enemy to be unchanged. A Russian attack
by three divisions and about 200 tanks in the area of Uritzk
was -started on 19 Oct., but was suddenly called off, accord-
ing to the latest statements by prisoners of war. The
enemy now seems to be waiting for our retreat or for frosty
weather to set in before starting a new attack.
2.. Own Situation:
Our planes sighted seven drifting mines west of our
359 CONFIDENTIAL
( *T
C
•
%
25 Oct. 19^3 * CONFIDENTIAL.
Skaggerak declared area . On the evening of .25 Oct. 2-5.-30
planes flew into the Kattegat, obviously on" a 'mine laying ,
mission. Numerous, routes -were closed and all available boats
of the 9th .andlOth Coast Patrol Flotillas and of the 29 Mines
weeper Flotilla were ordered out as additional forces for
sweeping operations.--.; ■ • . .; . -,.
Convoy traffic in the entire Baltic Sea area was carried out
without incident. The 'Finnish steamer OSMO was unsuccessfully
attacked at an enemy plane with one torpedo- and two bombs .-■
west of Nargoen at 1215. A similar unsuccessful attack was
carried out on the tug HAP SAL with a barge in tow near Cape
Juminda at 0730 on 24 Oct.
V. Merchant Shipping
1. With regard to the inquiry of the Reich Commissioner
of Marttime Shipping asking which ports in Southern France are
approved as alternatives for the merchantmen transferred back
from Italy and how many ships at the most may be laid up
at each such port, Operations Division replied, after consult-
ation with Group West, that it Is planned to make use primarily
of the Etang de Berre where a large number of ships can be
laid up. For the purpose of dispersal against air raids a
few ships will also be laid up at Marseilles and at Sete.
2. Naval Intelligence Division, Foreign Merchant
Marine Branch deals in Report No. 9/43 with enemy tonnage
operating to and .from Portugal and with Italian merchant
shipping. For copy as per 1/Skl. 32978/43 gen. see war Diary,
Part C, Vol. XI.
VI . Subma r ine Wa v fa r e :
Submarine U "566", the fifth submarine proceeding to
the Mediterranean, was sunk by an enemy p,lane 30 miles south-
west of Leixoes, according to a report from our Naval Attache
in Madrid. Her entire complement -was rescued by a Spanish
trawler and landed at Vigo. Immediate release can be expect-
ed since it is a clear case of shipwreck. The .submarines now
in the North Atlantic have been assembled into Group "Siegfried
On account of a bearing of 213 degrees from BC 3343 taken on
a convoy radio wave by submarine U "413", this Group has
orders to proceed from 2100
a ll
360 CONFIDENTIAL
25 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL
on 25 Oct. on course 220 degrees in order to intercept- the
convoy quickly and, if possible, still during the night and
to block any avoiding U "188" .will be at the rendezvous off
Penang on §8 Oct. and submarine U "532" on 29 -Oct.
No reports of successes have been received from the Indian
Ocean or from the Atlantic. . .
VII. Aerial Warfare.
British lies and Vicinity :
The 3rd Air Force had 10 planes out on operation against
England, 59 over the Atlantic and 7 over the Mediterranean. No
reports of enemy planes having been shot down were received.
During the night of 25 Oct. three heavy fighters flew a
mission against London. At 1416 eight FV 200's' started out
against a convoy in the Atlantic. Twelve Ju 88 ' s returned from
unsuccessful free-lance operations over the Atlantic. ■
There was no enemy air acticity over Germany on 25 Oct. and
during that night. During the day three single planes .were
reported over the area Stavanger-Oslo and Stavanger-Bergen.
Our fighters were unsuccessful against these planes.
In Western France enemy planes attacked airfields, a power
station and a railroad station. For damage sustained at the
airfield of Brest-South see '"Daily Situation". Anti-aircraft
guns shot down two of the attacking planes. Several fighter
formations flew into the coastal areas of Belgium and North-
ern France without attacking. In the evening 25 planes flew
into the Kattegat, probably one minelaying. Fifty-four planes,
including 22 night fighters, went up on defense, but scored
no success .
Mediterran e an Theater:
During the day ten fighter -bombers of the 2nd Air Force
attacked ground targets west of Termoli. There were no night
operations. In Italy the enemy carried out attacks on Tar-
quinia and on the front; in Greece on Kos, Jania, Pordgorica
(north of Durazzo) and Candia . Altogether six enemy planes
were shot down.
Ja
-361- CONFIDENTIAL
•
25 Oct. 1943, COTFIDENTIAL
Eastern Front: , ..' ;
The 5th Air Force .reported 6.7 planes out on .; operation.
On Ice Fjord (Spitzbergen) unoccupied huts were sighted. It
can be assumed that the last' remaining troops were evacuated
by the destroyer reported by one of our submarines, since
no occupation or defense has been observed since the reconn-
aissance on 20 Oct. ■ ■•• ;•;
VI I I . Ware fare in the Mediterrane an and Blac k Sea_
i» Enemy Situation Medite rranean' ;; i.,- ;
According to la tes t reports altogether 38 vessels-
left the Mediterranean or Gibraltar for the Atlantic on; the /
afternoon of 23 Oct. namely 32 freighters, 2 tankers, 3 des-
troyers, and 1 auxiliary cruiser. Of these, 1 3 freighters,
and 1 tanker came from Girbraltar. • -
On the evening of 2^. Oct, a British transport 'with troops
aboard left Gibraltar for the Atlantic escorted by a destroy-'--
er. A DELHI class cruiser passed Cape . Spa : rtel at 1520 on
24 Oct. heading for the Mediterranean, On the same afternoon
1 auxiliary cruiser, 1 cable-layer from the Atlantic and two
LCT's from the Mediterranean arrived at. Gibraltar. At 0100
on 25 Oct. 4 vessels of medium tonnage and 1 large ship pass-
ed Ceuta, bound for the Atlantic.
The following were located at . Gibraltar at 1900 on 24 Oct.,
1 mine laying cruiser, 2 cruiser's in dock, 1 auxiliary cruiser,
13 destroyers, 8 corvettes, 12 'escort vessels, 5 British and
I Italian transports, 42 freighters, 12 tankers, and 171
planes. According to agent's report, there are still about
12,000 men aboard freighters . and transports in the bay and
harbor of Gibraltar, although 10,000 men have already left
Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.
There is still a large number of ships in Oran and Algiers,,
according to air reconnaissance.
At Mers el Kebir only warships, but no battleships, were
located. Olbia and Maddalena showed a slight increase in
freighters, but no supply traffic was observed, No new
reports have been received from the areas of Naples, Salerno
and Termoli. Increased activity by light naval foroes is
reported in the area Pescara-Ortona . Commanding General;
Armed Forces-, .South corrected his report of 24 Oct,, to
the effect that only 80 LCT's left for- the Atlantic up to
23 Oct. and not 180 LCT's as reported;
362 CONFIDENTIAL
f
25 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL
2 . O wn Situation Mediterranean :
The hospital ship AQUILEJA left Marseilles for
Barcelona at 14-30 and the hospital ship DJENNE rt
2400.
Submarine U "453", after completing her mine laying operation,
returned to Pola from Brindisi to take en a fresh supply of
mines in order to repeat this operation. Submarine U "431"
has not yet answered the enquirees of 23 and 25 Oct. regard-
ing her position.
German Naval Command, Italy reports that the demands for
sea transports made by Army Group B and Commanding General,
Armed Forces, South are steadily increasing due to the
revival of enemy air activity against our land communications.
On the vest coast of Italy continuous supplies from Genoa
and Spezia to Civitavecchia call for 30,000 tons per month
and in addition one supply-run with 44/000 tons. For arrears
from Plomblnb and Leghorn 1J>&, 000 tons have so .far beer, noti-
fied and will probably exceed 300 a 0G0 tons. Ports of destin-
ation are GJenoa or Marseilles.. Besides this, Elba must also *e
supplied. Delay In the transfer of the large ships from Italy to
France is caused by the shortage of crews and escort forces.
Mounting losses through enemy PT boats, submarine and
fighter -bombers demand heavier escort and intensified
submarine chase, especially as the Air Force is more
or less unable to assist. The 2nd Air Force has turned down
a request owing to lack of adequate and suitable planes,
but will try at least to cover the most important oper-
ations of the Navy through air reconnaissance. Only three
planes are available at present for convoy escorts. Every
endeavor Is being made to afford anti-submarine defense by
increasing ship-borne squadrons and by employment of Italian
planes with crews. The defense forces available are insuff-
icient, as many vessels are lying in dock. Motor mines-
weepers are required at the same time for mines weeping and
nine laying operations. The increase through captured ships,
especially in submarine-chasers, shows no effect yet. Convoy
escort will probably therefore be "extreme l.y weak. Naval landing
craft will proceed without escort. Further delays will be
caused because in the southern part ships can only move at
night. German Naval Command, Italy, therefore requests that
for the west coast war transports be fitted up as auxiliary
submarine chasers, that more freight barges be brought up
from Southern France and that, the projected German and Italian
construction program for naval landing craft be continued.
For the Adriatic Sea, the Army has demanded at once the
shipping of 30,000 tons per month from Trieste to ports
as far south of Ancona. Since only a limited number of
small vessels is available it
'U
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CONFIDENTIAL
25 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
is necessary to tranship the cargo in Ancona from steamers
to smallships. German Naval Command,- Italy regards the
number of promised naval landing craft and Siebel ferries
as inadequate. Because of the increasing threat from enemy
naval and air forces, the question of defense becomes more • .
and more acute. The few escort vessels so far requisitioned
and in sailing, readiness do not suffice. At least 10- 15 fast
and 'yell armed boats are required for escort tasks. There
■would be a. serious gap if these escort vessels were trans-
ferred to Admiral, Adriatic and fulfillment of the demands,
made . by the Army would become doubtful, especially since
these vessels are exceptionally suitable for carrying cargo
at the same time. German. Naval Command, Italy therefore
requests the following for the Adriatic coast: that naval
landing craft and Siebel ferries be constructed quickly;
the final figure be increased and losses replaced; a sufficient
number of escort vessels be left in the West Adriatic; coastal
traffic in the West Adriatic be controlled by German Naval
Command, Italy. Finally, German Naval Command, Italy points
out once more the urgency of mine defense off both Italian
coasts, which requires immediate, action.
3 . Area Naval Group South :
a . Adriatic Sea :
At noon on 24 Oct. two U. S. bomber formations
passed over Split, flying to the north.
An auxiliary sailing- vessel on passage to Cattaro is ovejc- ;,-;..
due. Two steamers left Dubrovnik for Trieste on 24 Oct. One
German steamer' and 'four other ships were seized off the
Dalmatian coast, according to an enemy radio report.
Naval Staff has confiremd the views, of Group South (see - ... ,
War Diary 23 Oct.), but draws the attention of Group South,.
German Naval Comma-hd, Italy and Admiral, Adriatic to the ;
fact that an exceptional 'situation exists as regards the
AUDAGE, inasmuch as Naval Staff already ordered on 12 Oct.. .,
that this vessel be placed temporarily under German Naval
Command, Italy as regards operations. ....
b . Aeg ean Sea : • :
Enemy S 1 1 ua t ion : •'
Five Hudsons made a low -level attack with bombs
and machine-guns on the harbor of Kos and on naval landing
craft F "123". No casualties or damage were sustained. Our
air reconnaissance sighted at 1430 50 miles south of Castell
Rosso three destroyers.
364 CONFIDENTIAL
25 Oct. 1943 C ONFIDENTIAL
course north-northwest, which were joined at 1500 by a
cruiser coming from the east. This group was 21 miles
southwest of Castell Rosso at 1612.
A submarine was reported north of Suda . On the afternoon
of 24 Oct. six planes attacked coas-'t patrol boat GA "54".
One plane was heavily damaged. The same boat reported, while
on passage from Naxos to Levitha, an engagement with an
enemy submarine at 0545 on 25 Oct. five miles east of the
northern point of Amorgos . Our boat sustaind damage and
suffered casualties. Amongst other things, the steering
gear was damaged and she was forced to resort to her hand
rudder.
It is probable that another vessel, apart from the British
escort boat HURWORTH L'"28", struck a mine near Kalymnos •
since detonations were observed on 22 and 23 Oct. at the same
position. According to statements of prisoners, the HURWORTH
L "28" had a complement of 200 men and was armed with three
12 cm. twin-barreled guns, two 3 cm. anti-aircraft guns and
two ma chine -guns .
The boat was on passage from Alexandria.
Own Situation:
Our troops landed at 0955 on the north coast of Levitha.
The island was cleared of the enemy during the day. Thirty-
three British were taken prisoner.
Reinforced company "Brandenburg" with Bulgarian assistance
carried out reconnaissance of the island of Strati (southwest
of Lemnos ) . No enemy forces were on the island.
The minelayer DRACHE left Piraeus during the night of 24
Oct. for Chalkis in" order to carry out a minelaying oper-
ation in the area of Pontikonisi during the night of 25
Oct. The minelayer will then proceed to Salonika to take on
fresh mines .
c. Black Sea
Enemy Situation:
Nothing special to report.
Own Situation:
Six boats of the 1st PT Boat Flotilla in two groups
are to attack vessels assembeled on Anapa roads during the
night of 25 Oct.
365 . CONFIDENTIAL
•
25 Oct. 19^5
CONFIDENTIAL
The operation is already under way and is assisted by
night reconnaissance planes. Otherwise nothing special
to report; :,'
The Army and the Air Force plan to transfer a considerable
part of their forces also to Old Rumania, i. e. not only
to Trans is tria, according to information received from Armed
Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy, Both services
approached Armed Forces High Com and "with requests to this
effect and wished '%o ascertain whether the Navy also plans
similar measures and considers them necessary. Quartermaster.
Division, Organization and Mobilization Branch;- confirmed,
the necessity of heavy occupation also of Rumanian territory
with naval forces and the necessity thus- of bases, supply,
forces and coastal defense forces. The extent of this will
depend on how f r r the focal point of na.val warfare necessar-
ily shifts further west if the front is withdrawn any. more.
IX. Situation East As ia
■ ■ 1
Nothing special to report.
-566- CONFIDENTIAL
2o Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
I ters of Politic a l Im port ance ■ . ; . .
"Exchange f Telegraph" denies the view, so' far generally
held, that the present Foreign Ministers' discussion "in Mos •
cow are to prepare the way. f or /a iconf ernnce between Rossevelt,
Churchill and Stalin. The negotiations, now concluded, will
already lead to far-reaching' practical results. Actually In
very many individual cases final solutions may have been found
and these will then only require the formal approval of the
three Governments concerned. These resolutions may then be
worked out In detail at a later date. The essential factor
i.s that every single resolution be so clearly ?nd accurately
defined as to exclude the possibility of a different inter-
pretation later on. The Russians, especially the man in the
street, are ma inly interested whether the conference will lead
to the second front. It is obvious that this question cannot
be- answered owing to strick military secrecy. .The people are,
however, amazingly optimistic and have themselves already
answered this question in the affirmative.
With regard to politics, it" is stated that all three powers
seem to have decided on a common policy towards the satellite
states so that once and for all It will be impossible for them
to play with the idea of finding protection from the U. S.
and Great Britain against the Soviet Union or vice -versa or at
any time in the future. The three Foreign Ministers are with
out doubt endeavoring to fix a uniform policy towards Rumania
Hungary, Bulgaria and Finland.
of
ze
oil
According to agency reports from Washington, the predicted
appointment of Marshall on 25 Oct. as Supreme Commander
the invasion forces in Western Europe did not materially.
This appointment will probably not take place until Marshal"]
comes to London next spring. The strategic plans, which did
envisage a landing in France p-n6 Holland before the spring
or summer of 1Q44, are entirely upset by the course of evenos
on the eastern front. The opinion was held In Washington Vst
winter that another year on the eastern front would result
in fulfillment of the aim of the U. S. i.e. exhaustion both
of Germany and of Russia, so that the armies of the Western
Powers would have an easy target in the course of a larding
in Western Europe. AMGOT would then take over in Europe in
order to stop the advance of left wing radicals. The Russian
summer offensive has completely upset all these plans and the
Americans and British must now act before the war has been
decided.
•367- CONFIDENTIAL
2b Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
Confernece on the Sit nation with Chief, Naval Staff
I. Army Situation;
The enemy extended his break-through near Melitopol
on the southern sector of the eastern front. A weak defensive
front is being built up by our forces. It is still doubtful
whether this attempt will succeed in view of constant heavy
enemy pressure. The enemy also extended the break-through south-
west of Zaporozhe still further. One ropetrovsk fell. The fight-
ing strength of our own forces can be estimated by the fact
that only one combat group could be formed from the remnants
of five divisions. The enemy started his drive on Krivoi Reg.
The sectors of Army Groups, Center and North were comparat-
ively quiet.
Only minor local fighting is reported from the Italian front.
No orders have been issued so far regarding a possible evac-
uation of the Crimea. According to information from Armed
Forces, High Command, Operations Staff, Navy, the Crimea is
to be held at all costs.
-*- -*- • Report b y Quartermas tier general :
a. Torpedo boat T :30" was commissioned at Danzig.
b, Orders dealing with the new erection of coastal batteries
on the Channel coast have been received from Armed Forces
^ High Command, Operations Staff. This measure is obvious-
ly aimed mainly at protection of special weapons. Copy of
teletype as per l/Skl 3202/^3 Gkdos . Chefs, see War Diary
Part C, Vol. X. According to these orders, the Navy is
to furnish the guns and personnel for at least two med-
ium batteries (four 15 cm, guns each) and the personnel
for two 21 cm. batteries of four guns each. Part of the
personnel Is to be Oravn from the 1,000 volunteer? 0^ the
Russian Legion and troops from the east who will be made aval
lable by Commanding General, Armed Forces, West. This will
not entail a reauction In the number of volunteers re-
quested by High Command, Navy for other points. Naval
batteries on other coastal sectors are not to be de-
commissioned on account of those new formations,
c A uniform operational command is necessary for aerial
defense of Gdynia and Danzig. Measures are oeing worker
out together with the Air Force.
-368- CONFIDENTIAL
26 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
In a Highly Restricted Circle
III. Report of Chief, Operations Branch, Operations Division :
a. Commander y. Submarines, Mediterranean has voiced object-
ions to new mine laying off Br in4'&s-i> ; since it is'. not certain
that TMB mines will react at the -water depths, of -over 20 ■' •
meters existing there and because the effect of the first,
operation -will, lead to patrol and defense. The -water depth of
off Bari makes minelaying possible, but Commander, Submarines,'
Mediterranean, advises against it, because this harbor j.s- '■■'■
unimportant and since enemy patrol must be expected there. He
plans a, torpedo operation b^ submarine U "453" in the area of
the southeast coast of Italy and Sicily.
Chief, Naval Staff decides that submarine U "453" should
first ca.rry out a minelaying operation off Bari and later on
repeat minelaying off Brindlsi. .
b. The 0S0RN0 sailed from Batavia today. A decision as to-
■whether she sould attempt a blockade-break must be reached
at the end of November. Plans for putting in are at present
under discussion by Group West -with an officer from Naval
Staff. Chief, Auxiliary Cruiser Section reports that the cap-
tains are remarkably confident. ':.:"■:.
$T
Special Items: ■'■ « ' ■
1. On inquiry from Quartermaster Division the Naval Liaison
Officer to High Command, Army. Army General Staff t reports.:
"1.; The flow of supplies to the Crimea is very limited.
Requests for shipment of supplies by sea have already been
received direct from Quartermaster General. . . . _-
2. The following figures must be assumed in case the Crimea,
is to be' evacuated:
a) Troops: approximately 200,000 #ien«
Horses: 60,000
Motor Vehicles: 15,000; in addition, all other equip-
ment .
b) Supplies: approximately 500,000 tons. About 120,000
tons" of livestock (400,000 head of cattle). Altb-
■' .. ..'..• gether 620,000 tons.
-369- CONFIDENTIAL
26 Oct. I943 CONFIDENT IAL
Should the overland route vis the isthmus of Perekop be
open, It csn be assumed that the bulk of the troops and
part of the cattle will be evacuated from the Crimea on foot
and supplies by railroad. Daily capacity 16 trains (7,200 '■ .
t ons ) .
Army General Staff. -request that everything be prepared in
such a -way that as much as ; passible is shipped by sea,
should evacuation become necessary at short notice,"
II. Naval Intelligence Division submits the following assess ■
ment of the situation regarding enemy landing craft:
^ I. Another 47 landing craft left the Mediterranean for
the Atlantic, making so far altogerher 80 LCT ! s or LCI's,
or 18$ of the number in the Mediterranean. Transfer to
England can be sssumed, since the first part of this group
•was sighted by our air reconnaissance at 0900 on 23 Oct.
300 miles northwest of Cape Ortega 1.
2. Amongst the vessels withdrawn were 6 LCF's and 13 LOG'S,
i.e. about two-thirds of the Mediterranean strength of these
classes. The others were probably LCI's, Since LCI's are not
built in England but come from the United States, their trans
for from the Mediterranean might be due to the difficulties
of a transatlantic crossing in winter.
3. In connection with the transfer of landing craft from the
United States to England in North Atlantic convoys, observed
for the first time on 8 Oct,, the following was detected:
% arrival of 2 L.'.T's en 12 Oct. and of further LST's, number .
unknown, on 24 Oct. in Londonderry.
4. This movement has not yet substantially changed. the
operational possibilities in the Mediterranean theater and in
the area of England.
Situation 26 O ct.
■^ ' War in Foreign Waters
I* Enemy Situation:
Nothing special to report.
370-"- CONFIDENTIAL
25 Oct. 19^3 iGON-F- TDSNTIAL
2. Own Situation: r ;./; t ../; J ."
The planned,; supply ";6^^a^ti. p^ '^ ^ijfae. BRAKE is can-
celed, since the submarines' operating in the Indian Ocean
are to call at Penang for supplies. An order to this effect
has been sent to the BRAKE with Radiogram 2142. She should,
however, hold herself in readiness for. further operations.
■*•-£• Situation W est Area
1. Enemy Situation:
Over the Bay of Biscay 33. planes were detected on'
24 merchantmen o.f up to J>,QQO CRT en northerly course. Group
West assumes them to be landing craft » At 1210.20 vessels,
yrri-bably also lending craft were sighted in CG- 4277 on a simii
course.
2. Own Situation:
Atlantic Coast:
The loss of submarine chaser "1403" on 25 Oct. was
apparently not due to mine or torpedo action, since no deton-
ation was heard or any great vibration felt, according to
statements made by survivors.
Sabotage is therefore presumed. The boat had docked at Lorient
and left the dockyard on 20 Oct.
Two ELM/J mines were swept off St. Nazaire.
Channel Coast:
*
The convoy of the steamer NORDVAARD left Calais,
eastward bound, at midnight and arrived at Dunkirk at 0300; ■ It
put out at 2100, but was forced by weather conditions to return
to port ha If an hour la ter . ■ -. , - -- : "■ - •■
Torpedo boat T"l4" and seven motor minesweepers left Le
Havre at 1800. They will proceed as far as Dunkirk, , weather
permitting.
Commander, 5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla had three boats in
immediate readiness at Le Havre for PT boat chase, if such
were located.
371 CONFIDENTIAL
2b Oct. 1943. J . ,',"' ..... f _ CONFIDENTIAL
Fop brief 'action report of patrol bo-t "v.d. GROEBEN", of
convoy escort NORDVAARD, dated 25 Oct, see teletype 0220"
III. Nor th S ea , Norway, Northern Waters
Nor th Sea :
Seven ELM/J mines vere swept near the West Frisian
Islands. Minesweeper M "23" -was refloated in the Molengat.
Nor way, North ern Waters ;
I . Enemy Situation:
Over the North Sea 21 planes vere detected on
operation. One British vessel was located at 1440 in AN
l\660. A PT boat was sighted off Honningsvaag at 0747 and
was attacked.
The areas of two grid squares at the entrance to Porsanger
Fjord have been closed owing to suspicion of mines.
At 1050 on 25 Oct. in enemy PT boat encountered a defense
cutter- in the Buskoesund (north of Sogne F^ord) but with-
drew to the north when haad grenades were thrown and •submac-
hine-guns fired. At 1500 two PT boats were sighted near Hovden
on course northnortheast . At 0702 en 26 Oct. a Hampden fired
a torpedo which missed on one of our southbound convoys near
Feistein. Numerous single planes were observed approaching the
west coast on 25 Oct.
2. Own Situation:
The destroyers BEITZEN and Z "38" left Kris tiansand
South at 2130, northbound. .
Thirty-four ships were escorted north and 17 south. Altogether
19 ships were delayed owing t.o shortage of escorts.
According to a report from Naval Command, Norway an agent
of the Secret Service was told to find out:
"What damage did the TIRPITZ sustain in the submarine attack?
Can this be repaired in Norway?".
Group North/Fleet proposes that the agent be given the follow-
ing information: . - , .
"Several double-bottom compartments of the TIRPITZ were dam
aged, resulting in the loss of oil. In addition several range-
372 CONFIDENTIAL
26 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL _
finders and light guns were damaged through vibrations. Repairs
willbe carried out during present repair in Norway. The ship
is apparently going on to Germany for routine dockyard per-
iod.
Naval Staff, which centrally controls the passing- on of in-
formation to the enemy intelligence, service regarding the
TIRPITZ, outlines the statements- and their tendency as
follows :
"Damage sustained by the TIRPITZ in the submarine attack is
only slight, since the mines exploded at a considerable -.
distance from the ship. Minor underwater damage to the
double -bottom compartments, resulting in the loss of oil.
Docking was unnecessary. In addition certain damage to
her electrical installations, obviously through vibration,
details of extent not known. Repairs possible in Norway.
At the same time routine repairs of boilers, engines and
weapons will be carried out. The ship will not return to
a German port uniil later, for as short a dockyard period
as possible. The reason is allegedly the heavy air raid
damage at the dockyards at Hamburg."
IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea
1. Enemy Situation:
Firing practices by the heavy anti-aircraft guns
aboard the MARAT were observed. Two tugs and two large
patrol vessels were seen sweeping magnetic mines on
the west roads of Kronstadt. Enemy planes over Luga bridge,
Lippovo and Kirgolovo were fired on by our anti-aircratt
batteries. North of Hungerburg bombs were dropped south
of the 2nd Army Coastal Battery of the 929th Battalion.
2. Own Situation:
In the Baltic Sea entrances 41 boats were out on
minesweeping operations and in the Baltic Sea 17. One ELM/J
mine was swept off Halsbarre. One mine detonation was re-
ported southeast of Grenaa. Escort service in the areas of
Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic and Commander, Mines- -
seepers, Baltic was carried out as planned and without
incident. Minesweeper M "451" ran aground south of Varisai
and sustained heavy damage.
Five coastal minelayers were out on mine laying operations
in the area northeast of Schepel.
Naval Command, Baltic reports with reference to the order
of Naval Staff (see War- Diary 19 Oct.) regarding dismantling
of batteries from the area of Admire 1, Baltic States that:
I. For the time being the following batteries will be left
373 CONFIDENTIAL
I— ^/ W ^ w • ju^i^y
•
%
at Kronsta&t Bay. Battery "Karkuli"" (f Our "I?" cm-.' guns)",
Battery "Peterhof" -(three 10.'5 cm-.' guns )'/ Battery ";Koen~
igsberg" (three 10.5 r cm. guns)," the 4.th Battery of the ,.
239th 239th Naval Anti-aircraft Battalion, (four 8.8 cm,: . •
anti-aircraft guns) the sixth Battery of the 239"th Naval
Ant i-a ircra ft Ba tta lion (seven 3 »v? •'■■cm. anti-a ircra ft guns ) ,-
and 'also 2 cm. guns" for battery defense. .■,:•;• :;/ •..: :
2. Complete dismanting gear for Battery . "Prinz He inrich". ,
is available. Order for dismantiling this Battery has been
given; 'time required probably three "weeks.
V. S ubmarine War f are
Submarine Group "Schill" consisting of eight boats,
hss been given orders to operate against a northbound
convoy in the Atlantic. This Group is to be ijpr patrol
line from BE 8878 to 8989 at 1000 on 2S Oat. Reconnaiss-
ance -will be carried out by BV 222 ! s and FW -200 ' s .
Submarines of Group "Siegfried" detected .an enemy bearing
in BC 3526 and BC 31. I n "the same area one of our submarines
■was attacked by a plane. According to .: radio decoding,-
stragglers of the awaited convoy received orders not to
proceed via BE 9360 but via 99?4. Then the convoy -was
proceeding much further south than assumed. The operation
■was broken off, since pursuit in a' southeasterly direction
could not lead to interception in view of the ins tense
enemy air activity which had started . in the meantime; -
Group "Siegfried" -was ordered to"" take up"a"new disposition
in-BC, right. third, against an expected slow :eastbound
convoy.' ■•-■; . .-;
Submarine U "I83" reports from the sea area of the
Maldives and Ceylon in the Indian .Ocean that she fired .
eight torpedoes which missed on 19, 23 and 24 Oct. and
attributes this to electric torpedo failures. This boat
is due at Penang on 30 Oct. '
VI. Aerial Warfare
British Isles and Vicinity :
The 3rd Air Force reports 2 planes on operation over
England, 3 over the Atlantic and 4 over the Mediterranean.
For reconnaissance evaluations of the Atlantic see "Enemy
Situation West Area".:
In the afternoon major enemy formations. carried out dive-
bomb attacks on the airfield at Brest South. Half of the
bombs fell into ; the sea. The seaplane dockyard and engine
workshop as well as the yard for land planes sustained
damage but are still in operation. No night operations are
reported. 374 CONFIDENTIAL
26 Oct. 19^3 CQWPlDEWTXAL
Mediterranean Theater:
jCMMM .' — •-*-/
Reconnaissance planes and fighter -bombers of the 2nd
Air Force supported Army operations on the Italian front by
attacking motor vehicles and tanks in the sector of Montenero.
In the Greek area our planes attacked Leros, Samos and in-
surgents in Northern Croatia and in the area of Joannini.
The attack on Leros harbor was carried out by 51 bombers
and 17 dive-bombers. Two small warships north of Leros and
west of Archi were damaged by direct bomb hits. Two cutters
were sunk. In the Italian area enemy fighters attacked
Ancona with machine-guns during the day. In the Greek area
raids were carried out on the airfields of Salonika -Sedes
and Mikra . Damage stained was slight.
In the Aegean area six enemy planes carried supplies to the
insurgents .
Eastern Front : '.k
The 5th Air Force withdraws its assumption of 25 Oct.
that Ice Fjord is unoccupied. One of our reconnaissance
planes was fired on from Longyearbyen.
Otherwise nothing special to report.
VII. _ Warfare in the Medi terran ean a rd Black Sea
I. Enemy Situa-cicn Mediterranean:
Twelve LCT's of an unknown type arrived at Gib-
raltar from the Mediterranean. One U. S. cruiser of the
HONOLULU Class, probably the PHILADELPHIA, and one dest-
royer left for the Mediterranean. At l8l4 one of our submarin-
es detected and unsuccessfully attacked a westbound convoy
45 miles west of Algiers.
No reports have been received from the area of Sardinia -
Corsica. In the Gulf of Salerno there were: on the morn-
ing of 25 Oct. a convoy of 6 freighters and 1 destroyer; <
at noon an outbound convoy of Ik ships. A formation of.
landing craft was sighted southeast of Capti. No sighting
reports received from the Gulf of Gaeta', Only mlo-or supply
traffic was observed off the east and south coasts of Italy.
Otherwise no reconnaissance -reports received.
- 2. Own Situation Mediterranean:
- : During the night -of 25 Oct. two boats of the 3rd PT
Boct Flotilla broke through a double destroyer patrol off the
Bay of Naples. A torpedo was fired against a destroyer but it
missed.
375 CONFIDENTIAL
<"--
26 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
The boats -were forced to turn about 4§ miles off the
anchorages in the Bay, since stershells end location made
further approach impossible. Six boats of the 11th Motor
Mines-weeper Flotilla left Spezia in the afternoon of a
mine laying operation. Flanking escort was afforded by
four boats of the 7th PT Boat Flotilla. Bad Weather is
at present hampering coastal traffic with small vessels.
Otherwise coastal traffic was normal.
The hospital ship DJENNE arrived at Barcelona in the
afternoon and the AQUILEJA in the evening.
Admiral, German Naval Command, Italy reports that the
transfer of motor minesweepers and PT boats from the
Western Mediterranean to the Adriatic See via Genoa -
Piacenza will start on 6 Nov. It will be possible to transfer
six large and nine small motor minesweepers and all PT boats
by the end of November. Admiral, German Naval Command, Italy
reports, with reference to the situation report submitted
on25 Oct., that escort, minesveep ng and mine laying oper-
ations on the west coast can no longer be carried out to
the extend required efter withdrawal of the PT boats and
motor minesweepers; furthermore, that any operational act-
ivity will be Impossible. He requests that large motor mine-
sweepers and PT boats be left on the west coast of Italy
until transfer of further vessels from home waters is
assured.
Operations Division is at present investigating the dispostion
of forces In the Mediterranean. The result of this invest-
igation is to be expected on 27 Oct.
3. Area Naval Group South:
a . Adriati c Sea :
The enemy air attack with bombs and machine-guns on
Janina (northwest of Dubrovnik) on the morning of 25 Oct.
caused no damage. According to a Croatian report, the
steamer RAD (4,000 CRT) was sunk by enemy air action. Naval
Shore Commander, Daimatia has moved to his emergency head-
quarters at Klis owing to the enemy situation. Departure of
three steamers from Dubrovnik to the north has been post-
pone! because of the enemy situation. The report of 25 Oct.
about an auxiliary sailing vessel being overdue has turned
out to be incorrect. The vessel did not leave Cattaro north-
bound intil the afternoon of 26 Oct.
Mopping -up operations on the islands off the Dalmatian coast
are being continued; next on the list is Korcula .
376 CONFIDENTIAL
26 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
b. Aegean Sea :
Enemy Situation:
No damage to speak of was 3uttained in the air
attack*on Candia during the night of 25 Oct. On 24 Oct. an
enemy bomber was shot down near Gavdos,
The following were disarmed and evacuated:
On Naxos 8 Italian officers and 340 men;
On Par os 2 Officers and 150 men.
The following information has been received about the enemy-
occupied islands in the Dodecanese:
Castell Rosso: Occupied by the British. Base for light
surface forces. Seaplane base.
Symi: Occupied by the British.
Nisyros : Said to be occupied by the British.
Leros : Total occupation 5-6,000 men (mostly naval
personnel). 3-400 British, well armed; rein-
forcements must be expected. Allegedly strong
anti-aircraft defense, one modern 9 cm. battery,
one Italian battery.
Pa thmos : One Italian battery.
Nicaria : One Italian infantry company, two companies
of Black Shirts, said to be pro-German. Is-
land allegedly occupied by the British.
Samos : Staff of Division Cuneo (General Soldarelli).
Occupation 6-8,000 Italians, 2-300 British
and allegedly 5,000 Greeks. Two airfields
under cons true -Dion.
Own Situation:
The DRACHE returned to Salonika after completion of
a mine laying operation. Convoy operations were carried out
without incident. Coast patrol boat GA "54" left Levitha
for Naxos in the morning, carrying troops.
Group South transmits for information copy which it has re-
ceived*
377 CONFIDENTIAL
26 Oct. 19^3
CONFIDENTIAL
%
*
of a teletype from Army Group E to Army Group F regarding
surprise occupation of Samoa before the execution of oper-
ation "Leopard". For copy of teletype as per l/Skl 3l8l/43
Gkdos Chef3. see War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.
c. Black Sea :
Enemy Situation:
Enemy submarines were located 20 miles southwest of
Sevastopol according to radio monitoring.
An enemy submarine attacked our towed convoy from Sevastopol
to Ak Mechet with two torpedoes at noon 25 Oct. A lighter sus-
tained damage and was towed in. Submarine -chase has been start-
ed at the point of attack, a Sub marine was sighted and attack-
ed by one of pur planes eight miles northwest of AK Mechet;
no success was observed.
Own Situation:
The sector between the northern and southern break-
waters of Kerch was shelled by 15 cm. guri3 between 1130 and
1155 on 25 Oct. No damage was done to naval installations-.
At the same time air attacks were carried out on the town
and harbor of Yalta. The tug BAIKAL sustained damage.
The goods train ferry EAINBU.RG vhich was damaged some time'
ago by an aerial torpedo hit sprang a leak while in tow from
Sevastopol to Odessa and put in to AK Mechet, where she was
beached.
The 1st PT Boat Flotilla carried" out the operation against
Anapa during the night of 25 0ct o as planned. The southern
decoy group had an engagement with patrol vessels, the north-
ern group at the same time attacked the harbor of Anapa with
six torpedoes. No detonation wa3 heard. The torpedoes pro-
bably passed under the targets and ran ashore or were caught
in barrages .
Two naval landing craft are evacuating the garrison of the
island of Biryutshi (east of Genichesk).
Two Italian midget submarines left Sevastopol on a submarine
chase.
-378- CONFIDENTIAL
26 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDEN TIAL
VIII. Situatio n East Asia
Nothing Special to report.
****#-X-*****************-**--*-*-X--*'
f
379 CONFIDENTIAL
27 Oct, 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
Items of Political Importance
According,. to "Exchange Telegraph" one of the concrete
results of the discussions so far in Moscow seems to be ■
the decision to establish immediately a permanent joint
Three Power Committee which will' have sufficient authority
to deal -with future problems -which arise. The Kremlin
attaches great Importance to the creation- of ■inter- > •■
Allied organizations. The criterion of the success of this
confernnce is, howover , still the military aspect, It is
said that the Soviet Press. has not taken up or commented
on Smuts ' Speech in -which he predicted the opening of the
Second front in Spring 19 } 4,4. This is probably because the
Soviet Delegation is still endeavoring to have this date
changed ,
The conference will last another ten to twelve days.
The' leading British Press seems remarkably optimistic
j about the outcome of the conference,, According to Radio
London, Eden is said to have presented a photo album
showing the extent of the devastation caused in Germany
by the Anglo-American air offensive,
A Russian periodical lists four theses with regard to the
reparations problem:
1. Germany, Italy, Finland, Rumania and Hungary must
pay reparations.
2. ■.•Reparations to be pa id in kind, not In cash.
3. Actual repair of war damage must be carried out by
. direct employment of German ma npower.
H\ The Soviet Union, Poland, Norway and Greece must
be given priority in reparations, since their
economy has suffered more than that of the U. S.
. and Great Britain.
The House of Commons passed without a division prolong-
ation of the mandate of the present Parliament for another
year. •
A Government statement before the Japanese Parliament on
2.6 Oct. states that the main target is at present complete
agreement between the High Command and political leaders.
At the same time foreign policy and strengthening of
Government authority at home must go hand in hand. The back-
bone of internal strength lies' in a speedy expansion of
the armament industry. ... t
580 CONFIDENTIAL
27 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
Confernece on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff
, - ■ ■ " ■ ■■■■■ ■ ■ ■■ 1 —1. - 11 1 ... -■ — — . , , , ,
I. A rmy Situation:
All German combat divisions have been withdrawn from
the Crimea, except the 98th Light Infantry Dicision.
There are ten Rumanian divisions on the peninsula besides
a very strong German supply base with exceptionally Large
quantities of material and supplies.
The enemy enlarged his break-through near Melitopol to a
depth of 30 kilometers.
In Italy the enemy more or less completed the assembly of
his troops in front of our "Barbara" line. He is concentrating
his activities on heavy bomber, operations , such as have not
been observed since Messina.
II. Chief, Naval Intelligence Division states that the British
Admiralty reports in detail on the operation of our PT
boats off Cromer on 24/25 Oct. According to this report, four
German PT boats were destroyed and seven damaged; 19 men
were taken prisoner.
In Highly Restricted Circle:
III. Report by Chief, Operations Branch, Operations Division
a. The Naval Attache in Tokyo reports the following dis-
position of Japanese submarines in the Indian Ocean:
1 submarine between Mombass^ and Diego Suzrez
3 submarines south and southwest of India
1 submarine on passage to Aden
1 submarine on return passage from Aden to
Penang, at present south of India.
b. According to information received from Armed Forces
High Command, Operations Staff, Navy, the said Oper-
ations Staff on 25 Oct. drew attention to the danger
of an enemy attack on Denmark, which would have very
serious consequences if it were to penetrate as far
as Sweden and the Baltic Sea. The Fuehrer agreed with
this opinion and approved the transfer of a further
division to Jutland.
Naval Staff if of opinion that the present assessment of
the situation with regard to Jutland needs re -examination.
381 CONFIDENTIAL
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*
27 Oct. 19^3 CO NFIDEN TIAL
Considering the present situation regarding landing
craft, bad weather can no longer be regarded as an
obstacle to landing operations and the employment of .
airborne troops would make operations even more
independent. Our barrages in the North Sea and the
Skagerrak will be no serious obstacle. It is significant
that "the Swedish naval base at Gothenburg has now been
expanded to a Naval Station and that a notoriously
pro-British officer has been appointed as its Chief. It
is noteworthy that this information comes from the
"Folkets Dagblatt 11 , a newspaper with a strong pro-
German National Socialist inclination. (The last sen-
.tence added by Chief of Staff; Naval Staff - Tr . N. )
Chief , Naval Staff ordered an investigation as to
whether , where and to what extent further fensive
mine barrages can be laid, despite the shortage of
.mines, The artillery defense of the Jutland coast could
only be reinforced at the expense of the Channel coast.
The following factors speak against an invasion of
Jutland: The possibility of our strong defense forces
and air formations being brought up quickly and without
hindrance from home territory; the fact that the enemy's
long supply route is flanked by the German coast and is
within reach of our fighters and of small battle units.
An operation against southern Norway/skagerrak coast
would be much 'more in line with the defense situation,
yet in both cases Sweden would be the .target.
c. According to further information received from Armed
•Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy the Fuehrer
attaches the utmost importance to all suitable naval
forces (PT boats, motor minesweepers, gun carriers, nnd
if necessary also submarines) being used for defense of
the Strait of Kerch and the Crimean sea area against
enemy landings, since Army forces are inadequate.
At the Fuehrer's request Chief, Naval Staff left here
at 1400 for the Fuehrer Headquarters accompanied by Chief,
Operations Branch, Operations Division.
382 CONFIDENTIAL
27 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
Special Items
I, In cooperation with the Coasts 1 Light Infantry Battalion
in Special Unit "Brandenburg" see War Diary 14 April 19^3 ) >
am operation by this Battalion is being prepared against the
West African and Brazilian coasts (Operation "Reisernte").
Naval Staff has made available two motor fishing vessels
for this operation. For details of this plan and preparations
see File 1/Skl. I Op. XI, 4 Vol. 1 "Commando operations".
Discussions were held on 22 Oct. between Commander, Coastal
Light Infantry Battalion and Operations Division, with the
following results:
"1. * Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff has ordered
that the Coastal Light Infantry Battalion is at present
to be employed in its full strength in the Aegean Sea.
Operation "Reisernte", for which preparations have just
been completed, must therefore be postponed for the time
being.
2. Operation "Reisernte", however, is not to be given up,
• since considerable time was spent on conversion, fitting-
up and equipment of the two vessels provided for this
operation as well as on the training of crews. Commander,
Coastal Light Infantry Battalion expects to be able to
have the required number of men available for this oper-
ation at the latest by next spring. Chances of success
will not be any less then than they are now.
3. It is not advisable to leave the vessels at the dock-
yard for the next six months .. Instead it will be better
for the boats as well as for the crews to be employed
elsewhere during this time. The boats and crews should,
however, not be worn out in such operations. Special
care must be taken that the vessels' ultimate use is
not disclosed. They should only participate in oper-
ations where the enemy has no opportunity to draw con-
clusions, from their present use, as to their later
assignment and where he cannot obtain an exact descrip-
tion or pictures of these vessels."
Chief, Fleet Branch, Quartermaster Division has been advised
accordingly. A telephone conversation with Chief of Staf,
Group North revealed the fact that Armed Forces High Command,
Intelligence Division, Sabotage Section had offered the boats
provided for operation "Reisernte" to Group North as patrol
vessels in the Skagerrak for control of the Swedish skerries
(Operation "Greif"). Chief of Staff, Group North was there-
383 CONFIDENTIAL
%
27 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
upon advised that this offer by Armed Forces High Command,
Intelligence Division, Sabotage Section is opposed to the
views held by Operations Division. For secutiry reasons
these boats can under no circumstances be' used for oper-
ation. "C-reif " . Group North will there-fore assign other
vessels to this and will employ the boats provided for
operation "Reisernte" only in such a way that security
is in no way endangered.
The Sabotage Section was informed by phone of the above
instructions given to Group North. The' order issued by
the Sabotage Section, without first consulting Naval
Staff, was due to a misunderstanding.
II. Operations Division has reached the following con-
clusion and assessment of the situation with regard to
divisi on of f or ces be tween the We 3 t ern Med it e rr^ neon
and the" Adriatic Sea s
"I. In the Wes tern lie d! terra ?iea n raval warfare is at present
concentrated" on defense - .* -
The tasks are chiefly:
a. Defense of our convoy traffic along the coasts of Italy
and southern France.
. b. Defense of the coast against landings.
- Our sea communications along the coast are at presnnt
starting up, German Naval Command," Italy states that
transport requirements will be 50,000 tons monthly
from Genoa and Spezia to Civitavecchia. Besides the
above, one single supply shipment of 44,000 tons is
necessary.
At present there are 136,.000 tons of return cargo at
P-iombino; this quantity will most likely increase to
■over 300,000 tons. Sea communications along the coast
will probably gain in importance, ' since the enemy is
already trying to wreck and interrupt overland commun-
ications in central and- northern Italy by air raids on
railroads and highways. However, sea connnuni cat ions
will not be d e cisiv e in holding • central Ital^y because
it will be possible to transport a large part of supplies
over the comparatively extensive network of- roads even
if air attacks hamper these operations. '.
■ P oa st s l defe nse in Italy and Southern France must be
borne chiefly' by coastal fortifications on the mainland
and by Army forces; naval .forces are only suitable for
patrol of coastal waters at night and sre therefore not
decisive in the defense of the coast.
384 CONFIDENTIAL'
27 Oct. 19^5 CONFIDENTI AL
Offensive task s would lie in attacks against enemy
supplies: to the Naples area and to Sardinia and
Corsica, if our own forces, were strong enough. PT
boats would be the only suitable naval vessels, but
but weather conditions during the nest six months
will restrict their operations.
With his naval bases in the Western Mediterranean the
enemy has moved quite close to our shores (Naples,
Sardinia, Corsica), in particular he posses almost
unchallenged air supremacy and his Air Force is there-
fore in a position to endanger our sea traffic cons-
iderably. The consequence is already that sea trans-
ports in the main areas can only be carried out by
small vessels, which must look after their own defense
in most cases (for instance: Naval landing craft).
Enemy naval acticity in this area has so far not had any
appreciable effect. It must, however, be expected that
stronger enemy naval forces will-appear on the coast as
the bases on Sardinia and Corsica are built up.
The submarine danger is still considerable.
In view of this situation it is not to be expected that
the few German naval forces will play a decisive part in
the tasks of the Navy, unless it should be possible to
increase their number considerably by transfers from
home waters. On the other hand, it is necessary to in-
crease sea transport on small, fast vessels in every
way possible.
2. In the Adriatic Sea the main problem at present is
the movement of supplies to the Army along the West
Adriatic coast, as far as Accona and along the Delmation
coast to the southeast. The extent of this traffic is
given as 30,000 tons monthly from Trieste to Ancona. Part
of this cargo must be transhipped at Ancona into small
vessels and carried further along the coast on these.
What has been said under 1) with regard to the west coast
of Italy also refers to this traffic. It will undoubt-
edly be possible, to route the greater part of this
traffic overland.
Supplies from Trieste along the Dalmatian coast to
Montenegro and Albania, however, play a d ecisive
; part in view of the traffic conditions in the Balkans,
At least. 100,000 tons per month must be transported
over this route by sea. Army Group Southeast states
that these supplies could never be transferred to
overland routes because roads and re ilwa-ys . are inade-
quate, but foremost owing to the partisan activity.
, thus the fighting strength of end supplies to the
German Forces in the Southern Balkans depend on sea
385 CONFIDENTIAL
•
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27- Oct. 19*13..'; ,...:-:::; .; : \ • CONFIDENTIAL
traiff ic which/ however, cannot be started yet at all,,
since most of the island off the Dalmatian .coast, are
. being held by partisans. •
Coas tal defense is extremely -weak in this area. It
cannot rely entirely on fortifications on the mainland
but must also be effective on the outlying islands. The
. necessaty operations for first of all mopplng-up and
.. occupying these islands and then for setting up defense
"VouldT require quite a few light naval forces, ■vhich are
not yet available.
The enemy has in the Italian' coast as far as Termoli
area a favorable jumping -off base for attacks on the
opposite coast, -which he can now easily reach unobserv-
ed, in one night, especially during the -winter because
Of the short distance tobe covered (on ;an average 60-80
miles). The excellent airfields in the Foggia area also
offer the enemy an opportunity for air operations against
our convoy traffic.
3. ' Our own Air Force will' be ur.able to assist the Navy
'..' ; effectively in the near future. . ; •
The few available naval forces must therefore be con-
centrated so. that dispersion will not 'make it . impossible
to carry out the required task in at least one area.
The most important task is sea traffic along the Bnlkan
coas.t. 'All available forces must be concentrated on this
target, eve n if j. t should ac tually be d e sira ble to in-
crease sea traffic also in the "other areas and to make
forces available, for offensive operations.
*
In conclusion it must be emphasized that there is already
such shortage everywhere in transports alone (steamers,
war transports':/ naval, landing craft, Siebel ferries and
auxiliary., sailing vessels) that it is necessary, to start
building new vessels in as >; large a number and. as quickly
as possible, if it is impossible to transfer naval forces
from home, waters to. the Western Mediterranean via : the
Rhone river, complete withdrawal of our combat ;forces
from this sea area must be accepted. . - ■ ■■■'
The enemy may otherwise be able to destroy or cut off
pur sea communications in the Eastern Adriatic through
' : - a relatively small commitment of his naval and air forces,
-■'in such a- way that our Army in the Balkans will become
: - 'powerless . "
These -considerations have led to the despatch of the following.
386 CONFIDENTIAL
27 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL
information to Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff
Quartermaster Division, Commanding General, Armed Forces,
South, Army Group B, Commanding General, Armed Forces,
Southeast, Army Group E, German Naval Command, Italy, Group
South, Admirals, Adriatic and Aegean, -with copies to Admiral,
Fuehrer Headquarters, Commanderin Chief, Air Force, Operations
Staff, Navel Liaison and High Command, Army, Army General
Staff, Naval Liaison:
"I. The following basic considerations have been followed
by Naval Staff in the dispostiion of naval forces in the
Mediterranean:
1. Tasks of Naval Forces:
a. In the- Aegean Sea? Most urgent is the mopping-up
of the remaining islands, then continuous supp-
lies oo the island occupation forces (including
constantly required shifting of forces) and, if
necessary, evacuations.
b. In the Adriatic Sea: Supplies for all services •
to Dalmatian ports, Montenegro and Albania.
Mopping-up of the outlying islands is essential
for this and at the smee time for building up
coastal defense.
c. On the West and East coasts of Italy: Transports
of supplies, especially for the Army and the
Air Force. Large return shipments, Patrol of
coastal waters for coastal defense; operations
against enemy supplies to Naples, Sardinia and
Corsiaa .
.
d. Off the south coast of France: Convoy escort
and patrol of coastal enters.
2. Undoubtedly the most important tasks of those mentioned
above are the ones on the Adriatic east coast ind in the
Aegean Sea. Re-routing of transports to Dalmatian ports,
Montenegro and Albania to the overland route is entirely
out of question in view of the Balkan traffic conditions
and because of partisan activity. Thus the fighting stren-
gth of the Gorman forces operating there and their supplies
depend entirely on the sea traffic. The same applies to'
the Aegean Sea .
Tasks in the Western Mediterranean and on the Italian
. Adriatic coast can and must take second place to these.
Supplies to the Italian front can be transported over-
land even if hampered by air attacks on railways and
roads. For offensive operations, which are verj desir-
able, only PT boats are suitable, but weather conditions
during the winter months limit their commitment very
much.
587 CONFIDENTIAL
•
9
2 7 Oct. 1943 ' UOlNiFlD iJlxriUilli
II. Naval Staff has therefore introduced the following
measures:
1. For the time being the two captured Italian destroyers :
and four Italian torpedo boats will put' into commission
in the Aegean Sea. . : .
2. In the Adriatic Sea all available and sutiable warships
and auxiliary warships will be fitted up and put into
commission. Center of operations Adriatic east coast.
3. All German PT boats ( 4 large, 8 small)- and 7 large and
9 small" German motor minesweepers:, will be transferred
from the Western Mediterranean to the Adriatic Sea over-
land.
Further transfer of some of these boats to the Agean Sea
is reserved.
One German 'mo't or minesweeper flotilla (11 lprge boats)
will remain in the Western Mediterranean. Transfers will
probably start on 6 Nov., one boat will be transferred
. daily.
4. In the Western Mediterranean as many Italian and French
Warships as it will be possible to man will be put into
commission (in the Italian area for the time being 5 tor-
pedo boats and at Toiilon. 4 French fleet tenders). In add-
ition captured vessels will be used to replace losses
and in exchange for vessels less suitable."
For- copy of teletype I. Ski I op 30089/43 Gkdos . see War Diary
Part C, Vol. XIV.
Ill, The decision reached by Chief of Staff, Naval Staff
regarding -che withdrawal of naval gunners from the area
of Admiral., Black Sea for reinforcement of the Adriatic
Sea area (see War Diary 23 Oct.) which decision was
forwarded to Army General Staff by the Liaison Officer
to Naval Staff, reads as follows:
"The withdrawal of naval gunners by Group South from
the area of Admiral, Black Seas as reinforcement for
the Adriatic Sea, where the number of personnel is
inadequate, is in line with the demands' .'of- Naval Staff.
However, the present situation in the area of the Crimea
and the Sea of Asov permits only the withdrawal for the
Adriatic coast of part of the navnl personnel which has
become a va liable through changes in the front. Naval
forces at present operating in the area of C-enichesk
will not be withdrawn for the time being. ..Naval gunners
who have up to now been brought up for manning Army coast'
al batteries are, however, to be withdrawn; it must be
388 CONFIDENTIAL
as per I
27 Oct. 1943 C ONFIDENTIAL
assured that equipment Is taken over by navel reserve
forces and action readiness re-established as far as
possible. "
For copy of order l/skl I a 29393/^3 Ski Qu A II
29883/43 Gkdos. see War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.
IV. Naval Intelligence Division, Enemy Situation Brancy
reports in "Brief Intelligence on the Enemy Situation" No.
21/43, amongst other matters on Anglo-American -warship
operations during the action in the Gulf of Salerno.
Naval Intelligence Division bases its information on a
special report from Reuter which reads as follows:
"At the opening of the attack in the Gulf of Salerno on
Sept. 9 a strong Anglo-American naval force of more than
500 vessels took part, from a 35,000 ton battleship down
to small tugs. During the following days the fleet assisted
the landing operations by fire of singular force and concen-
tration.
Admiral Cunningham was in command of the fleet. Vice Admiral
H. K. Hewitt of the U. S. Navy commanded the "Western Task
Force" operating off the Salerno coast.
The most formidable battle squadron ever to operate in
the Mediterranean protected the landing operation in the
Tyrrhenian Sea against attacks by surface forces. This
force was under command of Sir Algernon Willis and consist-
ed of the battleships RODNEY, WARSPITE, VALIANT, KING GEORGE
V and HOWE, the aircraft carriers ILLUSTRIOUS and FORMIDABLE,
the cruisers AURORA, PENELOPE, SIRIUS and DIDO and numerous
destroyers .
Another Force under the command of Rear Admiral Sir Philip.
Vian consisted of the small aircraft carriers UNICORN, HUNTER,
BATTLER, STALKER, and ATTACKER and was escorted by the
cruisers EURYALUS, SCYLIA and CHARYBDIS.
The "Westerm Task Force", responsible for the protection of
the landing operation, was divided in two groups - the south-
ern attack group commanded by the U. S. Rear Admiral J. L.
Hall, Jr,i , and the northern attack group commanded by. the
British Commodore G. N. Oliver. The southern group consisted
of the U. S. cruisers PHILADELPHIA, SACANNAH and BOISE and
18 destroyers; the second group consisted of the British
cruisers MAURITIUS, UGANDA and ORION, the monitor ROBERTS
and 20 destroyers.
•j
'Both groups were escorted" by a large number of minesweepers,
which did splendid work by sweeping lanes in the heavily mined
389 CONFIDENTIAL
27 Oc t . 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL
approach -waters for landing craft, troop and supply transports.
They' cleared 135' mines during. the first four days of operation.
Following their orders to attack without regard to losses or
difficulties, the destroyers proceeded straight to the coast
and attacked the coastal batteries at. close range* Numerous
batteries were put out of action right at the beginning of
the operation. In the following days almost* every one of the
warships fired a large number of shells on the German coastal
positions, The UGANDA fired 8l6 rounds of six-inch shells
within 10 days, while the AURORA, PENELOPE, SIRIU3 and DIDO
fired 5085 rounds in 14 days.
The- battleships WAPSPITE a nd : VALIANT, which were freed through
the capitulation of the Italian Fleet, arrived on 15 Sept.
Of 30 15-inch shells which they fired on this day, 19 hit
their targets. On the f ollowing da^ 16 direct hits were scored
and 8 vere within a radius of '±00 meters, of the target.
The American warships made similar efforts. The PHILADELPHIA
fired 29^6 6-inch and il6l 5-incJi shells during the operation.
The figures give only a slight Impression of the Intensity
of bombardment and the deadly accuracy but ths;?e Is no ques-
tion that this, bombardment was of immense importance "to the
success of the operation.
The Allied Fleet sustained losses, but t;he ris,k" taken is
regarded as having been sufficiently justified, This operation
was a ma gnif i c ent ' ' e.xa m£ le of the c cmr- J. e te c o - opera t i on of
the British and Amrrlean Fleet in a joint action ..against the
same target. "
Naval Intelligence Division comments as' follows: •
The above statements and other information obtained' from a
reliable source reveal, the. following tactical formation of
the naval forces -engaged in the landing operation at Salerno:
Two groups of heavy naval forces operated under Admiral A. B.
Cunningham:
1. One group of battleships and aircraft carriers under Adm-
iral Sir A. Willis,
2. 'one glrcraft carrier group under Admiral Sir Ph. Vian
both with anti-aircraft cruisers and "numerous ' destroyers as
outer escort for the landing operation.
The landing itself was carried out by the third group, the
"Western
390 CONFIDENTIAL
27 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
Task Force- 1 , under the U. S. Admiral H. K. Hewitt. The
U. S. Aircraft tender BISCAYNE served as flagship of the
"Western Task Force". Admiral Hewitt had two groups at
his disposal:
1. The northern group under the command of Commodore
G. N. Oliver.
2. The southern group under command of the U. S.
Admiral J. L. Hall.
The absence of the NELSON indivates that she was lying
(damaged?) at some port (Malta?) at the time of the
Salerno operation, since her departure from the Mediterranean
has not yet been ascertained.
The U. S. naval forces are combined in the 8th Fleet, with
Fleet station in Algiers, as has now been ascertained.
As regards the losses mentioned, so far only the loss of
the U. S. destroyers BRISTOL and BUCK and of the British
destroyer PANTHER have been reported by the enemy.
The BRISTOL and the BUCK were probably lost through striking
mines. The British have admitted the loss of the destroyers
PANTHER and INTREPID and of the minelayer ABDIEL. The Poles
have admitted the loss of the destroyer ORKAN.
Situation 27 Oct.
I. War in For e ign Waters
I. Enemy Situation:
A heavily escorted convoy carrying war materiel and
food for Russia is scheduled to leave New York on 7 Nov.,
according to an intelligence report received via Portugal
Escort forces are said to include two auxiliary aircraft
carriers .
On 22 Oct. eleven troop transports left Pensacola for England.
The troops will be moved to southeast England by rail from
ports of disembarkation on the west coast..
2. Own Situation:
$
o n
Naval Staff advised the Naval Attache in Tokyo by
Radiogram 0100 as follows:
II -T-
I. Commanding Admiral, Submarines plans to have all MONSUN
391 CONFIDENTIAL
•
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27 Oct. 1943 • CONFIDENTIAL _
submarines cell at Penang. No supply by the BRAKE. This
ship is,' .however, to be kept in readiness for other tasfes .
Nov "Schedule" -will follow.
2. Submarines "Lueddem", "Schaeger" and •'iTunker" will
arrive together at the rendezvous on 29 Oct. one hour after
sunrise, according to the lates-t reports from these sub- -
narines .
3. You may .expect submarine U."533" (Henning) and submarine
U "168" (Pich) on 5 NovV! •' ' ' • ■•■'■-<.. :
II. Situation We s t Area
■ £"'• Enemy Situation:
Over the Bay of Biscay 51 planes were detected on
operation. One British vessel saa located at 1153 in AL
6389 end one at 2215 in BE 27^0.
Our sir reconnaissance sighted at 1255 : in CP 9178 a north-
bound convoy of 56 merchantmen escorted by 1 cruiser, 2
destroyers and 4 escort vessels^ Speed 9 knots. There were
2 destroyers on northwesterly course at 1135 In CF 9673 •
2. Own Situation : ■;
A tlantic Co a st: ■: •
One submarine was escorted out from St. Nazaire.
- Ch annel Goas-.t; .. . -■.•.-■..
+ - • .
During the night of 26 Oct. from 23 10 to 0150 un-
known enmey targets ■ were continuously located by radar in
the area Fecamp to Oris Nez. Between 0235 and 02^5 an Army
Battery fired three rounds on targets west of Fecamp, which
withdrew northwest at high speed,. ''From 1358 to 1710; targets
on alternating courses were again located in the sea area
between Gris Nex-.and Calais in:. heavy fog.
At 2237 an enemy vessel carrying radar was located north
of Cherbourg proceeding on northerly course at medium
speed.
Torpedo boat T"l4" arrived at Calais at 0250. The convoy of
the ■ NORDVAAPJD put in to Dunkirk again at 2132 on 26 Oct.
Torpedo boat
392 CONFIDENTIAL
27 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
T "14" and the convoy of the NORDVAARD are to go on
eastward during the night of 27 Oct.
Six nines with snag lines were swept between Nieiiport and
Ostend. For brief report of Group West on the torpedo
operation by the 2nd, 4th, 6th and 8th PT Boat Flotillas
during the night of 2 4 Oct. see teletype 0336. Group
West floses its report with the following estimate:
"After midnight steady decrease of visibility towards
the east, which hampered the operation considerable.
The operation was entirely based on radio intercept reports;
air reconnaissance could not be carried out owing to the
enemy situation. Final conclusion arriver at is that the
convoy was actually about 12 miles further north than
assumed and moved in closer to shore before the attack
by the 8th PT Boat Flotilla, or that this Flotilla was
successfully driven off by destroyers." u
For estimate of landing possibilities during the night of
27 Oct, see teletype 1718.
III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters
11 ' m tm ■ 1 ... ■ m ™-.m ■ ■■■■■■■■i n — «■ 1 ■■'■ — 1 ■■,! — - ■■ >. m 1 . 1 ■ 1 1^. — .. 1,1 — .^....— ■ 1
North Sea :
1. Enemy Situation:
Our sir reconnaissance sighted at 0841 two landing
craft in AN 4999/3777 and at 1305 one minelayer proceeding
at high speed in AN 3780/90. Group North/Fleet believes that
these vessels were probably sweeping a channel for a break-
through by blockade runners,
2. Own Situation:
No shipping movements on account of heavy fog.
Norway, Northern Waters :
1. Enemy Situation:
Over the North Sea 15 planes were detected on
operation. Our Air reconnaissance sighted at 1140 in AB
2549 (southwest of Spitsbergen) 1 cruiser and 1 merchant-
man (5*000 GRT) on course 300 degrees, proceeding at 15
knots. Three of our own submarines have been ordered to
take up position against this unit off Ice Fjord.
393 CONFIDENTIAL
27 Oct.. 19^3. . CONFIDENTIAL
2. Own Situation:
In the area of Naval Command, Norway 32 ships
were. escorted north and 15 south, Nineteen ships were
delayed owing to shortage of escort.
Submarine U "39V left Hammerfest on 25 Oct, for Hope
Island with a weather detachement of the Air Force aboard.
At 0409 the destroyer EEITZEN ran aground in the Karmsund
two miles north of E_opervik.
No salvage operations are possible yet owing to heavy
south winds. Preparations have been made to bring up. .. ..
tugs, lighters and a floating crane.
Fighter procection has been promised, weather permitting.
Destroyer Z "33''' is standing by the BEITZEN. For further
particulars see teletypes 1750 and 1815, The damage was
caused by faulty navigation. Group North/Fleet has submitt-
ed an extract from the operational order of Admiral, North-
ern Waters for minelaying operation "Katharine" c -This oper-
ation is to be carried out by the 4th- -Destroyer Flotilla
with four vessels between 27 Oct. and 3 ■Nov,- The barrage
will be laid off Eanin Nos . For teletype regarding this, as
per 1/Skl 3l82/ i J3 Gkdos . Chefs, see War Diary, Part C, Vol.
Ila. :
IV. Skagerrak, B altic Sea Entrances, Balt i c Sea
I. Enemy Situation:
Shelling of targets in Leningrad by'Army guns led
to lively counter -fire which caused, however, only minor
damage. At 0750a minesweeper group was sighted south of
Lavansaari; this turned about presumably on account of the
weather.
There was lively air activity over Tyters . At the front,
operations by assault troops repulsed.
From 1018 to 1158 20 bombers and 7 fighters attacked our
barrage patrol between Tyters and Hogland in three waves.
Casualties were sustained but no damage.
2. Own Situation:
In the Baltic Sea entrances 28 vessels were engaged on
39^ CONFIDENTIAL
27 Oct. 1945 CONFIDENTIAL
■ "^ ■■■■Ml II
mines weeping operations and in the Baltic Sea J>6 vessels.
One ELM/ J mine was swept southwest of Laesoe. Escort
duty was carried out as planned and without incident. Mining
of the area northwest of Schepel with TMB mines was carried
out by five coastal minelayers.
Battery "Prinz Heinrich" shelled the naval dockyard at
Leningrad. Targets: four submarines and an aircraft
carrier under construction. Our fire was shifted to the
naval dockyard at Kronstadt when a smoke screen was put
up at Leningrad.
Dismantling of Battery "Prinz Heinrich" was started at 1200.
V. Merchant Shipping {£
Information has been received from the Deputy f Q i«
German Sea Transportation in the Mediterranean that German
crews will be available for six ships weekly which can be
moved back from Italian ports to southern France under
escort. If these crews can be supplemented by Italians
more ships can be transferred. German Naval Command, Italy
has been instructed to investigate whether escort can be
dispensed with, in order to assure a more 3peedy transfer,
and to submit its plans after consultation with Group West.
VI . Submarine Warfare
Group "Siegfried" has been ordered to have 20 submarines
In patrol line from BC 3^38 - 3849, 6222 - 6883, 9522 - 1882
at 1000 on 29 Oct.
Otherwise nothing special to report.
VII. Aerial Warfare
British Isles and Vicinity:
The 3rd Air Force had 2h planes out on operation over
the west area and two over the Mediterranean. There was also
very little enemy air activity. Nothing special to report.
395 CONFIDENTIAL
♦
27 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
Mediterranean Theater:
Our own Air Force carried out reconnaissance operations ; -
over the Italian area and the Aegean Sea , One enemy reconn-
aissance plane "was shot down- over Kos . ■■
Eastern Front:
The 5th Air Force carried out reconnaissance. For eval-
uations see Situation North Sea and Northern Waters. In
both cases contact could only be kept for a short time owing
to strong anti-aircraft defense. A bomber mission was unsuccess
ful since the target was not found again.
VI II , Warfare in the Med i terranean and Black Sea
r
I. Enemy Situation Mediterranean;
A light French cruiser passed through the Straits
of Gibraltar, westbound, at 0?45. Cape Spartel- sighted at
1120 a convoy- of apparently 10 ships proceeding towards the
Mediterranean. The following we're lying in Gibraltar at
2O00' o'n-26 Oct.-: ■■''■ - ' '"' ! •
1 cruiser in dock, 1 mine laying cruiser, 1 auxiliary cruiser,
14 destroyers, 11 oorvettes, l hospital ship, 2, transports,
including an Italian one, 41 freighters' and 8 tankers.
At 1230 there were east of Maddalena 3. torpedo boats and
4 patrol boats obviously oh minesw'eeping of the eastern
barrage in the Strait of Bonifacio.
Evaluation of photographic reconnaissance of 26 Oct. over
Termoli shows 2 largo, 8 medium-sized and 20-30 small
landing craft a3 well as 8 transports leaving port. An
outflanking landing is considered possible.
At 1245 there were between Ischia and Naples 3 destroyers
on northerly course.
At 1550 Gaeta was shelld from the sea. At 1357 20 miles south
of the Straits of Messina 28-30 ships were sighted on course
30 degrees. At noon our air reconnaissance sighted 75 miles
north-northwest of Alexandria 1 cruiser and 3 destroyers or '
torpedo boats on course 160 degrees.
396 CONFIDENTIAL
27 Oct. 19^ CONFIDENTIAL
According to an intelligence report via Portugal, British
merchantmarine captains are of opinion that an attack on
the Channel coast is not imminent but rather believe that
operations in the Mediterranean "will be intensified. Strong
formations of troops are said to be ready in Syria and, for
these, transports and escort vessels are being assembeed at
various ports in Libya, Egypt and Cyprus.
It is furthermore reported that large quantities of war
materiel are being assembled on Corsica, presumably for
an operation against Southern France.
2. Own Situation Mediterranean:
German Naval Command, Italy is of opinion that
experiences during the PT Boat thrust into the Gulf of
Naples on 26 Oct. indicate excellent prospects of success,
so that the withdrawal of PT Boats because of dwindling (f_
prospects in the open sea owing to the lack of reconnaissance
does not seem justified.
Six motor minesweepers and one naval landing craft carried
out mine laying operations "Zange" and "Hornisse" according
to plan, PT boats as escorts for operation "Zange" advanced
so far as the Strait of Bonfacio dut did not not contact
the enemy.
Submarine U "565" sank an enemy destroyer with a "Zaunkoenig"
torpedo in CJ 88^5.
The hospital ships AQUILEJA and DJENNE left Barcelona in
the eveningfor Marseilles.
One submarine was escorted out of Toulon. .
The Red Cross steamer PADURA struck a mine, most probably in
our barrage, and sank at 0200 ten miles south of La Couronne
while en route to Marseilles'. The steamer : did not follow course
instructions .
The convoy route between La Canarque and Marseilees has been
closed as a precaution owing to suspicion of mines.
German Naval Command, Italy asks for confirmation that it
will be advised in time about the- operation by the 10th
Italian PT boat Glotilia in connection with intelligence
(see teletype 1830). This matter is being dealt with by
Quartermaster Division.
-397- CONFIDENTIAL
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27 Oct. 1943 .CONFIDENTIAL
3. : Area Naval Group South; ' '..■•
a . Adria tic Sea :
Contrary to the order given, the steamers MAMELLI,
BRUNNER and MARKO left Dubrovnik for the north on 25 Oct.
They were attacked by enemy planes and shelled from the
island of Brae. The &AMELLI and the MARKO arrived .at Split
on the morning of 26 Oct. with 12 C.ec\C. and 25 -wounded.. The
BRUMER continued her passage and is said to have entered a
port of refuge
Cn 24 Oct. the Fascist boat ENARE under the command of an
Italian Major left Zara northbound, despite a warning issued
by the Port Commander, and was lost.
Mine-sweeping operations in the Fares ina Channel were dis-
continued after a mine detonation. Two mines were swe:pt.
Port Commands were established at Monfalcone, Pirano,
Parenco, £lbona, Arsa and Rovigno.
Naval 'Shore Commander, North Adriatic reports the setting
up of five batteries of the 621st Naval Artillery Battalion
at Polo, .Flume and Trieste. The batteries are only ready
for action to a limited extent since there is no- fire con-
trol and radar .gear. The five batteries at the ■three places
mentioned are not manned. For particulars -see teletype 0724.
b. Aegean Sea :
En e my S i t ua ' t i on :
A submarine 'was sighted at 1^40 on 26 Oct. 25 miles
east of Sklathos. •' • ■
On the evening of 26 Oct. there were two vessels, presumably
destroyers, north of Levitha on westerly course.
At 0920 on 27 Oct. coast patrol boat GA "54" reported a
submerging submarine northwest of Naxos . At IO56.GA "01"
was unsuccessfully attacked by a submarine. Submarine.
chase is being carried out. Our air- reconnaissance ■
sighted at 1155 1 cruiser, J> destroyers and 2 vessels,
presumably torpedo boats, on : course 160 degrees; at 1235
1 small cruiser and 1 destroyer- -were sighted on northerly
course. .•..••'. - ..
398 CONFIDENTIAL
27 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
Own Situation:
Evacuation of Gavods has been completed. The Naval
Artilery Battalion on Stampalia reports one 7-6 cm.
battery in action readiness. The tanker CELENO left Chalkis
with 501 Italians aboard for Salonika. Other convoy traffic
proceeded according to plan.-
c. Black Sea :
Enemy Situation:
An intelligence report from an untried source
dated 16 Oct. states that the Russians are making prepar-
ations for a landing in the Crimea. These operations are to
start after occupation of all routes leading through the
•Nogai Steppe. Training of special troops' has been going on
since February 19^3 at Sochi (main base?), Tuapse (fuel
and supply base) a3 well as Gagry, Suchum, Pizunda , Laza-
revsk, Kalinovya (ports of embarkation); the entire Black
Sea Fleet is to participate. About 1,200 special landing
craft of 5-10 tons, supplied by the United States, are ly-
ing in readiness at Batum, Suchum, Sochi, Tuapse and
Pizunda . In addition 300 landing craft for tanks and
materiel. Four tankers have been converted into patrol
vessels. About three . landing corps of altogether about
10,000 men are on the vest coast of the Caucasus. Start
of the operation is planned for the beginning of Oct. 19^5 •
Naval Intelligence Division has summarized the information
obtained on the tactical organization of the Russian Black
Sea Fleet. For copy as per l/Skl 32631/43 geh. see War
Diary, Part C, Vol. XlVa .
Own Situation: .
The tug BAIKAL capzized on Yalta roads owing to
damage sustained in the a ir attack on 25 Oct. In the enemy
air raids on Feodosiya at noon on 2.6 Oct. 2 of the 17
attacking planes were shot down. On their return flight these
planes attacked our convoy Cape Chauda - Feodosiya without
much success.
Submarine chase by Ship "19" and two boats of the 23rd
Submarine Chaser Flotilla near Ak Mechet was without
result. Two Italian midget submarines also returned to
Sevastopol from an unsuccessful submarine chase off the
south coast of the Crimea.
Submarine U "18" left Constanta for operations on the
afternoon of 27 Oct. Five naval landing, craft left Genichesk
on the afternoon of 26 Oct. in order to evacuate the last
troops from Biryutshi.
399 CONFIDENTIAL
*
27 Oct. 1943 .. CONFIDENTIAL
Seven boots of the 3rd Motor Minesweeper Flotilla carried
out a mine check in preparation for barrage "S 47". Four
motor minesweepers and three naval landing "craft left
Sevastopol fof Feodosiya m connection -with barrage oper-
ation "S 73".
No enemy vessels were sighted by our patrol lines off
Genichesk and the Strait of Kerch during the night of
26 Oct.
The ALBERICH with five river motor minesweepers of the
Danube Flotilla was sent back' to Belgrade by the Army on
the evening of 26 Oct. after completion of the defense
operations on the Sava.
On 26 Oct. two towed convoys proceeding up the j^nube were
fired on from short off Tachtalia.
IC. S ituation East Asia
According to an intelligence report, Colonel Mishina
has declared from the Japanese Armed Forces Headquarters
in China that the reinforcement of the Japanese Air Force
in China which is necessary for combatting the U. S. Air
Force is impossible, as demands are too great on other
fronts.
400 CONFIDENTIAL
28 Oct. 19^3 . . ■ C ONFIDENTIAL
Items of Political Importance
Nothing special to report.
Chief, Naval Staff returned from the Fuehrer Headquarters
Conference 6n the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff
■■ m ■ —■-■«., ■».,,■■■■.■ ■■■!■ ■ J ■ li - - i ■ — ■■—-■■ ■■. — ... ,. M .ii.ii — ill i i . • ■■■■■ i i—m . i. i. ■ ■ -ip ■■ !■ — .■ - i -
I. Report on the conference with the Fuehrer on the
situation in the Crimea at 16^0 on 27 Oct.:
"The Fuehrer ordered this special conference to discuss the
situation in the Crimea on account of a letter from Marshall
Ant ones cu, the contents of which General Hansen transmitted
in advance by teletype. Marshal Ant ones cu voiced his apprehen-
sion about the threat to the Crimea and recommended immed-
iate evacuation since he places small confidence in his
Rumanian troops. :: . ' .
Chief, Army General Staff reported briefly on the situat-
ion in the southern sector of the easte'rn front:
There are prospects of sealong off the enemy's penetration
near Melitopol. To do so, additional forces are being brought
up from the Crimea .
The situation at Krivoi Rog was 011I5 lightly touched on with
the remark that there were no vital changes since the last
report made at noon today. It was rnentionnned that eight
divisions are being brought up; this will take some time.
The fact that the Army Group A consider an immediate evuc-
uation of the Crimea overland advisable was not clearly
expressed. General Zeitzler reported that there is enought
ammunition in the Crimea to last about two to four weeks '
depending on the scale of the fighting to be expected. The
forces can live off the land to a large extent.
In response to a question by the Fuehrer, Chief, Naval Staff
reported by means of a chart on the strength of our naval
forces and shipping available in the Black Sea. It was point-
ed out that only a part of the naval forces mentioned is
always In readiness.
The loading capacity of the naval landing craft for sea trips
was given as 200 men with small arms and baggage, I.e. that
50 naval
401 CONFIDENTIAL
*
♦
28 Oct. 19*0 CONFIDENTIAL
landing craft, the number which at present can be assumed
as an average in sailing readiness, -will be able to trans-
port 10,000 men. A crossing to ports in Rumania requires
l£ days, a round-trip therefore at least four days. In
addition to the naval landing' craft, steamers are available
with a capacity again of approximately 10,000 men.
Russian destroyers have penetrated into the Western Black
Sea and submarines are operating there regularly. The enemy
Air Force is the main peril to our sea transports. This
threat -will increase as soon as Russian planes can take off
from the area north of the Crimea. Anti-aircraft armament on
naval lending craft is to be reinforced, above all with
quadruple guns which will become available after submarines
are equipped with the 3.7 cm. guns. In reply to the remark by
the Reichsmarschall that additional shipping, for instance
on theDanube, could be made available further investiget- .
ions were promised.
The Fuehrer's considerations:
1. Evacuation of the Crimea will have unpredictable polit-
ical and military significance. The Russians will move 300-
400 kilometers nearer to the Rumanian oilfields. Shortening
of the front will not entail saving fo troops, since expan-
sion of the defense of the Rumanian and Bulgarian coasts
will become necessary. The Crimea can anyway be held if the
pocket at Krivoi Rog can be eliminated; if not, evacuation
overland is uncertain. All considerations must therefore be
directed to an evacuation by see. An order for evacuation
will cause the Rumanian troops to lose their power of resist-
ance.
The Fueher ' s order :
- r - ■ iVS . .i , iii.
2. All naval forces are to be made ready for defense of
the Crimea and shipping for • transports (from or to the
Crimea according to the situation) and all preparations
are to be made. Do not. arouse unrest amongst the troops
through advance orders.
Receipt of the letter from Marshal Antonescu, which is
expected on 28 Oct., is to be awaited. Another reason why
any order for evacuation which may become necessary need
not be issued today is because the railroads in the Crimea
are busy for the next 2-3 days in moving our troops.
In- the discussion which followed, the Fuehrer, Commander
in Chief, Navy and the Reichsmarschall expressed their views
on the importance of the Crimea and the possibility of
holding it and bringing up supplies. Chief, Army General
Staff concurred. The Reichsmarchall asked how the situation
402 CONFIDENTIAL
28 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
with the Central Army Group had developed. When General
Zeitzler replied that the tension there had decreased,
the Reichsmarschall promised the transfer of air forces
from this sector to the area of Army Group South for
attacks on shipping targets.
Chief, Operations Branch telephoned from Fuehrer Head-
quarters and advised Chief of Staff, Naval Staff about
the above decision. Instructions were then passed on by
telephone to Group South by Chief of Staff, Naval Staff.
During the evening situation co nference at 2200 the question
of the Crimea was discussed further along the same lines.
Following a report by Chief, Operations Staff, Armed Forces
High Command on a projected directive regarding strengthen-
ing of defense on the northwest coast of France, the Fuehrer
asked when the heavy battery of Cherbourg is expected to be
completed. Commander in Chief, Navy stated in reply that the
date set so far was 1 Feb., but that completion will be
speeded up. Chief, Operations Staff, Armed Forces High
Command emphasised that all measures here must be completed
by the end of January."
II. The following report was received last night from
Group South:
tl-r
I. A week ago Army Group A ordered a "study" to be drawn
up on the evacuation of the Crimea in two hypothetical
cases:
a. Economic and materiel evacuation;
b. Evacuation of personnel and Its tactical exectuion.
The 17th Army Command handed the completed study on *—
24 Oct. to Admiral, Black Sea.
In the first case evacuation of materiel is provided
within four weeks without any changes in the fronts.
In the second case, which may be ordered or become
necessary through enemy pressure, the following is
planned: 36 hours for the evacuation of the eastern
front of the Kerch peninsula . Three days for with-
drawal to the Parpatsch line, two days for the evacu-
ation of the southern and southeastern part of the
Crimea, including Sevastopol, and three days for with-
drawal over the Perekop Isthmus. In all ten days.
In the latter case only troops with equipment and such
materiel as they themselves can carry will be withdrawn.
Evacuation by sea is limited since Sevastopol will soon
no longer ae available and the Eupatoria roads and the
bay of Ak Mechet, both rather unsuitable for only three
days more.
-403- CONFIDENTIAL
•
*
28 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL
The Army is therefore not reckoning on evacuation by
sea; this will he available only to the Navy.
3, The Navy recommended evacuation by sea instead of via
Perekop. This -would necessitate a step-by-step with-
drawal of the Army to the bridgehead at Sevastopol
Evacuation of 210,000 men with all shipping available
in the Black Sea would require five to six weeks. The
Army believes it impossible to hold Sevastopol that long
with the available two German and seven Rumanian div-
isions, the latter rather unreliable, and therefore
adheres to withdrawal via Perekop.
4. The Navy will make preparations for evacuation along
the following lines:
a. Transfer of flotillas to ports on the west coast.
b. From shore units, the personnel of port commanders
and the crews of batteries, after demolishing these will
be combined in battle units, They will be made partially
mobile with naval vehicles available in the Crimes and
will be attached to Army Units. The romaineder will be
evacuated by sea. Since political and currency questions
have not yet been settled, shore units will be withdrawn
to inland places in Rumania and Bulgaria or perhaps to
home territory; they will then be sent for new oper-
ations to the Adtiatic and Aegean Seas or to the Ruman-
ian and Bulgarian coasts after the political question has
been settled.
c. Quartermaster Division, Admiral, Black Sea will be trans-
ferred in this case to Constanta in order to control
withdrawal movements. The command post of Admiral,
Black Sea will also be moved to Constanta, as Nikola yev
is unfavorably situated and the remaining naval oper-
ations on the west coast can best be controlled from
there with the front towards the east.
d. The vessels operating in the Sea of Asov can probably
not be withdrawn. These are to carry out patrol duty"
during the evacuation of the Crimea. The crews are
then bo blow up their vessels and attache themselves
to the .Army.
e. The Reinforced Frontier Guard Control Service (Coastal),
the Black Sea Legion and Foreign Volunteers will be
transferred to the Adriatic Sea.
^04 CONFIDENTIAL
28 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL
5. The present situation is marked by:
a. The assembly of landing craft opposite Kerch and
moving up by the enemy of heavy guns under cover of
smoke .
b. The break-through of Melitopol on 25 Oct. The enemy
is now 60 kilometers from Genichesk. The Biryutshi
Peninsula was evacuated on the night of 26 Oct.
c. The enemy spearhead from the break-through at
Deepropetrovsk is 120 kilometers from Nikola yev.
6. Owing to the events at the front Army Group A ordered
at noon on 26 Oct. that evacuation according to the
second plan be started on 27 or 28 Oct. Admiral, Black
Sea therefore ordered the concentration of all shipping C
at Sevastopol. A telephone conversation with the Naval
Loaison Officer to High Command, Army showed that comp-
lete evacuation of the Crimea is not yet contemplated
according to the situation as estimated there. A report
from Admiral, Black Sea received in the evening stated
that Army Group A had canceled the order for Plan No. 2
and had ordered preparations for commencement of Plan
No. 1. Admiral, Black Sea therefore canceled the orders
for the assembly of shipping.
7. Shipping will be provided for the evacuations from the
Crimea which will now become necessary. In addition to
this, steamers will be transferred from, the Aegean Sea
to the Black Sea, Evacuation of naval materiel will
• start at once.
8.. Clarification is again urgently requested of the ^
political question regarding withdrawal into Rumanian
"and Bulgarian territory."
III., In view of the situation arising from the discussion
held at the Fuehrer Headquarters, Chief, Naval Staff
has ordered that the following clear and definite
instructions be despatched to Group South and Admiral,
.Black Sea with a copy to Armed Forces High Command . ■
Operations Staff, Navy:-
"I. The Crimea is of special political and military Importance:
as a cornerstone of the eastern front and as an advance
position off the Balkan coast. Rumania and also the
..alkan area is defended on the Crimea.. Evacuation of the
penisuia will not shorten the front, since Russian pressure
will force us to build up defense of the entire Rumanian
C oa s t .
405 CONFIDENTIAL
28 Oct.. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL
A Russian advance by a further 300 to 400 kilometers to
the Rumanian oilfields, which are essential for -warfare
in Europe, will be very disadvantageous. -
2. The Crimea will not have to be given up. if the eastern
front can be held in the sector Krovoi Rog - Melitopol.
If the Russian break-through cannot be stopped, the poss
ibility of evacuation and the supply by land is doubtful
It seems possible to re-establish the southern sector
of the eastern front by bringing up Army and Air Force
reinforcements .
3. According to 20, all considerations with regard to trans
.ports from, and to the Crimea must be based exclusively ■
on the sea route. Further advice on transport require-
ments for maintenance of supplies by sea will follow. In
this connection it is particularly emphasized that there
is no intention of evacuation at present and that no
order has as yet been received. Nothing but the usual;;-
economic goods are to be evacuated from the Crimea - •
also in order to avoid the idea of evacuation taking
hold of the troops prematrrely and causing alarm. On
. the contrary, commands, naval snd shore units must be
';-•' fully aware of the fact that the Crimea is a vital
position for defense of the Balkans and demands of
everybody all-out action and devotion in the battle for
this strategically important target. Gaining time can
• • also be decisive."
For relevant orders l/Skl 3200 and 3205/ i O Gkdos . Chefs,
See War Diary, Part C, Vol. XlVa .
IV. High Command, Army, Army General Staff, Na val . Lia is on •
and Commander in Chief, Air' Force^ Operations Staff, Naval
Liaison, have been informed of the above order and the former
requested, to submit as soon as possible information on the
requirements of the Army General Staff for supplies to the
Crimea by sea.
Furthermore-Chief, Naval Staff ordered that such personnel of
the. naval artillery battalions as have not yet been withdrawn
to the Adriatic Sea are to remain in. the Crimea as long as
evacuation has not been decided on definitely. Though build-
ing-up of coastal defense in the Adriatic Sea is urgent, the
Crimean fortress should in no way be weakened just at this
moment. Operations Division will communicate at once by phone
with Admiral, .:*aiack Sea in order to establish the position
with regard to withdrawal and transmit new orders.
V. Since Field Marshal Kesselring will remain in command
in Italy and Field Marshal Rommel will relinquish command
406 CONFIDENTIAL
28 Oct, 1943 CONFIDENTIA L
of Army Group B., it will be necessary for German Naval
Command, Italy to move its headquarters back again to the
vicinity of Commanding General, Armed Forces South.
VI, . Report by Chief, Naval Intelligence Division:
a. The German Legation at Bern reported to the Foreign
Office on 23 Oct. :
"A report from the Swiss Legation in London confirms that
no Allied landing on the Balkans was carried out because
tee Soviet Union handed Great Britiin and the United States a
note stating that an Allied invasion of the Balkans would bo
regarded by the Soviet .Union as an unfriendly ect. The United
States Government, is said to have regarded this note as an
unpardonable interference' with Allied strategy and shown its
annoyance.. The U. S. Government is said, however, to have
agreed at the request of Great Britian to await the outcome
of the Three Power Conference in Moscow' before deciding on
an invasion.
The above report is of special interest inasmuch as it comes
from Eden's private secretary."
b. ^According to information available to Naval Intell-
igence-Division, the enemy hss kO ships in sailing readiness,
with, a total tonnage of approximately 88,000 GRT, in the
Black Sea; these could transport in landing operations about
40,000 men with light equipment or 9,000 men with heavy equip-
ment.
Special Items: ■„
I. Air Force Command, Center in agreement with Quartermaster
Division, Naval Staff, has recommended to Commander in Chief,
Air Force, Operations Staff, that command of all air defense
forces in the area of Gdynia - Danzig be made the responsibili
ty of the Navy. This would mean that all air defense forces
stationed in Danzig would in every respect be placed under
naval command as regards operations. Naval Staff has requested
for this purpose the earliest possible use of anti-aircraft
searchlights, in order to build up a complete searchlight
system in. the area of . Gdynia - Danzig for night fighter oper-
ations . '. ■
Air observation Center, Danzig and Gdynia will be combined
under operational command of the Naval Air Obsrrvation Center,
Gdynia. It will be impossible' to establish floating obser-
vation posts, as personnel and materiel are not available.
-407- CONFIDENTIAL
V
*
*
28 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
II. Chief, Security Police, Paris reports to Operations
Division that the Italian steamers INDUSTRIAL, MARINA and
SULBIA, now at Vigo, plan to desert to the enemy. He
recommends that efforts be made to induce the captains, who
are said to be open to bribery, to proceed to French ports.
Operations Division immediately informed the Naval Attache
in Madrid with the order to make use of all facilities to
bring these ships into the German sphere of influence or
to prevent their desertion to the enemy.
For order l/skl 30170/43 Gkdos . see War Diary, Part C,
Vol. XI.
III. On 26 Oct. a discussion took place between Chief of
Staff, Naval Staff and Vice Admiral £be , dealing mostly
with the situation in the Mediterranean. The Japanese
Admiralty is at present especially interested in information
on the movements of enemy battleships and requests Naval
Staff to use its available facilities for this purpose.
Notes on this discussion as per l/skl I K 3193/43 Gkdos.
Chefs, in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XV.
IV. The following radiogram w^s received on 27 Oct. from
the Naval Attache in Madrid:
"The Spanish Foreign Minister has advised our Ambassador
of secret information indicating an imminent Anglo-American
landing In Southern France and at the same time on the
Atlantic and Mediterranean coasts. Similar rumors are circu-
lating here. If the British should actually plan this, the
speech by Smuts and rumors emanating from various enemy
sources, according to which the Allies will be unable to
start an invasion before next spring, could be intended
merely as a deception."
le
Situation 28 Oct .
I . War In Foregin Waters
1. Enemy Situation:
Nothing special to report.
2. O wn Situation:
The Naval Attache in Tokyo has received orders for
408 CONFIDENTIAL
2 3 Oct. 1943 CONF IDENTIAL
submarine "Dommes" to report the nature and weight of the
keel ballast.
The following instructions have been despatched to the Naval
Attache in Tokyo in connection with the loss of Ship "28":.
"I. Proceedure by "senior officer only" regarding Ship
"28" is canceled. For the time being despatch all communicat-
ions exclusively to Operations Division.
2. No permission to be granted survivors to send telegrams
or to telephone him.
3. What in your opinion are the chances of keeping this
incident secret? Is it considered certain that the submarine
took prisoners aboard? Are circles other- than the Navy
concerned in caring for the survivors?
4. What rescue operations did the Japanese Navy carry out?
What are the chances of success for a further search, consid-
ering weather conditions, sea, etc.?
5. a). From what time was ship "28" supposed to start anti-
submarine measures? .
b) What Japanese measures were provided and from when?
Bringing- in a large Japanese submarine through the
Bay of Biscay is regarded as a major operation here,
entailing use of all available escrrt forces. The -
lack of Japanese escort incomprehensible here.
6. Please cable as soon as possible n^mes of survivors
and brief report on her cruise and successes."
II. Situation West Area:
I. Enemy Situation:
Over the Bay of Biscay 27 British planes were
observed on operation. The convoy reported on 27 Oct. was
again located at 1053 in CF 5368, consisting of 60 merchant-
men, 5 escort vessels and 1 cruiser. The following were a Is
sighted: at O83O in BE 9293 2 landing craft with 2 escort
vessels on northerly course; at 1551 in BF 2524 2 cruisers
on northerly course; at 1556 in BF 2299 1 cruiser on north-
westerly course.
Heavy detonations were repeatedly heard In the afternoon on
the English Channel coast.
409 CONFIDENTIAL
28 Oct. 1943 CONFIDE NTIAL
Between 1119 and 1219 targets were located off Calais and
Boulogne in heavy fog wnd were shelled by our batteries
without the effect being observed. Between 2125 and 2236
targets were located east of Alderney.
2. Own Situation:
A tlantic Coast:
Two submarines were escorted in and one out.
For estimate of landing possibilities see teletype 1700..
Channel Coast :
Patrol positions were not taken up because of fog*
.m Between 0353 and 0355 two harbor defense boats off Zeebrugge
had a brief engagement with an enemy PT boat which withdrew
after hits had been observed (see teletype 1300).
The convoy of the steamer NORDVAARD and torpedo boat T "14"
was forced by fog to return to port immediately after depart-
ure on the evening of 27 Oct.
Torpedo boat T"l4" and six boats of the 4th Motor Minesweeper
Flotilla continued their passage east on the evening of 28
Oct. as far as Dunkirk.
PT boats S "100" and S "141" left Cherbourg at 1845 for
Boulogne.
#
III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters
N orth Sea :
Off Terschelling and Texel altogether four ground
mines were swept.
Fog prevented the convoy of the steamer NORDVARRD proceeding
from Dunkirk to Flushing as planned. All minesweeping oper-
ations a d other convoys as well as patrol operations during
the night also had to be canceled because of the fog. Channels
were swept during the day as planned and convoys in the
Heligoland Bight carried out. The suspicion of sabotage on
the harbor defense boat which sank at Dordrecht has not been
confirmed. The boat was swamped and sank due to a faulty
valve.
410 CONFIDENTIAL
28 Oct. 1943 C ONFIDENTIAL
With reference' to the situation report of Naval Command,
Baltic dated 23' Oct.' regarding attacks on nine Danish
fishing vessels on the Dogger Bank, "-Naval Command, North
points "out that the order issued on 25 May 1943 by Comm-
ander in Chief ; Air Force,. Operations Staff, at the insti- :
gation of Naval Staff, is still in force. In this "the
attacks originally ordered on Danish fishing vessels encoun-
tered in the closed areas in the North Sea are to be discon-
tinued for the time being." (see teletype 1230).
Naval Command, North requests Group North/Fleet, with copy
to Naval Command, Baltic, to draw the attention of units
under its command again to this order.
In connection with the assumption by Group North/Fleet that
the enemy vessels reported on 27 Oct. in the central North
Sea might have been engaged in mines weeping on our "West
Wall", Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North reports that
laying of enemy barrages as an eastern flanking protection >
for a swept channel is also not out of question.
Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North requests in this
connection:
a. effective air patrol of the "West Wall"
, b. • closing of the : "West Wall" area to fishing
c. granting permission to the Air Force to attack
. . ■••. all vessels encountered in the declared area
d. strengthening of the "West Wall" in the area of
Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North through laying
a new barrage "158" north or northwest as an addition
to barrages "14 A" or "15 A".
Finally, Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North draws attention
to the report of Admiral, Denmark of 23 Oct. concerning the
departure of nine fishing smacks from Tyboroen towards AN
6238, _in order to search for a missing smack,. since this
might have some connection with the reported enemy mine-
sweeping acticity. (see teletype 1240).
Group North/Fleet comments on the above as follows:
"I. The assumption of - Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North
that the enemy acticity of the "West Wall" observed on
27 Oct. (probably minesweeping) was connected with the
laying of enemy barrages as flanking protection for the
channels swept by the enemy, is not out of the question.
However, the procedure bj the enemy, who stayed for at
least five hours by daylight in the mined area, rather
411 CONFIDENTIAL
%
28 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
indicates minesweepigg. This, however does not exclude
the possibility that enemy mine laying operations are
being cariied out at night still further east as far
as our sea lanes. Anyway this must also be reckoned
■with now, after the discovery of the enemy's gap in
the barrage. The Group has therefore asked Naval Staff
for permission to lay new barrages in order to restore
the "West Wall" in this important area. Uncertainty
about the situation regarding enemy mine laying will make
it necessary for us to search our own minelaying courses
first of all.
2. Air patrol of the "West Wall" has not only been .requested
by Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North but also contin-
uously by all other Commands interested. The lack of
planes and the fuel situation, however, do not permit
such patrol. Fonstant observation of the English ports
on the east coast in order to recognize plans for land-
ing in good itime is also impossible. Group North/Fleet
therefore does not believe that enemy plans for landingw
will be recognized in time. The defensive power of the
"West Wall" is also from now on an uncertain factor,
unless the position of the enemy's barrage gap can be
ascertained, either accidentally through mines which
have drifted or through enemy minesweeping activity
which may be observed. Since defensive barrages, such
as the "West Wall" are only of value as long as they
can be patrolled and controlled, it is obvious that we
should give up the plan of reinforcing or restoring
the "West Wall" at all points where continuous patrol
is impossible. At first, however, Group North/Fleet
is of opinion that the barrages should be replaced
at least where enemy activity has been recognized,
especially off the Skagerrak, where enemy minesweeping
activitymay be closely connected iith the sailing of
blockade-runners .
3. Group North/Fleet does not believe that systematic
Danis minesweeping of German barrages is being carried
out, especially as the sweeping of these, which has now
been been detected, requires special gear and experience.
Considering the situation in the North Sea there is no
reason for the British to make use of Danish fishing
boats, which are without experience and inadequate for'
such important tasks as the clearing of gaps. Everything
considered, Group North is of opinion that it is
just if labl - to take food economy into consideration.
Norway, Northern Waters
I. Enemy Situation:
412 CONFIDENTIAL
28 Oct. -1945; CONFIDENTIAL
-Over- the North Sea 20 planes were detected on operation.
On- 27 Oct. three single planes flew into the areas of
Stavanger and Bergen without carrying out attacks*
Out air reconnaissance, flown on an increased scale for
.operation "Katherina" which started today,- sighted at 1050
and at 1130 in AC 6786 a unit of 2 cruisers, 9 destroyers
and 11 minesweepers on easterly course, speed probably
10 knots. Further reports show that the composition of this
unit is not quite certain since later on only 9 destroyers
and 5 motor gunboats, but no cruisers, were reported. Anoth-
er report mentions 9 destroyers and 6 patrol vessels. The
unit put up a snoke screen when our plenes approached and
tried to ward' off our contacting planes by heavy anti-air
craft fire and the use of flying boats.
2. Own Situation:
Group North/Fleet gave the following estimate of
the situation at 1700:
"The information so far received about the enemy forces
reported- today in AC 6786 at 1050 and at 1130 does not
yet clearly reveal the aim and the destination of the
enemy movements . If the unit actually only consisted' of
2 cruisers and 9 destroyers (British) on easterly course,
it is - assumed that it is to bring in a convoy from Russia
to England. If it also- included patrol vessels or mine-
sweepers, the transfer of a minesweeper unit to Russian
waters is possible. The cruising disposition and' the fact
that no vessels were reported in the vicinity of this unit
justify the assumption that this was not a convoy oper-
ation. A report about a cruiser and a merchantman in AB
2548 at 1130 on 27 Oct. might perhaps have some connection
with todays sighting report. It is possible that this was
a supply group for the force located today and was proceed-
ing to a waiting position further away when sighted. It is
possible that there will be a similar supply operation on
return passage. Considering the present situation, patrol
of Ice Fjord is of secondary importance. Our submarines
are returning to the Bear Island position. Operation
"Katharina" has been called off. The Group attaches special
importance t.o reconnaissance for the force located today and,
if possible, also for the small enemy group sighted on 27
Oct. in the vicinity of Spitsbergen and west thereof."
In accordance with instructions received from Group North,
Admiral, Northern Waters at 1520 gave orders to the 4th
Destroyer Flotilla to discontinue operation "Katharina"
and to proceed to Kaa Fjord via AC 7222. The 4th Destroyer
Flotilla was at 1100 approcima tely in AL 4940 about 240
miles west of the reported enemy. Our submarines
413 CONFIDENTIAL
•
*
28 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL
"were moved from the entrance of Ice Fjord to the operation
area Bear Island - southern point of Spitsbergen. For sit-
uation estimate of Admiral, Northern Waters on the calling -
off of operation "Katharine" see teletype 2359.
The lack of adequate air reconnaissance, brought to light
once more by the above incident, is important for an estim-
ation of the situation in Northern Waters. If an enemy force
is only detected when it has come almost within tactical range
of our own naval forces, our operations would no longer be
justified at all according to the general principles of
naval warfare. Actually we know nothing of what is taking
place or has taken place in the area between Scotland,
Spitsbergen and the Arctic coast, as our air reconnaissance
can give us only occasional information obtained by chance.
All attempts to tow the destroyer BEITZEN off have so far
failed. It will be necessary to lighten her as much as
possible and to assure her buoyance before towing-off oper-
ations can be continued. Group North/Fleet advises Naval
Staff for information of the instructions issued for the
transfer of the destroyer STEINBRINCK, with Commander,
Destroyers aboard, and of destroyer Z "34" from Kiel to
the northern ares. This unit will sail from Kiel at 0500
on 1 Nov.
It is still undecided whether destroyer Z "38" is to join
this group from Bergen. For particulars see teletype 1701,
In the area of Naval Command, Norway 44 ships were escort-
ed north and 15 south. Shortage of escorts delayed 21 ships.
IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea
1. Enemy Situation :
A service club for the German Armed Forces in Cop-
enhagen was destroyed at 2000 on 27 Oct. through sabotage,
Three Germans were killed and 18 including 2 sailors wounded.
In the areas of Admiral, Baltic States and Commander,
Minesweepers, Baltic the situation remains unchanged.
2. Own Situation :
Two ground mines were swept west of Cape Kullen.
Submarine chase was carried out northwest of Revalstein
without success. Otherwise nothing special to report.
4l4 CONFIDENTIAL
28 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTI AL
V. Merchant Shipping
Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Quartermaster
Divisi tij has approved the plan to return the French merchant-
men to the French Government, especially since they are un-
suitable. The Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping has
been asked to arrange the necessary formalities -with the
French Government and to see that these vessels are safeguarded
in such a way, even after they have been handed over to the
French Government, that they can be placed at our disposal
whenever required.
The Navy has been asked to prevent the possibility ■ of the
ships deserting to the enemy while being transferred and
while laid up. German Naval Command, Italy reports on in-
quiry from the Naval Staff that:
"I. Investigations are being made to ascertain how many
merchantmen can be transferred to Southern France and
from which ports. Details -will follow. ••■
2. Transfer will be greatly hampered through the f£:rst
withdrawal of technical personnel for the Aegean Sea by
the Deputy for German Sea. Transportation in the Mediterr-
anean. Approval was not given from here, since it is
almost impossbile to carry out our own tasks. It is
therefore requested that the Deputy be induced not
to withdraw technical personnel until the valuable
merchantmen have been transferred."
VI, Submarine Warfare
The convoy expected by Group "Schill" was sighted by
our air reconnaissance in CF 5368 on northerly course.
Anti-aircraft submarine U "256". escorting submarine -tanker
U "220" reported an attack by severll carrier-borne planes
from BD 4520.
The antiraft carrier station in BD has effectively hampered
our supply operations lately. Submarine -tanker UT "488" was
attacked four times within two weeks with bombs and once with
depth charges. No reports have been received from two of the
submarines of the supply group.
No reports on successes have been received.
415 CONFIDENTIAL
*
28 Oct. 19^3 C ONFIDENTIAL
VII. Aerial Warfare
B ritish Isles and Vicinity:
The 3rd Air Force had 17 planes out on operation over
the west area and 8 over the Mediterranean.
A Liberator plane escorting a convoy 450 miles vest of Lisbon
■was attacked four times by a FW 200 and driven off into the
clouds .
The enemy raided Cherbourg during the day. Damage vas done
to buildings in the arsenal. Four of the attacking plenes
•were shot down.
Northing special to report during the night.
Lively courier traffic by air between England and Sweden
continues .
Mediterranean Theater:
The 2nd Air Force carried out reconnaissance over the
Italian coastal area. The enemy attacked three airfields in
the Viterbo area. Two of the attacking planes were shot down.
Our casualties snd damages were slight.
Air Force Command, Southeast carried out reconnaissance over
the southern part of the Aegean Sea and in the direction of
the eastern Mediterranean. In the afternoon a unit of three
merchantmen with one escort vessel was sighted east of
Castell Rosso. One steamer (4,000 GRT) out of this unit was
sunk.
In aerial combat between Scarpanto and Rhodes between
4 Me 109' s and 3 Maryland plnnes all of the latter were
shot down.
Four Ju 88's heavily damaged a merchantman near Pathmos.
Eighteer enemy places machine-gunned Stampalia. In the
evening bombs were again dropped on the airfield of Maritza
on Rhodes, One Ju 8? was damaged.
Eastern Front:
No special reports were received from the Black Sea
area and from the Gulf of Finland.
Missions flown by the 5th Air Force oyer the Northern Waters
are reported under "Enemy Situation, Northern Waters".
416 CONFIDENTIAL
28 Oct. 1943 C ONFIDENTIAL
VIII. Warefare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea
1. "Enemy Situation Mediterranean;
The convoy of 7 freighters and 3 escorts, reported
off Cape Spartel at noon on 27 Oct., entered Gibraltar. At
2000 on 27 Oct. 6 ships left Gibraltar for the Atlantic,
including presumably 1 destroyer. At 2100 on 27 Oct. a
convoy, presumably. consisting of 20 ships, passed through
the Straits of Gibraltar, eastbound.
At noon on 28 Oct. .6 loaded troop taansports, including 1
Italian transport, escorted by 1 auxiliary cruiser and 3
destroyers, left Gibraltrr for the Mediterranean.
At 0400 a supply convoy of 30 to 40 ships -with escort vessels
was sighted 40 miles south of Naples, making for this port.
The following were sighted:
In Bastia at noon, 2 freighters, 1 tanker, 3 crash boats
and 1 motor gunboats;
Olbia 4 freighters:
Naples 3 destroyers, 4 escort boats, 4 "patrol boats or
minesweepers, 1 submarine, 4 tankers, 49 freighters,
1 LST, 2 LCT's "250" and 5 LCT's.
2. Own Situation Mediterranean:
Convoy traffic on the west coast of Italy was
carried out according to plan. Three PT boats were trans-
ferred from Via Reggie to Civitavecchia for new operations.
At Spezia a 15.2 cm. battery has been repaired and four other
guns are ready for action.
Contrary to previous assumptions, the minelayer JUMINDA was
not sunk by an enemy submarine but by PT boats on 24 Oct. '
near San Stefano. It is to be deplored that her distinguished
commander, Lt . Cdr. Brill, lost his life in this action.
The hospital ships DJENNE and AQUILEJA arrived at Marseilles
from Barcelona .
3 . Area Naval Group South :
a . Adriatic Sea :
According to an Army report eleven unidentified
vessels passed six miles off Valona at 1600 on northerly
course.
The steamer BRIMMER entered Sibenik on 26 Oct. The steamers
MAMELLI and MARKO, which left Split for Trieste at 0300 on
4 17 CONFIDENTIAL
28 Oct.- 1943- ■ C ONFIDENTI AL
27 Oct. were fired on in the Drvenic Channel, The MARKO
returned to Split because of heavy damage. The whereabouts
of the MAMELLI are still unknown. Traffic for large ships
between Valona and Dubrovnik is temporarily closed unitl
its safety can be assured. It has now been reported that
the steamer MARCELLA (3,08l CRT) was' sunk by bombs on
31 Oct. (obviously 13 Oct. - Tr. N.), and that the steamer
MERANO (3,704 GRT) and the tanker POCARICA (7,884 GRT) were
seized by enemy naval forces during the night of 15 Oct.
In the area of Cattaro four 15 cm., two 8.35 cm. and three
7.6 cm. guns manned by Arm, Personnel are reported in
action readiness.
According to information from Group South, intelligence
reports dated 21 and 23 Oct., have been received indicat-
ing that a landing in the sector of Split from the island of
^ Brae is planned for the last days of October. On 16 Oct.
™ five British were observed in Trogir. Group South has order-
ed Admiral, Adriatic to take any detense measures which are
possible with the existing limited facilities and has request'
ed Commander, Submarines, Mediterranean to investigate the
possibility of operations by submarine "453" for reconnaiss-
ance and attacks on the enemy (see teletype 1435).
Furthermore Group South has submitted to the following
situation estimate as requested from Admirsl,. Adriatic:
"I. Following the loss of several ships during the last
few days, it is not advi able at present to continue
traffic with large ships in the Albanian area up to and
including Dubrovnik. In the future also no large vessels
should proceed as long as enemy air and naval forces
have our coastal waters under continuous observation,
^ unless constant escort can be given and reconnaissance
flown. The enemy has complete freedom of action in this
area. An organized reporting service has obviously also
been built up already, so that the departure of ships
even at night is no longer any secret. The only possible
way of keeping traffic moving is to use a sufficient
number of small ships. This sould be possible in the
southern Adriatic as soon as unreliable Italians and
Albanians have been replaced by, or at least intersper-
sed with, German personnel who are not available yet.
Attempts have been made for weeks to speed this up, but
it depends on the transport situation.
2.. The area of the Dalmatian islands offers protection from
enemy naval forces. However, the insurgent situation
here also has led to serious losses. Traffic is only
possible at present with small vessels, since nearly all
ships are shelled despite
418 CONFIDENTIAL
28 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
the mopping-up operztions 30 far reported to be in
progress. The possibility of large ships operating
on the Dalmatian coast is dependent on the Islands being
mopped-up and enemy batteries silenced. It is doubtful
■whether transports can proceed -without hindrance even
if the islands have been cleared, unless the latter are
occupied by the Army and under constant control. Exper-
iences shew that the insurgents withdraw, but return
to the -islands if these are left unoccupied. Therefore
here too the use of large ships offers little success
at least for the present, not to mention the threat
from the air. The same refers to see transport and
bauxite shipments, especially since Ploce,. the main ,
• port for bauxite shipments, has meanwhile again fallen
into the hands of the insurgents.
3. No clear picture can be- gained here from the Deputy of
Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping about personnel
and materiel and the operational readiness of small.
' vessels for transport and supply purposes, despite
repeated endeavors to obtain this information.
4. Permission for carrying out urgent sea transports
from' Trieste to the west coast has been. granted at the
request of- German Naval Command, Italy along the
coastal route, taking the mine situation into account.
5. . Demands by Admiral, Adriatic arising from deyelopmentss
so far and. from the present situation will follow."
Group 3oUth reports further:
"a. The Army states that re-occupation by ' insurgents of
mopped-up islands must be expected, since our own
forces are not adequate'. f or permanent occupation.
b. Air. Force Command, Southeast advises that the planned
convoy escorts cannot be carried out, since the heavy
fighter squadron for this -purpose has not arrived.
Furthermore that, in view of the appearance of enemy
fighter forces over the Adriatic Sea and coastal waters
out dive-bomber and harassing bomber formations may not
operate south, of 44 degrees without fighter escort.
Such fighter .escort is, however, not availbble. For the
same reason no reconnaissance can be flown at present
by Air Commander, Croatia. ":'•''
c. This eliminates at present the only escort protection
available against enemy operations and Insurgent activ-
ity on the islands, which means that sea transport will
come to a
419 CONFIDENTIAL
?
28 Oct. 19^3 .
CONFIDENTIAL
standstill. The effects for all branches of the
Armed Forces are obvious .
d. It is requested that Air Force Command, Southeast
be supplied with adequate fighter, bomber and
reconnaissance forces and that an effective anti-
aircraft defense be built up on the Adriatic
coast. "
Army Group B has requested information From Naval Shore
Commander, North Adriatic in connection -with the planned
mopping-up operations on the islands of Krk, Cherso and
Lussino on the following points:
a. Available transports for the transfer of two
• to three infantry battalions, one light artill-
ery battalion, one assault-gun battery c
b. The possibility of escort.
c. Suitable ports of embarkation.
d. Most suitable landing places.
e. Enemy batteries known to be on Krk.
(See teletype 1935).
Air Force General Staff requests Naval Staff urgently to
instruct German Naval Command, Italy to assign at once to the
2nd Air Force four captured Italian vessels suitable as
sea -res cue boats.
(See teletype 1030).
♦ The matter will be dealt with further by Quartermaster .
Division.
b. Aegean Sea :
Enemy Situation:
Our air reconnaissance sighted at 1024 125 miles
northwest of Alexandria 4 ships, presumably destroyers,
on course 160 degrees and 1325 40 miles souths outness t
of Castell Rosso a convoy consisting of 3 merchantmen
on course 300 degrees. A report has already been made about
the successful attack carried out on this group. Between
1350 and 1418 an unidentified shipping target was located
12 miles west of Crete on southerly course.
At 2030: on 6 Oct. a submarine sank' an auxiliary sailing 1
vessel 23 miles northeast of Andros .
On the morning of 27 Oct. one enemy plane wa3 shot down by
anti-aircraft guns over Kos .
..../.:. -420- CONFIDENTIAL
28 Oct. 19^ , . • CONFIDENTIAL
Own Situation:
Submarine chase on 28 Oct. northwest of Naxos was
discontinued, as no more locations were made. A small oil
trace was still visible. The steamer INGEBORG and one armed
fishing vessel were transferred from Syra to Naxos . A customs
launch from Piraeus is to join this convoy and it will then
sail in the evening for Kalymnos, via Candie and south of
Stampalia, in order to disembark troops.
At midnight the steamer GERDA TOFT, with 18 combined oper-
ations assault craft on deck, is to sail from Piraeus to
Lavrion together with submarine chaser "2102". Naval Artil-
lery lighter MAL "12" will also he sent to Labrion from
Chalkis, in order to take troops and equipment for special
operation Samos (operation "Zwischenspiel" ) . Departure
i*s scheduled for 1600 on 29 Oct. from Panormos Bay (Mykonos ) .
Operation "Zwischenspiel" is to start on J>Q or J>1 Oct.
The DRACHE carried out a minelaying operation in the Gulf
of Salonika during the night of 27 Oct.
Naval landing craft F "370" with 200 survivors from Milos
arrived at Piraeus. Motor tanker MT "3", so far held at Istan-
bul, iilll sail on 29 Oct. for Mudros.
c. Black Sea:
Enemy Situation':
According to radio intelligence, there was a
submarine at 1251 off Cape Tarchentskuski and a destroyer off
the cnetral Caucasian coast at 1500. In the evening air raids
were carried out on Sevastopol and Eupatoria.
: Own Situation: "
A motor minesweeper group with three naval
landing craft on passage from Sevastopol to Feodosiya • was
forced by bad weather to put in to Balakaava. Naval landing
era t F "135" ran gground off Feodosiya, while returning
from patrol line. Mines weeping and convoy operations off the
Crimean coast had to be interrupted owing to weather con-
ditions. Patrol lines were not taken up during the night
of 28 Oct.
The moles of Kerch have been demolished. The town is under
enemy gunfire. .
Group South transmitted In the evening the following report
from Admiral, Black Sea:
421 CONFIDENTIAL
•
«
28 Oct, 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
"I. Genichesk -will be evacuated on 29 Oct.
2. The naval landing craft at Genichesk -will leave on
29 Oct. for Kerch and should pass the northern part
of the Strait of Kerch during the night of 29' 'Oct.
3. The five naval artillery lighters cannot be trans-
ferred under present weather conditions owing to
unseaworthiness increased by damage to their hulls
and contition of engines. These boats were already
partially swamped in seaway 2-3 during their last
operation. Their 8.8 cm, and 2 cm. guns will be
put aboard naval landing craft. The hulls < will be
blown up."
Naval Staff passed this report on to Armed Forces High
Command, Operations Staff, N vy, Commander in Chief , Air
Force, Operations Staff, Naval Laiison and Army General
Staff, Naval Liaison.
The measurres seem to be premature, in view of the assess-
ment of the situation at the Fuehrer Headquatters . Chief,
Naval Staff will be asked to decide whether intervention is
considered advisable.
According to 'a report from Group South, defense of the
Crimean coast .will be provided by:
£• In the Sea of Asov the 5 naval artillery lighters
stationed at Genichesk. Four naval landing craft ■•and
harbor defense boats will be in patrol line nightly be-
tween Ostroy - Birvutshi and Tchokrak. Furthermore,
reconnaissance line off Arabatskaya is planned, depend-
ing on the' enemy situation. -.
2. In the Strait of Kerch nightly patrol line with the
4 naval landing craft and- harbor defense boats remaining
there .
3. In the Black Sea: - ■; -
a. 4 to 6 naval landing craft of the 3rd Landing
Flotilla transferred to Feodosiya will nightly
take up patrol line from Cape Chauda to Kysaul.
It is planned to increase the number of boats.'
Furthermore, patrol line off the south const
of the Crimea west of Feodosiya .
b. The 1st PT Boat Flotilla and the Crimean group
of the 3rd Motor Minesweeper Flotilla will take
up reconnaissance line a gins t en enemy landing
operation only when certain information indicates
imminent attacks, in order to carry out offensive
operations against eneny naval forces if possible in
conjunction with night reconnaissance planes.
422 CONFIDENTIAL
28 Oct. 1945 CONFIDENTIAL
c. Attacks on enemy forces which are not detected
until landing:-'
- aa: By naval landing craft in patrol line and
lying at Feodosiya.
bb: By boats of the 1st PT Beat Flotilla -which will
be kept in immediate readiness during darkness
in Ivanbaba, unless out on operation against
the 'enemy' landing fleet.
G. The following are- at present available for the coast
end southern Crimea: 8 naval landing craft at
Feodosiya, 5 PT boats at Ivanbaba and, probably
from 29 Oct., 3 motor minesweepers.
©.. Furthernore barrage sections "S 71" and "S 72"
have been laid in Feodosiya Bay as protection,
against landings. These will be supplemented
probably on 28 Oct. by barrage-section S "73"
Subsequently mining is planned of Koktebel .
Bayand Baracken Bay (west and east of Ivanbaba)
which are suitable for landings. (See teletype
1430).
Furthermore Group South advises Naval. Staff, for information.
of the following instructions to Admiral, Aegean:
"I. The steamers SANTA FE, JOH. MAERSK and SONJA pre to
be transferred ts quickly as possible to the Black Sea
for a special operation. . Ports of destination will.
..follow. Date of sailing readiness to be reported.
2. The three Bulgarian steamers intended for the Aegean
Sea will be sent as early as possible so. tha:.t the
withdrawal, from there of ■ the three steamers of-
9,246 GRT will shortly be made up by the Bulgarian
vessels and five auxiliary sailing vessels, totaling
about 9,500 GRT." (see teletype 1425)..
IX. Situation East -Asia :
Nothing special to report.
#•*•*■**••*■*#•■**#■■**
423 '" CONFIDENTIAL
29 Oct. 19^5 CONFIDENTIAL
Items of Political Importance
Nothing special .to. report.
•
*
Conference on the Situation .with Chief, Naval Staff
1 . Army Situation:
The Fuehrer has issued the folio-wing directive to'.
Army Groups A and South:
"I. I have, brought up divisons- to the eastern front from
the south and vest, in order so smash the enemy forces
which crossed the Dnieper below Kremenchug by means of
a combined counter attack, which will be possible on
about 10 Nov. This attack will bring about a decisive .
turn in the situation for the entire southern sector
of the front.
2. The -aim. of further fighting until 10 Nov. must therefore
be to achieve at. all costs the necessary" conditions
for the successful completion of this intended counter-
attack, Any crises must be borne until then.
3. The necessary conditions for the attack 'are:
a. The' 1st Tank Army must hold its position- in the' .;
projecting bend of the Dnieper river until the ;
start of the attack and any withdraw only locally
and f absolutely necessary. Only thus will it be
possible to prevent the enemy extending his break-
through on the western bank of the Dnieper too,,
much and only this will the forces provided for the
counter-attack suffice for a successful completion
'of their task.
b. Army Group A must protect the southern flank of the
1st Tank Army in such a way that any threat to the
.rear of this Army to the north accoss the Dnieper
.••is avoided at all costs. The 6th Army must therefore
;• ',„\ hold'as long as possible the positions which it plans
•• ;tb. occupy during the night of 28 Oct. Should this,
however, no longer be possible a retreat, step by
/ ^step, to the line Gromovka-east of Beris lav-Dnieper-
Nikopol .bridgehead Is permissable
^2k CONFIDENTAIL
29 00t.l9 i l3 CONFIDENTIAL
but the northern wing must definitely hold its
position at the northern outskirts of Belenkoye*
Communications to the Crimea via the Perekop Isth-
mus must be kept open. The' Genichesk and Chongar
passes are to be closed. If today's attack of
the 40th Tank Corps effects a complete break-
through, a temporary relief attack by this tank
corps from the area of Nikopol is planned.
r. As regards evacuation of the Crimea my former decision
rema ins unchanged . "
For copy of this directive as per l/Skl 3221/43 Gkdos . Chefs,
see War Diary, Part C, Vol. XlVa .
On 28 Oct. fighting became lively in the central sector of
the eastern front. The situation is generally under control.
In the area of Nevel the enemy seems to be attempting a
further advance to the west.
Reports from the Italian front speak of a specially favorable
situation as regards our tanks and assault guns. ■
II. Air Commander, Atlantic Coast has asked that Commander
in Chief, Navy request further construction of BV 222 and
FW 200 typos of planes -Chief , Naval Staff does not intent
to intervene in the Air Force construction program. He is,
however, willing to intercede for further delivery to Air
Commander, Atlantic Coast of any planes of these types which
are still available or will become available in the interests
of naval warfare.
Ill* Report by Chief, Operations Branch, Operations Division
a. The enemy situation in Northern Waters proves that
our air reconnaissance is inadequate. We are unaware
of actual enemy movements . (Compare War Diary 28
Oct.)
Chief, Naval Staff ordered that a report to this
effect be submitted to Armed Forces High Command,
Operations Staff. He furthermore ordered consider-
ation as to how the SCHARNHORST and destroyer are
to operate should the enemy convoy traffic be re-
sumed. In addition investigations should be made as
to whether an increased number of submarines could
be supplied to Commander, Subnerines, Norway. Chief,
Naval Staff stated in this connection that the
practical effects of scientific research on
^25 CONFIDENTIAL
•
*
29 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL
location have so far been unsatisfactory.
Despite the "Naxos" and "Wanze" sets .the submarines
are nova days intercepted by enemy planes at night
completely by surprise.
b. Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff has issued
the following directive with regard to Denmark :
"I. The -withdrawal of a considerable number of very sea-
worthy landing craft from the Mediterranean to
England, in conjunction with the political pressure'
exercised by Moscow on the British and Americans,
make the possibility of a landing operation again-
st Western Europe even in winter time, appear much
more likely than before. The western theater is in
a constant state of defense readiness, because of
continuous activity there, whereas our troops in
. Denmark feel themselves to be more occupation forces
than combat troops.
2. Denmark, however, now becomes the foremost of the
'. countries threatened by an enemy landing. The ■ .:
occupation of Jutland by the enemy would'h^ve
strategic and political consequences of the first
magnitude. Norway would then be entirely cut off
from supplies, communication with Sweden established
and the- enemy Air Force' would have .supremacy in the
Baltic and North Seas. - .
By order of the Fuehrer, Armed Forces High Command
will therefore issue detailed instructions in case
of an enemy landing operation In Denmark.
3. First of all it is, however, necessary that the
shifting forces as ordered or planned by Commander,
German Armed Forces, Denmark, be carried out as
quickly as possible' (assembly of the 20th Air Force
Infantry Division, transfer to the coast of the
160th Division). All other measures which 'are still
possible in order to strengthen' our defense should
be taken at once.. :
Furthermore, all operations staffs' should move to
the headquarters from which they will control
operations in case of an enemy landing.
CONFIDENTIAL
-426-
29 Oct. 1943 C ONFIDENTIAL
The Fuehrer expects that Denmark -will Immediately
be put into highest action readiness, rigorously
eliminating all peace-time conditions and comforts.
The measures taken are to he given in the daily
reports . "
c. Naval Staff considers the measures taken in
Genichesk by Admiral, Black Sen to be premature
(See War Diary 28 Oct.) Chief, Naval Staff is of
the same opinion. He personally telephoned to
Admiral, Fuehrer Headquarters and Chief, Army
General Staff, advising them of his opinion and
asked the latter to postpone the evacuation of
Genichesk if possible, until -weather conditions
permit withdrawal of the five unsea worthy naval
artillery lighters. Chief, Army General Staff
approved. A telephone inquiry, ordered at the
same time, to Admiral, Black Sea later unfortunate-
ly disclosed that the boats have already been
blown up. Genichesk has not been evacuated yet.
IV. Report by Deputy Chief, Naval Communications Division
about the difficulties of obtaining for the Navy a large
number of "Hohentwiel" sets from Air Force production, Since
all fighters will now be equipped with these sets, the Navy
will have to be satisfied at present with a smaller allotment
than requested.
v * Report by Chief, Naval Ordnance Division: The difficulties
of co-ordinating requirements of engineer personnel for
"Zaunkoenig" torpedo production and for research on location
are further Intensified through a relaxation in the reserved
occupation regulations for this personnel also, which seems
unavoidable in view of the tense manpower situation of the
Army.
VI. Report by Quartermaster General:
a. The Fuehrer has ordered:
The economic situation of our ally Rummania forbids
in general any further encroachment on Rumanian
territory by German troops, or supply and repair
installations. Exceptions are still subject to
my approval in each individual case. Where large
transfers become necessary in the southern sector in
the course of dispersal measures or withdrawals,
these are to be directed to Transnistria , the
Western Ukraine or Galicia.
427 CPNFIDENTIAL
*
29 Oct. 1945 CONFIDENTIAL
Chief of Staff, Naval Staff reports in this
connection that it will probably be impossible
to carry this our as far as the Navy is con-
cerned. It will be unavoidable to make increased
use of Constanta in view of the developments in
the Black Sea situation. A report will be made
to Armed Forces High Command to this effect.
Chief, Naval Staff concurred.
b. At least 50 days will be required for the teansfer
of each PT boat to the Black Sea by land and the
Danube. The bottle-neck is in the dockyard at Linz.
Possibilities of increasing the dockyard capacity.,
at Linz are under investigation. If necessary,
transfer of repair work on Black Sea vessels from
Linz to Rumanian and Bulgarian dockyard's may be
considered. The Danube estuary usually becomes
icebound on 3 Jan., but this year will probably
freeze up already at the end of December.
c * Q ua r terma s ter Genera 1 reported on the situation
regarding mine -exploding vessels.
VII. Report by Chief, Naval Intelligence Division:
A.. The Moscow conference seems to be progressing .
smoothly according to Information received. It is
stated that the Russians asked for a corridor
to the Aegean Sea, amongst other demands.
b. The statement made by the Swedish Prime' Minister
at closed session of the Swedish Parliament dealt
with:
aa . Negotiations by the Trade Unions in Stockholm
for a Rus so -Finnish arms t Ice.
bb. Cessation of convoy traffic.
cc. Cutting down of ore shipments to Germany.
dd. Maintenance of Sweden's neutral policy,
From a secret report of a Swedish diplomat from
Moscow it is learned that:
aa . Russian cone liation towards Germany is out
of question.
428 CONFIDENTIAL
29 Oct. 1943
CONFIDENTIAL
bb. The Russian food situation is tolerable.
cc. The Russian war economy is organized and run
along model lines.
Special Items
I. The tense personnel situation and the inadequate assign-
ments of personnel to the Navy by Armed Forces High Command
have made it necessary more than before to recruit for the
Navy volunteers from the Germanic countries, the Germanic
races in the West and Croatia in order to cover requirements.
This recruiting has so far been left to the Reichsfuehrer SS.
A Fuehrer decree now gives the Navy in future the same priority
rights as the Waff en SS in recruiting volunteers in these
countries „
High Command, Navy has therefore cone to an agreement with
the Recihsfuehrer SS with regard to the recruiting of such
volunteers, this agreement also containing the basic reg-
ulations on their treatment while serving in the German
Navy,
II. The Burea of Naval Armament, War Economy Branch states
in its special war economy report (No. 219/43 of 26 Oct.)
regarding the evacuation in the east, amongst other things:
"Evacuation prepared in the southern sector of the eastern
front could in the main not be carried out as planned,
owing to the unexpectedly rapid development in the situation.
Times allowed for the preparation and evacuation were constant-
ly changed and curtailed, so that the forces used for evac-
uation and salvage were Inadequate or the assembled goods
could not be evacuated owing to lack of loading space.
In particular large quantities of food had to be destroyer
or left behind, for Instance:
grain - about 1.3 million tons
oil seeds about 0.3 - 0.4 million tons.
From livestock amounting to two million head of cattle in
the area of War Economy Inspectorate, South only 0.3 million
could be moved back in herds.
429 CONFIDENTIAL
♦
29 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL
On the other hand, removel of agricultural machinery and
implements of the MTS (Machine Tractor Stetion) -was success-
ful. More than ^00 trains or about 10,000 car loads were
removed, -which will be a help in considerable intensifying
agriculture in the Western. Ukraine. In the industrial sector
about 5,000 car loads of economic goods have been evacuated,
mostly dismantled machinery and equipment from factories pro-
vided for the "Ivan" program. Valuable motors and transform-
ers that vere ready for shipment had to be demolished owing
to lack of loading space.
Demolition of industrial plants hss been almost complete and :.
In most cases so extensive that any reconstruction will be
more difficult than the ■building up of new industry. The
enemy will therefore be unable to start up industry in the
evacuated areas for quite some time , For instance the coal :
mines in operation in the Donetz area, which produced already
480,000 tons in August, have been rendered useless by dis-
mantling Important machinery and through demolition. Moreover
it is to be expected that the mines will soon be flooded
owing to the lack of electric power. The plants producing and
treating iron were also demolished effectively, apart from
those in Taganrog. Evacuation of manpower could not be carried
out to the extent planned; at the most 400,000 persons crossed
the Dnieper, including one third fit for work.
Furthermore, partisan activity increased considerably while
evacuation was under way. ...
Evacuation of economic goods In the area of War Economy
Inspectorate, Center was also hampered by a strong partisan
movement which is already described as "the beginning of a
national rising."
III. Armed Forces High Command, Special Staff for Mercantile
and Economic Warfare has submitted copy of a memorandum
which vice Admiral Abe has handed the Recihsmarscha 11 re-
garding the Japanese request that we ceconsider the import-
ance of an air communication between Europe and Asia in the
interests of joint warfare and that every' attempt be made
to establish such a service. In this memorandum Vice Admiral
Abe pointed out, amongst other things, that Japan is con-
tributing "a part" of her operational submarines for traffic
and transport between Asia and Europe.
Naval Staff is of the opinion that very much more cnuld be
done in this respect.
^3° CONFIDENTIAL
29 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIAL
Situation 29 Oct .
I . War in Foregin Waters '
I.. Enemy Situation:
According to intelligence report of 16 Oct. from
Lisbon, the United States and Great Britain are said to have
requested that the Cape Verde Islands be occupied by Brazilian
troops. The Portuguese Government has agreed. The United States
plan to construct naval and air bases on the Cape Verde
Islands for the protection of shipping between Brazil and
the Congo river.
2. Own Situation:
Np thing special to report.
II. Situation West Area
1. Enemy Situation:
Over the Bay of Biscay during the day and the- •
night of 29 Oct. reconnaissance of remarkably uniform
intensity by 62 planes was observed. The large northbound
convoy which is estimated to be fbout 4 00 miles west of
Cape Finnisterre was not located again by our air recon-
naissance today.
Unidentified targets were located in the Channel between
0905 and 0945 south of Dover, from 0960 (?) to 1006 west
of Dunkirk and from 1905 until past midnight between Dunkirk
and Boulogne.
On 28 Oct. radar stations on the coast of Brittany located
between 2000 and 2200 many unidentified targets in the
area where the 4th Torpedo- Boat Flotilla had an engagement
with the enemy on. 25 Oct. and north thereof up to the lat-
itude of Alderney. At the same time gunfire at sea was seen
and heard. It is quite possible that enemy forces were shell-
ing each other, since none of our naval forces were there.
The weather observatory considers weather phenomena to be
unlikely.
2. Own Situation:
)0
Atlantic Coast:
Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West pirns to introduee
431 CONFIDENTIAL
•
29 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIA L
some new outer routes in the Bay of Bis cry, as it must
be assumed that present routes have become known through
the CAGNI. ■
Two ground mines were swept off Brest and one off St. Nazaire.
Between 1127 and II58 eleven Typhoons made a dive attack on
the airfield ot Brest-North, where slight damage was sustained.
Channel Coast:
PT boat S "100" temporarily ran aground at Cape d'Antifer
while en route from Cherbourg to Boulogne. PT boat S "141"
arrived at Le Havre at 1015 and PT boat S "100" at 1555-
At 11^5 fishery patrol boat FBO "23" struck a mine and sank
two miles north of Gravelines The crew of five is missing.
Twenty-six mines were swept in the area of Dunkirk and two
in the area of Lezardrieux,
Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West hopes to have the mine
situation off Dunkirk in hand shortly.
III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters
North Sea :
Sweeping of routes and minesweeping operations were
carried out by strong forces during the day but had to be
partially discontinued during the night of 29 Oct. owing
to fog. Four mines were swept.
Naval Command, North endorses the views of Commanding
Admiral, Defenses, ~North states on 28 Oct. regarding re-
connaissance of the Heligoland Bight. Naval Command, North
is furthermore of the opinion that continuous air patrol of
the "West Wall" barrages should be possible without any
extra forces if the area is flown over regularly once by
daytime and once by night. Possibilities of carrying out
night reconnaissance, which is especially important during
the long winter nights, are at present under investigation.
Naval Command, North urges similar investigations for the
area of the 5th Air Force. (See teletype 1533).
432 CONFIDENTIAL
29 Oct. 1943 C ONFIDENTIAL
Norway, Northern Waters :
1. Enemy Situation:
Over the North Sea 19 planes were detected on operation
in the morning and- 7 later on. The center of reconnaissance
activity was the sea area between Northern Scotland and the
Faroes. Our air reconnaissance sighted: at-1150 in;. AW- 2553
(25 miles east of Svatoi Nos ) 4 destroyers proceeding in
line ahead on course 120 degrees; at 1240 2 destroyers in
AW: -2237 on course 220 degrees; at 1515 in AC 8981 (20 miles
ea : st of Teriberski) a unit of warships; consisting" of 1
large, 5 medium-sized and 6 small vessels /.on" course 330
degrees. The types of these ships were not ascertained as
darkness was setting In. Whether this Is the same unit as
the. one on 28 Oct. cannot be said until further evaluation
has been made of photographic reconnaissance. On 28 Oct.
one enemy plane was reported over the Petsamo area and dur-
ing the night another one between Sogne and Hardanger Fjords.
2. Own Situation:
In the area of Naval Command, Norway 36 ships were
escorted north and 23 south. Altogether -25 ships were delayed
owing to shortage of escorts.
Group "Katharine" entered the skerries at 0349 on its home-
ward passage. 'Admiral, Northern Waters plans to repeat this
opera .tionas soon as:
a. Evaluation of our air reconnaissance gives us
an insight into the enemy situation,
b. the uncertain weather again becomes favorable.
On 12 Oct. the Naval "Command, Norway expressed to the
Quartermaster Division its belief that the best solution for
strengthening Alta would be to provide some PT boats (even
of older type) while the TIRPITZ is out of action readiness.
The Task Force supports this -recommendation and proposes that
a PT Boat Training Flotilla be transferred to Alta. It is
pointed out that Alta Fjord offers an ice-free exercise
area, long nights and protected: firing ranges.
Quartermaster Division fulls explained to Operations
Division the reasons for rejecting this plan. The task and
size of the PT Boat Flotilla require a number of buildings
on shore, besides numerous units afloat. Smooth working
of the training program does not allow the personnel aboard
to be separated from those in training ashore. Naval Staff
has therefore sent the following decision to Naval Command,
Norway, Commanding Admiral, Task Force and also to Group
North/Fleet for information:
-433- CONFIDENTIAL
29 Oct.. .1^3 CONFIDENTIAL '■
"Transfer of PT boats- to Alta Fjord while the TIRPITZ'ls out
of action readiness is . impossible. Boats from, operational-
flotillas cannot be made a vo liable for this purpose. Trans-
fer of PT Boat Training Flotilla is impossible. Withdrawal
to Alta Fjord of PT boats from the area- of -.Admiral, .West
Norwegian Coast Is left to your discretion. "
IV. Skage rrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea
1. Enemy Situatio n:
The Foreign Office submits the following reports
received from the Consul General at Gothenburg on 28 Oct. : •
"I. A British PT boat arrived this morning at Lysekil.
Great' danger of Norwegian ships putting out.
2. According to a reliable report, a British PT boat
arrived at Lysekil at 0900 on 28 Oct. She commenced at
once with the unloading of about 50 drums of about 50
kg. each, contents unknown. From 1500 loading started
of a large quantity of small, heavy and seemingly
valuable iron parts. At 2000 the boat was still at
Lysekil, loading having ceased. During- this months six
small cranes that are now being used for the first time
were erected in the harbor of Lysekil for no obvious
reason. At present there are about 100 police and
stevedores at Lysekil. Great danger of Norwegian ships
also putting out."
Both reports were immediately passed on by teletype to Group
North/Fleet, Naval .Command, Norway and Commanding Admiral,
Defenses, Baltic. ,
2. O wn Situation; .
Patrol in the Skagerrak for blockade -runners is
being carried out during the night by six boats in patrol
line from Skagen to Valderoebod via Halloey and three
minesweepers in AO 4415; during the day by patrol line
of six boats from AO 4428 to 4152 and three minesweepers
In patrol' line from AO 3625 to 3661.
Minesweeping operations in the Baltic Sea entrances were
carried out by 13 boats and in the Baltic Sea by 31 boats.
Nothing special to report from the areas of Commander,
Minesweepers, Baltic and Admiral, Batlic States.
-434- CONFIDENTIAL
29 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
According to a report from the Mining end Barrage Command,
Frederikshavn of 7 Oct. about 45 German EMC mines with
antenna firing and 0,5 m. mooring rope have been found cut in
the Skagerrak. Operations Division asked for the numbers,
which showed that most of the mines belong to barrages
"16 c" and "16 d" off the Skagerrsk end some to barrages
"6 a" and "25". As these mines were not detonated by the
enemy, it can be assumed that they were cut during a mine
reconnaissance operation at night. Systematic minesweeping
operations are not indicated. There may be some connection
with a boockade -break from Sweden. Extensive mine reconn-
aissance in preparation for a landing is, however, also
conceivable, this being indicated by two mines from barrage
"6 a" (off List.) and one mine from barrage "23" (off Bergen).
V. Merchant Shipping
Naval Staff has despatched the following directive
to German Naval Command, Italy and Group West:'
"Armed Firces High Command has approved the request of
the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping to return
to the French Government the large French Merchantmen .
which are unsiited for our purposes. The Reich Commissioner
will arrange formalities with the French Government and will
see to it that these ships are always at our disposal in
case we need them. German Naval Command, Italy and Group West
should take measures to prevent the ships deserting to the
enemy while being transferred end while laid up".
VI, Submarine Warfare
The operation by Group "Schill" against the northbound
convoy in BE has so far been without result. One of the
submarines only was able to obtain hydrophone bearings
on three to four steamers end one destroyer. Long-range
reconneissance of Air Commander, Atlantic Coast will try
to find out on 30 Oct. at dawn whether the enemy has
made any deviations. Group "Seigfried" reported nothing
but a few planes sighted.
Submarine U "218" has carried out the mine laying operation
off Trinidad.
-.
435 CONFIDENTIAL
29 Oct. 1945 CONFI DENTIAL
VII. Aerial Warfare
British Isles and Vicinity:
• •mm~ 1 1 ■■ — ■ ■ — ■■■ I L P 1 — II II I II I Ml' ' ■ ■ ■■ '* " "
The 3rd Air Force had 19 planes out on operation over
the vest area and 21 over the Mediterranean.
Air Commander, Atlantic Coast reported at 1110 a large oil
patch at position 420 miles -west of Cape Ortega 1, Otherwise
nothing special to report.
Mediterranean Theater :
The 2nd Air Force had 18 fighter-bombers, 35 fighters
and 11 reconnaissance planes out on operation and Air Force
Command, Southeast 7.1 bombers,- 10 fighters, 17 reconnaissance
planes and 18 transport planes,
In the Italian area only reconnaissance missions were carried
out. A Unit consisting of 1 light curiser and 3 destroyers
were attacked' by eleven of our bombers at 1315 South-southeast
of Castell Rosso. No exact observation of the result i-s
reported. At noon the enemy attacked Genoa with 60 - 80
Fortresses and Stirlings and, among other things, caused
heavy damage at the tank factory on Ansaldo harbor. One
Fortress was shot down by anti-aircraft guns-. One out of
twelve Spitfires which raided the airfield of Guidonia was
shot down by our fighters. No damage'was sustained during
the raid on the airfield of Grosseto* . Over the Army front
two planes were shot' down by Army anti-aircraft guns. About
30 fighters made a -sortie as far as Rome. In the Aegean Sea:
nine, planes attacked the island ofAmorgos. One of our
patrol vessels was sunk. Naval anti-aircraft guns and- fighters
each shot down one enemy plane. Twelve • planes attactked the
airfield of Candia . During the night' of 30 Oct. four reconn-
aissance planes were located over the Aegean Sea .
"' Eastern Front: ;
Photographic reconnaissance of the Black Sea establ-
ished in Tuapse', Ge lend zhik and Anapa 64 landing craft and
altogether 20 motor minesweepers and 19 PT boats. Minor enemy
forces'" attacked Sevastopol and Yalta during the night of 30
Oct.. ;; • • ...
The 5th Air Force; re onna is sane e activity. For evaluations
see Enemy Situation Northern Waters.
436 CONFIDENTIAL'
29 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENT IAL
VI I I . Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea
1 . Enemy Situation Medit er ranean;
A convoy of 52 merchantmen -with 1 destroyer and 2.
corvettes passed- through the Straits of Gibraltar westbound
at 1500 on 28 Oct.; 8 freighters and 1 escort vessel of this
convoy entered Gibraltar. The convoy was joined;.by 2 freighters
2 tankers and 4 escort vessels from this port, At 1800 on 28
Oct. 3 freighters in ballast and 1 French gunboat- left Gib-
raltar for the Mediterranean. During the night of 28 Oct. 1
DIDO class cruiser and 4 auxiliary curisers put in to
Gib tal tar -and I mine laying cruiser .' ', out.
Tho westbound convoy sighted by Cape Tres -Forces' at 1530
on 28 Oct. passed Ceuta on 0100 on 29 Oct. It consisted
of 22 ships, including several very large transports.
According to an intelligence report, altogether 40,000 men
have passed through Gibraltar for Italy since 21 Oct.
Alboran reported at 1800 on 28 Oct., at a distance of 35
miles north of the coast 1 battleship, 2 cruisers and other
vessels heading for the Atlantic.
No new observations are reported from the Italian sea area.
2 . O wn Situation Mediterranean:
The mine laying operation just starting off the
Italian east coast had to be postponed owing to weather
conditison. Five patrol vessels have been commissioned. at
Marseilles. Three of these boats developed engine trouble
while on transfer to Toulon. Three boats of the 7th PT Boat
Flotilla were sent out from Nettunia on a torpedo operation
in the Bay of Naples.
For report of German Naval Command, Italy on the loss of
the minelayer JUMINDA on 22 Oct. west of San Stefano see
teletype 0125. The body of Lt. Cdr. Brill was recovered
on 24 Oct. and buried at Snn Stefano on 28 Oct.
Group West reports that the assumption regarding the loss
of the PADUA In our own barrage south of Port de Bouc is up-
held, although the Captain of the steamer and members of the
creq are trying to shift the position of sinking to route
"Lowe". The Captain of this stealer had strict orders not
to proceed at night". The qccident was solely caused by negli-
gence. The route has again been opened to traffic (see teletype
0030).
The hospital ship AQUILEJA Arrived at Marseilles at 0200.
Submarine U "431" must be regarded as lost. This submarine
started on return passage to Toulon on 19 Oct. after her
great succes in CH 7496. She was spotted by an enemy plane
on 21 Oct. and has not reported although- called on twice
to do so - 437 CONFIDENTIAL
v
•
29 Oct. 1943 C ONFIDENTIAL _
Own submarine situation in the Mediterranean:
Total number 12 of which
at Toulon 4
at Pola : 3 out of war
readiness
in the Western Mediterranean: 1
on return passage: 2nd .
on passage to the Aegean Sea: 3rd
returned to Toulon, owing to damage: 4th
at Pola, ready for mine laying operation f
off Brindisi:5th
The next submarine at Toulon will not be ready to sail
before 13 Nov. •
The submarines at Pola have no "Zaunkoenig" torpedoes and
are therefoer unsuitable for operation in the Aegean Sea.
Owing to this situation only one submarine is available for
the Aegean Sea, since at least one must be left in the
Western Mediterranean where prospects of suscess are good. A
break-through the Sicilian Channel by further boats has
started.
Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy has been
advised accordingly.
German Naval. Command, Italy reports that following the'
new disposition of anti-aircraft guns by Army Group B,
only 18 heavy anti-aricraft batteries are left on tte
Ligurian coast from the border down to Piombino. This is
inadequate for protection of the ports.. This weakness is
also having its effect on the defense against sea targets.
This is all the more serious inasmuch as one division of
reserves has been withdrawn from the area of Army Group B.
3- Area Naval Group South:
a . Adriatic Sea:
The steamer MAMELLI arrived at Pola on 28 Oct. with
16 dead and 40 wounded aboard. On 29 Oct. the steamers
GIGLIOLA, BRUNNER and FITENGOOT left Sibenik for Zarn . Naval
Shore Commander, South Adriatic has transferred to Tirana.
b. Aegean Sea :
En emy Situation:
During the nl S ht of 28 Oct. the airfield of Mar-
itza on Rhodes was raided. At 0940 on 29 Oct. our air reconn-
aissance sighted 90 miles south of Caste 11 Rosso 1 cruiser
and 3 destroyers on northerly course and at 1245 4 destroy-
ers 38 miles southwest of Castell Rosso.
..-.438 CONFIDENTIAL
29 Oct. 1943. C ONFIDENTIAL
at O83O eight torpedo bombers attacked a submarine chaser
group out on operation south of Amorgos with bombs, torpedoes
and ma.chine-guns. At the same time torpedoes fired by the
submarine had to be avoided. Two of the attacking planes
were shot down. The submrrine was detected again by our air
reconnaissance at 1105 ten miles south of Amorgos. All
Available submarine -chasers have been ordered out.
An intelligence report from the beginning of Oct. states that
small sailing vessels flying the Turkish flag, but with Brit-
ish crews, are being used for combatting submarines between
Rhodes and Castel RRosso.
Own Situation ;
The steamer INGEBORG was torpedoed at OO56 west of
Stampalia and sunk. The customs cutter NIOI was torpedoed
at 0812 during rescue operations. Armed Fishing vessel KFK
"3" arrived at Stampalia with III survivors from the INGEBORG
abroad. Further survivors are still adrift on floats at the
scene of the disaster.
Nice infantry landing craft, on passage from Salonika to
Piraeus, were forced by bad weather to seek shelter off
shore.
c . Black Sea :
Enemy Situation:
Our air reconnaissance sighted at 0640 90 miles
wests oiithwest of Sucftum 1 destroyer, 2 guardboats and 1
motor on course 300 degrees. Destroyer "C" was probably
in the area of Sochi in the evening, according to radio
intelligence.
■ Own Situation:
NO PT boat operations were carried out during
the night of 28 Oct. owing to weather conditions. Patrol
lines were not taken up for the same reason.
The five naval artillery lighters lying at Genishesk have
been blown. up. The motor minesweeper group with three naval
landing craft has been transferred from Balaklava to Feod-
osiya for a minelaying operation.
Convoy Sevastopol - Constanta has been postponed for 24
hours because of weather conditions. Naval landing craft
MFP ,; 126" ran aground near Cape Khersonnes while evacu-
ating the field railway. Attempts to tow her off have so
far been unsuccessful.
Group South transmits a report from Admiral, Black Sea that
the 17th Army Command has withdrawn the order for a short-
term evacuation of personnel from the Crimea (code; word
"Michael 2"). The order for the evacuation of materiel (
2*39- • CONFIDENTIAL
50 Oct. 19^3 CONFIDENTIA L
(Code word"Michfiel" ) remains In force.
IX . Situation in East Asia :
Nothing special to report.
Items of Political Importance
According to Allied agency reports it seems as if the
Moscow talks have already led to an agreement. Ratification by
the Governments concerned -will not take long. In a statement to
the press Rossevelt said that the aims of the conference "were
lasting peace and the end of world aggression. It is generally
regarded as significant that Russia has become a partner in a
the large-scale political plans for a new order in Europe at
least in principle. If this is actually the case, a great weight
has been taken off the mind of the Western Powers and a polit-
ical success has been gained, estimation of which depends on
the extent of the concessions, probably in military. matters,
made to the Russians by the Americans and British. Our hopes
that political tension between our enemies might improve
our situation in a not too distant future may be frustrated
if present indications about the results of the conference
should prove correct. .
Noteworthy is the observation that British propaganda is be-
ginning to pay increased attention to the development of
the situation inside Germany. The description of conditions
in Germany given by exchanged prisoners of war plays an im-
portant part in this.
According to a report from a neutral (Swedish) source in
Finland, the Finnish Congress of Trade Unions is said to
have demanded in a declaration addressed to the Finnish
people that the Government do its utmost to gee out of the
war as soon as possible. .It is high time, it stated, that
thing be done in this direction. However, the country must be
put in a position to maintain good relations with all her
neightors .
Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff
I.. , . Army Situation :
The enemy has put up an extensive smoke screen in the
Strait of Kerch. It must be assumed that preparations for land-
ing are completed.
Our forces in the Nogai Steppe are at present retreating to
a line ten kilometers west of Genichesk - Berislay. An offen-
sive operation by us is underway northwest of Zaporozhe in
order to shorten the front.
^0 CONFIDENTIAL
30 Oct. 19^5
confidential
in the sector of the 9th Army fighting continued with vary-
ing success. Attacks carried out with a further intensificat-
ion of gunfire and repeated fourteen times during the day
were repulsed in the area west of Smolensk.
A new enemy attack is expected in the area of Nevel.
In Italy the "Barbara" line is in general occupied by our
forces .
The situation on the Dalmatian coast is still extreme ly
unsatisfactory. :
II. Chief of Staff, Naval Staff deems it necessary that
Group South and Admiral 1 , Black Sea be given specific
instructions by Naval Staff regarding the Crimea.
Chief, Naval Staff concurred. The teletype regarding this
makes reference to the instructions given by Naval Staff
on 28 Oct. and then continues as follows:
"Order for defense of the Crimea is confirmed.
Further air forces are being brought up to the
southern sector of the eastern front. The order to
Army Group A provides that critical situations must
be borne until the arrival of reinforcements, now on
their way, takes effect. Commanders must see to it
that uneasiness felt by the troops, which must be
assumed owing to the premature order for evacuation,
is removed and that the old fighting spirit is rest-
ored wherever it has been affected. Orders issued by
the Commanding General, Armed Forces for the evacuat-
ion of economic goods from the Crimea are not concern-
ed by this . "
III. The German Ambassador at Ankara has, on instructions,
attempted to obtain Turkish permission for eight to ten
naval landing craft, flying the merchant flag and carrying
civilian crews, to proceed from the Black Sea to the Aegean
Sea for the purpose of carrying supplies to the islands.
This request was finally rej.ected on 27 Oct. The Turkish
Foreign Minister took the opportunity to point out that
the previous pasoage caused strong protests from London and
Moscow and that these countries on their part had requested
permission for similar vessels to pass through. He therefore
took the German radio announcement that naval landing craft
are to be regarded as warships as the basis for a state-
ment to these two Powers that in future the passage of such
vessels
441 CONFIDENTIAL
30 Oct.. 19^3. CONFIDENTIAL
will no longer be allowed. This decision is not so un- *
favorable for us, he stated, inasmuch as he has agina
rejected the passage of enemy ships of types -which are-
much more troublesome than naval landing craft. In view
of Turkey's, extremely difficult situation as regards the
Straits she can take no risks or make any exceptions
to either side. (See also War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII ).
IV, Chief, Naval Ordnance Div is ion reported about the
effects of the elimanation of the Fuehrer's full protection
against conscription from the electrical Industry. Commander
in Chief, 'Navy cannot compy with the request- made by these
circles for personal intervention with the Fuehrer, sine
Minister Speer has already andertaken an unsuccessful attempt
in this direction. Should new aspects of the situation
arise, he would be willing to approach the Fuehrer once
more, together with Minister Speer, in view of the problem
of developing electric submarines. Commander in Chief, Navy
furthermore orderrd an investigation and report on the effects
of the. 8$ withdrawal from naval factories.
V. Quartermaster General reports that the Navy has been
requested by Chief, Air Force Geeeral Staff, to assist air. ■
Commander, Atlantic Coast with manpower in the construction
of airfields in Western France. Quartermaster Division draws
attention to the small controbution that the Navy could at
best make to the ^gignatic airfield construction project
of the Air Force. Moreover considerable . hesitation is
felt on principle to the fulfillment of this wish, as it
would create a precedent 'the consequences of • which cpnnot
be foreseen. The utmost that Quartermaster Division could
recommend is that the request for further allocation of
manpower by Air Force General Staff ve endorsed with the
Ministry, drawing attention to the Navy's interests in
air operations off the Atlantic Coast.
Chief, Naval Staff concurred with the opinion of Quarter-
master Division. ,.:'-
In a Highly Restricted Circle
VI. In view of the sinking of the steamer INGEBORG the
Fuehrer has .urged that more submarines be despateced to the
Aegean Sea. Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy
has meanwhile been informed of the submarine situation in
the Mediterranean (see War Diary 29 Oct.)
Chief, Naval Staff ordered that arrangements be made for the
despatch of a further submarine.
442 CONFIDENTIAL'
30 Oct. 1943 CONFI DENTIAL
Special Item s , ..'
I. The Fuehrer was Indignant about the report that the
five naval .artillery lighters at Genichesk were blown up,
according 'to' information received from Armed Forces High
Command, Operations Staff, Navy.
The Army has been ordered to make investigations regard-
omg the premature order, now canceled, for evacuation of
the Crimea and regarding the evacuation of Genichesk. The
Commander responsible has been called to the Fuehrer Head-
quarters. in order to vindicate himself.
Admiral, Black Sea was requested at 2045 by telephone to
submit a full report on the events and circumstances lead-
ing to the blowing-up of the boats.
II. In departmental discussions at the Naval (Ship) Constr
uction Division on 18 Oct. 194;? the question was raised by
Naval (Ship) Construction Division, regarding submarine type
XX B, whether Naval Staff cuuld accept a reduction of the
submarine's radius of action from 20,000 to 12,000 miles
In favor of a gain in cruising speed bj .two .knots (from 10
to 12 knots). Operations Division then advised Naval (Ship)
Construction Division that a cruising speed above ten knots
would be very welcome but that reduction of the action radius
is impossible. A radius of 12,000 miles is actually equal to
the shortest route between Bordeaux and Singapore, but in-
cludes no reserve and permits neither a deviation from the
shortest route, which must be possible to a great extent,
nor a. long patrol off one of the two ports of destination,
which must also be reckoned with. The possibility that the
Atlantic ports as well as Singapore might be closed to
the submarine and that she may have to. proceed to a Nor-
wegian port through the North Atlanic or to some other
Japanese base through the Sunda Strait must not be lost
sight of when considering the action radius. A radius of
20,000 miles is therefore indispensable.
III. Brief Report on the Enemj Situation No. 22/43 of
Naval Intelligence Division deals, amongst other' things ,
with the rights, referred. to as Facilities", accorded by
Portugal to our enemy:
1. Great Britain receives the right to use the airfield on
the island of Terceira which has been occupied by British
troops.
2. For use of the port of Horta of Fayal the restrictions
of the Hague Covenant of 190? have been waived for
Great. Britain and her Allies, i. e. enemy warships and
merchantmen may use the port of Horta as in peacetime.
443 CONFIDENTIAL
30 Oct. 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
Supplies for enemy forces on the Azores will be
carried exclusively by enemy ships.
Portugal retains full sovereign rights over the Azores
except for tee airfield of Terceira .
The report furthermore deals -with Italian submarine losses,
said to amount to 84 boats, and with the laying down of
two of the three projected 45,000 ton U. S. aircraft carriers
■which are to be completed in little more than a year.
Copy as per l/Skl 33184/43 gen. in War Diary, Part D "Data
on the Enemy Situation" t
Naval Intelligence Division also submits a statement, com-
piled from captured orders, of individual evaluations on the
operations by naval forces and the landing fleet during the
landing at Algiers on 8 Nov. 1942. As the documents captured
are incomplete a survey of the -whole plan is impossible.
Copy as per l/Skl 33136/43 gen. in W^r Diary, Part D,. "Eval-
uation of Intelligence on Foreign Navies" .
IV. A summary of ■ enemy intelligence gained by radio dec-
iphering and radio intelligence from 18 to 24 Oct, is
contained in Radio Monitoring Report No. 43/43.
See especially pages 4 and 5 regarding the convoy battle
of ONS 20, -with diagram, and page 8 regarding the caution
shown by the enemy Air Force over the inner Bay of Biscay
owing to the danger from our own fighters.
Situation 30 Oct,
I. War in Fore-gin Waters
1. Enemy Situation:
Nothing special to report.
2. Own Situation:
The Naval Attache in Tokyo reports that there are
no objections to the announcement within the Navy of the
loss of Ship
444 CONFIDENTIAL
30 Oct. 1943 C QfliFIDENT i AL
"28". It was impossible to avoid the loss becoming known to
the Japanese public and the German community through the
landing of survivors at different points.*, their accommod-
ation in hotels end transfer to the "Hakoke" Nav^l Camp.
It must therefore be assumed that the enemy will soon receive
information through neutrals and Russians. The survivors are
moreover certain that they saw the submarine take prisoners
aboard.
Furthermore, the Naval Attache in Tokyo gave the names of
survivors of Ship "28" - 5 officer, 2 senior noncommissioned
officer, 45 noncommissioned officer and 59 seaman, altogeth-
er 111 men. One officer, 4 noncommissioned off